日美同盟的历史演变及其对亚太安全的影响

日美同盟在二战后大致经历了"威权同盟"、"互助同盟"和"伙伴同盟"三个阶段,这一同盟之所以能够长期存在并不断发展,究其原因,是双方在亚太地区甚至全球范围内有不断交迭和发展变化的共同战略利益.同盟中的美日两国既相互倚重,又彼此制约,同盟性质也随国际形势的变化不断发生着嬗变.21世纪,随着美国亚太战略的不断调整和日本的日益强大,日美同盟将对亚太格局的形成与塑造产生重要影响.     

美日同盟:面向21世纪的全面调整

九一一事件以来,美日对双边同盟进行了新一轮调整,美日同盟的调整和演变受一系列因素影响,并对日本的安全政策走向、东亚地区安全环境产生重大而深远的影响。     

美国单边主义笼罩下西方同盟体系的嬗变--九一一后日美同盟与德美同盟的比较研究

九一一后,在美国国内及其主要盟友的支持下,美国支配和塑造世界政治的能力骤然上升到近年来从未有的高度。但随着时间的推移及美国霸权主义甚嚣尘上,西方同盟体系已经和正在发生着重大变化,美国支配世界的能力也大不如前。本文选取美日、美德两个同盟为案例进行比较研究,以期探讨这一变化的深层原因。文章认为,不同的文化背景、历史经历、国际环境和国内政治因素,最终导致日、德两国对西方同盟体系采取不同的政策。随着世界政治经济的发展,西方同盟体系必将发生进一步分化,美国的霸权也决非没有界限。     

日本民主党政权下日美同盟调整的背景及动向

2009年，日本民主党上台执政，日关同盟关系随之产生变化，日美在一系列双边及多边问题上暴露出明显的分歧和斗争，日美同盟之所以呈现出斗争的态势是基于日美双方不同甚至对立的利益考量，同时日美在应对共同的威胁时又表现出彼此拉近和合作的一面。未来，日美同盟仍将继续发展，影响东亚乃至亚太地区局势稳定和地区合作进程。     

冲绳基地战略价值的变化与美日同盟的转型CSSCI

冲绳美军基地是美日同盟的重要支柱,也是美国在西太平洋维持军事优势的战略要地。在70多年来的历史中,冲绳基地及其驻军的规模、结构和任务经历了重要的变化,但其战略价值始终受到重视。围绕冲绳基地的争议集中于海军陆战队,美国计划将其大部移驻关岛等地,日本则担心此举会削弱美军威慑力。近年来,美国的全球战略先后转向反恐战争和大国竞争,其基地政策随之走向分散化、小型化,冲绳基地的战略价值和美日同盟的分工也由此发生重大变化。当前和未来一段时间,应对所谓导弹威胁是美军的首要关切,美日会否在冲绳部署弹道导弹和巡航导弹,将对地区安全形势产生重要影响。     

非对称同盟内部矛盾与美菲关系的转折——以菲律宾对美国政策变化为主线

力量不对称的同盟是当今世界诸多双边或多边同盟的常态,而非对称同盟中更弱小的一方基于有限实力和安全需求的考虑,通常都会依赖同盟大国的保护,为此在对外政策中更多地选择追随同盟大国的行为.然而,国际政治的历史和现实却一再表明,非对称同盟中的小国也可能表现出与常规认知相反的、针对其更强大盟友的外交疏离行为,也即在不对称同盟内部可能存在比常规矛盾更加深刻的问题.本文从盟友之间的战略分歧、收益落差及需求差异,盟国自身的内政变化,以及同盟外部威胁的弱化三个层面分析非对称同盟内小国对大国的"外交疏离"现象,并结合美国与菲律宾同盟关系的调整及美菲在南海问题中的互动,进一步分析上述三个层面影响要素的解释能力,指出美菲关系在克服这些矛盾时所面临的挑战,以及此类同盟内部矛盾得以缓和与化解的条件.     

论日美同盟建立和初期发展中的东南亚因素

冷战时期,日美同盟是美国在亚太地区应对所谓共产主义威胁的最重要也最为核心的双边同盟。在日美同盟建立和初期发展的过程中,东南亚因素是重大影响因素,体现在三个方面:第一,东南亚是确保日本不倒向共产主义阵营和日美同盟安全的关键地区;第二,日美同盟是包括美国东南亚同盟体系在内的亚太同盟体系的核心;第三,日本发挥其盟友作用,配合美国推进东南亚地区的经济开发,从“软”方面确保东南亚“自由世界”的安全,遏制共产主义在东南亚的扩张。     

外交身份框架调整影响下的德国对美同盟政策变化

在德美同盟中，德国并非完全追随美国，其对外政策呈现出在“战略协调”与“外交对抗”之间动态变化的特点。根据本体安全理论，德国动态调整对美同盟政策的动力机制源自于德国维护其“文明国家”“西方国家”和“正常大国”复合型外交身份稳定性的需要。德国在“战略协调”和“外交对抗”之间的策略选择，取决于美国外交政策对德国复合外交身份稳定性的冲击程度。当美国对外政策调整严重威胁到德国外交身份的稳定性时，本体安全机制会推动德国调整其对外身份的叙事结构，指导德国采用外交对抗或战略平衡的方式应对由此导致的身份危机。不过，德国的对美政策调整被限定在外交身份框架的范围之内，因而两国间的分歧不会造成德美同盟关系的根本性破裂。     

美日同盟的新一轮强化:内容、动因及前景

2015年4月底,美国和日本签署新版《美日防卫合作指针》,这是冷战后美日同盟强化的一个标志性节点。美日不仅更新了同盟的主要目标,更显著拓展了两国安全合作的范围和层次。美日战略目标和政策方针高度契合是美日同盟强化的主要原因。奥巴马政府推行的"亚太再平衡"战略与安倍政权鼓吹的"积极和平主义"需要两国相互配合与支持,这使新形势下强化美日同盟具有必然性和稳定性。然而,美日两国的国家利益和政策导向也在一些关键领域存在分歧。     

美韩同盟再定义与韩国的战略选择:进程与争论

本文系统总结了自2002年底以来美韩同盟再定义的磋商过程,以及双方在驻韩美军基地调整、同盟内部军事安全角色分工、同盟的未来战略构想等三大焦点问题上所取得的实质性进展,认为通过区域扩展和内涵扩展的路径选择,美韩同盟再定义已基本实现利益平衡与威胁平衡的双重目标。通过对美韩全球性战略同盟关系的定位与确认,韩国也由此结束了数年来激烈的外交方向辩论,再度确立了中近期亲美的结盟外交路线,然而有关韩国对外战略的争论不会就此终结。     

Never Say Never: Considerations about the Possibility of Australia Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nuclear program. These conditions interact with Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the technological and industrial feasibility of “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons postures, respectively. The only Australian nuclear posture that does not lack credibility in light of all these factors is the use of “tactical” weapons to deter major landings on the Australian mainland.     

The Power of Prestige: Explaining China’s Nuclear Weapons Decisions

ABSTRACT

The majority of the nuclear proliferation literature is dedicated to understanding why states acquire nuclear weapons. While this question remains important, it is also advantageous to push beyond this inquiry to ask what motivates a state’s nuclear decisions after acquisition. Recent research indicates that a state’s nuclear force structure is heavily influenced by its threat environment. But what explains decisions relating to specific nuclear weapon systems? If security is a sufficient explanatory variable, then why would a state pursue nuclear weapons with high development and production costs but relatively low security gains? Using China as a case study, this article explores the power of prestige in explaining such decisions.     

US Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Order: An Australian Perspective

Abstract

This article addresses the question of how US extended nuclear deterrence might endure in a shifting Asia-Pacific where the traditional nuclear order underpinning the credibility of US security guarantees is deteriorating. The Australian case study demonstrates how periods of nuclear order and disorder can inform a state's attitudes toward the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence. Australia's interest in a nuclear weapons capability from 1956 to 1972 was symptomatic of a period of nuclear disorder. This interest declined from the early 1970s due to changes in both the global and regional environments where the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons was relatively contained. This emerging, recognizable nuclear order diminished the interest in an indigenous nuclear weapons capability and led Canberra to rely on US extended nuclear deterrence. This order has remained fairly robust for more than 30 years. However, beyond 2012, we may yet witness a breakdown in this order. This will generate a much greater interest by US allies in the operational aspects of US extended nuclear deterrence.     

Perceptions toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: Findings from a public opinion survey

Due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons, North Korea’s nuclear weapons test represents a serious security threat to East Asia as well as a global risk. Many sources, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, argue that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses a security threat to the United States because missiles fired from North Korea could reach Hawaii or Alaska. Against this backdrop, however, no empirical research analyzing how much the ordinary American feels threatened by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been conducted. This paper examines American public opinion toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program based on a regional survey conducted in Hawaii during the summer of 2005. The research compares and evaluates through various quantitative research methods, to what extent the respondents’ various demographic, political, and socioeconomic backgrounds seem to have divergently influenced the perception of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In the evaluation of the majority of people in Hawaii, North Korea is pursuing the nuclear weapons program to enhance their national prestige and for self-defense purposes. Many respondents proposed multilateral negotiation as a desirable settlement method for managing North Korea’s nuclear program.     

2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference

The 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that was recently held in New York may have closed with a consensus on an "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT of 1968, but it did not discuss how this would be achieved. Ryukichi Imai, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), Tokyo, argues in this article that despite the diplomatic success of the 2000 Review Conference, the results are in reality less satisfactory: the United States and Russia continue to conduct their business with a lack of transparency; there was no discussion of the current dangers of proliferation; and no agenda for the future was set, allowing the nuclear threat to remain, particularly in North East Asia.     

POLICIES OF LAST RESORT FOR DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

This paper analyzes the policy remedies for dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. After six nuclear tests and three recent successful ICBM tests, North Korea is close to miniaturizing nuclear warheads and establishing a reliable delivery system, thus achieving a much-feared nuclear weapons capability. In defiance of the extraordinarily tough U.N. Security Council resolutions, Pyongyang persists in developing nuclear weapons. North Korea's nuclear weapons program already has exceeded the strategic patience, of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Harsher policy options to deal with the DPRK nuclear weapons are imperative. Several drastic options, including severe sanctions, preventive bombing, nuclear armament of South Korea, are evaluated in the final round of engagement policy on guaranteeing nonaggression and a peace agreement with Pyongyang.     

Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Iranian Rivalry in the Post Revolutionary Era

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led to a set of major shifts in the Middle East and an anti-Israeli stance became a central approach of the revolutionaries. Up to 1979, however, Tel Aviv had a close relationship with Tehran whose enmity with its Arab neighbours was anchored in a historical struggle for regional supremacy. Israel has remained an enemy of Islam and the Muslims for the revolutionary leaders and as Iran's power grew Israel's anxiety increased accordingly. A new division of power in the region and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons led to a direct rivalry between Iran and Israel and consequently many Israelis have come to regard Iran and its nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel that has to be halted. This article explores the roots of enmity between these two countries, scrutinizes the threats of a nuclear armed Iran for Israel and attempts to determine what kind of measures might work to convince Iran to renounce its nuclear program. The article has four sections with the first section covering the history of the relations and the origins of hostility between Iran and Israel. The second section provides a brief overview of how the division of regional power led to direct rivalry between Tehran and Tel Aviv. The third section details Iran's nuclear program and examines its threats to Israel and the last section covers the current sanctions debate over what type of measures might work to compel Iran to renounce its nuclear weapons.     

International relations theory and Japanese pacifism: Why didn’t Tokyo go ballistic over North Korean nukes?

Seen from the perspectives of the various Western theories of international relations, Japan’s peculiar armed pacifism can appear very different. Prominent neorealists have predicted that Japan will inevitably develop nuclear weapons; prominent liberals have cited Japan as the model pacifist nation of the future. Over the last five years, it became clear to Japan that North Korea either possessed, or was on the brink of acquiring, nuclear weapons. How would the Japanese government respond to such a critical threat to its security? The case of North Korean nukes suggests that policymakers should be wary of the grim expectations of Western neorealists, at least in regard to Japan.     

A view of how the mining industry can support NEPAD

This article examines how British decision‐makers attempted to manage the Suez crisis and Falklands conflict. Of interest is the influence which the number of actors involved and the structure of their alliance relationships had on British calculations. The level of available military technology is also examined, in particular whether the absence of mutually recognised upper thresholds of mass destruction makes the Suez crisis and Falklands conflict akin to international disputes which occurred prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that both crises occurred in the ‘nuclear age’.     

联盟形成理论:评估及对中国的政策启示

本文对联盟形成理论进行了全面回顾与评析,认为在过去几十年中,联盟形成理论主要有两大发展,一是在研究"为什么形成联盟"这个问题上,存在从势力均衡理论到威胁均衡理论再到利益均衡理论的理论演进;二是上述三个理论各自内部的理论深化。按照拉卡托斯的理论演进判断标准以及"奥卡姆剃刀"(Occam’srazor)原则,文章对有关理论演进进行了评估,认为从势力均衡理论到威胁均衡理论的发展相对成功。然后,本文提出如何从联盟形成理论及其演进历程中寻求启发,以建构一个简约的联盟解体理论。最后,讨论了联盟形成理论对中国当前对外政策的启示。