<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">Plato’s Pharmacy</Emphasis>

In this essay, one of Derrida’s early texts, Plato’s pharmacy, is analysed in detail, more specifically in relation to its reflections on writing and its relation to law. This analysis takes place with reference to a number of Derrida’s other texts, in particular those on Freud. It is especially Freud’s texts on dream interpretation and on the dream-work which are of assistance in understanding the background to Derrida’s analysis of writing in Plato’s pharmacy. The essay shows the close relation between Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s texts and Freud’s study of the dream-work. The forces at work in dreams, it appears, are at play in all texts, which in turn explains Derrida’s contentions in relation to the pharmakon as providing the condition of possibility of Plato’s texts. The essay furthermore points to the continuity between this ‘early’ text of Derrida and his ‘later’, seemingly more politico-legal texts of the 1990s. A close reading of Plato’s pharmacy, with its investigation via ‘writing’ of the foundations of metaphysics, and thus also of the Western concept of law, is obligatory should one wish to comprehend how Derrida attempts to exceed the restricted economy of metaphysics through his analysis of concepts such as justice and hospitality.     

Sovereignty Without Sovereignty: Derrida’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Declarations Of Independence</Emphasis>

This article questions the common assumptions in legal theory regarding Derrida’s well-known Declarations of Independence. Through a close reading of this text, well-known ground such as the relation between speech and writing, the notion of representation, speech act theory, the signature, and the proper name is covered. The contribution that this analysis makes in the present context lies in the additional ‘step’ that it takes. The article seeks to give an explanation of the laws at work in Derrida’s thinking in the above respects and to explain more specifically how they find expression in Declarations of Independence. The article in this regard also investigates the importance and role of the ‘notions’ of death, loss of meaning, loss of ownership, and loss of sovereignty in Derrida’s thinking. The contention is that if we take account of Derrida’s reading in Declarations of Independence, it is possible to view constitutions in a very different way, more specifically their ‘origins’, with inevitable implications for constitutional interpretation.

Self-Awareness (<Emphasis Type="Italic">svasaṃvedana</Emphasis>) in Dignāga’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇasamuccaya</Emphasis> and -<Emphasis Type="Italic">vṛtti</Emphasis>: A Close Reading

The concept of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors.     

Freedom of association in labour relations in the context of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Maqasid</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">al</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Shari’ah</Emphasis> principles

Labour relations are an important chapter in economic and industrial development. Labour relations are divided into personal employer-employer relationship and collective relationship between employer and trade union. The collective relationship forms the core of the employees’ right to freedom of association. This article discusses the right of employees to freedom of association including the right to strike from the Islamic perspective. The Islamic principles applicable in this context are Maqasid-al-Shari’ah (the higher objective of Islamic law), Haqq and Jama’ah (the functional concepts in Islamic law). Freedom of association in labour relations which is basically a western concept suits the three Islamic principles and the Islamic principles are in line with the ILO standards and European law. This article is written by using pure legal research method, i.e. adopting a content analysis approach with the Islamic sources such as the Qur’an and Hadith as a point of reference.     

Linking <Emphasis Type="Italic">Signifié</Emphasis> with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Signifiant:</Emphasis> The Court of Justice of European Union as a Product-Defining Authority

Saussurean concept of signifie-signifiant agnation can be used to explain the EU law product-nomenclature referrals. The CJEU has an especially important role in developing detailed rules of product nomenclature interpretation in cases where ambiguities emerge. In its jurisprudence, the CJ pursues preservation of the predominant intuitive model of that interpretation even in cases involving composite products. Only in cases where the composition can easily be identified, the Court relies on the concept of the defining element—i.e. it takes the dominant element of the product as a product nomenclature determining one. With respect to novel products, the CJ applies the same general penchant. Therefore, with respect to such products, the Court attempts to establish their signifié-signifiant match by referring to analogous features and characteristics of already existing products. Such an approach is an evidence of the CJ’s self-constraint of its otherwise Demiurgic power concerning the product nomenclature. This argumentation implies that even the CN classification offers a catalogue of relatively rigid designators and that their rigidity is respected by the CJ. The CN designators are not perfectly rigid because the CJ takes into account not only the logical values of respective CN positions, but also the practical aspects (including transactional costs) of the CN classification, as well as the general objectives of EU rules underlying the CN position identification.     

His Dark Legalities: Intellectual Property’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Psychomachia</Emphasis> in Philip Pullman’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">His Dark Materials</Emphasis> Trilogy

This article will explore the vastest, most terminal, and—at least in the natural law tradition–most legal of spaces: namely, the home of the divine sovereign, Heaven. Specifically, I am interested in the contemporary (re)depiction of heavenly space as a ‘Miltonic’ theatre of war, as represented in Philip Pullman’s fantasy trilogy, His Dark Materials. This spatial mise-en-scene, as spectacular as it is, is a peculiar choice for an avowed atheist and anticlerical like Pullman. For it would seem to confirm than confront the verities of theology and the very structures of belief that Pullman seeks not only to critique but to overthrow. Namely, that Heaven exists, though as an absolute monarchy rather than (as Pullman plugs for) a republic. I will argue, however, that Pullman’s neo-Blakean vision of Heaven-as-Hell (ruled over by the tyrannical Metatron, as regent for a senescent ‘Authority’, i.e. God) is a metaphor: a metaphor for legal rather than theological space. And the legal space that Pullman metaphorises, I will argue, is nothing less than the imaginary of millennial intellectual property rights, an ideo-juridical inner space more and more projected upon and underpinning spatial notions like the ‘Commons’. The war in Heaven, then, is an elaborate allegory for struggles over the contol of knowledge under the conditions of Global Capital, with Lord Asriel, Lyra and Will functioning as Lessig-style activists, colonizing the new technologies (anachronised here as ‘amber spyglasses’, ‘subtle knives’, ‘alethiometers’ etc.) to topple ‘The Authority’ of intellectual property law and institute a democracy of digitality in which ideas are free to circulate in that most unreal and Real of spaces, the internet.     

Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Miranda</Emphasis> Rights

Seventy-five psychiatric inpatients were evaluated with respect to their Miranda-related abilities using Grisso’s (1998, Instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press) instruments and Goldstein’s (2002, Revised instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights) revision to determine: whether different versions of Miranda warnings translate into differences in understanding; the influence of psychiatric symptoms, diagnostic categories, and IQ upon Miranda comprehension; and the relative performance of persons with psychiatric impairment on Miranda-relevant abilities. Results indicated that although the Miranda language used in Goldstein’s revision generally showed lower grade reading levels and higher reading ease scores than Grisso’s original instruments, this did not translate into improved understanding. In addition, psychiatric symptoms were negatively correlated with Miranda comprehension, even after controlling for IQ. Finally, results revealed that psychiatric patients’ understanding and appreciation was substantially impaired compared to Grisso’s adult validation samples, and was roughly comparable to Grisso’s juvenile validation sample. Implications of these results for policy reform are discussed.

“<Emphasis Type="Italic">Peer effects</Emphasis>” or “<Emphasis Type="Italic">quasi</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">peer effects</Emphasis>” in Spanish labour court rulings

The current work seeks to ascertain whether rulings on dismissal cases issued by incumbent judges in Spanish labour courts are influenced by whether they are acting alone in their own court or sharing duties with other judges such as replacement judges, support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. We consider that a court is treated when more than one judge rules in it. Then, an analysis is conducted so as to determine the effect of such a treatment on the percentage of cases ruled in favour of the dismissed worker. The data used in the research are taken from the information recorded at court level provided by the statistics kept by the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. A total of 2888 observations were available, corresponding to the period spanning 2004 to 2012. As regards the findings, it may be concluded that there is a significant positive impact on the number of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers when incumbent judges are not acting alone in their court, particularly when the incumbent judge solves cases together with another professional judge.     

The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ārṣajñāna</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Praśastapādabhāṣya</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nyāyakandalī</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vyomavatī</Emphasis>

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vai?e?ika, the cognitive category of ār?ajñāna (??i cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vai?e?ika texts. This article deals with how ār?ajñāna is conceptualized in Pra?astapādabhā?ya (PBh), ?rīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyoma?iva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ??i cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ??i cognition apparent in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vai?e?ika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyak?a) and siddhic vision (siddhadar?ana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse.     

Is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Viveka</Emphasis> a Unique <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇa</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vivekacūḍāmaṇi</Emphasis>?

This is an enquiry based on the Vivekacū?āma?i (VC), the primary focus of which is to present viveka (discrimination) along with its three catalysts, namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava as the unique pramā?a of Ultimate Knowledge. This paper discusses the significance of the six popular pramā?as of Advaita Vedānta (AV) and reiterates that as far as AV is concerned epistemologically those pramā?as have merely a provisional value (vyāvahārika). In accordance with the purport of VC this paper argues that ?ruti and tarka, culminating in anubhava (trans-empirical insight sans experience) are blind in themselves and are enthusiastically carried forward by viveka (discrimination) for the attainment of the final realisation. This paper concludes that viveka, along with its three catalysts namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava is the sole pramā?a of the trans-empirical experiential knowledge of Brahman.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Alice’s Adventures</Emphasis>, Abductive Reasoning and the Logic of Islamic Law

How does a Muslim jurist think the law and how, accordingly, he judges a fact? Using Alice in Wonderland as hermeneutical device to explore the logic of fiqh, this article identifies a divergence between Western and Islamic legal thinking in the application of abduction as key form of inference in the law of Islam. In particular, looking at the fact/law relation in symbolic terms, the article highlights how, while a dichotomy between fact and law characterizes Western legal thinking, fiqh upholds a connection between the “real” and the “right” (?aqq), where the effort (ijtihād) in understanding sharī‘ah postulates the actualization of the “rule” (?ukm) in God’s creation. Thus, if sharī‘ah pre-scribes the Law, not only is the rule discovered through the sources (u?ūl), but the right has to be justified through a verdict de-scribing the fact, for the law to be validly stated for the given situation. In this sense, abduction as explanatory “hypothesis” (Peirce) and “inference to the best explanation” (Harman) of sharī‘ah provides an account for the probabilistic nature of fiqh, its ramification (furū‘) through verdicts, as well as for the epistemic and narrative function of the tradition as core aspects of the logic of Islamic law. At the same time, doubts can be raised about the compatibility between this logic and the deductive logic of modern state law, as a sub-product of Western legal thinking.     

‘We the People of the United States…’: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Matrix</Emphasis> and the Realisation of Constitutional Sovereignty

In its enunciation of “We the people,” the Constitution of the United States of America becomes a constitution of the flesh as it simultaneously invokes a constitution, a nation and a people. Correspondingly, its amendments as a list of rights pertaining to sex and race discrimination, and freedoms of bodily movement and action, assert the Constitution’s authority through the evocation of “natural” human bodies. In this article, I explore the way in which a sovereignty of the United States’ Constitution is realised in the particularlised bodies of its citizens. The fundamental and foundational laws of the United States, and the narratives and myths used to interpret them, are in part rendered legitimate by the Constitution’s embodiment, which extends from its physical manifestation in written documents into the flesh of its citizens. In order to make this argument, I turn to the film The Matrix (1999), the success of which relies on an investment in bodies and the United States’ Constitution as matter through its interwoven narrative themes of human slavery and emancipation, reality and computer-generated simulation. At the same time, The Matrix extends its ideological play into the bodies of its audience, who experience the film’s thrillingly sensorial fantasies of constitutional rights while enjoying its affective special effects. Thus, the sovereign authority of United States constitutional law is experienced as “natural” through the phenomenological experience of cinema.     

The sociological imagination revisited: lessons from <Emphasis Type="Italic">America’s Safest City</Emphasis>

In America’s Safest City, Simon Singer embraces the sociological imagination to situate juveniles’ personal troubles within the context of middle-class affluence and modernity. In so doing, he departs from the standard research paradigm that seeks to explain delinquency by using secondary data sets that contain limited measures of theoretical constructs identified by reigning perspectives. Singer’s decision has resulted in a rich analysis that is replete with criminological lessons about the nature of delinquency. Four such lessons are presented here, which include: (1) a lower-class bias has clouded thinking about crime; (2) the reaction to crime differs across classes; (3) parents matter in producing adolescence-limited antisocial youths; and (4) suburban delinquency may be a precursor to white-collar crime.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> and the Revival of Brahmanism

There are good reasons to think that Brahmanism initially belonged to a geographically limited area, with its heartland in the middle and western parts of the Gangetic plain. It was in this region that Brahmanism was at that time the culture of a largely hereditary class of priests, the brahmins, who derived their livelihood and special position in society from their close association with the local rulers. This situation changed. The most plausible hypothesis as to the reasons of this change sees a link with the political unification of northern India, begun by the Nandas and continued by the Mauryas. Both the Nandas and the Mauryas had their home base in the region called Magadha and had no particular interest in brahmins and their sacrificial tradition. As a result Brahmanism as an institution was under threat; it either had to face disappearance, or reinvent itself. It did the latter. Brahmanism underwent a transformation that enabled it to survive and ultimately flourish in changed circumstances. This paper will argue that the Mahābhārata can be looked upon as an element in this Brahminical project. Far from being a mere collection of stories and general good advice, it was an instrument in the hands of a group of people who were determined to change the world in ways that suited them, and who to a considerable extent succeeded in doing so during the centuries that lay ahead.