A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives

It has been suggested that Africa is experiencing a ‘NewScramble’ thanks primarily to its oil and gas wealth,with the United States and the People’s Republic of Chinaactively competing for access to Africa’s resources. Thisarticle aims to scrutinize the claim that Africa is facing aNew Scramble, analysing the nature of the economic and politicalchanges at work, the importance of Africa’s oil, and thepolitical and economic forces behind the new oil rush. The articlestarts with an overview of the phenomenon labelled by some asthe ‘New Scramble’. The main body of the articleevaluates the existence of a New Scramble from three subjectperspectives: history, international relations, and businessstudies. Finally, by analysing the likely impact on the economiesof oil-producing states, it considers whether we should dismayor rejoice over the ‘New Scramble for Africa’. Itconcludes that the existence of a New Scramble or a US–Chineserace for Africa should be treated with some caution and thatthe use of terms such as ‘scramble’ and ‘race’is perhaps misleading, while the economic impact of oil investmentsis likely to be bleak.     

The Common African Defence and Security Policy

The literature on Africa’s collective security arrangementsfocuses on the African Union’s Peace and Security Counciland the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)before it. This article shows that the Peace and Security Councilis only an implementation mechanism of a broader policy framework,the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), thatwas adopted recently in Sirte, Libya. The article argues thatthe adoption of such a broader collective security policy frameworkwas made possible by changes within the international system.These changes brought about a shift from realism to idealismin various regions of the world. In Africa, the idealistic undercurrentfound expression in renewed interest in African institutionsand African solutions to African problems. The article alsodemonstrates that the CADSP will confront many challenges rangingfrom general theoretical and normative questions that bedevilcollective security arrangements elsewhere to specific issuessuch as funding and other practical implementation matters.     

Patronage politics, donor reforms, and regime consolidation in Uganda

Using the state and its resources has constituted a vital formof consolidating power for Africa’s rulers. However, donor-sponsoredreforms have threatened to curtail the opportunities of Africanleaders to maintain their regimes in power. Donor reforms introducedunder structural adjustment programmes have sought to reducethe size and scope of government as well as to cut state spendingand thereby curb the possibilities of state patronage. Reformshave also attempted to contain corruption and improve stategovernance. In Uganda, however, the relationship between donorsand the government has reproduced patronage government. Thedonors have hailed Uganda as a major case of economic successin Africa. They have provided it with large amounts of financialassistance to support the implementation of reforms. High levelsof foreign aid have provided the government with public resourcesto sustain the patronage basis of the regime. Moreover, in acontext where wide discretionary authority was conferred ongoverning elites in the implementation of reforms, public resourcescould be used in unaccountable and non-transparent ways to helpthe government maintain its political dominance. The donorshave begun to realize belatedly that they have been proppingup a corrupt government in Uganda.     

Jacob Zuma, the social body and the unruly power of song

This article tracks the life of the song ‘Umshini Wami’(My Machine Gun) adopted by Jacob Zuma, the President of theAfrican National Congress, since early 2005.  It exploresthe wider implications of political song in the public spherein South Africa and aims to show how ‘Umshini Wami’helped Jacob Zuma to prominence and demonstrated a longing inthe body politic for a political language other than that ofa distancing and alienating technocracy. The article also exploresthe early pre-Zuma provenance of the song, its links to thepre-1994 struggle period and its entanglement in a seamlessmasculinity with little place for gendered identities in thenew state to come. It argues too that the song can be seen asunstable and unruly, a signifier with a power of its own andnot entirely beholden to its new owner.     

The oil boom in Equatorial Guinea

In less than a decade, Equatorial Guinea has transformed itselffrom an African backwater into one of the world’s fastestgrowing economies and a sought-after political partner in theGulf of Guinea. The sole reason for this transformation hasbeen the discovery of oil and gas. This article outlines therise of Equatorial Guinea as one of Africa’s leading oilproducingcountries and investigates the political, economic and socialeffects of becoming a petro-state. The article is based on theauthor’s field research in Equatorial Guinea in the autumnof 2003 and interviews with senior oil company staff, governmentofficials and staff of international organizations as well assecondary sources. This research demonstrates how reliance onoil and gas exports can lead to profound changes in a country’spolitical economy.     

Libya's foreign policy in flux

This article provides a brief assessment of Libya’s oftenunpredictable foreign policy with regard to Africa. The firstsection presents a brief historical background to Libya’sinvolvement on the African continent and Colonel Gaddafi’smilitary interventionism in Africa. The next section assessesthe 1990s and Muammar Gaddafi’s popularity during thisperiod as well as his often extravagant economic involvementin Africa. The third section considers Gaddafi’s ambitiousrole in the African Union and his efforts to secure a unitedAfrica. The fourth section assesses Gaddafi’s dramaticforeign policy shift from rogue criminal to responsible statesman,following his historic decision to relinquish his country’sweapons of mass destruction (WMD) and an almost enthusiasticwillingness to welcome the West back after decades of antagonismand the subsequent wave of international praise as a consequence.Finally, it gives a brief assessment of the future of Libya’sforeign relations.     

Social capital, social liabilities, and political capital: Social networks and informal manufacturing in Nigeria

This article addresses the question of why social networks havefailed to promote economic development in Africa when they havebeen associated with economic growth in other parts of the world.Detailed field research traces the role of social networks inthe economic organization of two dynamic informal enterpriseclusters in the town of Aba in south-eastern Nigeria, an arearenowned for the density of its popular economic networks andfor the rapid development of small-scale manufacturing underNigeria’s structural adjustment programme. Focusing onthe role of embedded social institutions and their restructuringamid the competitive pressures of rapid liberalization, I considerthe extent to which social networks in Aba constitute ‘socialcapital’ capable of promoting economic development inthe context of ongoing liberalization, ‘social liabilities’that undermine accumulation through a social logic of redistributionand parochialism, or ‘political capital’ throughwhich popular forces are incorporated into the ‘shadowstructures’ of predatory states. This article challengesthe essentialism of much of the contemporary literature on Africansocial networks, arguing for a sharper focus on the specificinstitutional capacities of indigenous economic institutions.It calls for greater attention to the role of rapid liberalizationand state neglect in explaining the developmental failures ofAfrican informal enterprise networks.     

Crime, conflict and politics in transition-era South Africa

Despite the potentially catastrophic repercussions of SouthAfrica’s violent crime epidemic, little progress has beenmade in understanding why violence has persisted and even escalatedsince the end of apartheid in 1994. Adopting an historical approachthat highlights the persistence of urban violence throughoutthe twentieth century, this article focuses on the criminaldimensions of the ‘political’ conflicts of the 1980sand 1990s. The advent of democracy was not in itself sufficientto erase a deeply entrenched culture of violence produced bydecades of repressive racial policing, violent crime and socialconflict. Moreover, politicized hostilities and the continuingdeterioration of law and order structures in the final yearsof apartheid gave birth to various groups that engaged in criminalviolence and provided favourable conditions for well establishedcriminal networks. Such elements were unlikely to put down theirguns and relinquish power simply because politicians declaredthe fighting to be over. Situating transition-era violence withinits historic context and broadening the narrow conception of‘political’ conflict enable us to better understandboth this fractious period and the violence that continues toafflict South Africa.     

Diversity and state-building in Ethiopia

In multi-ethnic Ethiopia, diversity has been a serious obstacleto statebuilding. In fact, the process of state-building hasbeen chequered with ethnic tensions, squabbles and conflicts.Although ethno-regional identity politics, at least in its mostviolent manifestation, is a relatively recent phenomenon inthe country, its seeds had been sown with the rise of the absolutiststate by the middle of the twentieth century. The politicalentrepreneurs of Ethiopia’s various communities have pursueddivergent ways of dealing with diversity. The dominant Amharafollowed an assimilationist policy (1889–1991); sincethe 1960s, the Eritreans and a section of theOromo politicalactors have opted for the secessionist route; and since themid-1970s, the Tigrayans have gone for the ‘accommodationist’alternative. Of the three choices that the political actorshave had, this article argues that the ‘accommodationist’path, despite its serious flaws, has effectively discreditedboth the assimilationist and secessionist options. Ethiopia’scurrent constitution may contain amendable articles. Its veryaccommodationist character, however, seems to make such amendmentdifficult, given the highly politicized nature of ethnicityin the country. In this sense, Ethiopia is permanently changedand the accommodationist formula is unavoidable in the processof state-building.     

Reasons for sub-Saharan Africa's development deficit that the commission for Africa did not consider

Despite a substantial amount of aid (much larger in per capitaterms than provided to any other region), sub-Saharan Africancountries, with very few exceptions, have regressed since independence.The general history of Africa since achieving independence hasbeen one of development failure. Some protagonists point tosigns of change that argue for more aid. This article suggeststhat aid to Africa has not worked because human, social andinstitutional capital — not financial capital —poses the binding constraint. In that context, doubling aidto Africa from $23 billion in 2004 to $50 billion annually by2015 seems a questionable proposition. This commentary suggestsunconventional ways of dealing with the problems involved inimporting the essential ingredients that Africa needs. It concludeswith the observation that the aid community’s currentobsession with poverty reduction and the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs) may be harming rather than helping the cause ofdevelopment in Africa and argues that the focus on growth anddevelopment should be restored.     

'Liberation' or capture: Youth in between 'hakuma', and 'home' during civil war and its aftermath in Southern Sudan

Generational tension and youth crisis have been prominent themesin recent analyses of civil conflict in Africa. Field researchin Southern Sudan in 2004–2006 suggests that the analysisdoes not fit the Sudanese war. This article examines a structuralopposition between the sphere of military/government (the ‘hakuma’)and the sphere of ‘home’. It argues that to be a‘youth’ in Southern Sudan means to inhabit the tensionsof the space between these spheres. While attempting to resistcapture by either sphere, youth have used their recruitmentby the military to invest in their home or family sphere. Theiraspiration to ‘responsibility’ illustrates not generationalrebellion, but the moral continuity in local society, also evidentin discussions of marriage.     

The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa

This article analyzes some factors underlying the spread ofinsurgent violence in Africa. It focuses on the impact externalfactors have on power struggles on the continent. The firstof these is the unsteady support for democracy from Westerndonors, which has impeded more far-reaching domestic changesin much of Africa. Second are wider changes in the internationalsetting that dramatically enhanced the international standingof armed movements in the post-1989 period. The article arguesthat the interplay of both factors has induced would-be leadersto conquer state power by violent rather than non-violent means.This becomes particularly evident in regard to Western effortsto solve violent conflict through power-sharing agreements.The hypothesis is put forward that the institutionalizationof this practice for the sake of ‘peace’, i.e. providingrebels with a share of state power, has important demonstrationeffects across the continent. It creates an incentive structurewould-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgentpath as well. As a result, and irrespective of their effectivenessin any given case, power-sharing agreements may contribute tothe reproduction of insurgent violence.     

South Africa’s foreign policy aspirations and the National Development Plan (NDP 2030): the role of soft power

Chapter 7 of the NDP 2030 articulates a foreign policy vision for South Africa over two decades. While the NDP acknowledges the place of ‘soft power’ in realising this vision, it remains doubtful whether South Africa will indeed take advantage of the enormous gains offered by soft power as a foreign policy lever. This paper examines the role of soft power in achieving the foreign policy mandates prescribed in the Plan. It argues that, like other regional powers such as China, South Africa needs to pay more attention to its soft power attributes if it is to fast-track the successful implementation of its foreign policy ambitions for 2030. We conclude that sustaining South Africa’s rising position and influence in the international system and in Africa, will largely depend on its ability to consciously adjust its foreign policy trajectories – in the long term – in tandem with its soft power resources and competences.     

FROM 'NATIONHOOD' TO REGIONALISM TO THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE: 'BOPHUTHATSWANANESS' AND THE BIRTH OF THE 'NEW' SOUTH AFRICA

Although majority rule has been achieved in South Africa, thefinal years of one ‘independent’ bantustan, namelyBophuthatswana, and their aftermath, illustrate the problemsof creating a unified identity. Ironically, in the death throesof apartheid, a Pandora's box of ethnic and regionalist claimswas opened. Although these claims were tied to the maintenanceof privileges gained by a tiny minority created through apartheidpolicy, Bophuthatswana had also been sustained by an ideologywhich, although at times highly contradictory, was also indicativeof the space given to twenty years of bantustan nation-building.This article provides a reinterpretation of these complex territoriesby showing how, in the 1990s, in the wake of fundamental politicalchanges in South Africa, the Bophuthatswana regime reshapedits nation-building discourse into a distinctive regionalistcoalition based upon socio-economic and ethnic criteria. Moreover,unlike previous approaches to the region, it shows how contestedterritorial claims were integral to this regionalist movement.Whilst the Bophuthatswana regime finally imploded and its regionalistcoalition was absorbed into South Africa's North West Province,the legacy of the bantustans for South Africa is replete withambiguity. In the post-apartheid era of transition to the NorthWest Province, some of these fault lines, termed ‘Bophuthatswananess’,are discussed. The continuing influence of their core of ‘Batswanaarbiters’ raises pertinent questions concerning the obstaclesto inclusive nation-building.     

The ‘science’ of superiority: Africa and scholarly colonial assumptions

ABSTRACT

The use of ‘neopatrimonialism’ as a category in mainstream scholarship on African polities and economies is ubiquitous. A critique by Thandika Mkandawire has shown that the ‘neopatrimonial school’ is devoid of conceptual coherence and analytical power – it is an expression of a prejudice, not a useful tool for research and analysis. The article endorses Mkandawire's view but points out that this is by no means the only example of its kind. On the contrary, the use of categories which assume the superiority of societies in the global North over those in Africa is widespread. The article illustrates this by discussing and criticising two others, the ‘democratic consolidation’ paradigm and the ‘failed state’ framework. It argues that all three shape assumptions by scholars in Africa as well as outside it which obstruct concrete analysis. A critique of these paradigms is thus essential to the development of scholarship on and about Africa.     

Informal moves, informal markets: International migrants and traders from Mzimba District, Malawi

International migration from Malawi has changed profoundly sincecentrally organized mine migration to South Africa ended inthe 1980s. Contemporary movements are more diverse and lesstied to labour, as informal trade has developed alongside. Thisarticle replaces a common ‘productivist’ perspectiveon migration with a decentralized approach, using ethnographicobservation and anthropological case studies to understand interrelatedflows of people and goods. It shows how in an emergent informalmarket for South African goods in Mzimba, Malawi, price informationdoes not structure trade practices. Historical continuitiesin the socio-cultural organization of illegal migration, ratherthan liberalized market forces, shape this economic configuration,including price formation. The research for this article was financed by the NetherlandsFoundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).Data were collected in Mzimba district, Lilongwe, Blantyre (Malawi),and Johannesburg (South Africa) in the period from April 2004to March 2005. ^1. Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and dependence in BlackAfrica: historical origin’, Journal of Peace Research9, 2 (1972), pp. 106, 115. ^2. David A. McDonald, Lephophotho Mashike, and Celia Golden, ‘Thelives and times of African migrants and immigrants in post-apartheidSouth Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.), On Borders:Perspectives on international migration in southern Africa (St.Martin’s Press, New York, 2000), pp. 168–95. ^3. In the 1990s, migration to South Africa has expanded enormously,and alongside it, regional trade. See Jonathan Crush and DavidA. McDonald, ‘Transnationalism, African immigration, andnew migrant spaces in South Africa: an introduction’,Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, 1 (2000), p. 2. Theincrease in regional trade is difficult to quantify as muchof this trade is informal in nature and does not appear in officialfigures. ^4. See, among others, Jonathan Crush, Alan Jeeves, and David Yudelman,South Africa’s Labor Empire: A history of black migrancyto the gold mines (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991). ^5. Dunbar Moodie, Going for Gold: Men, mines, and migration (Universityof California Press, Berkeley, 1994). ^6. Harold Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in SouthAfrica: from segregation to apartheid’, Economy and Society1, 4 (1972), p. 433. ^7. For an example of this phenomenon in another context, see JensA. Andersson, ‘Administrators’ knowledge and statecontrol in colonial Zimbabwe: the invention of the rural–urbandivide in Buhera district, 1912–80’, Journal ofAfrican History 43, 1 (2002), pp. 119–43. ^8. See the numerous interesting studies published by the SouthernAfrican Migration Project (URL: http://www.queensu.ca/samp). ^9. Hopes for a re-opening of TEBA remained alive, though, and werefed by election promises in Malawi’s first multipartyelections in 1994. See among others ‘More light on TEBA;not in UDF manifesto’, Malawi News, 5–11 November1994, p. 4. See also Wiseman C. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi governmentand South African labour recruiters, 1974–92’, Journalof Modern African Studies 34, 4 (1996) pp. 623–42; WisemanC. Chirwa, ‘ "No TEBA. . . forget TEBA": the plight ofMalawian ex-migrant workers to South Africa, 1988–1994’,International Migration Review 31, 3 (1997), pp. 628–54. ^10. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi government’, p. 627; JonathanCrush, ‘Migrations past: an historical overview of cross-bordermovement in southern Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.),On Borders, p. 15. Labour recruiting agencies competing forlabour in (colonial) Malawi were the Witwatersrand Native LabourAssociation (WNLA), and the (Southern) Rhodesian Native LabourBureau (RNLB). The agencies were later renamed as The EmploymentBureau of Africa (TEBA) and the Rhodesian Native Labour SupplyCommission, respectively. ^11. F.E. Sanderson, ‘The development of labour migration fromNyasaland, 1891–1914’, Journal of African History2, 2 (1961), pp. 259–71; G. Coleman, ‘Internationallabour migration from Malawi, 1875–1966’, Journalof Social Science (University of Malawi) 2 (1972), pp. 31–46;Robert B. Boeder, Malawians abroad: The history of labor emigrationfrom Malawi to its neighbors 1890 to the present (PhD thesis,Michigan State University, Ann Arbor, 1974). ^12. Robert E. Christiansen and Jonathan G. Kydd, ‘The returnof Malawian labour from South Africa and Zimbabwe’, Journalof Modern African Studies 21, 2 (1983), p. 311. ^13. Ibid, p. 324. ^14. J.K. van Donge, ‘Disordering the market: the liberalisationof burley tobacco in Malawi in the 1990s’, Journal ofSouthern African Studies 28, 1 (2002), p. 105. This is not tosay that tobacco production solely relies on migrant labour. ^15. In the period 1977–1998, average annual intercensal growthrates in rural areas were highest in tobacco-producing areassuch as Kasungu District (4.4 percent) in the Central Region,and Traditional Authority (TA) Mpherembe (5.3 percent) in MzimbaDistrict in the Northern Region. Lowest growth rates were concentratedin the poor and densely populated southern districts, such asChiradzulu (1.4), Mulanje (1.6), Phalombe (1.5), and Thyolo(1.7). See Figure 2. ^16. In western Mzimba, and possibly elsewhere in the Northern regionwhere average education levels are higher than in the rest ofMalawi, people look down upon labouring in the low-paid tobaccosector. For figures on education levels, see T. Benson, J. Kaphuka,S. Kanyanda, and R. Chinula, Malawi: An atlas of social statistics(National Statistical Office of Malawi/IFPRI, Zomba/Washington,2002), p. 51. ^17. Bridget O’Laughlin, ‘Missing men? The debate overrural poverty and woman-headed households in Southern Africa’,Journal of Peasant Studies 25, 2 (1998), p. 10. ^18. ‘91 Malawians deported’, The Daily Times, 9 December1994, p. 1. This is not to suggest that the South African governmentdid not deport Malawians before 1994. See Boeder, Malawiansabroad, p. 155, for an example from the 1930s. ^19. Information obtained by the author from the Malawian consulatein Johannesburg, South Africa, March 2005. ^20. Before 1994, transport in Malawi was highly problematic as government-controlledbus services were limited. With liberalization, matola (pick-upsand lorries) greatly improved rural transport, while minibusservices and foreign bus companies facilitated respectivelyrural–urban and international mobility. Exchanging foreigncurrency was equally problematic before liberalization; withouta passport and proof of recent travel, banks could refuse toexchange. ^21. Deanna Swaney, Mary Fitzpatrick, Paul Greenway, Andrew Stone,and Justin Vaisutis, Lonely Planet Southern Africa (Lonely Planetpublications, London, 2003), p. 222. ^22. Zimbabwe’s decreased popularity is also evidenced by thenumerous Zimbabwe-born youths of Malawian descent waiting forthe processing of a Malawian passport at the Department of Immigrationin Blantyre. ^23. The persistence of unequal sex distributions in the extremenorth of the country is a further indication of the popularityof Tanzania as a destination for, especially, male migrants(see Figure 2). ^24. Mzimba’s transport sector thus emerged before economicliberalization. In the 1980s, some South Africans started thebusiness by investing in vehicles and using Mzimba drivers.By the early 1990s, the South Africans had left the businessaltogether and Malawians took their place. ^25. R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire,Vol. II: East-Africa (Oxford University Press, London, 1949),pp. 564–68; Leroy Vail and Landeg White, ‘Tribalismin the political history of Malawi’, in Leroy Vail (ed.),The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (James Currey,London, 1989), pp. 151–92; Leroy Vail, ‘The makingof the "Dead North": a study of the Ngoni rule in northern Malawi,c. 1855–1907’, in J. B. Peires (ed.) Before andafter Shaka: Papers in Nguni history (Institute of Social andEconomic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1978), pp.230–67. ^26. John McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875–1940(CLAIM, Blantyre, 2000), p. 152. See also Sanderson, ‘Thedevelopment of labour migration’, p. 260. ^27. For instance, figures for the 1930s suggest that fewer Malawianswere working in mining related jobs (recruited through WNLA)than in other sectors of the South African economy, notablydomestic services and industry. See Boeder, Malawians abroad,p. 168. ^28. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004.For an earlier account of Malawian migrants’ travel problems,see E.P. Makambe, ‘The Nyasaland African labour "Ulendo"to Southern Rhodesia and the problem of the "highwaymen," 1903–1923’,African Affairs 79, 317 (1980), pp. 548–66. ^29. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004. ^30. Records of the Employment Service Division of the MGLR suggestthat entering into official labour contracts when already inSouth Africa was common in the early 1970s. The numerous ‘typical’Ngoni, Tumbuka, and Tonga names (such as Jere, Makamo, Kumwenda,Chirwa) appearing on these lists further suggest that, in particular,migrants from northern Malawi were familiar with this procedure.Malawi National Archives, file: 14 ESD/SU/34, Lists of Malawiansentering into contracts of employment, 1969–1975. ^31. The aim of anthropological case studies — also referredto as the ‘case-study method’ — is not topresent representative cases, but to illuminate wider socialpatterns and processes through the study of the particular.Here, the cases are used to illustrate the social processesat work in new social phenomena. See Max Gluckman, ‘Ethnographicdata in British social anthropology’, The SociologicalReview 9 (1961), pp. 5–17. ^32. Malawians advertise their services in daily newspapers or neighbourhoodweeklies, under categories such as ‘domestic workers’or ‘gardeners’. Often they explicitly state theirMalawian origin. ^33. This development seems to be confirmed by population figures(see Figure 2): TA M’Mbelwa in western Mzimba was Malawi’sonly TA where male absenteeism increased in the period 1987–98. ^34. In 2004, all booking-offices in Mzimba district have been closed.Stories of cheating transporters who suddenly disappear withthe money paid in advance have made people more cautious. ^35. The term is seen locally as a reference to the brand name —Caterpillar — of big ground-work machinery used for roadconstruction. ^36. Alongside the market for South African goods thus developedan informal money-transfer market, as illegal immigrants haveno access to South Africa’s banking system. Transporterscarry cash remittances of migrants, while migrant businessmenhave set up more sophisticated money transfer systems, operatingsimilarly to official agencies such as Western Union (whichdoes not operate in South Africa). ^37. Lindela is a repatriation centre near Johannesburg for illegalimmigrants awaiting deportation. See SAHRC, Lindela at the Crossroadsfor Detention and Repatriation: An assessment of the conditionsof detention (South African Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg,2000). ^38. For example, an ongoing survey among international bus passengersleaving Lilongwe for Johannesburg indicates that 61 percentof the travellers originating from Mzimba district (n = 294),expects to be accommodated by a relative upon arrival. ^39. Due to lack of uniformity in the products traded, reliable pricecomparisons between the Johannesburg and Mzimba markets aredifficult to make. Common model mobile phones, such as the Nokia3310, are an exception. In 2005, a used Nokia 3310 fetched some300–400 rands in Johannesburg, which amounts to 5,700–7,600Malawian kwacha. In Mzimba, these phones are usually sold for5,000–6,000 kwacha.     

Short term interests,long term perspectives: Balancing South Africa's peace and security approach in the EU–SA Strategic Partnership

ABSTRACT

South Africa’s peace and security outlook in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership has been guided by the content and substance of the founding document, which incorporates an interdependent approach to development. For South Africa, engagement in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership is framed by its historical background, its identity and the content of its foreign policy. South Africa's foreign policy in particular adopts an integrated approach to securing the state within its surrounding regional and continental geography. This article reviews South Africa's approach to peace and security, in the context of the strategic partnership. The article argues that, overall, South Africa's definition of peace and security is compatible with that of the EU; however, Pretoria's vision of how it provides peace and security has naturally changed in line with the varying international circumstances in which it has found itself. While this has proved difficult at times to reconcile, peace and security collaboration in the strategic partnership has managed to remain intact.     

Economic statecraft in South Africa's regional diplomacy

This paper considers the extent to which South Africa utilises positive economic statecraft to promote human rights in the region – that is, the degree to which it mobilises its economic engagement to affect a desirable political outcome in its foreign engagements in Southern Africa. The country's reaction to crises in Zimbabwe and Swaziland over the past 20 years is a strong indicator of the limits of South Africa's statecraft in this regard. These engagements highlight the inevitable clash between the country's principled preference for ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of sovereign states and its constitutional mandate to respect and promote human rights. Despite eschewing the role of ‘regional hegemon’, there is an expectation that South Africa will play an integral role in securing regional stability. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the country chooses to approach resolving regional challenges with a co-ordinated political and economic approach. This paper argues that, to be more effective in spreading a progressive regional agenda that encourages democracy, governance and human rights, South Africa needs to incorporate a stronger element of positive economic statecraft in its foreign policy implementation.