Contesting the Governance of Capital Flows at the IMF

Financial crises can trigger different actors to reassess their ideas, interests, and policies, and sometimes change them. The Global Financial Crisis triggered a reassessment at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the utility of capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. In 2010, the IMF embarked upon an official reassessment of these issues and in 2012 published an official “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and managing capital flows that gives more caution toward capital account liberalization and endorses the use of capital controls in certain circumstances. This article traces the political process that yielded the IMF's new view and draws out lessons for thinking about policy change in global economic governance institutions.     

Agree to reform? The political economy of conditionality variation in International Monetary Fund lending, 1983–1997

Abstract.  This article analyzes variation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality. Conditions attached to IMF loans vary qualitatively and quantitatively across time and space, contrary to the allegations of inflexibility and insensitivity. This study theorizes that despite the IMF's official rules to determine conditionality by economic criteria, variation arises because the strategic interests of the five biggest contributors to the IMF (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France) interfere with IMF policy, which potentially compromises the effectiveness of its programs. This theory is tested empirically against 398 conditionality agreements contracted between 1983 and 1997 using an event-count method based on the Poisson distribution to obtain statistical results supportive of the theory.     

Effects of Exchange Rate Regime on IMF Program Participation

This article investigates the effect of a domestic policy choice, the exchange rate regime, on countries’ interaction with an international institution, their participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending agreements. I hypothesize that the effect of the level of international reserves on a country's probability of participation in an IMF program depends on the exchange rate regime. A low level of international reserves threatens unfavorable economic and political outcomes only in countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. The level of reserves may thus be a significant determinant of participation in IMF programs only for countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. I use a dynamic univariate probit model of IMF program participation to assess empirically the effect of reserves in countries that maintain fixed, intermediate, and floating exchange rate regimes. The empirical results support my hypothesis: reserves have a significant effect only in countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate.     

Austerity versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the International Monetary Fund Since the Great Recession

Since 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has become more open to the use of discretionary fiscal stimulus packages to deal with recessions, while changing its doctrine on the timing and content of fiscal consolidation. The article traces this evolution of the Fund's doctrine to staff politics, more diverse thinking in mainstream economics, and a careful framing of the message through the use of mainstream macroeconomic models. To map the changing contours of institutional views on fiscal policy through 2008–2013, the article undertakes a detailed content analysis of official publications from the Fiscal Affairs Department and the Research Department. The connection between these shifts and significant personnel shake‐ups is demonstrated through an extensive biographical analysis of the authors of all IMF studies cited in the official reports of the two departments. The findings contribute to the emerging debate on the sources of intellectual and policy change in international economic organizations.     

IMF Conditionality,Government Partisanship,and the Progress of Economic Reforms

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic partisan politics. More IMF conditions can pressure left‐wing governments into undertaking more ambitious reforms with little resistance from partisan rivals on the right; under right governments, however, more conditions hinder reform implementation by heightening resistance from the left while simultaneously reducing leaders' ability to win their support through concessions or compromise. Using data on post‐communist IMF programs for the period 1994–2010, we find robust evidence supporting these claims, even after addressing the endogeneity of IMF programs via instrumental variables analysis.     

Banking on Seniority: The IMF and the Sovereign's Creditors

The programs designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the Global Financial Crisis have shown more awareness of the importance of domestic demand for the prospects of economic recovery. Yet the IMF has continued to do little about the late payments made by governments to domestic creditors and suppliers. In contrast, the greater protection historically awarded by the IMF to foreign creditors has endured throughout the recent crisis. The article suggests that, in order to adequately balance foreign creditor seniority and growth objectives, the IMF may sometimes need to emphasize equitable burden‐sharing across categories of creditors rather than privilege the interests of international bond markets.     

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.     

Quantitative Leverage Through Qualitative Knowledge: Augmenting the Statistical Analysis of Complex Causes

Social scientific theories frequently posit that multiple causalmechanisms may produce the same outcome. Unfortunately, it isnot always possible to observe which mechanism was responsible.For example, IMF scholars conjecture that nations enter IMFagreements both out of economic need and for discretionary domesticpolitical reasons. Typically, though, all we observe is thefact of agreement, not its cause. Partial observability probitmodels (Poirier 1980, Journal of Econometrics 12:209–217; Braumoeller2003, Political Analysis 11:209–233) provide one methodfor the statistical analysis of such phenomena. Unfortunately,they are often plagued by identification and labeling difficulties.Sometimes, however, qualitative studies of particular casesenlighten us about causes when quantitative studies cannot.We propose exploiting this information to lend additional structureto the partial observability approach. Monte Carlo simulationreveals that by anchoring "discernible" causes for a handfulof cases about which we possess qualitative information, weobtain greater efficiency. More important, our method provesreliable at recovering unbiased parameter estimates when thepartial observability model fails. The paper concludes withan analysis of the determinants of IMF agreements.

A member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of othermembers from the Fund ...[provided] the member represents thatit has a need to make the purchase because of its balance ofpayments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves. —InternationalMonetary Fund Articles of Agreement [IMF] negotiations sometimesenable government leaders to do what they privately wish todo, but are powerless to do domestically. —Robert Putnam(1988, p. 457)

     

Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and Accountability

Much has been said about the failing policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this essay, I attempt to explain why the IMF has pursued policies that in many cases not only failed to promote the stated objectives of enhancing growth and stability, but were probably counterproductive and even flew in the face of a considerable body of theoretical and empirical work that suggested these poilcies would be counterproductive. I argue that the root of the problem lies in the IMF's system of governance. Thereafter, I discuss how the World Bank managed to reform its agenda in order to fulfill its goals of poverty reduction more successfully, and what lessons this reform holds for the IMF. I conclude by proposing needed reforms for the IMF that might mitigate some of the problems it has encountered in the past.¹     

A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality

The paper explains IMF and World Banklending and conditionality stressingchanges in relative bargaining power ofdifferent stakeholders over time. Itapplies public choice theory to explain theinterests of the institutions' memberstates, its borrowers and staffs as well asprivate actors attaching their money to theIFIs' programs. Using panel data for 43countries between 1987–99 it is shown thatthe number of Fund conditions seems to beinfluenced by contemporaneous World Bankactivity and ``bad'' policies.     

Back to Basics: The Great Recession and the Narrowing of IMF Policy Advice

This article contributes to the literature on the dynamics of change and continuity in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) policy paradigm. The IMF embarked on a process of “streamlining conditionality” during the 2000s, but many observers have argued that the IMF's policy paradigm from the 1990s remains intact. This article examines whether the scope of the IMF's policy advice to borrowers during the Great Recession narrowed in comparison to its advice to borrowers during the heyday of the Washington consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. The article uses qualitative content analysis to establish the frequency of a series of policy dialogue indicators in four sample sets of countries requesting IMF stand‐by arrangements over three decades. The evidence suggests that contemporary IMF policy advice to borrowers continues to stress the importance of fiscal consolidation, with reduced emphasis on promoting the structural economic reforms associated with the Washington consensus era.     

Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011

The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter‐ or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re‐analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time‐series cross‐section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross‐classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.     

Making Sense of Greek Austerity

The process of approving a Greek drawing on funds provided by the international community is now familiar. There is concern about the prospect of securing an agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and Greece, which satisfies all parties. This paper suggests that all parties to the agreement have interests in an orderly resolution of the Greek crisis that keeps Greece in the Eurozone. Furthermore, it argues that disagreements and delay before eleventh‐hour agreements can best be explained politically. The paper first demonstrates how Greece, the IMF, and the EU each have a clear interest in finding an orderly solution to the Greek crisis that allows it to remain in the Eurozone. It then outlines the incremental nature of the package and its strategic benefit both for the European banking sector, and governments in Greece and the Eurozone more broadly.     

IMF flexibility or neoliberal adaptation: A discursive content analysis of Article IV policy biases in Argentina

At the turn of the century, the consensus among scholars was that the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policy preferences, which centered on deflation via austerity, privatization, and deregulation, were indicative of its neoliberal bias. However, a subsequent wave of literature has challenged this view by suggesting that the IMF has demonstrated flexibility. While these accounts arrive at their conclusion via different analytical and empirical focuses, this article posits that the flexibility or breath of ideas found within the discourse itself is key to gauging policy biases (previous study). Herein, this article contributes to the question of whether the IMF can be considered a “flexible” institution via its analysis on Argentina (1989–2006; 2016–2017). Extending a previous study's methods, this one provides a “discursive content analysis,” on the IMF–Argentine Article IV consultations. Ultimately, the findings show that policy discourse remained neoliberal throughout.     

Pakistan on the brink

The massive suicide bomb that destroyed the Marriott hotel in Islamabad on 20 September drew international attention to three crises – security, political and economic – that are challenging Pakistan and its leadership. The rise of a local Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan is a major concern. So are ongoing political uncertainty and an economic crisis that saw Pakistan ask the International Monetary Fund for a $7.6 billion loan in November.     

The Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis

The IMF settlement of December 1976 looms large in popular and partisan views of the politics of the 1970s. It is argued here that conventional academic wisdom has come to embody several misleading myths about its impact on economic policy. Evidence is presented to challenge four such myths which suggest that the IMF forced the Labour government to launch an attack on public spending, introduce cash limits to control public spending, introduce monetary targets and abandon the pursuit of full employment through demand management.
Although the language of the [IMF] negotiations reflected the arcane terms of international finance… the decisions required of the British Government were profoundly political… behind the technical financial decisions lay fundamental differences over the appropriate balance between the private and public sectors, the priority between capital accumulation and social welfare, the relative weight to be given to incentives and equality… What was at issue was the future shape of the political economy of Great Britain.¹     

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.     

Government Constraints and Accountability: Economic Voting in Greece Before and During the IMF Intervention

Incumbent parties in Southern Europe experienced losses in their electoral support that came along with a series of economic reforms imposed by the EU and the IMF. However, recent theories of accountability would predict lower levels of economic voting given the limited room left for national governments to manoeuvre the economy. To resolve this puzzle, the paper presents and models quarterly vote intention time series data from Greece (2000–2012) and links it with the state of the economy. The empirical results show that after the bailout loan agreement Greek voters significantly shifted their assignment of responsibility for (economic) policy outcomes from the EU to the national government, which in turn heightened the impact of objective economic conditions on governing party support. The findings have implications for theories linking international structures, government constraints and democratic accountability.     

Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea: the Case of the Kim Young Sam Administration, 1993–1998

This article examines the nature of political and institutional reform initiatives that have been carried out under former president Kim Young Sam. How effective have they been in consolidating democracy in Korea? Specifically, we examine why the Kim Young Sam government's political reform campaigns have been limited, and explore the impact of this limitation on his institutional reform initiatives and the process of consolidation of democracy in Korea. We argue that Kim Young Sam's initial political reform campaigns have contributed to creating a favorable environment for his institutional reform efforts. However, limitations of these initial political reform campaigns such as political funding and bribery scandals have hampered institutional reforms. We also argue that these difficulties were intensified by public dissatisfaction with Korea's poor economic performance and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance. As a result, Kim Young Sam's moral legitimacy as a civilian and reform-oriented leader toward the public has totally evaporated. Therefore, experiences under the Kim Young Sam administration are just trials and errors of democratization that show another failure in presidential leadership in Korea. These experiences will negatively affect the consolidation process of democracy in Korea by increasing the public's distrust of government as a whole. As a result, democratic consolidation in Korea is being delayed.