Freedom of Expression,Autonomy, and Defamation

Law and Philosophy -     

表达自由的法律涵义

在西方发达国家表达自由被认为是民主社会的重要基础,是每个人发展与进步的基本条件.根据美国的法律实践,法律对表达自由的保障,不仅适用于为大众所普遍接受的、无害的或中立的信息及思想,而且也适用于那些令人不愉快的、扰乱国家或不利于某一部分群体的信息或思想.因为这些都是民主社会的多样性、多元性与宽宏大量所需要的.在此前提下,任何有关表达自由的形式、条件、限制或处罚等方面的立法都必须是确定的.     

表达自由与民主政治

文章从民主政治最基本的含义,即自治出发,讨论了表达自由与民主政治的关系.民主政治的健康运行,必须以民众能够享有表达自由为前提,民众必须能够就范围广泛的公共事务,借助报纸、电台和互联网这样的传播媒体,进行公开和充满活力的讨论.政府必须随时回应来自民众的呼声和意见.在这种情况下,不仅直接与民主政治有关的政治言论应当受到保护,而且有助于培养民众政治参与的表达,也应当受到法律保护.     

表达自由与合理使用制度

一表达自由(freedom of expression),也称信息自由、言论自由(freedom of speech),意指所见所闻所思以某种方式或形式表现于外的自由。它至少包括了解信息的自由、持有意见的自由、传播意见的自由、接受意见的自由、意见表达方式的自由,是一个以知情权为中心的法律构造。信息自由保障了一个人传递并且获得信息的权利。其正当性大致基于下面三个互相依     

论表达自由

作为宪法自由权的表达自由指公民享有的受法律规定、认可和保障的 ,使用各种媒介手段与方式公开发表、传递自己的意见、主张、观点、情感等内容而不受任何他人或组织干涉、限制或侵犯的权利。主要包括 :言论、新闻出版自由、艺术表现自由和集会自由。表达自由具有广义的政治自由权利属性 ,但不是政治自由权利的核心 ;是属于外在的精神自由 ,具有广义的精神自由属性 ;表达自由不属于思想自由 ,而是思想自由的外在表现 ,它确证着人们思想自由的实现程度     

表达自由和人格权的冲突与调和——从基本权利限制理论角度观察

在基本权利体系中,人格权是一种旨在保护个人自由的基本权利,表达自由则是一种旨在促进公共参与以及促进公共利益和公共道德的基本权利.在特定情形下,表达自由与人格权所包涵的两种价值追求呈现出一种相互竞争的态势,人格权的实现会对表意人构成限制,而表达自由如果与基本权利之外所谓"公共福祉"之类的法律理由相结合,便会对人格权构成限制.作为当事人的冲突双方尽可通过论证的方式,来为规范性或者评价性陈述提供合理基础,支持自己的权利主张.裁判者则不能任意地限制一项权利,无论如何,冲突需要被衡量.     

知识产权领域的表达自由:保护与规制

表达自由是世界各国普遍认可的宪法权利,在知识产权领域是以私权及其限制制度得以实现的。表达自由原则后延伸至商业言论领域,由此形成政治言论与商业言论类型之分,并产生保护与规制的法律问题。知识产权领域的表达自由,主要有新闻报道、戏仿创作、安全软件警示、商标戏仿、广告宣传等情形,其受保护的条件及程度各有不同。在知识产权司法实践中,对商业言论在内的表达自由案件,应注重宪法、知识产权法、反不正当竞争法等系统规范适用,同时考虑建构公共利益检验标准、法益位阶选择规则、利益平衡原则作业方案等裁判规则。     

论表达自由与公正审判

表达自由与公正审判均具有极大的社会价值 ,但又存在着一定的利益冲突 ,怎样合理处理它们之间的关系 ,是各国法学界和法律实务界共同关注的重要话题。本文概述了国际社会对表达自由与公正审判关系之态度 ,着重阐述了表达自由与公正审判之间的界线问题 ,并最终提出了在国内解决这一矛盾的建议     

表达自由、媒体近用权与政府规制

一、表达自由与思想市场理论 表达自由,又称表现自由、意见自由、表述自由,其内涵和外延在学理和制度上可谓莫衷一是、形形色色,不过,将这项具有普适性的基本人权界定为:公民享有的受法律规定、认可或保障的,使用各种媒介或方式公开发表、传递思想、意见、主张、观点、情感或信息等内容而不受他人干涉、限制或侵犯的权利,则应被广泛接受.     

Freedom of Expression and Choice of Language*

This paper argues that sound principles of freedom of expression protect an individual's choice of which language to speak. They do so, not to guarantee against mistranslation, but rather to ensure that speakers are able to reach their intended audiences and, more importantly, to allow for the expressive value of speaking a particular language as a symbol of ethnic or political identification. The example of Quebec's Charter of the French Language and the resulting litigation is considered in some detail.     

Freedom and Futures: Personal Priorities, Institutional Demands and Freedom of Religion

How should one define the legitimate reach of individuals' institutional obligations in the light of their right to freedom of religion? The most divisive settings for this question involve exclusions from certain jobs and schools. At the same time, some fundamental issues of ethics and law lie in the background. One of the most central concerns choice. On one approach, if there are other sources of work or education that do not make the same demands on the objector then she should choose between conforming and taking up that alternative. On another approach, even if there are such alternatives, people should not be confronted with such a dilemma: they should be entitled to stay in their preferred institution, which must make its best effort to accommodate them. The conflict between these two views arises from underlying differences concerning the nature of free choice itself; about the obligations borne by institutions in civil society; and about basic rights. The connections between these notions are investigated, and a way through the disagreement is suggested.     

Freedom of Expression in the Dutch Constitution: Censorship and Sense Construction

Models of communication,frequently used in legal semiotics, offeran analytic framework for the relationshipbetween legal rules on the one hand andcorresponding behaviour on the other.Semiotic models seek to clarify(un)successful legal communication; theytry to reveal the processes ofinterpretation and sense construction. Theessence of these models is that thesubstantive meaning of a rule can (orcannot) be transmitted in a `flow model'of information. The models are based upona linear causality of ruleinformation. In this paper, the processesof sense construction are described,taking the freedom of expression, as laiddown in Article 7 of the DutchConstitution, as an example. Although thetext of Article 7 remained unalteredsince its first drafting in 1815, itssubstantive meaning has changedfundamentally. The transformation wascaused by complex processes that tookplace in social practice. These complexprocesses with respect to Article 7 arecompared with the transformation processesanalysed with respect to Article 96 of theDutch Constitution, published in anearlier paper. A comparison between bothArticles leads to the question: `Do weneed to construct an analytical model forlegal communication in whichreciprocal relations between legislatorand citizens are highlighted?' On thebasis of the two case studies, whichdescribe the influence of social practiceon the substantive meaning of the(textually unaltered) Articles, we have toanswer the question in the affirmative.     

侵犯著作权的惩罚性赔偿与表达自由

著作权侵权具有易发性、难以预防和控制、侵权成本低与维权成本高的特点。传统民法认为,侵权损害赔偿只具有填补损害的功能。然而,作品作为一种典型的公共产品,著作权人对作品的控制较弱,补偿性损害赔偿难以为著作权提供足够保护。因此,在著作权侵权救济中应引入惩罚性赔偿。同时,考虑到惩罚性赔偿有可能会不合理地限制作品的传播进而影响到社会公众的表达自由,在惩罚性赔偿的适用范围和条件上应当做出一定限制。     

言论自由、出版自由、新闻自由的主体及其法律保护

言论自由的主体是自然人 ,出版自由的主体是自然人和法人 ,新闻自由的主体是法人。法律应当对言论区别不同类型给以相应的保护 ;对出版自由 ,法律既要保护 ,又要限制 ,但二者的界限尚有待明确 ;法律对新闻自由在保护的同时 ,要注意它与公民个人权利、与国家权力、与公众人物的利益发生冲突时应采取不同的调整手段。     

表达自由:美国非营利组织的宪政基石

在美国,对于非营利组织而言,表达自由远比结社自由更为重要.表达自由保障了非营利组织的资源筹措,限制了官方对非营利组织的表达活动的任意限制,提高了官员及公众人物对非营利组织提起诽谤诉讼的门槛,从而成为美国非营利组织发展的宪政基石.     

Freedom of Opinion and Freedom of Expression: Some Reflections on General Comment No. 34 of the Un Human Rights Committee

The United Nations Human Rights Committee is a body of 18 independent experts (including a member from the Netherlands, Professor Cees Flinterman) who are tasked with monitoring compliance with the provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in force 23 March 1976). The Committee deploys four principal activities — periodic examination of State Party reports, interpretation and progressive development of the provisions of the Covenant in the form of General Comments, and adjudication of individual complaints under the Optional Protocol, as well as follow-up procedures. This article analyzes the Committee’s second General Comment on Article 19 of the Covenant, which stipulates freedom of opinion and freedom of expression. In 52 paragraphs the General Comment systematically examines, defines and delimits the concepts contained in the three subparagraphs of Article 19, basing itself primarily on the Committee’s concluding observations upon examination of State Party reports and on the case-law in response to petitions under the Optional Protocol. The Committee highlights the primacy of freedom of opinion, recognizing that it is crucial for a democratic society that persons have access to truthful, reliable and pluralistic information, including through the internet, in order to develop a personal opinion whose expression must then be protected by law. The Committee notes, however, that whereas it is inadmissible to impose any restrictions on freedom of opinion, there are certain responsibilities that attach to the exercise of freedom of expression, namely the respect of the reputation of others as well as considerations of health, morals and national security. The Committee holds that so-called ‘memory laws’ as well as blasphemy laws are incompatible with Article 19 and that defamation laws must strike a balance between competing rights and interests. Paragraph 49 of the General Comment clearly affirms the right to hold non-conformist historical views and the right to be wrong. While it is not the function of lawyers or judges to establish what historical truth is, Article 20 of the Covenant imposes an obligation on governments to prohibit incitement to racial hatred or violence, the criminalization of which requires narrow definition of the elements of the crime.