On Logic in the Law: “Something,but not All”

Abstract. In 1880, when Oliver Wendell Holmes (later to be a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) criticized the “logical theology” of law articulated by Christopher Columbus Langdell (the first Dean of Harvard Law School), neither Holmes nor Langdell was aware of the revolution in logic that had begun, the year before, with Frege's Begriffsschrift. But there is an important element of truth in Holmes's insistence that a legal system cannot be adequately understood as a system of “axioms and corollaries”; and this element of truth is not obviated by the more powerful logical techniques that are now available.     

Shifting the Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influences on the Supreme Court's Use of the Marketplace Metaphor in Twenty-First-Century Free Expression Cases

Justices on the Supreme Court of the United States have employed the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor to communicate how they understand freedom of expression for nearly a century. The meanings behind metaphors, however, are not static. This article examines whether justices’ references to the metaphor in twenty-first-century cases remain primarily tied to the original meaning – one related to the Enlightenment ideas at the heart of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's first use of the metaphor in 1919 – or if the meaning has shifted to represent more discourse-based understandings of communication in democratic society, such as those put forth by John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas. This article, through an analysis of twenty-first century Supreme Court decisions that discussed the marketplace metaphor, identifies evidence of a shift in the Court's understanding of the foundational theoretical concepts behind the meaning of the metaphor.     

霍姆斯大法官的言论自由观——“明显且现实的危险”原则的发展

霍姆斯大法官对言论自由保护的观点主要表现为提出了"明显且现实的危险"原则这一理论。在1919年的谢内库诉合众国案中,霍姆斯提出了"明显且现实的危险"原则,在艾布拉姆斯诉合众国案中又提出了"思想市场"这一概念。在1925年的吉特洛诉纽约州案中,他提出"明显且现实的危险"检验标准完全适用于对立法裁决的司法审查,在1927年的惠特尼诉加利福尼亚州案中,布兰戴斯大法官(霍姆斯赞同)对这一原则进行了进一步的修正和完善。在该案中提出的"明显且现实的危险"原则适用的限制条件,使这一理论的发展达到成熟。霍姆斯提出的这个理论,后来成为美国完善公民拥有言论、出版自由的理论基础,对美国的法理学产生了很大的影响。     

The Creative Commons licences through moral rights provisions in French law

Since 2002, Creative Commons has been continuously evolving in order to create a licensing scheme that not only fulfils the needs of the author but also stays compatible with already existing national copyright laws. The extent of the respect of moral rights provisions has always been highlighted during the licences’ evolution. This Article first examines whether moral rights are expressly mentioned in the licences and if so, what their treatment is. Each element of the moral rights in the French system will be considered in order to verify their compatibility with the Creative Commons licences. In this context, it will be also asserted whether some existing clauses in the licence contradict with the moral rights of authors. The Article will conclude that although a more flexible interpretation of moral rights provisions is needed when dealing with open content licences, it is essential that Creative Commons addresses the aspects of the licences that are identified as problematic in relation to moral rights. Finally, it will be demonstrated that regardless of the legal status of the licences, the authors' responsibility towards their rights is what will ultimately be the safeguard of their creations' path.     

“人权的终结”六论

作为意识形态的人权成功波及全球,而作为实践的人权却面临着巨大灾难和困境,这形成了鲜明的悖论。尽管权利是自由主义的卓越产物,但自由主义政治哲学和法律哲学却未能充分理解权利的运作。因此,本文提出一种新的人权谱系和人权哲学对自由主义人权理论予以替代。作者主要从人权与自然法的革命性特征,人权与主权的内在联系,人权普世主义与文化相对主义的相互依赖,以及人权在追求人的解放和自我实现过程中对主体的分裂和重构等方面展开论述。     

权利思维的另一面

严格说来,全球范围(中国尤甚)内的对权利的学术理论研究对于权利的现实性或者权利的社会实用性相对较为忽视。两位美国学者史蒂芬·霍姆斯和卡什·R·孙斯坦撰写的《权利的成本》一书则是力图改变上述缺憾的一部力作。书中体现出来的现实主义的权利思维路径对我们关于权利的理论思考和实践构设与操作具有启发和借鉴意义。     

实用主义的法官法理学*--透视霍姆斯大法官的司法哲学

奥利弗·W.霍姆斯是美国法理学与司法史上的一个里程碑,历经百年,他的司法哲学仍然意义深远地影响着美国的法律思想与司法实践。在霍姆斯的司法哲学理论中,法官的首要职责是遵守代表多数方的立法,即使立法存在缺陷;然而,对立法机构的尊重,并不是因为法院缺乏发现事实的能力,而是法官在裁判时不得依赖个人对事实的认知。在其撰写的司法意见中,霍姆斯为言论自由与结社所做的辩护与其对优势社会力量或立法的尊重之间存在着矛盾。正是古典的司法自制理论与狭义的司法能动主义,共同构成了霍姆斯的实用主义法理学,这是一种美国法律本土背景下的法官法理学。     

Retrieving the ‘subject’ of European integration

In this article, a critical reinterpretation of citizens as subjects of European integration moves the focus of EU law from EU citizens' subjection to their subjectification. This analysis draws on post‐structural social theory in arguing that the law is instrumental to securing the material conditions for transnational political subjectification because it regulates both EU citizens' access to transnational social relations and the perception of difference between them. However, the law also reinforces constraints on the process of transnational subjectification. Systematic obstacles, which must be taken into account, are not limited to economic status, but include other variables like gender or age. It will be argued on this basis that EU law needs to develop a more coherent politics of subjectivity. Towards this goal, the law must carefully attend to what is (and is not) depoliticising in EU citizenship rights.     

Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist.On the Question of What Ought to Be Preserved of His Philosophy

Abstract. Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important German‐speaking philosophers of law of the twentieth century. This paper raises the question of how to classify Radbruch's theories in the international context of legal philosophy and philosophy in general. Radbruch's work was mainly influenced by the southwest German school of Neo‐Kantianism, represented by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask. Their theories of culture and value show an affirmative‐holistic understanding of philosophy as a source of wisdom and meaningfulness. Kant, on the other hand, belongs more to a fundamentally different, critical camp of philosophy. Although Radbruch has incorporated Kantian Elements into his theory, he is rather a member of the affirmative‐holistic camp. In the end the question will be raised as to what ought to be preserved of his philosophy.     

A Vision of Social‐Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich from “Living Law”

The hundredth anniversary of the original publication of Eugen Ehrlich's Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law is nearly upon us. The book earned high praise from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Karl Llewellyn as one of the outstanding works of its time. Ehrlich has been identified as an early legal realist, a pioneering figure in legal sociology, and a leading theorist of legal pluralism. In this retrospective review, I explain the strengths and weaknesses of this classic book. Ehrlich articulated an unsurpassed account of dynamic social‐legal change, an account that remains fresh and timely today.     

Some Varieties of Linguistic Argumentation

The maxim to understand the law literally (Montesquieu, Voltaire) resembles Holmes' Plain Meaning Approach. But these approaches should not be considered as the expression of a naïve legal epistemology. They rather stress that the law ought to be interpreted as it is understood by the prudent citizen. In this way, the ideal of the rule of law is best guaranteed.     

Moral Rights in the Digital Age: New Possibilities for the Democratization of Culture

This paper is concerned with the impact of digital technology on the moral rights of authors. The ability to reproduce, modify and redistribute artworks through information technology has made it extremely difficult for authors to monitor the use of their works and, where problems arise, to assert their moral rights. In spite of these difficulties, however, this paper argues that moral rights are actually growing in importance because of new technologies. It is precisely when the capacity to manipulate works is greatest that concerns about artistic integrity and the preservation of cultural heritage become most pressing. This paper suggests that technological change calls for a new approach to moral rights: the focus in the future should be on cooperative efforts between authors and their public to protect culture. Technology has the effect of 'democratizing' the relationship between author and audience by allowing the audience to participate more directly in the creative process with the author. Despite the potential threat to artistic integrity, this transformation should nevertheless be embraced by authors and artists for its positive implications for cultural vitality in the longterm.     

The House of Lords and homeless people's rights

For the past 20 years, there has been legislation enshrining certain rights for homeless people. This essay is an assessment of the judiciary's role towards homeless people as far as it applies to the most senior court, the House of Lords. It describes the nature of those issues where the House of Lords have had the opportunity to discuss the operation of the homeless persons legislation. It also seeks to explore the reasons why the approach taken has been restrictive. The House of Lords has played an important part in interpreting the homeless rights legislation. The restrictive role of their Lordships is contrasted with other areas where the court has taken rather more generous perspectives on the rights of vulnerable people. It canvasses the various reasons why this should have occurred and notes that limited assistance can be gleaned from traditional approaches to this judicial task. It suggests that the concept of differential politicization throws useful light on the process.     

Do C&IT Facilitate the Wrong Things?

There is a simple view of the role of C&IT (computers and information technology) in the legal academy that states, 'C&IT is just a tool. Use it or abuse it as you will. It has no ideology. It can no more be a bad thing than can a car or a chisel'. It is an additional resource on top of whatever we had before. I want to link that claim to a set of analogous claims about the relationship between law and science and law and mathematics, and subject them to scrutiny. I shall call these claims (that science, mathematics and computers are 'just' tools) collectively the 'neutrality claim'. So far as concerns computers, I shall suggest that C&IT in law has a tendency either towards reaction or towards reductionism in how we understand law in the academy. I will finish by considering an area in which computers have been relatively more successful-chess-and trying to work through the similarities and distinctions.     

Theorising Children's Rights in Youth Justice: The Significance of Autonomy and Foundational Rights

This paper develops a theoretical approach to children's rights in youth justice, located within a wider rights‐based theory of criminal justice which emphasises the centrality of citizens' autonomy. Understanding what is special about children's rights in the youth justice system requires an understanding of how children's autonomy differs from that of adults. One difference is that within the legal system children are not considered to be fully autonomous rights‐holders, because childhood is a time for gathering and developing the assets necessary for full autonomy. These assets should be protected by a category of ‘foundational’ rights. It is argued that an essential component of a rights‐based penal system for children is that it should not irreparably or permanently harm the child's foundational rights. The concept of foundational rights can then underpin and strengthen international children's rights standards, including those relating to the minimum age of criminal responsibility, differential sentencing for children and adults and a rights‐based system of resettlement provision.     

Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagination

Two recent books, Joseph Weiler's The Constitution of Europe and Larry Siedentop's Democracy in Europe, seek to address one of the defining issues in contemporary European legal studies; the search for a European public philosophy. Both site their critiques within a particular jurisprudential tradition, the modernist; one that is bound up with anxieties about legitimacy and constitutionalism. This review article suggests that the ‘new’ Europe has been too easily distracted by the lures of constitutionalism, and more particularly by the temptations of Treaties. Public philosophies are not found in Treaty articles. Rather, a public philosophy is a state of mind, a product of the political imagination. And it is the absence of such an imagination which lies at the root of contemporary concerns regarding constitutionalism and legitimacy; the concerns which underpin Weiler's and Siedentop's books. A discussion of these books, in the first two parts of this article, is followed by a discussion of Godfried Wilhelm Leibniz's ‘universal’ jurisprudence. It is suggested that such a jurisprudence is better able to furnish a public philosophy for the ‘new’ Europe; just as, indeed, it was for the ‘old’ Europe. Moreover, such a jurisprudence is far more than a mere theory of laws and constitutions. Leibniz's jurisprudence requires that we think, not merely ‘beyond’ sovereignty, or even beyond democracy, but beyond constitutionalism.     

Returning to the Past: The South Australian Colonisation Commission,the Colonial Office and Aboriginal Title

In the closing decades of the twentieth century many scholars sought to both address and redress the ways in which indigenous people's rights in land had been treated historically by colonisers in Anglophone settler societies. More recently, this work has been criticised by a new generation of legal historians who have sought to delineate more carefully the role that the law actually played in the treatment of aboriginal title in the past. In keeping with the latter approach, this article seeks to recover the manner in which the indigenous people's interests in land were treated in the British colony of South Australia at the time it was founded in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. It emphasises the manner in which the colonisers, the South Australian Colonisation Commission, rather than the British Colonial Office, deployed a range of legal arguments, especially in the context of political negotiations between these two parties. It concludes that the imperial government's treatment of indigenous interests in land was primarily determined by its perception of the relationships of power on the ground between the colonial state, the settlers and the Aboriginal people rather than by its application of any particular legal principle or norm.