Organised Criminals as “Agents of Obligation”: The Case of Ireland

Relying on Brown's (2005a, b) thesis that contemporary shifts in penal policy are best understood as a reprisal of colonial rationality, so that offenders become “non-citizens” or “agents of obligation”, this article argues, firstly, that this framework (with certain important refinements and extensions) finds support in developments in Irish criminal justice policy aimed at offenders suspected of involvement in “organised crime”. These offenders have found themselves reconstituted as “agents of obligation” with duties to furnish information about their property and movements, report to the police concerning their location and, importantly, refrain from criminal activity or face extraordinary sanctions. Secondly, it is submitted that this draconian approach to the control of organised crime is built on false premises; specifically the idea that “organised crime” as such exists and is best controlled through restrictions on the freedom of key groups or “core nominals”.     

Crimes committed by terrorist groups: Theory,research, and prevention

Statement of Purpose: A decline in state-sponsored terrorism has caused many terrorist organizations to resort to criminal activity as an alternative means of support. This study examines terrorists' involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and manufacturing illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. Special attention is given to transnational organized crime. Crimes are analyzed through the routine activity perspective and social learning theory. These theories draw our attention to the opportunities to commit crime and the criminal skills necessary to turn opportunity into criminality. Through these lenses, the research appraises the “successes” and “failures” of terrorists' engagement in crime. Because “failures” can result from law enforcement efforts to (1) interrupt criminal skill development, and/or (2) remove criminal opportunities via technologies and transportation systems, the research represents a best practices approach to the study and control of terrorism. This project was supported by Grant No. 2003-DT-CX-0002 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Organized economic crime and corruption in Urkraine: The problem of countermeasures

The collapse of communism in Ukraine created opportunities for organized criminal groups to expand their economic criminal activities in the “shadow economy” by penetrating all levels of public and economic administration. Ukrainian law enforcement agencies are poorly equipped to handle this increase in criminal activity, especially with respect to uncooperative foreign and domestic economic institutions. State machinery for regulation and control of industry and commerce was easily accessible to organized crime through bribing of state officials, who received no supervision during economic restructuring. Notwithstanding the active assistance of corrupt government officials, organized economic crime has benefited from chaos and lost government control as the result of recent economic reforms in Ukraine. Researchers in this study hypothesize that the social and economic disorder, as well as a common and justified mistrust of state officials, fosters a pessimism and erodes moral standards, which in turn fosters criminal activity. Of late, judicial sentencing for those convicted of economic crimes has become lighter while many economic criminal cases are never investigated or prosecuted in the first place. In order to combat large-scale corruption, there must be better supervision of government officials and better monitoring of foreign economic transactions. One of the most disastrous consequences of the collapse of the Ukrainian communist system has been the widespread increase of economic crime. This phenomenon is self-sustaining, penetrating all levels of Ukraine's economy and administrative sectors. Criminal activity helps to sustain the shadow economy in Ukraine, which has been estimated by various sources to constitute 50 to 60 percent of the economy. Law enforcement and administrative efforts have been largely futile in curbing this corruption. Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome the criminal social and economic order that has become ingrained in this “shadow economy.” This paper seeks to propose policy solutions for Ukrainian economic crime and corruption that could be implemented at the national level.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Random Activities Theory</Emphasis>: The Case for ‘Black Swan’ Criminology

In the United States, infamous crimes against innocent victims—especially children—have repeatedly been regarded as justice system “failures” and resulted in reactionary legislation enacted without regard to prospective negative consequences. This pattern in part results when ‘memorial crime control’ advocates implicitly but inappropriately apply the tenets of routine activities theory, wherein crime prevention is presumed to be achievable by hardening likely targets, increasing the costs associated with crime commission, and removing criminal opportunity. In response, the authors argue that academic and public policy discourse will benefit from the inclusion of a new criminological perspective called random activities theory, in which tragic crimes are framed as rare but statistically inevitable ‘Black Swans’ instead of justice system failures. Potential objections and implications for public policy are discussed at length.     

“Where's Whitey?”: Black Mass, ethnic criminality, and the problem of the informant

The essay is an interdisciplinary examination of the popular American tradition of organized-crime narratives based on the testimony of criminal informants. Primarily, it examines the most prominent current instance of this tradition: a book entitled Black Mass: The Irish Mob, the FBI, and a Devil's Deal (2000), depicting the recent scandal involving James “Whitey” Bulger. While this book is often received as a contemporary exposé of the ethical perils of informant use in combating organized crime, it actually reiterates the chronic interpretive pitfalls of more traditional “gangland” informant narratives like Murder, Inc. (1951) or Peter Maas's The Valachi Papers (1968). Black Mass's adoption of a classical “noir” literary form, meanwhile, imports certain traditional assumptions that often make these popular narratives immune to recent academic revisions: assumptions about the “Fordist” character of criminal organization, about the uncanny but invisible skills of modern ethnic gangsters, and about the relationship of the state to organized crime. Portions of this paper were presented at a conference hosted by the University of Chicago in May 2004: “Constructing the Current: Theorizing Media in a New Millennium”.     

The natural history of extended co-offending

Most criminal acts are committed in very small groups or alone, and are repeated sporadically. But that is not always the case. Co-offending can include larger groups, cooperating sequentially or simultaneously, knowing each other or at least knowing about one another. We may use the term “extended co-offending” to subsume varieties of crime organization, crime networks, gangs, and criminal clusters. Extended co-offending also includes vaguely organized crime repetitions, and is a matter of degree. Criminal cooperation can be extended in time, space, numbers of persons involved, and types of criminal action. The extension process has a very wide span of possibilities. Drawing ideas from Max Weber and others, this paper suggests that the natural history of criminal cooperation progresses in four stages, with steeply decreasing prevalence: (1) primordial clusters of offenders, (2) small-scale charismatic leadership of offenders, (3) a medium-scale patrimonial system of offenders, and (4) and an extended patrimonial system of criminal cooperation. Primordial co-offending occurs on a very local level, with little or no hierarchy or systematic repetition. Extended criminal cooperation usually requires personal trust among offenders, favoring patrimony over formal organization.     

Criminal victimization of the elderly: An overview

This paper reviews existing literature and examines three questions : a) the nature and extent of criminal victimization of the elderly, b) the impact of crime on the lives of the elderly, and c) suggested crime prevention measures. One finds that contrary to popular opinion the elderly are less frequently criminally victimized than persons in younger age groups. The 1966 NORC survey, 1972 Denver Victimization Survey, and the 1973 LEAA Survey, all show that the elderly in comparison to younger age groups are victimized less frequently for most personal crimes. However, there is variability in regard to who among the elderly are more likely to be victimized. In profile the elderly at highest “risk” are single females who are socially isolated, have physical or mental impairments, incomes below $3000 per year, and live in or near high crime areas. Despite the fact that the elderly are less frequently victimized than others their “fear of crime” is greater, and has been increasing since 1965, than other age groups. Many factors are important in fueling their fear. Some of the more important concerns are the elderly’s physical and emotional vulnerability, especially in high crime areas, and their isolation (both socially and self-imposed) from others within a community. There are, however, efforts being made to further protect the elderly against crimes and to reduce their fear. Several examples of existing programs established in an effort to ameliorate the problems are specified. Also, suggestions, based on research findings, are made which could further deter crimes against the elderly and lessen the insidious fear of crime that exists.     

“Organized crime” and “organized crime”: Indeterminate problems of definition

Despite decades of effort, the search for a universal definition of organized crime has eluded both academics, criminal justice agencies, as well as international bodies. More than two decades ago, a content analysis of such definitional efforts by this writer (Hagan, 1983) noted that, while many writers, including those of textbooks, failed to supply explicit definitions of organized crime, some consensus was apparent. These earlier findings are explored and compared with updated content analyses of American criminology and criminal justice textbooks and organized crime textbooks. Also discussed are definitions offered by criminal justice agencies and those by international organizations. A distinction is made between “Organized Crime” groups and “organized crime,” activities by groups that are organized. This paper was presented at the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Baltimore, Maryland, March 2006.     

Microcycles of Violence: Evidence from Terrorist Attacks by ETA and the FMLN

Recent research has demonstrated that individual crimes elevate the risk for subsequent crimes nearby, a phenomenon termed “near-repeats.” Yet these assessments only reveal global patterns of event interdependence, ignoring the possibility that individual events may be part of localized bursts of activity, or microcycles. In this study, we propose a method for identifying and analyzing criminal microcycles; groups of events that are proximate to each other in both space and time. We use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to analyze over 4,000 terrorist attacks attributed to the FMLN in El Salvador and the ETA in Spain; two terrorist organizations that were both extremely active and violent but differed greatly in terms of history, grievances and motives. Based on the definition developed, we find strong support for the conclusion that many of the terrorist attacks attributed to these two distinctive groups were part of violent microcycles and that the spatio-temporal attack patterns of these two groups exhibit substantial similarities. Our logistic regression analysis shows that for both ETA and the FMLN, compared to other tactics used by terrorists, bombings and non-lethal attacks are more likely to be part of microcycles and that compared to attacks which occur elsewhere, attacks aimed at national or provincial capitals or areas of specific strategic interest to the terrorist organization are more likely to be part of microcycles. Finally, for the FMLN only, compared to other attacks, those on military and government targets were more likely part of microcycles. We argue that these methods could be useful more generally for understanding the situational and temporal distribution of crime.     

Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism

This report assesses conditions that contribute to or are potentially hospitable to transnational criminal activity and terrorist activity in selected regions of the world during the period 1999–2002. Although the focus of the report is on transnational activity, domestic criminal activity is recognized as a key foundation for transnational crime, especially as the forces of globalization intensify. The report has been arranged geographically into the following major headings: Africa, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. Within the geographical headings, the report addresses individual countries with particularly salient conditions. Cases such as the Triborder Area (TBA) of South America and East and West Africa, where conditions largely overlap national borders, have been treated as regions rather than by imposing an artificial delineation by country. The bibliography has been divided into the same geographical headings as the text. The major sources for this report are recent periodical reports from Western and regional sources, Internet sites offering credible recent information, selected recent monographs, and personal communications with regional experts. Treatment of individual countries varies according to the extent and seriousness of conditions under study. Thus some countries in a region are not discussed, and others are discussed only from the perspective of one or two pertinent activities or conditions. Because they border the United States, Canada and Mexico have received especially extensive treatment.     

The Internet, Technology, and Organized Crime

Digital technology has transformed organizational life. Developments in communications, and in information storage and retrieval, to name just two areas, have greatly enhanced the efficiency with which legitimate organizations operate. Unfortunately, the benefits of digital technology are not lost on criminal organizations, which exploit digital technology to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their own operations. This paper will discuss the organized criminal exploitation of digital technology, by looking at a number of illustrative cases from Asia and around the world. It will discuss the various types of “conventional” organized crime that can be facilitated by digital technology, as well as terrorism, which itself can be regarded as a special kind of organized criminal activity. One fundamental question that the paper will seek to address is whether the activities of Asian organized crime have become substantively different as a result of technology, or whether traditional organized criminal activities in Asia are merely being conducted on a more efficient and effective basis. The paper will note the transnational nature of much organized criminal activity, and will discuss mechanisms for the control of organized crime in the digital age.     

Static and Dynamic Indicators of Minority Threat in Sentencing Outcomes: A Multi-Level Analysis

Designation as a “Habitual Offender” is an enhanced form of punishment which unlike, “Three Strikes” or “10-20-Life,” is entirely discretionary. We use Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling to assess the direct effects of race and Latino ethnicity on the designation of Habitual Offenders as well as the effect of both static and dynamic indicators of racial and ethnic threat on those outcomes. Our data include 26,740 adults sentenced to prison in Florida between 2002 and 2004 who were statutorily eligible to be sentenced as Habitual. The odds of receiving this designation are significantly increased for black and Latino defendants as compared to whites, though race and ethnicity effects vary substantially by crime type, being strongest for drug offenses and negligible for violent crimes. Static measures of group level threat (% black and % Latino) have no cross-level effect on sentencing by race or Latino ethnicity. However, increasing black population over time increases the odds of being sentenced as Habitual for both black and Latino defendants. Increasing Latino population increases the odds of Habitual Offender sentencing for Latinos, but decreases it for blacks. The prospect of engaging dynamic as opposed to static measures of threat in future criminal justice and other social control research is discussed.     

Hate Crime and the Privatization of Political Responsibility: Protecting Queer Citizens in the United States?

My purpose in this article is to address issues that arise with the emergence of “hate crime” law as a response to violence against historically subordinated groups, with particular reference to gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered (henceforth “GLBT”), and otherwise queer citizens. The specific jurisdictional context of my reflection is the USA but the issues I raise have significance beyond that context. Increasingly in recent years hate crime legislation has been adopted or proposed in the US as well as other jurisdictions as a response to bigotry and violence directed against minority groups in multi-cultural societies. In 2006 in the UK, proposals to outlaw “incitement to religious hatred” were hotly debated. In 2008 demands are being made to extend the ‘incitement laws’ to include incitement to homophobic hatred. In 2007 in the US the Senate and House of Representatives in Washington DC passed an Act, which some described as the Matthew Shepard Act, to promote and enhance the use of the criminal law against perpetrators of crimes motivated by hatred based on perceived sexual orientation and gender identity. Ultimately the Act failed to become law. The debates in the UK and US provide the backdrop against which I want to examine the arguments for and against hate crime legislation, both generally and with specific application to queer citizens. This require us to think again about the relation of queer citizens to the state, the reach of political equality and human rights, and the aims and limits of the criminal law and system of “criminal justice”.

Big Investment Fraud and “Yakuza Money” Crime — Two Perspectives of Financial Crime in Japan

Financial crime in Japan takes a major toll on both individual victims and the nation’s economy. This paper focuses on large investment frauds that have occurred from post-war Japan to the present as well as financial crimes that involve racketeers of boryokudans, or organized crime groups, more commonly known as yakuza. Major financial offending by organized crime groups include: yamikin (loan sharks), sokaiya (shareholders who extort corporate funds), jiageya (“land sharks” who frighten tenants into vacating properties), and new forms of yakuza money crime that constitute significant challenges to enforcement. The paper concludes that more comprehensive legislation that applies to all forms of investment fraud is needed in order to stem the tide of white-collar crime in Japanese society.     

Organized criminal involvement in the illicit antiquities trade

From the ”glocal” perspective of a large sample of archaeologists conducting fieldwork throughout the world and working on the very sites of interest to looters, this paper explores the question whether and to what extent organized crime is involved in the theft and illicit export of archaeological resources. Two major findings are presented: first, archaeologists tend almost unanimously to consider that organized crime operates within the ‘global’ antiquities market, but when asked about their own personal experiences with looting on the sites where they work, many fewer report observations of organized crime; second, however, it is apparent that respondents’ conceptions of “organized crime” involve media-driven, stereotypical representations of mafia-style structures. Therefore, although in their reporting of observed local activities they do not provide substantial survey evidence of the presence of organized crime so defined, they do report appreciable “organization” among those who have looted their sites—which, again, they have almost unanimously experienced. This paper considers the implications of such findings for both the definitional debate on organized crime and the academic analysis of the trade in looted antiquities.     

The political-criminal nexus in the united states

Summary The 1967 Task Force Report on Organized Crime (TFR) found that “...all available data indicate that organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted public officials.” 48 From that standpoint, neutralizing local law enforcement would appear to be central to criminal operations. That conclusion would depend on (a) how one defines “organized crime” and (b) the assumption that organized crime described by the Task Force covers all cases and species of it including what is referred to as “non-traditional” organized crime. A conclusion that seems unchallengeable in the Report is the observation that it was impossible to determine “the extent of the corruption of public officials in the United States.” The lack of information on this question was aggravated by the fact that many of those who provided information to the Task Force were themselves public officials.     

Crime or social harm? A dialectical perspective

This paper proposes to examine some of the core philosophical issues to have arisen out of the recent calls to move “beyond criminology”. It will be claimed that the dismissal of crime as a “fictive event” is premature, as crime does indeed have an “ontological reality”. Nevertheless, it will be asserted that the relation between harm and crime is contingent rather than necessary. Accordingly, this paper will argue that there is merit to the claim that we should unify research on social harm through the creation of a new field, a step which would have the added benefit of constructing an alternative venue for crimes of the powerful scholars who wish to explore the destructive practices of states and corporations unconstrained. This paper, therefore, will also offer a dialectical definition of social harm based upon classical Marxist strains of ontological thought.     

Intention and Attempt

Anglo-American criminal law traditionally demands a criminal purpose for an attempt conviction, even when the crime attempted requires only foresight or recklessness. Some legal philosophers have defended this rule by appeal to an alleged difference in the “moral character” or “intentional structure” of intended versus non-intended harms. I argue that there are reasons to be skeptical of any such differences; and that even if conceded, it is only on the basis of an unworkable view of criminal responsibility that such a distinction would support a rule restricting attempts to criminal purpose. I defend instead the “continuity thesis,” according to which attempts are functionally continuous with endangerment offenses: both are legal efforts to regulate unreasonably dangerous conduct. The upshot of the continuity thesis is that there is little substantive difference between attempt and endangerment in principle, no matter how they are labeled in law.     

Snakeheads,mules, and protective umbrellas: a review of current research on Chinese organized crime

China’s red-hot economy in recent decades has not only brought the country unprecedented wealth and political prominence in the world but also created ample opportunities for criminal enterprises to flourish. A review of recently published literature reveals that two types of transnational criminal activities – human smuggling and drug trafficking – received a fair amount of empirical attention in the research community. Other crimes, however, although carrying equally significant cross-national implications, have received scant attention. Thanks to a handful of empirical studies in recent years, the notion that traditional Chinese crime syndicates dominated transnational criminal activities has largely been dispelled. Most of those involved in transnational crimes (at least in human smuggling and drug trafficking) were found to be otherwise ordinary individuals who exploit their social or familial networks to take advantage of emerging opportunities. The criminal underworld in China appears to be growing along two separate tracks, with transnational organized crimes operating on one track and locally based criminal organizations on the other. Both groups of criminal entities are not known to cross paths in any systemic way. Research on Chinese organized crime (either locally based or transnational) has remained rather limited. Future research needs to emphasize empirical strategies to explore these and other pressing transnational criminal activities, as well as to solidify recent findings.     

Nigeria

Conclusion Organized crime activities flourish in Nigeria because law enforcement is weak or nonexistent at all levels. The police were corrupt even before organized crime emerged in its present form in Nigeria. Since “corruption is necessary for the successful operation of organized crime,”⁹⁴ the structure and operation of the Nigerian police, together with the activities of corrupt heads of state and corrupt politicians, made Nigeria fertile ground for organized crime. When those who make the laws and those who enforce the law are shamelessly corrupt, then the entire society is cor-rupted. These leaders are supposed to be the role models of the younger generations in Nigeria. Instead, they represent what Gresham Sykes and David Matza have termed the “appeal to higher loyalty”—a technique for rationalization of wrongs by under-privileged elements of Nigerian society who willingly engage in criminal activity.