The role of political partisanship during economic crises

Major economic crises may promote structural reforms, by increasing the cost of the status quo, or hinder them, by inducing more demand for protection. The ideology and political partisanship of the ruling government may be crucial in determining the prevailing course of action. In good times, conservative parties are typically pro-reform. However, do these parties try to exploit periods of crisis to carry out their reforms? Do social-democratic parties support even greater social protection? To answer these questions, this paper uses indicators of structural reforms in the labor, product, and financial markets for 25 OECD countries over the 1975–2008 period. The empirical analysis confirms the ambiguous effect of crises: product markets are liberalized, but financial markets become more regulated. Partisan politics also matters, as right parties are associated with more pro-market reforms. Yet, crises modify partisan politics: right-wing parties refrain from promoting privatizations, and oppose the introduction of greater financial market regulations. By contrast, center parties liberalize and trim unemployment benefits generosity, while left parties privatize. Furthermore, weak, fractionalized governments, which are associated with more regulated product markets, are also more likely to liberalize during a crisis.     

A new scale of partisanship

The 1980 and 1982 American national election studies include a new series of questions about individual partisanship. It is possible to create a 5-point scale of party support/closeness from these questions. The new measure performs reasonably as regards its relationship to other measures of partisanship, to its own continuity over time, and to dependent behavior. There is also a new question on independence, but this is best treated as a separate item rather than being incorporated in the party support/closeness scale. The new measure also performs well in measuring strength of partisanship.     

The transformation of the new deal party system: Social groups,political ideology,and changing partisanship among northern whites, 1972–1988

This paper examines the partisanship of a neglected segment of the American electorate—white northerners. Like their southern counterparts, northern whites have moved toward the GOP (Grand Old Party) and away from the Democratic party during the last two decades. In fact, a substantial plurality of northern whites now identify with the Republican party. Moreover, Democratic losses and Republican gains have not been confined to particular categories of social groups but have cut across groups traditionally identified with the parties. However, political ideology is closely related to the changing partisanship of northern whites. Liberals have become more Democratic and conservatives have become substantially more Republican since 1972. Moreover, the relationship between ideology and changing partisanship occurs within most categories of social group membership, suggesting that ideological orientations now override social group ties in the formation of partisanship. The northern white electorate, in sum, is undergoing an ideological transformation that is reshaping the contours of American politics.     

Sending mixed signals: the role of gender and partisanship in evaluations of political leaders

Partisanship and gender are powerful heuristic cues used by citizens to understand their elected officials’ ideology. When these cues send complementary signals – a Democratic woman or a Republican man – we expect they will aid citizens in evaluating their leaders’ political ideology. However, when partisanship and gender send conflicting signals, we expect citizens will be more likely to misperceive their leaders’ beliefs. We test this proposition using ideological evaluations of incumbent US senators collected in the 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies. The findings support our hypotheses, illustrating voters’ reliance on both partisan and gender cues. Our results suggest potential consequences for not only Republican women, but also Democratic men.     

Religion,partisanship and preferences for redistribution

This article offers a new theoretical explanation of the relationship between religion and the demand for redistribution. Previous literature shows that religious individuals are less likely to favour redistribution either because (a) religion provides a substitute for state welfare provision, or (b) it adds a salient moral dimension to an individual's calculus which induces them to act contrary to their economic interests. In this article, it is argued that the effect of religion on an individual's redistributive preferences is best explained by their partisanship, via a process of partisan motivated reasoning. In contexts where parties are able to combine religion with pro-redistribution policies, religious individuals are more likely to favour redistribution as doing so reinforces their partisan identity. In advanced democracies, religious individuals are more likely to be supporters of centre-right parties that oppose redistribution. However, in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the historical and political context leads to the opposite expectation. The nature of party competition in CEE has seen nationalist populist parties adopt policy platforms that combine religion and leftist economic programmes. They are able to credibly combine these two positions due to the way in which religion and the welfare state became linked to conceptions of the nation during the inter-war state-building years. Using data from 2002–2014, the study shows that religiosity is associated with pro-redistribution attitudes in CEE. Furthermore, religious supporters of nationalist populist parties are more likely to favour redistribution than religious supporters of other parties. The results of this research add greater nuance to our understanding of the relationship between religiosity and economic preferences.     

Social determinism,rationality, and partisanship among college students

This study finds high rates of defection from parental partisanship among a sample of undergraduate students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, despite relying on students' perceptions of their parents' party loyalties, which almost certainly exaggerate agreement between students and parents. There was a much higher rate of defection among students from Republican families than among students from Democratic families. The pattern of defections from parental partisanship was consistent with the rational reevaluation hypothesis: liberal-conservative self-placement was strongly related to party identification among students from Republican families and families without a party preference.     

Ethos,ideology, and partisanship: Exploring the paradox of conservative democrats

Despite the increasingly liberal cast of the national Democratic Party, self-identified conservatives continue to represent a significant segment of the party. At least 25 percent of Democratic identifiers considered themselves to be conservatives during the 1972–1988 period. This paper explores the puzzle of why significant numbers of political conservatives continue to identify with the Democratic Party. We argue that conservative Democrats relate to their party not because of political ideology, as do Republicans and to a lesser extent, liberal/moderate Democrats, but because of the symbolic values associated with the main groups in the party—what we refer to as party ethos. This proposition is examined by analyzing a new set of open-ended questions included in the 1988 American National Election Study probing citizens' images and assessments of the Republican and Democratic parties.The data utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data forAmerican National Election Study 1988: Pre- and Post-Election Survey were originally collected by Warren E. Miller and the National Election Studies. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.     

Political interest furthers partisanship in England,Scotland, and Wales

According to much of the literature, partisanship in Britain exercises little independent influence on the vote but merely reflects voters’ prospective and retrospective evaluations of the parties’ performance with regard to their management of the economy, national security, and public services. In this view, partisanship comes close to Fiorina’s model of a “running tally” of political experiences. Similarly, Dalton’s notion of “cognitive mobilization” suggests that seeking out political information should undermine both the need for and the likelihood of party identification. Applying Mixed Markov Latent Class Analysis to the British Election Study Panel 1997–2000, we challenge these perceptions by demonstrating that partisanship is more stable than previously thought, and that high levels of political interest are linked to higher levels of partisanship and possible also to higher levels of stability. This is much more in line with classic ideas about party identification than with “revisionist” critiques of the Michigan model, and with current models of political cognition. Moreover, it suggests that political interest renders affective ties more powerful in stabilizing themselves.     

Weakening partisanship and the higher educated in Britain

Abstract. The decline in support for traditional political parties in a number of Western democracies is often attributed to the effects of recent educational expansion and a consequent rise in cognitive mobilisation in the electorate. The thesis that support for the two major parties in Britain is lowest among the young educated is tested here, using survey data for the period 1964–1983. The analysis indicates that for only a short time in the early 1970s was there evidence of such a relationship, and that differences in major-party support which are related to age and to educational achievement have all but disappeared by the 1980s. Moreover, the findings cast serious doubt upon the validity of current operationalisations of 'cognitive mobilisation'.     

Short term forces and changing partisanship

This research stemmed from the growing realization that party ID is not purely the long-term force originally conceptualized. The current conception is that it is a combination of a standing decision and responses to political events. The research addresses two questions: For what proportion of partisan changers is party ID a lagging, stable attachment to be changed only after a period of disaffection from one's party? What is the relative power of the various time 1 short term forces to alter party ID time 2? Among the short term forces, time 1voting behavior showed the strongest relationship to future change in ID. Criteria were established to identify changers whose change was based in past attitudes or behavior. For these criteria a typology was created to categorize the possible time 1 reasons and motivations for changing partisanship. The distribution of changers among categories illustrated that past voting behavior is the major instrument of partisan change. Only a small percentage were motivated by attitudes alone. Thus, overall the distribution confirmed the conception of party ID as lagging and stable. However, a substantial minority, 31 percent, showed no prior signs of partisan change.     

Transnational partisanship: idea and practice

That parties might successfully organize transnationally is an idea often met with scepticism. This article argues that while certain favourable conditions are indeed absent in the transnational domain, this implies not that partisanship is impossible but that it is likely to be marked by certain traits. Specifically, it will tend to be episodic, structured as a low-density network and delocalized in its ideational content. These tendencies affect the normative expectations one can attach to it. Transnational partisanship should be valued as a transitional phenomenon, e.g. as a pathway to transnational democracy, more than as a desirable thing in itself.     

Democracy,interrupted: Regime change and partisanship in twentieth-century Argentina

Electoral volatility is much higher in new than in advanced democracies. Some scholars contend that weak partisan ties among the electorate lie behind this high volatility. Political parties in new democracies do not invest in building strong linkages with voters, they claim; hence partisanship is not widespread, nor does it grow over time. Our view is that democratic processes do encourage the spread of partisanship and hence the stabilization of electoral outcomes over time in new democracies. But this dynamic can be masked by countervailing factors and cut short by regime instability. We expect that, all else being equal, volatility will decline over time as a new democracy matures but increase again when democracy is interrupted. We use disaggregated ecological data from Argentina over nearly a century to show that electoral stability grows during democratic periods and erodes during dictatorships.     

A new political system

Nomination: Trichotomy or dichotomy? by Arend Lijphart, p.125
Nomination: Semi–presidentialism: A political model at work by Gianfranco Pasquino, p.128
Reflections: The political system of the European Unionby Maurice Duverger, p.137     

A new political system

Abstract This article aims at defining the concept of 'semi-presidential government' and detailing the diversity of its practices. There are in fact three types of semi-presidential regimes: the president can be a mere figurehead, or he may be all-powerful or again he can share his power with parliament. Using four parameters - the content of the constitution, tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority and the position of the president in relation to the majority - the author seeks to explain why similar constitutions are applied in a radically different manner.     

Government partisanship in Western democracies, 1945–1998

Abstract. In this article, we put forward a continuous measure of government partisanship, which allows meaningful comparisons across countries and across time, for 17 Western democracies for the period of 1945 through 1998. Our measure is predicated upon a manifesto-based measure of party ideology recently developed by Kim and Fording (1998), along with yearly cabinet post data. After discussing the validity of our measure, we replicate one of the most cited works in comparative political economy over the last ten years – Alvarez, Garrett and Lange's (1991) analysis of economic performance – by utilizing our own measure of government partisanship. We conclude that comparativists need to exercise greater caution in interpreting and evaluating the past findings of a large number of multivariate studies in comparative politics.     

Ideology in three voices: an adapted methodology for the study of political ideology

Abstract

Theology in four voices represents a fitting methodological model for the study of political ideology, given the similarities between religions and ideologies as belief systems with ineliminable, fundamental beliefs. The formal theological voice is dropped from consideration on the grounds that, while the involvement of academic theologians in the theology of ordinary believers is entirely appropriate, political theorists ought not to be involved in seeking to change or refine the ideologies which they research. The normative voice – which we refer to as the established voice – consists of texts which carry authority within a particular ideology, such as The Communist Manifesto in Marxism, or J.S. Mill’s On Liberty in liberalism; the espoused voice represents that which adherents of an ideology explain about what they believe; the operant voice consists of the political action taken by the adherents. While there are potential disadvantages to this method, there are also potential advantages. Firstly, it enables a fuller understanding of an ideology, especially when tensions arise between the three voices. Secondly, it allows the researcher to enter at any one of three points into a circle leading from pre-understanding to understanding. Thirdly and finally, the model presents opportunities to combine different methodological approaches into ideological research.