The organizational cohesion and political access of business: a study of comprehensive associations

Abstract. This article utilizes an internationally comparative data set to examine the potentiality of comprehensive business associations to define and articulate the interests of business as a whole. We argue that the organizational structures of comprehensive associations - the degree to which they integrate diverse interest areas and they compete with one another- are critical to the degree of probable influence gained in a given country. Using data from seven countries - Austria. Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom - a concept of business cohesion is constructed based on these structural properties. Having differentiated among the countries in terms of the cohesion of business associations, we then relate these differences to variations in the participation of associations in the formulation and implementation of public policy.     

The impact of European economic integration on business associations: The UK case

This article presents the results of new survey research that assesses the routes and activities used by UK business associations in gathering and exchanging information with European institutions. All major UK business associations are covered, ranging from trade and professional associations to associations of the self‐employed and federations. A representative sampling framework allows general conclusions for the whole association sector to be drawn. The chief findings are that there are multiple routes for European activities employed by most associations. The most important route for all categories (except federations) is the national route, using meetings with UK ministers, officials or agencies as an attempt to get them to influence the EU. The second most important route is through European associations (which is the chief route for federations), which are also seen as the most open to influence. A ‘Brussels strategy’ of direct lobbying, or a Brussels office, is the third most important route. It is the main route for 16 per cent of respondents, which is surprising given its costs but demonstrates the increasingly important light in which the European institutions are seen. The use by associations of individual member companies to lobby for them is also surprisingly high (for 10 per cent it is the main route). Association size, resources and sectoral circumstances are shown to be important influences on an association's European strategy.     

Conceptualising the policy engagement of interest groups: Involvement,access and prominence

While much progress has been made in empirically mapping and analysing a variety of interest group activities in the last decade, less attention has been devoted to conceptual work that clearly defines and distinguishes different forms of policy engagement. This article contributes to this endeavour by developing a theoretical framework that explicitly links currently available measures of the policy engagement of groups to the distinct concepts of group involvement, access and prominence. It argues that greater conceptual clarity will lead to better accumulation of knowledge in the sub‐field and a better understanding of the role of interest groups in political systems.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

The creation of neo-liberal corporate bias in transnational medicines control: The industrial shaping and interest dynamics of the European regulatory state

Abstract. Drawing on the political theories of corporatism, neo–liberalism and pluralism, and on comparative empirical research in Brussels, Germany, Sweden and the UK, this article conceptualises the nature of Europeanised medicines regulation. It argues that a marketisation of regulation has been established in the European Union as a result of competition between national regulatory agencies for 'regulatory business' from the pharmaceutical industry. In the pharmaceuticals sector the Europeanised regulatory state is a product of three key factors: (a) the European Commission's commitment to an 'efficiency' regime which would meet the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies, (b) the endemic corporate bias associated with medicines regulation in the most influential member states, and (c) the considerable success of neo–liberal politics across a number of major member states, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.     

The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

Governmental participation and the organizational adaptation of Green parties: On access, slack, overload and distress

Abstract.  This article explores the reciprocal links between the organizational transformation of Western European Green parties and their governmental experience. On the one hand, a series of hypotheses with regards to the possible link between prior organizational adaptation and eventual access to governmental participation are examined. On the other, the opposite question is addressed: that of the potential impact of governmental participation – and, more recently, exit from government – on further organizational adaptation. Following both a qualitative and a qualitative comparative (QCA) analysis, one ultimately identifies a link between prior organizational adaptation and eventual access to government, but a much more indirect and contrasted link between governmental participation (and exit from government) and further organizational adaptation.     

The paradox of collective action: Linking interest aggregation and interest articulation in EU legislative lobbying

Olson's logic of collective action predicts that business interest associations face fewer collective action problems than citizen action groups. This article challenges this assumption by arguing that forming an organization comes with different collective action problems than voicing a joint policy position. This leads us to examine an important paradox: Citizen groups face challenges in establishing themselves as organizations but find it relatively easy to position themselves on policy issues, whereas the reverse is true for business associations. We study this paradox empirically based on interviews with spokespersons of interest organizations active in the European Union and find support for our hypotheses. Our findings demonstrate that citizen groups position themselves on policy issues more easily than business interests and that this competitive advantage is amplified when policy issues attract the attention of the media.     

The economic theory of rent seeking

Tullock’s concept of rent seeking was the first statement of a quantitative principle about the social costs of such activities as lobbying and favor seeking. As such, this part of Tullock’s legacy to modern economics is one of his most important contributions.     

The rise and decline of regional power: A historical case-study of privilege seeking

This paper comprises one of Olson's findings about the rise and decline of nations and Tullock's idea of privilege-seeking. In the historical framework of Northern Europe the history of a town being closely linked with its saltern is investigated. It is shown that throughout the centuries rent- and privilege-seeking dominated. This was primarily done to avoid competition and, finally, to get excessive revenues. The sovereigns' production-costs of the privileges were low and Tullock's results of an efficient transfer mechanism are confirmed. Additionally, the findings of coalition-forming and mortgaging support the inevitable sclerotic process. Market activities find their political counterparts which is illustrated by the building and destroying of specific coalitions. A typical delay of privilege- and coalition-seeking is observed depending on the economic and political success. Regulatory measures are explored then “exploited”, and allies are found, “utilized” and dropped, finally leaving certified rents of no value.     

Professional associations and the free rider problem: The case of optometry

Political influence by a professional association, like the influence of any special interest group, is a collective good for the members of the profession. This paper investigates the variables affecting the ability of state optometric associations to overcome the free rider problem and induce optometrists to join the association. Although the empirical results show little evidence that organization costs are reduced by concentration in urban areas, the results do strongly support the hypothesis that there will be less free riding in smaller groups. The results also support the hypothesis that selective incentives enable latent groups to overcome the free rider problem. By providing continuing education at reduced fees to members of the association, optometric associations have increased the percentage of optometrists who are association members in those states with statutory continuing education requirements.     

The 1989 European elections: Campaigns and results

Abstract: This article gives an overview discussion of the electoral campaigns and the results of the European elections of 1989. The role of national as well as European actors and issues during the campaigns are highlighted, and the results are discussed, both in view of turnout and party strength, in terms of its likely implications for the national and European political process.