冷战后欧洲安全重建中的俄罗斯因素北大核心CSSCI

20世纪90年代,在国际地位急剧下降的背景下,俄罗斯先是希望以欧洲安全与合作组织为基础构建欧洲安全框架,后又期望借助与北约形成制度性框架安排,以维持在欧洲安全议题上的话语权。新世纪以来,随着经济恢复和崛起步伐的加快,面对北约东扩特别是美国积极推动在欧洲部署导弹防御体系所带来的强大压力,俄罗斯酝酿并明确提出了全新的欧洲安全框架构想,以图增强在欧洲安全议题上的话语权。在种种结构性因素制约之下,未来欧洲将长期维持俄罗斯、北约、欧盟三极并存的力量格局并形成动态的三边安全格局,其中俄罗斯与北约的关系将更具关键意义。     

世人瞩目的北约组织东扩问题

苏联和华约解体,北约和华约两大集团对峙消失,但大国争夺欧洲的斗争仍在进行。美国国力削弱,但作为冷战后唯一的超级大国,企图借助北约,继续控制欧洲,并力图将前苏联控制的国家和独联体纳入其战略范围,防止俄罗斯东山再起,北约东扩即是其重大战略举措。东欧和独联体国家对此表示欢迎,俄罗斯则坚决反对,态度强硬。北约东扩以及围绕此间题展开的错综复杂的斗争,乃是新形势下美俄之间斗争的重要方面。     

冷战后欧洲安全重建中的俄罗斯因素

20世纪90年代,在国际地位急剧下降的背景下,俄罗斯先是希望以欧洲安全与合作组织为基础构建欧洲安全框架,后又期望借助与北约形成制度性框架安排,以维持在欧洲安全议题上的话语权。新世纪以来,随着经济恢复和崛起步伐的加快,面对北约东扩特别是美国积极推动在欧洲部署导弹防御体系所带来的强大压力,俄罗斯酝酿并明确提出了全新的欧洲安全框架构想,以图增强在欧洲安全议题上的话语权。在种种结构性因素制约之下,未来欧洲将长期维持俄罗斯、北约、欧盟三极并存的力量格局并形成动态的三边安全格局,其中俄罗斯与北约的关系将更具关键意义。     

为北约的未来号脉

冷战结束以后,在美国的推动下,北约大举东扩,北约成员国数量猛增,传统防区从欧洲扩张到了中亚。但美国与欧洲国家在北约存在的目的、行动机制等关键问题上意见相左。北约难以在短时期之内成为一个真正意义上的国际组织。     

北约战略扩张新态势及欧盟的反应北大核心

自冷战结束以来,北约战略扩张态势持续不断,其行动空间和能力拓展已呈现出鲜明的全球化色彩.作为欧洲安全的提供者和美欧关系的主要平台,北约在与欧盟通过构建伙伴关系而推进安全合作的同时,其战略扩张也给欧盟带来了多方面冲击,既弱化了欧盟在北约机制中的构建和纠偏能力,也降低了欧盟及欧洲安全在北约安全议程中的位序,更削弱了欧盟对欧洲安全的主导权.受到美国外交、英国退欧、德法分歧等多方面因素的影响,欧盟将会在未来一段时间内通过校订北约战略定位、应对美欧关系有限震荡及维持多重外交关系等途径努力调整和塑造同北约的合作关系,并在此过程中建立和维护欧盟的战略自主地位.     

北约走向何方？

2008年的北约峰会着重讨论北约东扩和阿富汗战争两大问题，都没有取得实质性成果。其原因。一方面是俄罗斯重新崛起令欧洲不敢小觑；另一方面是美国操纵北约东扩和企图在中亚强势扩张不被北约成员国所接受。美国和其他北约成员国战略利益不同的矛盾将困扰北约的未来走向。     

安全文化与战略选择的相关性--以冷战后的北约东扩为例

在冷战后北约东扩的过程中,北约的安全文化与大国的战略选择之间有着紧密的相关性.安全文化中的规范与认同影响着大国的战略互动,是大国战略选择的内在根据,而大国战略互动中的矛盾与分歧也反作用于安全文化中的规范与认同.从北约东扩的情况看,北约欧洲化与全球化、单边主义与多边主义的矛盾及其发展将对北约的安全文化产生重大的影响.     

北约职能扩张的发展演变

北约的职能扩张性是冷战后北约具有的一个新特点，而政治性和干预性的发展又是这一特点中表现较为突出的两个方面，整个北约的扩张性是北约在欧洲新的安全形式下所循序渐进发展起来的，而且它的发展是北约战略调整的必然结果，其对欧洲安全产生的消极影响不但将威胁欧洲自身的安全与稳定，而且将严重威胁２１ 世纪的世界安全。     

“北约亚太化”：联盟转型还是联盟扩员

近年来,北约对亚太地区的介入不断加深,呈现“北约亚太化”态势。“北约亚太化”主要受到地缘政治环境、美国对华竞争战略、欧洲盟国协调等因素影响,突出表现为以应对“中国挑战”为战略目标、以强化与亚太伙伴国家关系为主要手段、实现亚太与跨大西洋的安全联动。当前,对于“北约亚太化”的认知分歧主要聚焦于其属于联盟转型还是联盟扩员。通过比较分析联盟转型与扩员的条件,可以发现“北约亚太化”的实质是北约将联盟空间拓展至亚太地区,推动联盟转型。尽管北约积极加强与亚太国家间关系,但是双方之间的信任程度和互利水平有限,这使得“北约亚太化”难以发展为在亚太地区的联盟扩员。“介入亚太”已经成为北约的长期任务,会对中国周边安全、亚太地区局势与大国战略竞争造成不容忽视的影响。对此,中国需要加强与欧洲国家的经贸合作、巩固与亚太国家的务实合作、推动建立与完善包容性的地区安全机制,妥善应对“北约亚太化”。     

北约核政策与核态势的回顾及展望

北大西洋公约组织作为军事同盟,自建立之初就以美国核武器的"延伸威慑"为安全保障。冷战时期,欧洲曾是美苏争夺霸权的重要战场,双方进行了疯狂的核军备竞赛,欧洲长时间笼罩在核阴云之中。冷战结束后,欧洲各国从核阴霾中成功走出,在美国的主导下,北约实力逐步走向全盛时期。出于对后冷战时期国际安全形势的乐观判断,北约的关注重点从单纯的传统军事防御向更加广泛的非传统安全领域扩展,核武器在北约防卫中的作用不断减弱,核武器规模不断裁减。然而,2014年的乌克兰危机给欧洲的战略格局带来巨大冲击,俄与美欧关系降至冰点,双方开始轮番展示核力量,核阴影再次重现欧洲上空。从北约核态势的历史演变轨迹和乌克兰危机对北约核态势的冲击中,人们能够窥见北约未来安全发展态势。当前北约与俄罗斯核态势的变化,预示着未来核竞赛模式与风险都会与冷战时期有所不同,意味着核门槛的降低以及核武器使用风险的增加,这对全球核不扩散机制、全球核裁军进程与全球军事竞争模式都将产生深远影响。     

Separable but not separate forces: NATO's development of the combined joint task force

This article argues that the Combined Joint Task Force has profoundly affected the European security architecture. The CJTF structure shifted the terms of the European security debate from whether NATO should have a role in the post‐Cold War world to how NATO should act in this new security environment. The CJTF therefore helped NATO to survive its post‐Cold War existential dilemma, and to emerge with the same level of cohesion and cooperation that it possessed during the Cold War.     

Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany

ABSTRACT

Perceptions of threat from Russia’s military activities in Ukraine and President Trump’s critical attitude towards NATO have put the idea of a common European army on the agenda of European politics. Do these strategic threat perceptions also influence public support for the creation of a common European army? Previous research has largely overlooked strategic threat perceptions as individual-level determinants of public support for a common European army. This article explores the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and support for a common European army at the individual level of analysis with representative German survey data from 2018. The multivariate analysis shows that perceiving Russia’s military activities in Ukraine as a threat to Germany’s security, and U.S. foreign and security policy as a threat to the cohesion of NATO significantly increases support for the creation of a common European army, even when the influence of numerous other determinants is controlled for. The findings highlight the importance of considering strategic threat perceptions in future analyses of public opinion on European defence cooperation and integration.     

俄罗斯安全战略全面转向“以攻为守”

美国推动北约东扩、决意在东欧部署导弹防御系统以及挑起新一轮军备竞赛等一系列举措,使俄罗斯战略安全环境持续恶化。为应对美国和北约咄咄逼人的攻势,俄罗斯将“以攻为守”作为安全战略的核心,加快军事改革以迎接未来挑战。     

Reluctant disarmer: Italy's ambiguous attitude toward NATO's nuclear weapons policy

Of the five North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European countries of US nuclear forward deployment, Italy is the least-known and studied case, even though the country hosts the largest number of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and still has two bases of deployment. The paper aims at filling this gap by analyzing Italy's current view on the presence, value, and future of NSNWs hosted on its territory. The analysis begins with the examination of the process of profound devaluation that has minimized, starting from the end of the cold war, Italy's original interest in this category of weapons. It then examines the reasons why Rome continues to pursue conservative nuclear weapon policies and distances itself significantly from the progressive camp of NATO members, particularly Germany, that explicitly call for the withdrawal of US NSNWs from Europe. Through the study of the Italian domestic politics and security culture, the article explains Italy's opposition to any radical change in the NATO nuclear status quo, and its reluctance to pursue policies that are consistent with the process of nuclear devaluation that the country has experienced over the past two decades.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

Saving NATO: Renunciation of the Article 5 Guarantee

The purpose of this article is to offer a radical proposal: NATO should unleash its potential as the world's premier cooperative and collective security organization by stepping down from being a European collective defense alliance. In other words, I argue that without renouncing territorial security guarantees in Europe, NATO will sacrifice its effectiveness in the new security environment.     

The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

The American Role in European Defense Reform

In order to influence the direction and outcomes of defense reforms occurring across Europe, the United States needs to refocus its military-to-military engagement programs with its European allies. Instead of seeking to build partner capacity among the newest NATO members or aspirants, Washington will be better served by maintaining and strengthening interoperability with those allies that are adaptive and innovative, deployable and expeditionary, and capable of full spectrum operations—that is, allies such as France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This finding is based upon what Washington itself sees as the future of conflict and the kinds of coalition partner skills and abilities the United States will need to counter post-International Security Assistance Force International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) threats to U.S. and collective security. Given budget and force structure cuts facing the United States as well, the American military cannot afford to waste its limited security cooperation resources.     

Still focused on the Atlantic: accounting for the limited Europeanization of Portuguese security policy

This article examines the limited Europeanization of contemporary Portuguese security policy and highlights how the persistence of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the emergence of the Lusophone world have shaped Portuguese participation in the European Union's (EU's) Common Foreign and Security Policy in recent years, particularly in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Africa and in the European Defence Agency's co-operation activities. Europeanization's conceptual weaknesses, combined with the mutually reinforcing nature of transatlantic, EU and Lusophone security co-operation, have reinforced the ambiguous nature of what a “Europeanized” vision for European security might look like, especially given long-standing loyalties to NATO. This affords states considerable margin for manoeuvrability in defining their security priorities, so long as they are seen as being broadly consistent. This article reassesses the appropriateness of the Europeanization concept and shows how Portugal has approached this strategic balancing act, supporting the development of the EU's CSDP whilst remaining loyal to NATO and seeking to develop security relations in the Lusophone world, achieving legitimacy by stressing complementarity and multilateralization in security co-operation.     

U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions: Nonlinear Challenges,Practical Opportunities

The Obama Administration's desire to push forward with strategic nuclear arms reductions during the President's second term requires the navigation of numerous shoals and reefs. U.S. and Russian negotiators will have to overcome both political and military obstacles to accomplish post-New START reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. For example, efforts to reduce offensive nuclear weapons are complicated by U.S. and NATO plans for missile defenses deployed in Europe and by exigencies in U.S. and Russian domestic politics. In addition, the military-technical aspects of cyber war and nuclear deterrence can no longer be treated, analytically or practically, as isolated compartments. This article considers several aspects of the relationships among possible post-START offensive force reductions, advanced conventional weapons including missile defenses, and emerging cyber capabilities.