Actuarial status of the OASI and DI Trust Funds

This article summarizes the current financial condition and actuarial status of the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) program, as shown in the 1986 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees. The Trustees note that the assets of the OASI and DI Trust Funds will be sufficient to permit the timely payment of OASDI benefits for many years into the future, on the basis of all four sets of assumptions shown in the report. For the next 75 years, the estimates show that the OASDI program, overall, is in close actuarial balance, based on the two intermediate sets of assumptions. The DI program by itself, however, is not in close actuarial balance for the next 75 years. The actuarial deficit for the DI program could be remedied by a small reallocation of the contribution rate from OASI to DI, in such a way that the OASI program would remain in close actuarial balance and OASDI benefits would not be affected. Although the Trustees do not at this time recommend such a reallocation, they note that the financial condition of the DI program will need to be carefully monitored for the next several years.     

Actuarial status of the OASI (old age survivors insurance) and DI (disability insurance) Trust Funds

This article summarizes the current financial condition and actuarial status of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, as shown in the 1987 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees. The Trustees note that the assets of the OASI and DI Trust Funds, on a combined basis, will be sufficient to permit the timely payment of OASDI benefits for many years into the future, on the basis of all four sets of assumptions shown in the report. For the next 75 years, the estimates show that the OASDI program, overall, is in close actuarial balance, based on the two intermediate sets of assumptions. The DI program by itself, however, is not in close actuarial balance for the next 75 years. The actuarial deficit for the DI program could be remedied by a small reallocation of the contribution rate from OASI to DI, in such a way that the OASI program would remain in close actuarial balance and OASDI benefits would not be affected. Although the Trustees are not recommending such a reallocation, they note that the financial condition of the DI program will need to be carefully monitored.     

Actuarial status of the OASI and DI Trust Funds

This article presents the summary of the 1988 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds. It summarizes the financial condition and actuarial status of the OASDI program based on the alternative projections. The long-range 75-year estimates indicate that, under the intermediate (II-A and II-B) assumptions, the OASDI program will experience about three decades of positive annual balances, with continuing annual deficits thereafter. The positive balances in the first part of the 75-year projection period nearly offset the later deficits, so that the program, as a whole is in close actuarial balance. Over the long-range projection period, the OASDI program has an actuarial deficit of 0.58 percent of taxable payroll, based on the intermediate alternative II-B assumptions and calculated on a level-financing basis. The DI program by itself, however, is not in close actuarial balance for the next 75 years. The actuarial deficit for the DI program could be remedied by a small reallocation of the contribution rate from OASI to DI, in such a way that the OASI program would remain in close actuarial balance. Although the Trustees are not recommending such a reallocation, they note that the financial condition of the DI program will need to be carefully monitored.     

Actuarial status of the OASI and DI Trust Funds

This article summarizes the current financial and actuarial status of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. The results presented are from the 1984 Trustees Report and are similar to the results in the 1983 report. This year's estimates show that the Social Security Amendments of 1983 restored the financial soundness of the OASDI program. According to the actuarial estimates, benefits can be paid on time throughout the 1980's and for many years thereafter. Because trust fund levels are projected to be relatively low through 1987, however, the program could again experience financial difficulties in the near future if economic conditions become worse than anticipated under the pessimistic (Alternative III) assumptions. After 1987, the program's ability to withstand economic downturns is projected to improve. On the basis of intermediate (Alternative II-B) assumptions, the OASDI program is in long-range close actuarial balance. This actuarial balance reflects substantial year-by-year surpluses during the first half of the 75-year projection period that are slightly out-weighed by substantial deficits later on.     

Stochastic models of the Social Security trust funds

Each year in March, the Board of Trustees of the Social Security trust funds reports on the current and projected financial condition of the Social Security programs. Those programs, which pay monthly benefits to retired workers and their families, to the survivors of deceased workers, and to disabled workers and their families, are financed through the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds. In their 2003 report, the Trustees present, for the first time, results from a stochastic model of the combined OASDI trust funds. Stochastic modeling is an important new tool for Social Security policy analysis and offers the promise of valuable new insights into the financial status of the OASDI trust funds and the effects of policy changes. The results presented in this article demonstrate that several stochastic models deliver broadly consistent results even though they use very different approaches and assumptions. However, they also show that the variation in trust fund outcomes differs as the approach and assumptions are varied. Which approach and assumptions are best suited for Social Security policy analysis remains an open question. Further research is needed before the promise of stochastic modeling is fully realized. For example, neither parameter uncertainty nor variability in ultimate assumption values is recognized explicitly in the analyses. Despite this caveat, stochastic modeling results are already shedding new light on the range and distribution of trust fund outcomes that might occur in the future.     

Early retirees under Social Security: health status and economic resources

Some proposals to change the Social Security program to ensure long-run solvency would reduce or eliminate benefits for early retirees. This article documents the health and financial resources of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) beneficiaries aged 62-64. It identifies a substantial minority of early retirees who might be economically vulnerable if either the early eligibility age or normal retirement age was raised. Attention is directed at the extent to which poor health limits work in this age group and the extent to which curtailment of early OASI benefits might lead to increases in the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls. Using a set of comprehensive health measures, we estimate that over 20 percent of OASI beneficiaries aged 62-64 have health problems that substantially impair their ability to work. This finding implies that in this age range, as many severely disabled persons receive OASI benefits as disability benefits. In fact, 12 percent of early beneficiaries would meet a more stringent criterion for being classified "disabled"--SSA's medical standard for disability benefits. The evidence therefore indicates that OASI functions as a substantial, albeit unofficial, disability program for early retirees. Compared with those who have no health problems or are less severely impaired, early OASI beneficiaries who meet the medical criteria for disability benefits are more likely to be living alone and more likely to be poor or "near poor." The great majority of the group--almost 80 percent--are women. Analysis of their earnings histories suggests that most of these beneficiaries do not satisfy the insured-status requirements for Disability Insurance benefits. The article considers the different roles of the OASI program and the DI program for health-impaired individuals aged 62-64. Disability modelers sometimes overlook an important aspect of program administration. Under customary screening procedures implemented in Social Security field offices, applicants for early OASI benefits who appear to be severely impaired simultaneously apply for DI benefits if they are disability insured. If they are found eligible for DI benefits, those applicants become DI beneficiaries. The implication is that raising the earliest entitlement age would have little impact on the DI rolls. Unless there are changes in eligibility criteria, the DI program would not serve as a safety net for many of the most severely disabled early retirees.     

Financial status of social security program after the Social Security Amendments of 1977

The Social Security Amendments of 1977 resulted in substantial improvement in the current and projected financial condition of the OASDI program. This article reviews the causes of the recent operating deficits, describes the effects of the amendments that most influence the program's financial status, and gives projections of income and expenditures under the new law. The revised benefit formula eliminates the "over-indexing" expected to occur under the old provisions and results in stable earnings-replacement ratios under practically all future economic conditions. About one-half of the long-range actuarial deficit was resolved by this step alone. Increases in the contribution and benefit base, along with tax-rate reallocations and increases, prevent the imminent depletion of the OASI and DI trust funds. Increased income due to the higher wage bases is partially offset in later years, however, by greater benefit payments based on the increases in the coverage of total earnings. Overall, under the new law the OASDI program is projected to be financed adequately for about 50 years but significant operating deficits are expected after that. The financial condition of the hospital insurance program was substantially unchanged by the amendments, however, and the HI trust fund is expected to be exhausted in 1988.     

Actuarial status of the HI (hospital insurance) and SMI (supplementary medical insurance) Trust Funds

This article is adapted from the 1987 Annual Reports of the Medicare Board of Trustees. It presents a summary of the current financial and actuarial status of the Hospital Insurance (HI) and Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Funds. The Board found that the present financing schedule for the HI program is sufficient to ensure the payment of benefits over the next 12-14 years if the intermediate (II-A and II-B) assumptions underlying the estimates are realized. Although steps have been undertaken to reduce the rate of growth in payments to hospitals, the Board urges Congress to take remedial measures to bring future HI program costs and financing into balance. The Board found the SMI program to be actuarially sound but recommends that Congress take action to curtail the rapid growth in that part of Medicare.     

Actuarial status of the HI and SMI Trust Funds

This article is adapted from the 1986 annual reports of the Medicare Board of Trustees. It presents a summary of the current financial and actuarial status of the Hospital Insurance (HI) and Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Funds. The Board found that the present financing schedule for the HI program is barely sufficient to ensure the payment of benefits through the late 1990's if the intermediate (II-A and II-B) assumptions underlying the estimates are realized. Although steps have been undertaken to reduce the rate of growth in payments to hospitals, the Board urges Congress to take remedial measures to bring future HI program costs and financing into balance. The Board found the SMI program to be actuarially sound but recommends that Congress take action to curtail the rapid growth in that part of Medicare.     

Social Security area population projections: 1987

The following article, first published as Actuarial Study No. 99, describes the population projections that underlie the long-range cost estimates for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, which are included in the 1987 Report of the OASDI Board of Trustees. The projections start from a recent estimate of the population in the Social Security Area by age, sex, and martial status and from an estimate of existing marriages by age of husband and age of wife. Three separate projections, denoted Alternatives I, II, and III, are developed by analyzing historical data and making three different sets of assumptions about future net immigration, birth rates, and death rates.     

Actuarial status of the HI and SMI Trust Funds

This article is adapted from a summary of the 1984 annual reports of the Medicare Board of Trustees. It presents the actuarial status of the Hospital Insurance (HI) and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Funds. Although the Social Security Amendments of 1983 have made the HI program potentially less vulnerable to excessive rates of growth in the hospital industry by providing the Secretary of Health and Human Services some discretion over the level of payments to hospitals, the Board found the financing schedule for the HI program barely adequate to ensure the payment of benefits through the end of this decade if the assumptions underlying the estimates are realized. The Board found the SMI program to be financially sound, but it noted with concern the rapid growth in the cost of the program and the extent to which general revenues have become SMI's major source of financing. For both HI and SMI, the Board recommends that Congress consider ways to curtail the rapid growth in program costs.     

Actuarial status of the HI and SMI Trust Funds

This article is adapted from the Summary of the 1985 Annual Reports of the Medicare Board of Trustees. It presents the actuarial status of the Hospital Insurance (HI) and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Funds. Two actions favorably affecting the financial status of the HI Trust Fund have occurred since the publication of the 1984 Reports: (1) Fiscal year 1986 hospital payment rates will continue at the same level as in fiscal year 1985, and (2) the level of the annual increase in the rates that can be granted without specific justification has been reduced. Despite these two actions, the Board found that the present financing schedule is barely sufficient to ensure payment of benefits through the late 1990's if the assumptions underlying the estimates are realized. The Board found the SMI program to be financially sound, but it noted with concern the rapid growth in the cost of the program. For both HI and SMI, the Board recommends that Congress consider ways to curtail the rapid growth in program costs.     

Receipt of multiple benefits by disabled-worker beneficiaries

In 1971, 44 percent of workers who had been currently entitled to social security disability insurance (DI) benefits for 1 year or more also received benefits from at least one other source. Their average disability insurance benefit was higher than that of persons who received only DI benefits. On the average, total benefits to those receiving multiple benefits were double the amounts paid to those receiving only DI benefits. The combined benefits for the former produced median replacement rates about 50 percent larger than the median replacement rates for the latter. High replacement rates--defined here as more than 80 percent of predisability earnings replaced by benefit--predominate among those with multiple benefits. Considering replacement rates based solely on disability insurance benefits substantially understates the extent to which benefits from public and private programs actually replace predisability earnings. Replacement rates based solely on DI benefits are generally higher for those receiving DI benefits only than for persons receiving multiple benefits. Limiting DI benefits to the replacement rate from DI benefits alone is disadvantageous for persons who receive only DI benefits, compared with those who also receive other benefits.     

Economic policy, intergenerational equity, and the Social Security Trust Fund buildup

For the next 75 years, the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) system is projected to be close to in balance, on average. For approximately the next 40 years, under current projections, the combined OASDI Trust Fund is expected to continually have excesses of income over outgo, creating a buildup that will peak in 2030 at about +12 1/2 trillion (roughly 23 percent of the gross national product). Thereafter, the system is projected to be in annual deficit continually until the trust fund is exhausted in 2051. This article focuses on two fundamental issues that must be understood if the potential economic consequences of this buildup are to be evaluated properly. The first issue deals with the fact that the nature of Federal economic policy during the buildup period will determine the ultimate economic impact of the buildup. The second issue concerns the effect of the buildup, and its disposition, on the Social Security program's treatment of one generation of workers compared with another. If a fund is actually accumulated as projected, part of the retirement benefits of the "baby-boom" generation will, in effect, be self-financed. If, however, that fund is used for other purposes--directly or indirectly--future cohorts of workers will be required to fully finance benefits promised to the baby-boom retirees.     

Lifetime distributional effects of Social Security retirement benefits

This article presents three measures of the distribution of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) for people born between 1931 and 1960. The results are based on simulations with the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), which projects retirement income through 2020. The base sample for MINT is the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation panels for 1990 to 1993, matched with Social Security administrative records. The study population is grouped into 5-year birth cohorts and then ranked by economic status in three ways. First, the population is divided into five groups on the basis of individual lifetime covered earnings, and their lifetime present values of OASI benefits received and payroll taxes paid are calculated. By this measure, OASI provides much higher benefits to the lowest quintile of earners than to other groups, but it becomes less redistributive toward lower earners in more recent birth cohorts. Second, people are ranked by shared lifetime covered earnings, and the values of shared benefits received and payroll taxes paid are computed. Individuals are assumed to split covered earnings, benefits, and payroll taxes with their spouses in the years they are married. By the shared covered earnings measure, OASI is still much more favorable to persons in the lower income quintiles, although to a lesser degree than when people are ranked by individual covered earnings. OASI becomes more progressive among recent cohorts, even as net lifetime benefits decline for the entire population. Finally, individuals are ranked on the basis of their shared permanent income from age 62, when they become eligible for early retirement benefits, until death. Their annual Social Security benefits are compared with the benefits they would have received if they had saved their payroll taxes in individual accounts and used the proceeds to buy either of two annuities that provide level payments from age 62 until death: a unisex annuity that is based on the average life expectancy of the birth cohort or an age-adjusted annuity that is based on the worker's own life expectancy. On the permanent income measure, OASI is generally more favorable to people in higher income quintiles. Moreover, it is particularly unfavorable to those in the lowest quintile. Because people in the lowest quintile have a shorter life expectancy, they receive OASI benefits for a shorter period. This group would receive greater benefits in retirement if they invested their payroll taxes in the age-adjusted annuity. OASI is more favorable to them than the unisex annuity, however, OASI is becoming more progressive in that the net benefits it provides drop more rapidly among higher income quintiles than lower ones. This article also examines how OASI affects individuals by educational attainment, race, and sex. On both the lifetime covered earnings and the permanent income measures, OASI is more favorable to workers with less education and more favorable to women. The results by race and ethnicity are mixed. When people are ranked by the present value of their shared lifetime covered earnings, OASI appears more favorable to non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than to non-Hispanic whites. When people are ranked by shared permanent income in retirement, however, OASI produces negative returns for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the most recent birth cohorts, with non-Hispanic blacks faring relatively worse. The changes across cohorts occur partly because of changes in tax rates and benefits, but more importantly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce. Of particular importance is the increasing share of beneficiaries who receive worker benefits instead of auxiliary benefits as wives or widows. OASI benefits are based on the lifetime covered earnings of current or former married couples, as well as on earned retirement benefits of individuals. The reduced importance of auxiliary benefits (due to the higher lifetime covered earnings of women) and the increased proportion of divorced retirees make OASI more progressive--even as net benefits decline--for current and future cohorts than for cohorts who retired in the 1990s. Analysis of these findings suggests that simulations of policy changes in Social Security must take into account the decreasing importance of auxiliary benefits across birth cohorts and the complex changes in individuals' marital histories.     

Disabled workers and the indexing of Social Security benefits

We examine how benefit amounts and family income would change in response to changing the Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, OASDI) benefit indexing scheme. We are interested in a class of reform options designed to gradually slow the growth of benefits across the board. These options include the "price indexing" and "longevity indexing" proposals that have been part of the recent Social Security reform debate in the United States as well as a range of proposals developed in Europe. In this article, we focus on the distributional effects on the disabled. This focus leads to two comparisons. First, we compare disabled-worker beneficiaries to another group that would be affected by the changes, retired-worker beneficiaries. Second, we examine relative changes for particularly vulnerable subgroups of disabled workers. In the empirical analysis, we use two illustrative examples of potential indexing changes: Shifting from wage indexing to price indexing of the initial level of OASDI benefits; and Adjusting the initial benefit level for changes in life expectancy at retirement, that is, longevity indexing. We employ a historical counterfactual simulation to evaluate outcomes that would have resulted from changing the indexing scheme at one particular point in time. The hypothetical implementation period begins with the historical start of the current regime of indexing in 1979 and ends with one of the reference periods of the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a 17-year period. However, we briefly assess the extent to which the results would be applicable to other time horizons. The analysis uses a cross-sectional sample of OASDI beneficiaries from the 1996 SIPP matched to Social Security administrative records. Further, we use total income from the SIPP (as adjusted to correspond to the calculated OASDI benefit amounts) to simulate eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and SSI benefit amounts. Our overall findings pertain to three outcomes: (1) effects on OASDI benefits viewed in isolation, (2) the offsetting role of SSI, and (3) the diluting effect of other sources of family income. We find that a broader perspective incorporating all three measures is necessary to obtain an appropriate picture of distributional outcomes. Even though the proposals were designed to have proportional effects, differences between groups--such as disabled and retired workers--can arise from differences in the timing of benefit claiming, mortality, and other factors. Specifically, our cross-sectional estimates suggest that the average change in OASDI benefit levels would be higher for disabled-worker beneficiaries than for retired-worker beneficiaries. These differences are attributable to the fact that a higher proportion of the stock of disabled beneficiaries have been on the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls for a relatively short period of time and therefore have been affected by the shift in indexing scheme for a longer period of time. These results must be interpreted within the context of the methodology that was used. Further, other methodologies may lead to different results. For example, in previous studies that restricted the sample to a particular birth cohort, a higher proportion of disabled workers than retired workers were observed to have been on the DI program rolls for a relatively long period of time. Longer time on the beneficiary rolls corresponds to less exposure to the new indexing scheme and smaller estimated benefit changes. Thus, the same underlying factor-the timing of benefit claiming-influences both results. When the offsetting role of SSI benefits is also considered, we estimate smaller overall changes, especially for those at the bottom of the income distribution. When OASDI and SSI are considered together, differences in average benefit changes between disabled and retired workers are removed. This is due to a higher rate of SSI program participation among disabled workers than among retired workers. In addition, including SSI substantially reduces the proportion of disabled workers that have large simulated changes in benefit amounts. The estimated effects of changing the indexing scheme are further muted when total family income is considered. This occurs on a roughly equivalent scale for disabled and retired workers. As a result, changing the indexing scheme would produce little change in the status quo differences in poverty status between disabled and retired workers. Finally, we examine the most economically vulnerable subgroups of OASDI beneficiaries. Within the general group of beneficiaries, we find that the most vulnerable would be less affected than average, primarily as a result of the mitigating effect of SSI benefits. Further, within the population of disabled-worker beneficiaries, we examine economically vulnerable subgroups including those in the lowest primary insurance amount quartile, with less than a high school education, with an early onset of disability, or a primary mental impairment. These groups would also be less affected than average.     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.     

The net effects of the Project NetWork return-to-work case management experiment on participant earnings, benefit receipt, and other outcomes

The Social Security Administration (SSA) initiated Project NetWork in 1991 to test case management as a means of promoting employment among persons with disabilities. The demonstration, which targeted Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants and recipients, offered intensive outreach, work-incentive waivers, and case management/referral services. Participation in Project NetWork was voluntary. Volunteers were randomly assigned to the "treatment" group or the "control" group. Those assigned to the treatment group met individually with a case or referral manager who arranged for rehabilitation and employment services, helped clients develop an individual employment plan, and provided direct employment counseling services. Volunteers assigned to the control group could not receive services from Project NetWork but remained eligible for any employment assistance already available in their communities. For both treatment and control groups, the demonstration waived specific DI and SSI program rules considered to be work disincentives. The experimental impact study thus measures the incremental effects of case and referral management services. The eight demonstration sites were successful in implementing the experimental design roughly as planned. Project NetWork staff were able to recruit large numbers of participants and to provide rehabilitation and employment services on a substantial scale. Most of the sites easily reached their enrollment targets and were able to attract volunteers with demographic characteristics similar to those of the entire SSI and DI caseload and a broad range of moderate and severe disabilities. However, by many measures, volunteers were generally more "work-ready" than project eligible in the demonstration areas who did not volunteer to receive NetWork services. Project NetWork case management increased average annual earnings by $220 per year over the first 2 years following random assignment. This statistically significant impact, an approximate 11-percent increase in earnings, is based on administrative data on earnings. For about 70 percent of sample members, a third year of followup data was available. For this limited sample, the estimated effect of Project NetWork on annual earnings declined to roughly zero in the third followup year. The findings suggest that the increase in earnings may have been short-lived and may have disappeared by the time Project NetWork services ended. Project NetWork did not reduce reliance on SSI or DI benefits by statistically significant amounts over the 30-42 month followup period. The services provided by Project NetWork thus did not reduce overall SSI and DI caseloads or benefits by substantial amounts, especially given that only about 5 percent of the eligible caseload volunteered to participate in Project NetWork. Project NetWork produced modest net benefits to persons with disabilities and net costs to taxpayers. Persons with disabilities gained mainly because the increases in their earnings easily outweighed the small (if any) reduction in average SSI and DI benefits. For SSA and the federal government as a whole, the costs of Project NetWork were not sufficiently offset by increases in tax receipts resulting from increased earnings or reductions in average SSI and DI benefits. The modest net benefits of Project NetWork to persons with disabilities are encouraging. How such benefits of an experimental intervention should be weighed against costs of taxpayers depends on value judgments of policymakers. Because different case management projects involve different kinds of services, these results cannot be directly generalized to other case management interventions. They are nevertheless instructive for planning new initiatives. Combining case and referral management services with various other interventions, such as longer term financial support for work or altered provider incentives, could produc     

Social Security cost-of-living adjustments and the Consumer Price Index

OASDI benefits are indexed for inflation to protect beneficiaries from the loss of purchasing power implied by inflation. In the absence of such indexing, the purchasing power of Social Security benefits would be eroded as rising prices raise the cost of living. By statute, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social Security benefits are calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Some argue that this index does not accurately reflect the inflation experienced by the elderly population and should be changed to an elderly-specific price index such as the Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans 62 Years of Age and Older, often referred to as the Consumer Price Index for the Elderly (CPI-E). Others argue that the measure of inflation underlying the COLA is technically biased, causing it to overestimate changes in the cost of living. This argument implies that current COLAs tend to increase, rather than merely maintain, the purchasing power of benefits over time. Potential bias in the CPI as a cost-of-living index arises from a number of sources, including incomplete accounting for the ability of consumers to substitute goods or change purchasing outlets in response to relative price changes. The BLS has constructed a new index called the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) that better accounts for those consumer adjustments. Price indexes are not true cost-of-living indexes, but approximations of cost-of-living indexes (COLI). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006a) explains the difference between the two: As it pertains to the CPI, the COLI for the current month is based on the answer to the following question: "What is the cost, at this month ' market prices, of achieving the standard of living actually attained in the base period?" This cost is a hypothetical expenditure-the lowest expenditure level necessary at this month's prices to achieve the base-period's living standard.... Unfortunately, because the cost of achieving a living standard cannot be observed directly, in operational terms, a COLI can only be approximated. Although the CPI cannot be said to equal a cost-of-living index, the concept of the COLI provides the CPI's measurement objective and the standard by which we define any bias in the CPI. While all versions of the CPI only approximate the actual changes in the cost of living, the CPI-E has several additional technical limitations. First, the CPI-E may better account for the goods and services typically purchased by the elderly, but the expenditure weights for the elderly are the only difference between the CPI-E and CPI-W. These weights are based on a much smaller sample than the other two indices, making it less precise. Second, the CPI-E does not account for differences in retail outlets frequented by the aged population or the prices they pay. Finally, the purchasing population measured in the CPI-E is not necessarily identical to the Social Security beneficiary population, where more than one-fifth of OASDI beneficiaries are under age 62. Likewise, over one-fifth of persons aged 62 or older are not beneficiaries, but they are included in the CPI-E population. Finally, changes in the index used to calculate COLAs directly affect the amount of benefits paid, and as a result, projected solvency of the Social Security program. A switch to the CPI-E for the December 2006 COLA (received in January 2007) would have resulted in an average monthly benefit OASDI benefits are indexed for inflation to protect beneficiaries from the loss of purchasing power implied by inflation. In the absence of such indexing, the purchasing power of Social Security benefits would be eroded as rising prices raise the cost of living. By statute, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social Security benefits are calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Some argue that this index does not accurately reflect the inflation experienced by the elderly population and should be changed to an elderly-specific price index such as the Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans 62 Years of Age and Older, often referred to as the Consumer Price Index for the Elderly (CPI-E). Others argue that the measure of inflation underlying the COLA is technically biased, causing it to overestimate changes in the cost of living. This argument implies that current COLAs tend to increase, rather than merely maintain, the purchasing power of benefits over time. Potential bias in the CPI as a cost-of-living index arises from a number of sources, including incomplete accounting for the ability of consumers to substitute goods or change purchasing outlets in response to relative price changes. The BLS has constructed a new index called the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) that better accounts for those consumer adjustments. Price indexes are not true cost-of-living indexes, but approximations of cost-of-living indexes (COLI). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006a) explains the difference between the two: As it pertains to the CPI, the COLI for the current month is based on the answer to the following question: "What is the cost, at this month ' market prices, of achieving the standard of living actually attained in the base period?" This cost is a hypothetical expenditure-the lowest expenditure level necessary at this month's prices to achieve the base-period's living standard.... Unfortunately, because the cost of achieving a living standard cannot be observed directly, in operational terms, a COLI can only be approximated. Although the CPI cannot be said to equal a cost-of-living index, the concept of the COLI provides the CPI's measurement objective and the standard by which we define any bias in the CPI. While all versions of the CPI only approximate the actual changes in the cost of living, the CPI-E has several additional technical limitations. First, the CPI-E may better account for the goods and services typically purchased by the elderly, but the expenditure weights for the elderly are the only difference between the CPI-E and CPI-W. These weights are based on a much smaller sample than the other two indices, making it less precise. Second, the CPI-E does not account for differences in retail outlets frequented by the aged population or the prices they pay. Finally, the purchasing population measured in the CPI-E is not necessarily identical to the Social Security beneficiary population, where more than one-fifth of OASDI beneficiaries are under age 62. Likewise, over one-fifth of persons aged 62 or older are not beneficiaries, but they are included in the CPI-E population. Finally, changes in the index used to calculate COLAs directly affect the amount of benefits paid, and as a result, projected solvency of the Social Security program. A switch to the CPI-E for the December 2006 COLA (received in January 2007) would have resulted in an average monthly benefit $0.90 higher than that received. If the December 2006 COLA had been adjusted by the Chained CPI-U instead, the average monthly benefit would have been $4.70 less than with current indexing. Any changes to the COLA that would cause faster growth in individual benefits would make the projected date of insolvency sooner, while slower growth would delay insolvency. Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) estimated that switching to the CPI-E for COLAs would move projected insolvency sooner by 3-5 years. A projection by SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that annual COLAs based on the Chained C-CPI-U beginning in 2006 would delay the date of OASDI insolvency by 4 years.     

Tax impact from elimination of the retirement test

The OASI eligibility provisions include a retirement test (or earnings test), and in 1979 aged beneficiaries who are under age 72 give up $1 in current benefits for each $2 of annual earnings above $4,500. If the retirement test were eliminated, total OASI payouts would increase because aged workers would no longer forfeit benefits. Aged workers also might increase earnings or delay retirement if this penalty on work effort were removed. Increased earnings would generate additional OASDHI taxes and individual income taxes. This article examines the fiscal effects on OASI benefit payouts and increased tax receipts if the retirement test were eliminated.