Citations to Authority in Supreme Court Opinions

This article analyzes citations used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its majority opinions. The research explores variations in citations and evaluates various explanations for these variations, including the potential impact of individual judicial style, legal factors, and group interaction in the formation of opinions. The article suggests that systematic analysis of citations holds potential for contributing to our understanding of the judicial process.     

Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one‐third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.     

Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court: A Mechanism to Maintain,Build, and Consolidate

Reexamination and reinterpretation of the “mature” (1955–1984) New Deal era of congressional attacks on the Supreme Court reveals a new hypothesis: that Court‐curbing efforts played a previously unrecognized role in party system development. Court rulings that create inter‐ and intraparty tension provide opportunities for various actors to attack the Court in an effort to solidify their faction's standing within national coalitional politics. Congressional attackers can use Court‐curbing resolutions and amendments in efforts to help them maintain coalitional cohesion, build a new majority, or consolidate previous victories. Thus, we might see legislative‐judicial relations as an unrecognized “site” of political development, where coalitional change is opposed and wrought.     

Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court

Sparked by interest in game‐theoretic representations of the separation of powers, empirical work examining congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions has burgeoned in recent years. Much of this work has been hampered, however, by the relative rarity of such events; as has long been noted, congressional attention to the Court is limited, and most Court decisions represent the last word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. By adopting an approach that allows us to separate the factors that lead to the event itself (that is, the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those that influence the timing of the event, we find that case‐specific factors are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, whereas Congress‐ and Court‐specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our study yields a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation‐of‐powers system.     

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation‐of‐powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.     

Authority to treat: a comparative look at the jurisdiction,practice and procedure of the Supreme Court of Victoria,Children's Court of Victoria and Family Court of Australia in medical matters

The medical treatment of children is a crucial interface of law and medicine. The problems in this emotive area of law are compounded by the current state of the law in Australia which is uncertain and fractured. It is the purpose of this article to examine the jurisdictions of the various courts that stand competent to order that a child undergo medical treatment in circumstances where the child's parents/guardian refuse to provide consent to such treatment. The problems associated with the present system are identified and proposals for the reform of the current system offered.     

The Totemic Authority of the Court

This article examines the place of the court within civil religion. It is argued that every civil religion is rooted in a magical anchor that in contemporary democratic civil religions is provided by the court. While in most institutions of civil religion totemic authority is represented, in court it is present. Therefore, court proceedings are occurrences of magic: they are performances (rituals and ceremonies) during which the sacred Thing is present. In court, the law itself and the clerical community to which it was entrusted assume the characteristics of the sacred Thing. The law appears under two facets: on the one hand, it is a norm and a word while, on the other hand, it is a Thing devoid of meaning and reason. Formalism is a magical mode of thinking that treats law as a timeless and meaningless Thing. In the course of the argument, the distinctions between ceremony and ritual, between social structure and communitas, and between religion and magic are reformulated, and the concepts of zone of familiarity and clerical community are laid out in a nutshell. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Conservatorship of Wendland: in the Supreme Court of California

HELD: A conservator of the person may not withhold tube feeding from a conscious conservatee who is not terminally ill, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state, absent clear and convincing evidence that the conservator's decision is in accordance with either the conservatee's own wishes or his best interest.     

Senator Opposition to Supreme Court Nominations: Reference Dependence on the Departing Justice

Research indicates that senators evaluate U.S. Supreme Court nominations on two ideological dimensions: the distance between themselves and the nominee, and the potential effect confirmation would have on the Court median. My analysis of nominations from 1968 to 2006 provides evidence that senators are also influenced by the ideological contrast between the nominee and the departing justice.