All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Bringing Back the States: A Congressional Perspective on the Fall of Slavery in America

In the aftermath of America's Civil War, national lawmakers who chronicled the fall of slavery described the North as a terrain of states whose representatives assembled in Congress, as evidenced in Henry Wilson's The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (1872–77) and Alexander Stephens’s A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States (1868–70). Beginning in the early 1900s, scholars who helped establish the field of American constitutional history redescribed the national government as the voice of the Northern people and the foe of the states, as evidenced in Henry Wilson's The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (1872–1877) and Alexander Stephens's A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States (1868–1870), a first generation of scholars writing during the Progressive Era redescribed the national government as the voice of the Northern people and the foe of the states, as evidenced in William A. Dunning's Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction (1898), John W. Burgess's The Civil War and the Constitution (1901–1906), and James G. Randall's Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (1926). Although a second generation of scholars uncovered traces of the lawmakers' perspective of states, new efforts in the wake of the civil rights movement to understand the internal workings of political parties and the contributions of ordinary Americans kept the study of national lawmakers and their states on the margins of inquiry, as evidenced in leading revisionist histories of Reconstruction, including Harold Hyman's A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (1973), Michael Les Benedict's A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863–1869 (1974a), and Eric Foner's Reconstruction: An Unfinished Revolution (1988). Today, the terrain of Northern states remains in the backdrop, as illustrated in recent studies featuring the wartime national government, including James Oakes's Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861–1865 (2012) and Mark E. Neely, Jr.'s Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War (2011), as well as studies of the mechanisms of constitutional change during Reconstruction, including relevant sections of Bruce Ackerman's We the People II: Transformations (1998) and Akhil Reed Amar's America's Constitution: A Biography (2005). This review essay argues that incorporating the states back into this century‐old framework will open new lines of inquiry and provide a more complete account of federalism's role in the fall of slavery. In particular, a return to the archives suggests that in the uncertain context of mid‐nineteenth‐century America, slavery's leading opponents in Congress saw the Constitution's federal logic not simply as an obstacle, but as a crucial tool with which to mobilize collective action and accommodate wartime opposition at a time when no one could say for sure what would remain of the United States.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

Pogrebinskii: After Today,a Coalition Is No Longer Needed in the Rada

Today the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) repealed the "quadruple two"—the scandalous constitutional reform that was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in the "Orange winter" of 2004. Today, in the fall of 2010, six years later, the hands of the Ukraine's political clock have been turned back.

Ukraine has returned to the old edition of the constitution, and has again become a presidential-parliamentary republic. The director of the Kyiv Center for Political Research and Conflict Studies, Mikhail Pogrebinskii, gave his assessment of the event, which many have called a coup d'état, in an exclusive mini-interview with ForUm.

Mikhail Borisovich, the CCU today declared that the constitutional reform of 2004 was unconstitutional, with the clarification that this decision is final, not subject to appeal, and mandatory for implementation. However, some experts have already expressed the assumption that it will "get hung up" in the parliament. What do you say?     

The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union1

Abstract: Our aim in this article is to consider whether the Union's deliberation over and decision‐making on constitutional norms, can contribute to render it more democratic. From a normative perspective, the way a constitution is forged has deep implications for its democratic legitimacy. In light of recent events, we consider how procedural changes in constitution‐making might contribute to rectify the Union's democratic deficit. To do so we first develop a thin model of constitution‐making based on the central tenets of deliberative democracy. Through this we seek to outline how a legitimate constitution‐making process will look from a deliberative democratic perspective. Second, we distil out some of the core characteristics of the Intergovernmental Conference (hereafter, IGC) model and assess this against the normative model, to establish the democratic quality of the IGC model. Third, we assess the current Laeken process by means of spelling out the central tenets of this mode of constitution‐making, and we assess it in relation to the normative standards of the deliberative model. In the fourth and final step, we consider what contribution constitution‐making might make to the handling of the EU's legitimacy deficit(s). We find that the Laeken process, in contrast to previous IGCs, was explicitly framed as a matter of constitution‐making. It carried further the democratization of constitution‐making, through its heightened degree of inclusivity and transparency. However, when considered in relation to the deliberative‐democratic model, it is clear that the Laeken Constitutional Treaty cannot be accorded the full dignity of a democratic constitution. The Constitutional Treaty can however lay the foundations for We the European people to speak.     

Text Matters: Some Reflections on the Forging of a New Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa

The South African Constitution establishes a constitutional democracy with a strong form of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court is required to declare invalid any legislation or conduct of the President which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The author, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, argues that the text of the Constitution has been an important determinant of the Court's jurisprudence, both in relation to the Court's jurisprudence concerning the institutional structures established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights jurisprudence.     

EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation

After the European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights the EU will become subject to legally binding judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and participate in statutory bodies of the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly; Committee of Ministers) when they act under the Convention. Convention rights and their interpretation by the ECtHR will be directly enforceable against the EU institutions and against Member States when acting within the scope of EU law. This will vest the ECHR with additional force in a number of Member States, including Germany and the UK. All Member States will further be subject to additional constraints when acting under the Convention system. The article considers the reasons for, and consequences of the EU's primus inter pares position under the Convention and within the Council of Europe, and the likely practical effect of the EU's accession for its Member States.     

Intimations of Unconstitutionality: The Supremacy of International Law and Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court

Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court reopens the debate on the extent of the immunity enjoyed by states for violations of jus cogens. The decision, which questions the authority of the ICJ's 2012 judgment in Germany v Italy, could certainly have effects on the formation of customary international law. In addition, it revives the discussion on the relationship between national and international law and on the supremacy of the latter over the former, especially if read in light of the previous Medellín and Kadi I decisions. Judgment 238/2014 is an opportunity to reappraise the role played by international law in domestic courts, particularly in cases where international law conflicts with core domestic constitutional values.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

Taking Care of Strasbourg: The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in Kosovo’s Domestic Legal System

This paper addresses the position of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law in Kosovo’s domestic legal order. To begin with, it reviews the background of the issue of human rights in Kosovo highlighting its distinct position and perspective. This article then analyses the position held by the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols in Kosovo’s legal order while also addressing the ECHR’s constitutionalization, its direct effect and the constitutional review on basis of it. The paper then examines whether the case-law of the ECtHR is binding in Kosovo, whether it is directly effective, and whether Kosovo’s Constitutional Court can use it as a ground in the conduct of constitutional reviews. This paper argues that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR both hold a privileged status under Kosovo’s constitutional law, despite Kosovo not being a party to the ECHR and, therefore, having no international liability to implement the ECHR. In addition, the paper offers certain arguments regarding the relative positions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR within the current practice of Kosovo’s judicial system. This paper concludes with the argument that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR hold a privileged status in the context of Kosovo’s domestic legal order—one which could serve as a precedent in respecting human rights and freedoms.     

Trump's Promise: Withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement

On June 1^st, 2017, President Trump announced that the United States will be withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, a move he has promised to make since his early campaign days. This move came as a shock to many people all over the world. The Paris Agreement is the world's first comprehensive climate agreement that aims to take proactive measures towards global warming. In order to fully understand this withdrawal, we must familiarize ourselves with its parent-treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the constitutional precedent involved with such a change.     

Post‐Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away

This article analyses the critical yet elusive notions of state neutrality, secularism and religious coercion under the European Convention in light of the European Court of Human Rights recent decision in Lautsi v Italy. We contend that the real concern in the Italian crucifix case was not the infringement of the school pupils’ religious freedom nor the proselytising or coercive effect of the ‘passive’ religious symbols. Rather, opponents of the longstanding symbols were animated by desire for strict religious equality, a notion that is, correctly in our view, not guaranteed under the Convention. Lautsi has significantly cleared the conceptual undergrowth surrounding state neutrality and the varieties of secularism, reined in the elastic notion of religious coercion and eschewed attempts to squeeze the constitutional diversity of European religion‐state frameworks into a strict American‐style separationist mould. The Convention jurisprudence on freedom of religion has finally come of age.     

National parliaments and the European Union: part of the problem or part of the solution to the democratic deficit in the European constitutional settlement?

European integration is as much an opportunity as a threat to national parliaments. The view that national parliaments have been the main losers in the process is not substantiated by empirical evidence. National parliaments have adapted their structures and procedures to keep pace with the increasing scope of integration. This process has included strengthening the constitutional powers of parliaments in some of the member states. The recognition in the Nice and Laeken declarations that national parliaments have an important role in enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Union and the key provisions of the draft protocols on the role of national parliaments and subsidiarity adopted by the Convention on the Future of Europe will ensure that national parliaments have the opportunity and the means, if they so choose, to be closely involved in Union affairs. Constitutional change at the Union level is likely to trigger normative and procedural change in the member states.     

Constitutional Judicial Review in the Russian Federation

The institution of constitutional judicial review has acquired a new legal foundation for its application: the Constitution of the Russian Federation (RF), adopted on 12 December 1993; the federal constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 21 June 1994; and other acts. However, the opportunities for full implementation of this new legislation on constitutional judicial review in the Russian Federation are constrained by problems from the past: first of all, by the problem of depoliticization, which has assumed exaggerated proportions as a result of the lack of practical success that marked the first stage of the Constitutional Court's operation in Russia. The resolution of this problem has become a condition for the viability of specialized constitutional judicial review in the RF. The difficulty of understanding and mastering this problem is further aggravated by the ambiguous nature of the institution of constitutional judicial review, not only in the Russian model but also in the classical model of its organization. For it is indisputable that constitutional judicial review is a component of the mechanism of judicial authority, regardless of where it is situated in the constitutional structure of power. However, constitutional judicial review cannot be wholly equated with traditional judicial functions since it is at the same time also a political activity undertaken through a jurisdictional form.     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat

This article takes stock of the emerging scholarship on the European Court of Justice's 2008 Kadi decision and seeks to make sense of the court's apparent evasiveness towards international law. The article argues that Kadi is best understood as an act of civil disobedience prompted by the UN Security Council's misapplication of foundational principles of the international order. In turn, the court's forceful articulation of the stakes in this case signals a prioritisation of basic rights within the supranational constitutional architectonic. In this respect, the ‘domestic’ constitutional implications of Kadi are just as far reaching as its consequences for the EU's status as an actor under international law.     

Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU: Towards ‘Individual’, ‘Constitutional’ or ‘Institutional’ Justice?

Abstract: The European Convention on Human Rights, promulgated by the Council of Europe in 1950, is widely regarded as the world's most successful experiment in the trans‐national judicial protection of human rights. The EU's much more recent judicial and political interest in human rights has also been widely welcomed. Yet, while the crisis currently afflicting the Convention system has not gone unnoticed, the same cannot equally be said of the difficulties presented by the increasing interpenetration of the two systems. Amongst the few who have shown some interest in these problems, the dominant view is that good will and common sense will provide adequate solutions. We disagree. Instead, we detect a gathering crisis which, unless properly analysed and effectively tackled, will only deepen as the EU's interest in human rights develops further. In our view, the problem is essentially conceptual and that, ultimately, it boils down to a much‐neglected question, simple to state but not so easy to answer: is the trans‐national protection of human rights in Europe a matter of ‘individual’, ‘constitutional’ or ‘institutional’ justice?     

A Negligent Blow to Children at Risk: MAK and RK v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights)

In MAK and RK v United Kingdom the European Court found that the absence of a common law duty of care owed to parents by doctors falsely suspecting them of their child's abuse violated the European Convention on Human Rights. This appears to be so even where the suspicion is a reasonable and blameless one to make, all things considered. In such circumstances, the court's decision to find that a parents' Convention rights had been unjustifiably infringed, and to order compensation accordingly, is likely to have the effect of frustrating the effective protection of children genuinely at risk of abuse.