Swedish Corporatism in Social Welfare Policy, 1986–1994: An Empirical Examination

Recent literature suggests that Swedish politics is decorporatizing. This article reports on the results of a survey of Swedish interest groups active in social welfare policy, administered in 1986 and 1994. The results cast considerable doubt on the decorporatization thesis. Little change is discernible between the two surveys on indicators of key corporatist behaviours on the part of interest groups and government. The immediate goal of the article is to provide evidence that the Swedish system is not, in fact, decorporatizing to the extent cited in recent literature. A larger aim, however, is to push the study of corporatism in a more empirical direction. The value of the theory will be enhanced if researchers are more precise about what it means and what behaviours should follow from it.     

Pluralism, Corporatism and the Distributive Conflict in Developed Capitalist Countries

In the 1970s the level of the distributive conflict increased in most developed capitalist countries. But at the same time it was found that the level of the distributive conflict remained on an unchanged level or even declined in some countries. In this article the role of interest organizations is analysed in explaining both cross-national differences in the level of the distributive conflict and the resurgence of the distributive conflict in the 1970s. Using Mancur Olson's new theory of interest organizations, the author shows on a theoretical level that a pluralist mode of interest intermediation is conducive to a high level of the distributive conflict and that a corporatist mode of interest intermediation is conducive to a low level of the distributive conflict. Empirical analyses in 18 developed capitalist countries are then carried on to test this theory. Empirical analyses strongly support the theory.     

Corporatism and the Microeconomic Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy: The Swedish Model Revisited*

The aim of this paper is to advance the research into the workings of ‘corporatist’ societies by adding a microeconomic dimension and outlining how such a revised model is applicable to recent Swedish experience. Sweden is often regarded as a corporatist society., that is, one in which policy is the outcome of a ‘social partnership’ between encompassing groups coordinated by government. This corporatist approach, resting on the existence of a macro-economic social contract between peak organizations, is complemented here by an analysis of the micro-level incentives and mechanisms conducive to operating within the corporatist cooperative framework. These characteristics are seen as together constituting what I term the solidaristic market economy, a system of economic relations different in fundamental respects from the two with which we are familiar. While Swedish reality docs not correspond exactly to the economic model set out, the case is made that it is as reasonable to extrapolate from Swedish experience to the solidaristic market economy (and vice versa) as to learn from U.S. experience about the competitive market economy and from the Soviet Union about the command economy. Complemented by these micro-characteristics, corporatist analysis of economic relations under social-democratic regimes is thus seen as explaining the resilience of the ‘Swedish model’. Rather than in constant peril as critics suggest, the encompassing interest organizations and the patterns of relations among them are characterized by continued solidity in keeping with the operating principles of the solidaristic market economy.     

English Pluralism, Functionalism and Corporatism: The Legacy of Paul Hirst

Paul Hirst began his career as a Marxist, and in his later work he made important contributions to numerous debates, the most notorious of which was his pronounced scepticism towards the idea of globalisation. However, Hirst's principal legacy to political theory was the development of his normative theory of 'associative democracy'. This article presents a critique of Hirst's theory emphasising his indebtedness to the tradition of English political pluralism. On a preliminary analysis, Hirst's project appears to have been predicated on a normative defence of voluntarism, individualism and pluralism. However, I make the case that on closer examination this is undermined and contradicted in his work – and in the work of the earlier English pluralists – by an implicit assumption of social unity. This assumption is manifest in the functionalism and corporatism that Hirst presented as necessary components of pluralism, which in turn reflect his unwarranted presumption that industrial productivity, efficient economic governance and welfare provision represent impartial and incontestable axioms of social organisation.     

Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a Deliberative Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability

This essay proposes a deliberative model of bureaucratic accountability and assesses its feasibility. Conventional wisdom suggests that a deliberative theory of bureaucratic accountability has little utility outside corporatist contexts. I reject this view because recent changes in patterns of interest representation have transformed both corporatist and pluralist bureaucracies into more hospitable environments for public deliberation. Contrary to the claims of democratic corporatists, recent pluralist practices of interest representation also seem to be compatible with public deliberation. Hence, movement toward greater openness in administrative decision-making is possible from both liberal pluralist and corporatist starting points. Corporatism clearly has no monopoly on democratic deliberation.     

State Structure and Variations in Corporatism: The Swedish Case*

The question addressed in this article is: Why are some countries more corporatist than others? It is argued that neither pure micro-, nor pure macro-explanations can account for the great variation in the degree of corporatism (however measured) among western countries. Instead, an institutional variant is put forward, where the structure of the state at the time of the formation of working-class organizations is taken as the main independent variable. It has been shown that the development of collaborative or confrontational labor movements was decided by the reaction of the existing political elites to the demands from the working class in the pre-World War I period. Where suffrage came late, and where the class system was rigid. a radical/revolutionary orientation would dominate the working-class movement, hindering corporatist arrangements, and vice versa. The problem with this argument is that it does not fit the Swedish case. Although democracy was introduced comparatively late and although the class system was rigid, Sweden has been considered the nearly ideal-typical case of corporatism. It is argued that the deviant Swedish case can be explained by the specific structure of the pre-democratic Swedish state - centralized, but not closed; bureaucratic and professional but not especially authoritarian; differentiated but not without central coordination of policy.     

Interest Group Competition over Policy Outcomes: Dynamics,Strategic Behavior,and Social Costs

This paper analyzes a two-period model of interestgroup competition between two groups to affect thepolicy outcome. The paper characterizes the subgameperfect equilibrium and considers the welfareimplications of the model. The subgame perfectequilibrium to this game is allocatively efficient ifand only if the initial equilibrium is allocativelyefficient and interest groups are equally adept atproducing political pressure. When rent seeking isconstitutionally protected, the notion of rent-seekingconstrained efficiency is defined as the cooperativesolution to the rent-seeking game. It is shown that arent-seeking constrained efficient equilibrium isattainable by forcing winners in political competitionto fully compensate losers.     

Can Welfare States Grow in Leaps and Bounds? Non-Incremental Policymaking in the Netherlands

The rapid expansion of the Dutch welfare state in the 1960s is described as an example of non-incremental policy growth. The reasons for this include: the largeness of policy change; the willingness of policymakers to consider new programs that marked dramatic departures from older programs, the commitment of policymakers to the goal of universalizing programs rather than introducing satisfycing measures; and the disruption of the traditional mode of corporatist representation in policymaking. The possibilities for an equally rapid dismantling of the welfare state are discussed.     

Impacts of Intergovernmental Financial Incentives on State Welfare Policymaking and Interstate Equity

Welfare policy in the United States is strongly influenced byintergovernmental factors. This analysis traces the effectsof federal financial incentives on state welfare policy decisionsacross programs and examines how changes in federal incentivesaffect state policy choices over time. The data indicate thathigher levels of federal participation are associated with substantialreductions in variance of welfare grants among the states andwith higher levels of interstate equity. These findings implythat significant shifts in welfare outputs would result froma devolution of responsibility for welfare to the states.     

Corporatism in Crisis: Stability and Change of Social Partnership in Austria

While recent developments in Western Europe provide numerous examples of the instability and decay of corporatist arrangements in the face of economic crisis, Austrian social partnership still exhibits remarkable stability. The article tries to explain this stability of corporatist politics in Austria. The Austrian case is also used to demonstrate some limitations of the academic literature on the breakdown of corporatism. However, stability in the Austrian case does not mean that nothing has changed. Changes have occurred within the existing institutional framework. Two main factors in the transformation of Austrian social partnership are pointed out, namely socio-cultural and political changes. Finally, some future perspectives of Austrian corporatism are outlined.     

社会保障与市场经济

社会保障是指国家和社会对公民在生、老、病、残而丧失劳动能力或因自然灾害而面临生活困难时给予的物质帮助 ,以此来保障每个公民的基本生活需要和维持劳动力再生产而建立的一种制度。社会保障对建立社会主义市场经济体制意义重大。它是市场经济的重要支柱 ,是市场经济的“安全网” ,是市场经济的“助推器” ,尤其是社会保障对于扩大内需、启动消费所起的作用 ,我们应予以足够的重视。     

The Politics of Social Welfare Reform in Urban China: Social Welfare Preferences and Reform Policies

China’s social welfare reform since the mid-1980s has been characterized as incremental and fragmented in three dimensions—social insurance, privatization, and targeting. This paper attempts to explore the micro-foundation of China’s urban social welfare reform by examining the diverse social welfare preferences and the cleavages among societal groups. It argues that the diversity of the societal groups’ preferences for social welfare has given rise to two lines of cleavage in urban China with respect to social welfare—between state sector and non-state sector employees and between labor market insiders and outsiders. The Chinese authoritarian regime’s political priority—economic growth with social stability—has induced the government to accommodate public social welfare preferences in social welfare policies. Therefore, the three dimensions of Chinese social welfare reform policies since the mid-1980s reflect and respond to the social cleavages derived from societal groups’ different preferences for social welfare.     

Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking

Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government.     

New Public Management Reforms of the Danish and Swedish Welfare States: The Role of Different Social Democratic Responses

This article investigates market-type reforms of the service welfare states in Sweden and Denmark. Sweden has implemented such reforms to a greater extent than Denmark. The explanation should be found in the different responses of the Social Democratic parties to the NPM agenda in general and market-type reforms in particular. In Denmark, the Social Democrats have opposed market-type reforms, whereas in Sweden they have been more open towards these ideas. With this focus, the paper differs from most other writings about variation in the extent of NPM.