National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: A Cross-national and Longitudinal Comparison

The article tests the argument that group–membership relations vary between public interest groups and other types of groups. While public interest groups draw their members from diffuse constituencies supporting the causes of the groups, sectional groups exhibit a closer correspondence between the interests advanced and the members recruited. According to the literature, differences can therefore be expected both in the patterns of membership recruitment and in the degree of membership influence in groups. The analysis draws on a survey of all national interest groups in Denmark. It demonstrates that public interest groups differ from other groups in their patterns of membership recruitment. However, it finds no tendency for public interest groups to be either less or more democratic than the average group.     

Information, Interests, and Environmental Regulation

This study contributes to the understanding of informational approaches to bringing about compliance with environmental regulations with particular attention to differences in the influence of information provided by different information sources. Based on theorizing from a combination of information processing and interest group literatures, we develop hypotheses about regulatees' reliance upon and the influence of different sources of information. We test these hypotheses for Danish farmers' compliance with agro-environmental rules. Our findings show that information plays a role in bringing about regulatory compliance, but its influence is not as strong and is less direct than might be thought to be the case. In addition, we show that not all information sources have the same influence. The findings demonstrate that interest groups have important roles in information provision and legitimization of policies that have often been assumed in the literature but have rarely been empirically examined.     

Legislators,organizations and ties: Understanding interest group recognition in the European Parliament

What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups as relevant policy actors? Addressing this question is fundamental for understanding the role of political elites in shaping patterns of interest representation and interest groups’ role in legislative decision making. Building on theories of legislative behaviour and informational theories of legislative lobbying, we argue that MEPs give recognition to those organizations that are instrumental for achieving key political goals: re-election, career-progression and policy influence. The pursuit of these goals generates different patterns of MEP recognition of interest groups. We contribute to the literature in three ways. Conceptually, we propose interest group recognition as a key concept for understanding interactions and links between legislative and non-legislative actors. We illustrate the high conceptual relevance of recognition for interest groups research while noting its conspicuous neglect in the literature. We address this gap and place the concept central stage in understanding legislators’ attention to and behaviour towards interest organizations. Theoretically, we build on a classic framework explaining legislators’ behaviour and refine it through the lenses of informational theories of legislative lobbying. We argue and show that legislators recognize organizations that enhance electoral prospects in their home Member States, and that legislator–group ideological proximity and an interest group's prominence in a specific policy field affect MEPs’ decisions to recognize some organizations as relevant actors. Our argument acknowledges the importance of the broader context in which MEPs operate and pays attention to how they react to and interact with it. Empirically, we propose an original and innovative research design to identify and measure recognition with the help of social media data. Our measurement strategy constitutes a significant improvement insofar that it reduces the challenges of measurement bias usually associated with self-reported data generated through interviews, surveys, or the textual analysis of newspaper articles and official documents. Our research design allows using fine-grained measures of key dependent and explanatory variables and offers the very first analysis of MEP interest group recognition that holds across decision-making events and policy areas. We test our argument on a new dataset with 4 million observations recording the recognition of more than 7,000 organizations by 80 per cent of MEPs serving in EP8. We find that MEPs are more likely to recognize organizations from their Member State, particularly under flexible- and open-list electoral institutions. MEPs are also more likely to recognize organizations that share their ideological affinities and are prominent actors in policy areas legislators specialize in.     

Are they listening? Public opinion,interest groups and government responsiveness

What is the role of interest groups in the transmission of issues between the public and government policy? While government responsiveness to voters has received widespread scholarly attention, little is known about the role of interest groups in the transmission of public opinion to government. It is argued here that interest groups importantly influence government responsiveness to public opinion, but that the effect varies by type of interest group: while cause groups increase the responsiveness of governments to their electorate, sectional groups decrease government responsiveness. Drawing on a new and unique dataset, this article examines the relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government expenditure across 13 policy areas in Germany from 1986 until 2012 and shows that interest groups indeed have a differential effect on the responsiveness of governments. The article’s findings have important implications for understanding political representation and the largely overlooked relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government policy.     

Interest group–party linkage in the twenty‐first century: Evidence from Denmark,the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

This article systematically investigates interest group–party interactions in the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom based on cross‐national surveys with responses from 1,225 interest groups. The findings show that interest groups and parties still interact in the beginning of the twenty‐first century, but that the vast majority of their interaction involves a low degree of institutionalisation. Using fractional logit analysis, it is demonstrated that the strength of interest group–party linkage is primarily affected by systematic differences in state–society structures and organisational group characteristics. Moreover, differences are found in what conditions different types of interaction. Whereas historical legacies and partisan origin influence an interest group's structural party links, group resources make interactions of a less institutionalised, ad hoc nature more likely.     

Is Spending More Potent For or Against a Proposition? Evidence from Ballot Measures

The recent academic literature suggests that pressure from special interest groups has little or no influence on whether initiatives and referendums are passed or defeated. Further, there is a consensus that, to the degree that groups' campaigning is important for explaining outcomes, groups opposing the initiative and favoring the status quo have an advantage over groups that support change. These studies have not considered that interest groups campaign strategically and therefore that campaigning is endogenous in ballot measure elections. This study examines the effect of campaigning on ballot proposition elections and develops a research design that accounts for strategic and endogenous campaign advertising. The research design uses a two-way fixed-effects model to estimate the effect of interest group pressure on ballot measure outcomes. The data are based on television advertising for or against California ballot measures from 2000 to 2004. The results show that supporting and opposing interest groups' campaigning has a quantitatively important and statistically significant influence on ballot measure outcomes. The campaigning of supporting interest groups is at least as productive as that of opposing interest groups.     

How interest groups influence public opinion: Arguments matter more than the sources

Through what mechanism do interest groups shape public opinion on concrete policies? In this article, three hypotheses are proposed that distinguish between the effect of the arguments conveyed by interest groups and the effect of interest groups as source cues. Two survey experiments on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change allow the testing of these hypotheses. The resulting evidence from several countries shows that, with respect to interest groups’ attempts at shaping public opinion, arguments matter more than their sources. This is so even when accounting for people's trust in the interest groups that serve as source cues and for people's level of information about a policy. The finding that interest groups affect public opinion via arguments rather than as source cues has implications for the literature on elite influence on public opinion and the normative evaluation of interest group activities.     

Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy,Parliament, and the Media

A key issue for interest groups and policymakers is the ways through which organized interests voice their interests and influence public policy. This article combines two perspectives on interest group representation to explain patterns of interest group access to different political arenas. From a resource exchange perspective, it argues that access to different political arenas is discrete as it is determined by the match between the supply and demands of interest groups and gatekeepers—politicians, bureaucrats, and reporters. From a partly competing perspective, it is argued that access is cumulative and converges around wealthy and professionalized groups. Based on a large‐scale investigation of group presence in Danish political arenas, the analyses show a pattern of privileged pluralism. This describes a system where multiple political arenas provide opportunities for multiple interests but where unequally distributed resources produce cumulative effects (i.e., the same groups have high levels of arena access).     

Kosovo: The development of interest groups in a fragile democracy

Kosovo offers a unique opportunity to study interest groups in both a transitional political system and a new country. As the youngest of the Balkan countries, both its pluralist democracy and its interest group system are in the early stages of development. The most significant influence on this development was Kosovo's grueling fight for independence from Serbia in the 1990s. This produced a particular form of interest and interest group activity quite different from most political systems in transition to democracy. As in all such systems, however, Kosovo's group system has also been shaped by its political culture, socioeconomic, including religious, factors, and particularly the international community. This article explains the various factors that shaped early interest group activity, its characteristics, and how it has evolved into a more traditional group system but one that remains bifurcated.     

Pluralism,corporatism and perception of corruption

When people know who is influencing the elected politicians and they may ‘put the rascals out’ in case they feel that the incumbents are corrupt, ceteris paribus, their perception of the level of corruption should not be affected by lobbying. If on the other hand people are not sure which or how many actors are influencing public policy and they are not able to hold the government truly accountable as interest group influence is constant with different governments, people will be more likely to perceive the government as corrupted. The former system is a characteristic of corporatism and the latter of pluralism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that interest groups with resources such as business groups or firms in pluralist systems are more influential than groups with few resources. Thus, people may perceive pluralist policy‐making system as more corrupt than corporatist policy‐making system where fewer visible actors have more or less equal weight in the policy‐making process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions

The article compares the political activities of different types of interest groups. Drawing on data from a survey of all Danish national interest groups, it demonstrates significant variation in the strategic choices of different types of groups. Groups with corporative resources direct much attention towards influencing the bureaucracy. They possess resources valued by officials and therefore have good options for utilizing a strategy targeting the administration and seeking corporatist integration. By contrast, public interest groups are more likely to use publicly visible strategies in which affecting the media agenda plays a central role. By engaging in such strategies, public interest groups can demonstrate a high level of engagement to their diffuse membership. Furthermore, the goals of public interest groups are typically conducive to pursuit through public strategies. A third category of other groups is incorporated in the analyses as a point of reference to establish patterns of strategy use. While there are clear differences between groups with regard to most strategies of influence, different types of groups are equally engaged in a parliamentary strategy. Interacting with Parliament seems to be important for groups integrated in corporatist structures as well as for those relying more on public strategies.     

Balancing constituency and congruence: How constituency involvement affects positional congruence between organized interests and the general public

This article asks to what extent and under which conditions interest groups are congruent with public opinion. We argue that interest groups can be caught in a balancing act between engaging with their constituency on the one hand and aligning their position with the broader public on the other hand. We contribute to previous studies by arguing that the effect of interest group type on congruence is moderated by the degree to which constituencies are involved in advocacy processes and the salience of policy issues. We test these expectations by analyzing 314 media claims made by Belgian interest groups regarding 58 policy issues. The results demonstrate that citizen groups with formal members are more prone to share the position of the broader public compared to concentrated interest groups such as business associations, especially if they involve their members in advocacy activities and when issues are salient in the media.     

The use and effect of political propaganda in democracies

This paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised. By propaganda semitruths are distributed among the electorate. The decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives. The analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate, the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate. The pecuniary interest of an interest group is, however, also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group. It has finally become apparent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies.     

Getting a Seat at the Table: Capital,Capture and Expert Groups in the European Union

European Commission expert groups provide powerful platforms from which interest organisations can steer the EU consultation process and weigh in on policy outcomes. Commission decision-makers and bureaucrats rely heavily on expert groups to provide expert policy advice on highly technical issues in the early stages of the policymaking process. Interest organisations provide this advice in order to have their voices heard at the EU level. But whose interests are being represented in these expert groups? Which types of interest organisations, in other words, get a seat at the table and why? This article, using data on over 800 expert groups and nearly 3,000 interest organisations, argues that expert group membership is largely a function of superior resources, EU-level interests and existing institutionalised ties to decision-makers. Far from simply addressing the Commission’s need for expertise, expert group membership is more a story of capital and capture.     

On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective

It is a widely held belief that interest groups respond competitively to political challenges from other groups. This view is found not only in the traditional theory of interest groups, but also in the literature on policy typologies. Though it is not necessarily supposed that groups form in response to opposition, it is believed that when groups exist, they compete. If an interest group is thought of as a multipurpose organization, whose leaders might spend organizational funds on nonpolitical programs which directly serve the members, the supposition of competition can be subjected to rigorous examination. Political competition causes the cost of political success to rise. Since group leaders must allocate scarce revenue among projects, it seems that nonpolitical projects might become more attractive when the political environment becomes competitive. Political scientists have usually been disposed to take the opposite view, believing that demand for political activity rises as the cost of political success increases. The nature of political action as an organizational investment is discussed from the allocative perspective in this essay. It is shown that competition cannot be safely assumed unless other strong hypotheses are invoked. A Slutsky-type theorem is deduced for political reaction.     

It’s All in the Name: Source Cue Ambiguity and the Persuasive Appeal of Campaign Ads

As strategies for campaign political advertising become more complex, there remains much to learn about how ad characteristics shape voter reactions to political messages. Drawing from existing literature on source credibility, we expect ad sponsorship will have meaningful effects on voter reactions to political advertisements. We test this by using an original experiment, where we expose a sample of student and non-student participants to equivalent ads and vary only the paid sponsor disclaimer at the end of the message. The only thing that differs across stimuli is whether a political candidate, a known interest group, or an unknown interest group sponsors the advertisement. Following exposure to one of these ads, participants complete a posttest battery of questions measuring the persuasiveness of the message, source credibility, and message legitimacy. We find that ads sponsored by unknown interest groups are more persuasive than those sponsored by candidates or known interest groups, and persuasion is mediated by perceived credibility of the source. We conclude by discussing our findings and their implications for our understanding of contemporary campaigns.     

Election Timing,Electorate Composition,and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from School Districts

There is considerable debate about how election timing shapes who votes, election outcomes, and, ultimately, public policy. We examine these matters by combining information on more than 10,000 school tax referenda with detailed micro‐targeting data on voters participating in each election. The analysis confirms that timing influences voter composition in terms of partisanship, ideology, and the numerical strength of powerful interest groups. But, in contrast to prominent theories of election timing, these effects are modest in terms of their likely impact on election outcomes. Instead, timing has the most significant impact on voter age, with the elderly being the most overrepresented group in low‐turnout special elections. The electoral (and policy) implications of this effect vary between states, and we offer one explanation for this variation.     

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies — is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the ‘right direction’. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. qu]Much of the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form of freely provided “objective” studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks). qu]The analysis here is vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole, 1989: Ch. 1.3, p. 77, Rentseeking behavior).     

Loose Cannons or Loyal Foot Soldiers? Toward a More Complex Theory of Interest Group Advertising Strategies

Recent court decisions have encouraged new types of interest groups to become involved in election campaigns. Yet questions remain about whether interest group sponsorship of advertising affects the content of the issues being discussed. The ability of interest groups to influence the campaign agenda has implications for the extent to which politicians can be held accountable by citizens. In this research, we present a new conceptual framework for explaining variation in interest group advertising strategies and examine the factors leading different types of interest groups to be loose cannons (diverging from the issue debates among candidates) or loyal foot soldiers (matching the candidates’ issue debates). We find more evidence of loyal foot soldier behavior among new multi‐issue interest groups and among Republican groups and candidates. Fears of interest groups “hijacking” campaign agendas appear unfounded.     

The Diffusion of Human Trafficking Policies in the Post-Soviet Region: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Adoption in Ukraine,Latvia, and Russia

This paper analyzes how human trafficking policies diffused in the post-Soviet region. By adapting the diffusion of innovation framework to fit the international context, I examine whether human trafficking adoptions in the post-Soviet region were due to internal determinants and/or diffusion effects. A comparison of Russia, Latvia, and Ukraine found that internal determinants such as state commitment to human trafficking policy and interest group strength were more important to policy adoption than external pressures from the international community while state capacity and bureaucratic restructuring impeded policy adoption. I argue that policymaking, even in authoritarian regimes, is more nuanced than blind compliance with international treaties and shows that interest groups and policy entrepreneurs work within the constraints of national policymaking to adopt human trafficking policies.