Harm and Wrongdoing in Criminalisation Theory

Contemporary theories of criminalisation address, with varying emphasis, themes concerning the harmfulness and the wrongfulness of the conduct. In his article for the present issue, Antony Duff relies chiefly on notions of wrongfulness as the basis for his proposed criminalisation doctrines; whereas in their 2011 volume on criminalisation, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch invoke both wrongfulness and harmfulness as prerequisites for prohibiting conduct. The present article assesses the comparative merits of these approaches, and argues in favour of the latter, two-element perspective. In this article, the author puts forward a number of reasons suggesting why the two-element approach (of wrongfulness and harm) is preferable. These reasons include, firstly, an inductive argument—that the kinds of wrongful conduct for which criminalisation seems a plausible response are those that include an element of harm or risk of harm. Secondly, a defining role for the state is one of resource-protection: of safeguarding the means and resources through which citizens can live good lives. Thus the concept of citizens’ living resources—and the related conception of harm—should be made a constitutive and explicit element of criminalisation theory, rather than subsuming resource-protection under a general rubric of wrongfulness. Thirdly, a two-element approach provides reciprocal limiting principles concerning the scope of criminalisation. One can, for example, employ wrongfulness requirements to limit the criminalisation of conduct that has remote harmful consequences; and, conversely, use a harmfulness requirement as means for restricting the criminalisation of wrongful acts.     

What is the Harm Principle For?

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence.     

Wrongfulness and Prohibitions

This paper responds to Antje du-Bois Pedain’s discussion of the wrongfulness constraint on the criminal law. Du-Bois Pedain argues that the constraint is best interpreted as stating that φing is legitimately criminalised only if φing is wrongful for other-regarding reasons. We take issue with du-Bois Pedain’s arguments. In our view, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is wrongful in du-Bois Pedain’s sense. Rather, it is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is what we call bare wrongful—that is, that the reasons in favour of φing are defeated by the reasons against. Though du-Bois Pedain is critical of this view, we argue that her criticisms do not convince.     

The Wrongfulness Constraint in Criminalisation

If conduct must be wrongful in order to be justifiably criminalised, how should its wrongfulness be established? I examine a conception of wrongfulness put forward by A. P. Simester, which makes wrongfulness turn on whether the reasons favouring the performance of an action are, all things considered, defeated by the reasons against its performance. I argue that such a view can only generate appropriate substantive constraints in the context of criminalisation if it can distinguish between the sorts of reasons that a verdict of wrongfulness, as a concept distinct from stupidity or selfishness, should attend to, and the sorts of reasons it should leave out. Assuming that this conception of wrongfulness should operate as a constraint on criminalisation in a liberal-democratic state, the only reasons it should include are other-regarding reasons. What matters is whether the agent commits an other-regarding wrong. This conception of wrongfulness helps us further to resolve fundamental questions concerning mala prohibita and the legitimate reach of any duty to obey the law.     

The Significance of Transferred Intent

The doctrine of transferred intent (or transferred “malice” in England) generally provides that if A attempts to harm B but, because of bad aim, misses and accidentally causes the same harm to befall C, A’s harmful intent vis-à-vis B is transferred to C, thus rendering A guilty of intentionally harming C. Commentators acknowledge the doctrine to be a legal fiction, but they differ regarding whether the fiction produces just results, some believing it does, others believing that A is guilty at most of attempting to harm B rather than intentionally harming C. Commentators who agree that the fiction produces just results nevertheless differ regarding whether the fiction should be retained or whether A’s intent to harm “a” person, in this case, B, is the only intent that signifies for crimes of intentional harm, regardless of whom A eventually harms. Doug Husak sought to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory regarding bad-aim cases by proposing in 1996 that A be punished for attempting to harm B (rather than for harming C) but sentenced as if he had harmed B. I once believed that Husak was correct. But I now have doubts, in part because Husak, along with others, cannot explain why the strength of people’s intuitions regarding A’s responsibility in bad-aim cases depends upon (1) C’s being a reasonably foreseeable victim, and (2) C’s being harmed by the same threat of force that A initially unleashed against B. I argue that one cannot achieve reflective equilibrium in bad-aim cases without inquiring into why resulting harm matters in criminal law, and that when one does, one discovers that just as people’s intuitions regarding whether intentional harms are proximate depend upon how resulting harms occur, so, too, people’s intuitions regarding whether an actor is guilty of intentional harm depend upon how resulting harm comes about.     

环境污染责任之违法性判断

环境污染侵权责任需以行为人之行为具有违法性为要件。对于违法性之判断,除应考虑被害人所受损害之程度外,加害人行为对于加害人自己及社会上一般大众的效益,亦应一并予以考虑。因而违法性之判断,在纠正正义与功利主义之间,如何取舍,成为环境污染责任的重要议题。     

Indirect Crimes

Both law and morality routinely distinguish between direct wrongs of causing harm oneself and indirect wrongs of contributing to another’s harmful actions. This article asks whether this distinction matters for the purposes of a theory of criminalisation. It argues that, in some respects, the distinction matters less than is often supposed: generally, the potential future actions of others have at least some relevance to what we ought to do. However, it is morally significant that criminal liability for indirect wrongdoing can make our freedom to do valuable things contingent upon others’ failure to comply with their moral obligations. This raises substantial concerns of autonomy and fairness that tell against the creation of some – but by no means all – indirect crimes.     

Advancing Accountability: Moving Toward Victim Restoration

One of the goals of Pennsylvania's juvenile justice system is the “imposition of accountability” for offenses committed. This White Paper, originally published in 2006, takes the position that true accountability requires juvenile offenders to repair the harm caused by their offending behavior and to understand and acknowledge the wrongfulness of their actions, their responsibility for causing harm, and the impact of the crime on the crime victim and community. It identifies system responsibilities, restorative practices, and outcomes relative to accountability. This White Paper was the result of debate among focus group participants under the auspices of the State Advisory Group.     

Transgression Wrongfulness Outweighs its Harmfulness as a Determinant of Sentence Severity

When students suggest sentences for criminal offenders, do they rely more heavily on the harmfulness or on the wrongfulness of the offender's conduct? In Study 1, 116 Princeton University undergraduates rated the harmfulness and wrongfulness of, and suggested appropriate sentences for, a series of crimes. As expected, participants emphasized wrongfulness when choosing an appropriate criminal punishment. In Study 2, 33 Princeton undergraduates made similar ratings for violations of the University Honor Code, and rated their contempt for fabricated amendments to the Code that required sentencers to focus either only on harmfulness or only on wrongfulness. Again, sentences more closely reflected wrongfulness ratings, and participants were more contemptuous of the harmfulness-based proposal. We also consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for sentencing laws and policy.     

Self-Defense and Giving Rise to Cost: On Innocent Bystanders,Threats, Obstructors,and Obstacles,and the Permissibility to Harm Them

Philosophers have had trouble defending the common sense view that it is permissible to impose significant cost on an innocent person who is about to harm you to prevent the harm from occurring. In this paper, I argue that such harm can be justified if one pays attention to the moral significance of imposing a cost on others. The constraint against harming people who give rise to cost by their presence or movements is weaker than the constraint against harming bystanders. Moreover, I argue that people who give rise to cost have a duty to take on some of that cost to help protect the person under threat.     

刑罚根据完整化上的犯罪分类——侵害犯、危险犯、结果犯、行为犯的关系论纲

把结果犯、行为犯、危险犯作为犯罪既遂类型,是一种理论上的因果倒置。这些概念并不是在明确了犯罪既遂标准后根据既遂标准的不同所作的犯罪分类。相反,侵害犯与危险犯、结果犯与行为犯的划分,对犯罪既遂标准的确定具有理论指导意义。危险犯与侵害犯、结果犯与行为犯的划分需要以法益理论为前提,以完整化的刑罚根据为视角。侵害犯与危险犯是以犯罪完整化的刑罚根据在性质上的不同(是对法益的侵害还是对法益的危险)为划分标准的。结果犯与行为犯是以刑罚根据完整化是否包含结果要素为划分标准的。由于两组概念的划分标准不同,因而并非对应或者并列关系,也非包含关系,而是一种交叉关系。交叉的结果,便形成了四种犯罪类型:实害结果犯、危险结果犯、侵害行为犯、危险行为犯。这些犯罪类型的划分是理解犯罪既遂的基础,但并非从属于犯罪既遂理论。     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: judicial standards of wrongfulness since M'Naghten

In insanity defense litigation, the precise legal definition of wrongfulness is often critically important. References in the M'Naghten Rules to the appropriate standard of wrongfulness were ambiguous, resulting in a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether wrongfulness means legal wrong, subjective moral wrong, or objective moral wrong. This article reviews and analyzes these three judicial standards of wrongfulness in the context of case law from jurisdictions that follow each of the respective standards. The evolution of knowledge of right and wrong tests of criminal responsibility is traced back to its philosophical roots. Most psychiatrists claim no expertise in matters of morality or law. The American Psychiatric Association would bar psychiatric expert testimony on the ultimate issue of insanity, on the grounds that there are "impermissible leaps in logic" when psychiatrists opine on the probable relationship between medical concepts and moral-legal constructs. Whether or not they testify on the ultimate issue, psychiatrists should ascertain the applicable standard of wrongfulness in order to properly relate their findings to the relevant legal criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of their testimony.     

Criminal heterarchy and its critics: governance and the making of insecurity in Colombia

ABSTRACT

The FARC, Colombia’s oldest and biggest guerrilla organisation, has long been constructed as the country’s public enemy number one, an enemy that is increasingly portrayed as an outright criminal actor who abandoned all political ambitions. This image of the FARC as a criminal threat to the Colombian state and society is central to a broader turn towards criminalisation in Colombian politics. Through the lens of a critical governance perspective and the notion of the state’s discursive selectivity this article analyses turning points during which the construction of Colombian society’s criminal enemies became a driving force in the country’s security governance. Which social forces support the implementation of criminalising forms of security governance and how? What are the social and political consequences of the latter? In answering these questions, the article argues that the war on (guerrilla) crime assumes a ‘productive’ role for Colombia’s formal democracy.     

Suicidal and other self‐harming behaviour in offender women: The role of shame,anger and childhood abuse

Purpose. The main aim of the study was to consider the contributions of childhood physical and sexual abuse (CPA and CSA) and different aspects of shame and anger to self‐harming behaviours in 89 women prisoners. A further aim was to examine the mediating roles of shame and anger in any link between childhood abuse and self‐harm. Method. Standardized shame and anger questionnaires and four items assessing self‐harm modified from an impulsive behaviour questionnaire were verbally administered. Women were interviewed to assess the occurrence of physical and sexual abuse in childhood. Results. Over half (57%) the women reported suicidal and other self‐harming behaviours at some time in their lives, with 50% of these occurring just before or during the current sentence. All shame, anger, and abuse variables were significantly related to self‐harm, but only bodily shame showed an independent relationship when all variables were considered together. Bodily shame was most strongly associated with CSA, and a mediational analysis tested these specific links with self‐harm. Both CSA and bodily shame made significant independent contributions to self‐harm; however, bodily shame demonstrated the strongest effect, partially mediating the effect of CSA. Conclusions. This is the first study to demonstrate a significant statistical relationship between shame and self‐harming behaviours in women. The findings have implications for the assessment of the therapeutic needs of women prisoners. Future research directions are discussed.     

‘Consumer’ versus ‘Customer’: The Devil in the Detail

According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ‘consumer welfare’. In EU competition law, however, ‘consumer’ means ‘customer’ and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ‘customers’ is generally presumed to harm ‘consumers’ and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non‐linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ‘customer welfare’ does not coincide with the effect on ‘consumer welfare’ and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ‘consumers’, the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ‘consumer’ in ‘consumer welfare’; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves.     

论犯罪故意在三阶层体系中的地位

在引入三阶层体系的背景之下,学界对我国《刑法》第14条中犯罪故意的体系性地位产生了诸多争议。在犯罪论体系的发展过程中,随着不法的主观化和罪责的客观化、规范化,心理性故意确立了作为主观构成要件的地位,而罪责故意与违法性认识(不法意识)则留在罪责层面,成为罪责的核心要素。无论是以不法论的基础还是从我国实定法的角度来看,心理性故意均应归属于构成要件而非罪责;在承认故意的双重地位的前提下,对容许性构成要件错误采取"法律效果转用的罪责理论"是迄今为止最为妥当的见解;关于故意与违法性认识(不法意识)的关系,我国《刑法》采取的是罪责理论而非故意理论。在三阶层体系之下,我国《刑法》第14条的犯罪故意应当区分心理性故意、罪责故意与违法性认识(不法意识),其中,心理性故意应当归属于构成要件,而罪责故意与违法性认识(不法意识)则归属于罪责。     

侵权构成要件的不法性功能论

违法性是大陆法系侵权法保护范围的"调节器"、法律秩序的"信号灯",并在规范层面对侵权责任形态多样化、特殊责任构成和违法性阻却有重要意义。对违法性要件之取舍,我国侵权责任立法应结合侵权法的发展趋势、价值取向和体系构成作出选择。     

Mala Prohibita,the Wrongfulness Constraint,and the Problem of Overcriminalization

Law and Philosophy - The wrongfulness constraint, as a principle of criminalization, is supposed to preclude criminalization in the absence of wrongfulness. Crimes that look especially problematic...     

Law of Denial

Law’s claim of mastery over past political violence is frequently undermined by reversals of that relationship of mastery, so that the violence of the law, and especially its symbolic violence, becomes easily incorporated into longues durées of political violence, rather than mastering them, settling them, or providing closure. Doing justice to the past, therefore, requires a political and theoretical attunement to the ways in which law, in purportedly attempting to address past political violence, inscribes itself into contemporary contexts of violence. While this may be limited to an analysis of how law is an effect of and affects the political, theoretically this attunement can be further refined by means of a critique of dynamics that are internal to law itself and that have to do with how law understands its own historicity, as well as its relationship to history and historiography. This article aims to pursue such a critique, taking as its immediate focus the ECHR case of Perinçek v Switzerland, with occasional forays into debates around the criminalisation of Armenian genocide denialism in France. The Perinçek case concerned Switzerland’s criminalisation of the denial of the Armenian genocide, and concluded in 2015 after producing two judgments, first by the Second Chamber, and then by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR. However, although they both found for the applicant, the two benches had very different lines of reasoning, and notably different conceptions regarding the relationship between law and history. I proceed by tracing the shifting status of ‘history’ and ‘historians’ in these two judgments, and paying attention to the deferrals, disclaimers and ellipses that structure law’s relation to history. This close reading offers the opportunity for a critical reappraisal of the relationship between law, denial and violence: I propose that the symbolic violence of the law operative in memory laws is a product of that which remains unresolved in law’s understanding of historicity (including its own), its self-understanding vis-à-vis the task of historiography, and its inability to respond to historical violence without inscribing itself into a history of violence, a process regarding which it remains in denial.

     

The limits of environmental remediation protocols for environmental justice cases: lessons from Vieques,Puerto Rico

The United States Federal Government has repeatedly put the people of Vieques, Puerto Rico in harm’s way due to the injurious after-effects of air-to-ground weapons testing. Most of the harm happened during the Navy’s 70 years on the island. Yet, the harm continues today considering that aspects of the cleanup count as continued acts of environmental injustice, viewed within the context of the island’s colonial history. Usually, this harm deals with public health issues, but the remediation protocols do not account for considerations such as cultural identity and heritage. This paper shows how the procedures for environmental remediation in Vieques qualify as a case of environmental injustice according to Robert M. Figueroa’s ‘environmental justice paradigm.’ The aim of employing this kind of approach is to pinpoint the underlying reasons why this is a case of environmental injustice.