Community Development Block Grant Spending Revisited: Patterns of Benefit and Program Institutionalization

This article analyzes Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)spending by local governments between 1988–1992. We addressfour issues examining actual expenditure patterns in a smallcentral city and five satellite cities in Michigan: changesin CDBG expenditure patterns; levels of social targeting; theextent of institutionalization of expenditure patterns; andthe level of privatization of CDBG spending. We conclude thatwhile spending for housing and public works is related to thefiscal health of cities, expenditures for economic developmentand social services are related to political characteristics.Further, local governments exceed federal social targeting guidelines.Finally, while there is little privatization, the communitiesstudied evidence modest levels of program innovation in thelater years of the CDBG program.     

Devolution of the Small Cities CDBG Program in Mississippi

In 1982 responsibility for HUD's Small Cities Community DevelopmentBlock Grant program was transferred to state governments aspart of President Reagan's New Federalism initiatives. Devolutionwas designed to (1) implement a new vision of American federalism,(2) shift control over a significant source of financial resourcesfor nonmetropolitan areas, and (3) end the bypassing of stategovernment officials in community development decisionmaking.This article uses the eleven year (1975–1985) historyof Small Cities CDBG awards in Mississippi to assess the consequencesof the program's devolution. Changes in the pattern of stateCDBG awards indicate that the program's devolution produceda policy redirection that channeled CDBG funds to a larger numberof the smallest municipalities and permitted more local discretionin project design. As a result, HUD no longer dictated communitydevelopment policy to small cities. Instead, community developmentpriorities in Mississippi emerged out of an award process thatinvolved interaction among state and local officials.     

CDBG in Chicago: The Politics of Control

The first eight years of CDBG provided Chicago with almost three-quartersof a billion dollars. At the outset, the city executive, headedby Mayor Richard J. Daley, took control of CDBG planning andallocation, despite the efforts of the "machine's" opponentsto use CDBG's housing assistance and citizen participation requirementsas levers for political reform and social change. The city executivecontinued in firm control even after the Carter administrationtook office determined to reverse inherited New Federalism policies.City hall opponents found that HUD's more assertive policieson housing assistance, citizen participation, and targetinghad little effect on the executive's ability to decide how andwhere to spend CDBG funds. The dominant role of the executivealso persisted after Mayor Daley's death, although Mayor JaneByrne (elected in 1979) shifted CDBG decisionmaking from operatingcity departments to the mayor's budget office. ^*I am indebted to Sheila Macmanus for her valuable assistancein researching this article. David N. Larson, Deputy Commissionerof Planning, City of Chicago, read an early draft and made manyhelpful comments. Leonard Rubinowitz of Northwestern Universitygenerously provided me with working drafts of his chapter inDecentralizing Urban Development, cited below.     

Decentralizing Community Development Decisions: A Study of Oklahoma's Small Cities Program

Decentralization of the CDBG Small Cities program in 1981 gavestates great latitude in deciding how to allocate grant funds.Consequently, scholars expressed concern that, understate control,fewer CDBG funds would be expended for low- and moderate-incomebenefits via housing rehabilitation. Research on the Small Citiesprogram in Oklahoma indicates a definite shift in spending priorities.Since 1982, Oklahoma localities diverted CDBG funds primarilyto infrastructure andeconomic development instead of housing-relatedactivities, and channeled a larger amount of dollars into moderate-and median-income areas. As a result, the Small Cities programin Oklahoma, under state control, was found to provide lessdirect and immediate housing aid to lower income citizens.     

SSI eligibility and participation among the oldest old: evidence from the AHEAD

The proportion of elderly SSI recipients aged 70 or older has been growing in recent years, perhaps because of rising life expectancies overall and a higher incidence of poverty among the oldest old. In 1999, 84 percent of all elderly SSI recipients were 70 or older. This article examines Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility and participation among the oldest old. The analysis was based on 1993 data from the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old that were used to build a detailed SSI eligibility model to identify individuals who meet the federal criteria for SSI income and resource eligibility. The participation rate among those eligible for federal SSI benefits is 53.9 percent, which is generally consistent with the findings of other studies. Furthermore, eligible participants would receive a significantly higher federal SSI benefit than eligible nonparticipants. Correspondingly, eligible participants have significantly lower incomes and assets than eligible nonparticipants. An econometric model is used to estimate the influence of various demographic, financial, and health care use characteristics on the probability of SSI participation among eligible individuals and couples. The model corrects for measurement error in calculated benefits and for misclassifying someone as ineligible. The empirical results show that the effect of higher SSI benefits on the probability of participation is substantial--a $100 increase in benefits would increase the probability of participating for an average eligible unit by 15 percentage points. Many of the demographic, financial, and health care use variables also are important predictors of SSI participation among the oldest old. The eligibility and participation models are also used to simulate the effect of increasing the SSI unearned income disregard from $20 to $125. Those made eligible by this policy change would receive a very low federal SSI benefit on average, suggesting that they are on the margin of eligibility under the original program rules. The simulated participation rate is 48.8 percent--5 percentage points lower than under the original program rules--reflecting the low benefit that new eligibles would receive. Only 36 percent of those made eligible by the new program rules are predicted to participate. These SSI eligibility and participation models are potentially useful tools for policy analysis. It is fairly straightforward to use these models to change a feature of SSI eligibility, reestimate the group of eligible individuals and couples, and predict participation among those who are eligible under the simulated program rules. New eligibles can be compared with those eligible under original program rules. New participants can be compared with old participants. Although these models focus only on individuals aged 70 or older, this type of analysis can be helpful in estimating the potential distributional effects of proposed SSI policy changes.     

The regulatory style of environmental governance in China: the case of EIA regulation in Shanghai*

The body of literature that examines how institutional contexts affect environmental governance in advanced industrial countries finds that style of environmental regulation is country‐specific. In the pluralist form of democracy like the United States, environmental policy formulation involves bargaining and compromises among interest groups and regulation enforcement through relatively formal and legalistic means. In the corporatist form of democracy like Sweden and Great Britain, in contrast, environmental policies are more accommodating to divergent societal interests and tend to be less formal in their enforcement. These variations in regulatory style have been attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures, regime types and cultures. How do institutional contexts affect the style of environmental regulation in China, which is both a non‐democratic and developing country? This article examines China's regulatory style by focusing on environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulation in Shanghai. The Shanghai EIA system is analyzed in terms of policy ideology, policy content, regulatory process, public participation and policy consequences. It is shown that China's being a single‐party regime with a ‘rule of persons’ tradition has heavily shaped its environmental governance. Based on Shanghai experience, China's style can be characterized as formal in requirement, agency‐dominated in the regulatory process, legalistic in enforcement, and informal politics as the substance of regulation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Better than Nothing: How Policies Influence Political Participation in Low‐Capacity Democracies

A growing body of policy feedback work demonstrates that citizens' experiences with public policy influence the way they participate in politics. Most of this work takes place in advanced industrial democracies, but the nuances of policy design influencing participation in advanced democracies are often irrelevant for those in low‐capacity democracies. This study extends the policy feedback framework to address how policies might “feed back” differently in low‐capacity countries with uneven basic service delivery. In low‐capacity democracies, the most salient distinction is between those who have access to basic state‐provided services and those who do not. Using original data collected in Zambia, it demonstrates that those who have even marginal access to state services have higher levels of political engagement and political participation than those without access, indicating that imperfect extension of services may help boost democratic citizenship in developing countries.     

Outside Funding and the Dynamics of Participation in Community Associations

The poor and disadvantaged are widely seen as having weak organizations and low rates of participation in community associations, impeding their political representation and economic advancement. Many policy initiatives aim to build civic participation among the disadvantaged by funding local community associations. Taking advantage of random assignment in a program supporting women's community associations in Kenya, we find little evidence that outside funding expanded organizational strength, but substantial evidence that funding changed group membership and leadership, weakening the role of the disadvantaged. The program led younger, more educated, and better-off women to enter the groups. New entrants, men, and more educated women assumed leadership positions. The departure of older women, the most socially marginalized demographic group, increased substantially. The results are generalized through a formal model showing how democratic decision making by existing members of community associations can generate long-run outcomes in which the poor and disadvantaged either do not belong to any associations or belong to weak organizations.     

Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry

The determinants of OSHA performance can be examined by breaking the regulatory process into three elements relating to enforcement, compliance behavior, and the adequacy of standards in addressing safety outcomes. This paper develops and applies this framework to the U.S. construction industry during the period 1987 to 1993. Enforcement activity among the firms in the sample was substantial, with firms facing a high probability of annual inspection. But, despite this significant enforcement effort, inspections have a modest effect on firm compliance with OSHA standards. Finally, the health and safety standards cited most frequently diverge from the major sources of fatalities and injuries on construction projects. These results suggest that historic enforcement policies toward construction make less sense as OSHA moves into its fourth decade of operation. More generally, the paper illustrates the problem of focusing enforcement resources on large, high‐profile companies even though they often are not the major source of regulatory problems in an established area of public policy intervention. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Modeling SSI financial eligibility and simulating the effect of policy options

This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999.     

Participation rationales,regulatory enforcement,and compliance motivations in a voluntary program context

This article extends the study of regulatory compliance motivations from “traditional” regulatory settings to a government-sponsored voluntary one. We argue that the rationale(s) which motivate participants to engage a voluntary program likely shape which motivations drive them toward (or away from) program compliance. Our study examines the possible influence of program participation rationales alongside that of regulatory agents' enforcement styles and strategies. Leveraging a national survey of certified United States Department of Agriculture organic producers, we find that the more a producer pursues organic certification to increase profits, the more likely they are to report deterrent fears as an important compliance motivation. In contrast, the more a producer becomes certified to support the organic movement, the more heavily they weigh a personal sense of duty to comply. We discuss the implications of these, and other, study findings for compliance motivations theory and voluntary program integrity.     

Decentralization, Local Priorities, and the Community Development Block Grant Program in Milwaukee

This article analyzes the geographic distribution of CDBG fundsacross twenty-three neighborhoods in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, bycomparing federal, city, and neighborhood responses to localneed and by testing the impact of these responses on the finalfunding allocations. In Milwaukee, decentralizing decisionmakingto the city improved the program's responsiveness to local need.However, the funding decisions made by local officials did notalways direct funding exclusively to the most extreme need;nor did they distribute funding proportionately with respectto need, even though the city's targeting mechanisms were closelyrelated to the measure of need used in this analysis. We concludethat Milwaukee's program results were obtained through a mixtureof targeting rules and political competition over program decisions.     

Housing Voucher Take‐Up and Labor Market Impacts

Low participation rates in government assistance programs are a major policy concern in the United States. This paper studies take‐up of Section 8 housing vouchers, a program in which take‐up rates are quite low among interested and eligible households. We link 18,109 households in Chicago that were offered vouchers through a lottery to administrative data and study how baseline employment, earnings, public assistance, arrests, residential location, and children's academic performance predict take‐up. Our analysis finds mixed evidence of whether the most disadvantaged or distressed households face the largest barriers to program participation. We also study the causal impact of peer behavior on take‐up by exploiting idiosyncratic variation in the timing of voucher offers. We find that the probability of lease‐up increases with the number of neighbors who recently received voucher offers. Finally, we explore the policy implications of increasing housing voucher take‐up by applying reweighting methods to existing causal impact estimates of voucher receipt. This analysis suggests that greater utilization of vouchers may lead to larger reductions in labor market activity. Differences in take‐up rates across settings may be important to consider when assessing the external validity of studies identifying the effects of public assistance programs.     

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REFORM IN FLORIDA: Why Did Two Innovative Return to Work Programs Fail?

Why do well‐intentioned public policies sometimes fail? This research examines the failure of two Florida workers’ compensation reforms intended to help previously injured employees return to work: the obligation to rehire program and the preferred worker program. Interviews conducted with Floridians involved in workers‘compensation reform are examined to find out why these two programs failed. The disappointing outcome of the obligation to rehire and preferred worker programs can be tied to the dominance of business groups in state policymaking, the failure to provide a proper incentive and enforcement system, and the inability to foresee the consequences of reform because of policy and environmental complexity.     

From Internet to social safety net: The policy consequences of online participation in China

Internet‐based platforms are increasingly being used by governments around the world to facilitate public engagement with citizens. However, it remains an open question whether participation through these platforms can actually enable citizens to influence policies. We address this question by studying the patterns and consequences of online participation at a major electronic petition platform in China, a country with the world's largest Internet‐using population. Content analysis of over 900,000 petitions reveals that a substantial share of them concern lower‐class issues and are originated from less developed rural and suburban areas. Linking variations in petition volumes to an original data set of government policy priorities, we further show that online participation led governments to place greater emphasis on social welfare policies and to increase the coverage of a key low‐income assistance program. These results underscore the potential of online participation as an important mechanism to improve the quality of governance.     

Standing apart and sitting together: Enforcing coalition agreements in multiparty systems

Abstract.  One of the most obvious questions to be asked about coalition governments is what these governments do, but this question has received little systematic attention from coalition researchers. A key element of coalition governance that may inform our empirical knowledge of the actions of government – their origin, organization and results – is coalition agreements. Party leaders negotiating a new government invest time in writing coalition agreements, and they do this because they expect beneficial effects: more efficiency in coalition policy making, and more peace in the government. Written coalition agreements are considered to reduce uncertainty and mistrust, and this is why they have become institutionalized in countries with coalition governments. This article presents an approach to the comparative study of coalition conflicts as they emerge during government formation, the management of this conflict through drafting coalition agreements and the effects of this during coalition life. The article sets out a number of expectations about the effects of types of deals that parties make; and asks what types of conflict management are most effective and what are the conditions for enforcement – structural and strategic? In recent comparative work, the features of coalition agreements and mechanisms of coalition governance in Western Europe have received attention. This article sets out, with empirical material, how further comparative research on coalition governance may be developed.     

Businessman Candidates

Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.     

Car Stereos and the Criminal Sanction: The Dangers of Too Much Social Control

Noise pollution is an ongoing problem in American cities, and car stereos are a major reason why large numbers of people are unhappy. Citizens are demanding regulation of “boom cars” and the typical policy response is to use the criminal sanction. The behavior is annoying, but hardly morally opprobrious. Despite the best intentions of those who propose such laws, they are potentially a bigger danger to civil liberties than the behavior that they purport to regulate. The enforcement of such laws does little to curb the behavior in question, but may function as a content-based regulation of certain types of music, provides opportunities for racial profiling, and may harm the legitimacy of the government thus reducing its ability to use its police power in areas which are more appropriate for the use of that power.     

Does inconvenience explain low take‐up? Evidence from unemployment insurance

Application inconvenience is one popular explanation for why many individuals do not receive the social benefits for which they are eligible. Applications take time and some individuals may decide that the financial benefits do not outweigh these time costs. This paper investigates this explanation using cross‐state variation in administrative changes that made applying for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits substantially more convenient over the past decade. We find that the introduction of phone‐ and Internet‐based claiming did not have an appreciable impact on overall UI take‐up, nor did it lead to a shift toward recipients that are higher income or likely to be receiving the maximum benefit amount. These findings are inconsistent with a time‐ and transaction‐cost explanation for low take‐up, since remote UI claiming is less time intensive. This suggests that reducing application barriers alone may not be an effective tool for increasing program participation. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.