NETWORKING TO ACHIEVE ALTERNATIVE REGULATION:

Two national estuary programs in Florida, the Sarasota Bay Estuary Program (SBNEP) and the Tampa Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) are used to study the intricacies of implementation networks. Both programs are forms of alternative regulation and share similar attributes: an absence of a regulatory authority, exchange relationships based on equitable partnerships and an expected net aggregate benefit. Yet they arrive at two very different solutions. The results raise questions regarding the nature, scope and functioning of implementation networks. They also indicate that building networks is shaped by members' expectations and perceptions, and the degree of congruency they share with each other and the role of champions.     

STATE REGULATORY REFORM AND FEDERAL REGULATION

In the current political climate, it seems likely that a "New Regulatory Federalism" will push for deregulation at the federal level, with more regulatory responsibilities for the states. During the 1930s, economic regulatory responsibilities were assumed by the federal government. Protective regulation moved to the federal level in the 1960s. Dissatisfaction with centralized regulation has led to attempts at regulatory reform and decentralization. It is expected that these reforms will lead to greater flexibility, and responsiveness to regional differences.     

AN ADAPTIVE-LEARNING APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

This conceptual piece reviews the muddle in reform thinking in environmental regulation. It suggests that rhetoric and relief posturing will not lead to an improvement in regulatory performance, and various market mechanisms, while promising, are ill-suited to current organizational processes. Authentic reform efforts, it contends, should place greater reliance upon an adaptive learning approach to environmental policy development and implementation. Conceptual elements of such an approach are sketched out.     

REGULATION AND THE THEORY OF AGENCY1

The major arguments of this paper are that there is a need for an integrating framework for the study of regulation, including the design of regulatory institutions, and that the theory of agency may provide such a framework. The paper provides a brief overview of this approach. The theory of agency is a general theory of social relationships of “acting for” that is now under development in several disciplines, particularly economics and accounting. Regulation is seen as a generic relation observed widely in social behavior, and as a particular type of agency relationship. The problems of agency relations–e.g., the problems of principals in controlling agents and of agents in acting according to the principals' desires–have their counterparts in regulation.     

POLITICS AND REGULATION: THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH

Abstract: Government regulation of the economy has been the subject of criticism both on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Traditional economic theories explaining regulation may be deficient insofar as they assume a benevolent welfare maximizing government, intervening only to correct "market failures". Political theories of interest group influence (for example pluralist, capture, Marxist theories) provide some more realistic insights into regulation, but fail to yield rigorous, testable propositions. The theory of public choice applies the rigour of economic analysis to political behaviour and suggests some useful approaches to the explanation of regulation, focusing on the public goods problem of organizing large groups of actors for collective action and on the role of the political entrepreneur in mobilizing large numbers of voters. The public choice approach may also be useful in suggesting strategies for deregulation in some key areas of the Australian economy currently under scrutiny (for example banking, airlines, telecommunications).     

REGULATION OF THE FREE-ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The "new" line between communications that have full First Amendment protection and those that are subject to regulation is still in the process of being delineated by the Supreme Court; legal and mass a communication scholars are proposing a plethora of tests for future cases. Rather than proposing yet another test, this article starts from the premise that future advertising regulation cases will be based on legal philosophy and judicial "world view" as well as law and precedent. First Amendment law and advertising regulation concerns have historically been based on two different concerns and perspectives that have only recently been seen to interact. This article charts a perspective on the differences in the legal, philosophical and historical roots of these two areas, shows how and why they are now seen as interrelated and attempts to give some insight into possible future legal directions in this area.     

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL REGULATION

The emphasis of this paper is on the development of a framework for analyzing the impacts of governmerit intervention on issues of public health and safety. Government policies are classified into three general strategies: regulatory, fiscal, and educational. In most issues, governments pursue policies in all three categories. The authors explain how the effects not only of specific policies, but also of these general policy types can be assessed over the range of social issues. The conceptual framework is tested with regard to a particular issue–alcohol-related traffic accidents–across the American states from 1979-1 984. The results suggest that fiscal and educational policies had little effect, but certain of the regulatory policies tended to be related to traffic fatalities involving alco- hol. The empirical analysis demonstrates the utility of the conceptual framework presented.     

INDEMNITY FOR COMPANIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION CHANGES

The problem addressed by this paper is the conditions under which the government may wish to indemnify firms for losses suffered when environmental regulations are revised. Larger firms are likely to be in a better competitive position than smaller firms when environmental standards are raised. Financial risks discourage firms from investing in environmental capital unless some of the cost is shared by the public. Not having a compensation program will slow compliance with new regulations and make markets less competitive. The examples o f TRIS and the herbicides 2,4,5-T and Silvex are described.     

REGULATION OF ASBESTOS THE MICROANA1YTICS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE

This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which—in both capacities—it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major government actors, this paper investigates the political and economic forces that have shaped U.S. asbestos policy. It shows how the Congressional transition from promoter to regulator of the asbestos industry can be explained by the susceptibility of political processes to transaction-cost augmentation by the bureaucracy.     

LONG TERM CARE REGULATION IN THE STATES: A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE

In recent years there has been growing interest in differing state roles in the regulation of the health care industry. Most of this attention has stressed the impact of regulatory policy with only superficial attention directed towards understanding the extent to which states can be counted on to act effectively in the area of health care regulation. Using the regulation of nursing homes as a focus, this study evaluates a variety of sociocultural, political, and economic conditions for their impact on the development of various regulatory policies. The findings suggest that the development of certificate of need legislation and reimbursement controls were not related to significant changes ir, states' budgets for Medicaid services or in bed/population ratios. Instead, regulatory efforts were more closely linked to the sociopolitical environments surrounding the policy arena. While these factors provide some indication of the potential for strong state action in the regulatory arena, ultimately the use of state regulatory policies will depend quite centrally on the innovative tendencies of the state, its organizational capacity for addressing policy issues, and the nature and extent of interest group politics.     

AIR WARS: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL AIR PASSENGER MARKET

International civil aviation is governed by a cartel that dissipates its monopoly profits in surplus capacity. Based on the 1946 Bermuda agreement and the International Air Transport Association, the cartel imposes heavy costs on U.S. consumers and air travellers in general. The Carter administration attempted to make international aviation more competitive, but this progress was substantially reversed under Reagan. A new policy should be based on treating air travel the same as any other commodity and therefore subject to U.S. antidumping and antitrust laws. The goal of the policy should be to shift the cost of maintaining inefficient national flag carriers from the international community back on to the taxpayers of those countries.     

POLITICS, INSTITUTIONS, CONSTRUCTIVISM and the EMERGING INTERNATIONAL REGIME for FINANCIAL REGULATION

This article examines the growing number of interconnected international groupings that have been built to regulate global finance over the past quarter century. It suggests that the rationalistic approaches focusing on egoistic actors that have dominated scholarly study of this issue area have contributed to the understimation of the strenght of the regime for regulating global finance. It examines, as an alternative, constructivist approaches that stress the importance of institution.