The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation

The second-order dilemma arises from each individual’s incentive to free ride on a mechanism to solve the public goods provision problem (the first-order dilemma). We show by a voluntary participation game that if the depreciation rate is low, public goods can be accumulated through voluntary groups for provision, and that the accumulation is effective in solving the second-order dilemma. This analysis also shows that population growth increases the accumulation of public goods in the long run.     

Does Spatial Variation in Heterogeneity Matter? Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts

Because they supplement the municipal provision of local public goods, Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) provide an opportunity to examine the space, scope, and determinants of the provision of local public goods. A BID is formed when a group of merchants or commercial property owners in a neighborhood vote in favor of package of self‐assessments and local public goods to be funded with those assessments. These districts solve a collective action problem in the provision of public goods because once a majority has voted in favor, participation is compulsory for all merchants or commercial property owners in the neighborhood. I use a unique dataset on adoption patterns of BIDs in California to test two main claims suggested by the theoretical literature: first, that businesses respond to individual heterogeneity that determines the quality of local public goods, and second, that the type of heterogeneity—overall or spatial—matters. In contrast to the literature on residents, this study finds at best a weak correlation between a city's adoption of a BID and heterogeneity. In addition, despite the theoretical preference for spatial over overall heterogeneity, BIDs are not more likely to be adopted by spatially heterogeneous cities.     

'All for One and One for All': Transactions Cost and Collective Action

Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile 'profits' (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is 'non-profit' enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low-cost signals relating to process . There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed 'non-profit' and a common goal is non-rival.     

Pursuing the common goods: An economic theory of collective action among NGOs in transnational advocacy

This article integrates previous research on NGO behaviour with economic theory on collective action to create a generalizable and predictive model of advocacy campaign growth. It identifies three types of goods which NGOs may pursue in advocacy: unlimited, non-rival (public) goods; rival and excludable (private) goods; and rival but non-excludable goods. It then models an individual NGO’s decision to (not) join an existing advocacy campaign using a cost-benefit analysis conditioned by the presence or absence of competition for the good(s) sought by the NGO. This model of individual behaviour forms the basis for predicting collective action among NGOs with varying cost structures and pursuing a variety of rival and non-rival goods. The theory is illustrated using two cases of NGOs campaigning on World Bank policy.     

Swiss banking secrecy and the problem of international cooperation in tax matters: A nut too hard to crack?

How was Swiss resistance to international cooperation in tax matters overcome? This article argues that while Swiss banks are structurally dependent on access to the United States (US) financial market, Switzerland is structurally dependent on the economic welfare of its largest banks. Taking advantage of a tax evasion scandal in the midst of the global financial crisis, this indirect dependence gave US law enforcement authorities the opportunity to exercise pressure on Switzerland by threatening to criminally indict Switzerland's largest bank. The tax evasion scandal and subsequent Swiss concessions to the US had two important consequences for international tax cooperation. First, the scandal provided a focal point for collective action that allowed other countries to coordinate their strategies and direct them against the country that had been identified as uncooperative. Second, the scandal undermined Switzerland's ability to impede collective action because the bank's public admission of wrongdoing demonstrated the necessity of international tax cooperation.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

去组织化:业主集体行动的策略——以G市反对垃圾焚烧厂建设事件为例

组织化动员和草根动员是促成集体行动的两种常见形式,然而,G市反对垃圾焚烧厂建设的业主集体行动不仅没有组织化动员力量(如业委会)的参与,也没有草根行动者刻意维持的名实分离的弱组织,那么,业主集体行动如何可能?分析G市案例发现,"去组织化"是业主集体行动的策略选择。它包括三个特征,无领导有纪律、行动上自我定位和网络虚拟串联。"去组织化"依托政治认知、网络传播和情感动员消解合法性、安全性和搭便车三重集体行动困境。它与组织化动员和草根动员的差异在于,动员结构既不是有组织也不是弱组织,政治取向上呈现认知和行动的分裂。实践层面,它表明公民在治理参与中成长,也预示中国公民社会构建及其与国家良性互动的艰难;理论层面,个案研究的发现为考察业主集体行动的动员提出了新的问题。     

The Three Exit, Three Voice and Loyalty Framework: A Test with Survey Data on Local Services

The article presents a modified Hirschman framework with three types of exit: moving location; moving from the public to a private sector provider; and moving between public sector providers; and three types of voice: private voice (complaining about private goods); voting; and collective action. Seven hypotheses are generated from this framework. The article then presents evidence from the first round of an online survey examining citizen satisfaction with public services and the relationship between exit and voice opportunities. We find dissatisfied people are more likely to complain privately, vote and engage in other forms of collective participation; but only a weak relationship exists between dissatisfaction and geographical exit. We find some evidence that the exit–voice trade-off might exist as more alert consumers are more likely to move from the public to the private sector and those 'locked in' are more likely to complain than those who have outside options. Overall the results tend to corroborate the hypotheses drawn from the modified Hirschman framework.     

Authoritarianism,socioethnic diversity and political participation across countries

It is argued in this article that threatening stimuli affect political participation levels among non‐authoritarians more than among authoritarians. Focusing on socioethnic diversity, which is known to be particularly threatening to authoritarians and to relate negatively to political participation in the general public, analyses of individual‐ and macro‐level data from 53 countries is presented which supports this thesis. Participation levels among authoritarians are largely static, regardless of a country's level of socioethnic heterogeneity, while non‐authoritarians participate considerably less in countries with relatively high levels of socioethnic heterogeneity. This suggests that authoritarians participate to a proportionately greater degree in the most diverse countries.     

Using threshold models to explain international relations

The outcome of political opposition or revolution is a public good, which suggests that free riding will diminish the effectiveness of these forms of collective action. The private gains from contributing to collective goals are increased, however, if individuals place some value on ideological conformity or group identity. Nevertheless, some external stimulus is often needed to set in motion a tendency toward social motivation that is strong enough to outweigh the free rider incentive. This paper investigates the extent to which international pressure and demonstration effects can serve to signal support for the objectives of domestic groups in a target country and thereby mobilize collective action in pursuit of their goals. It is of interest to know not only the extent to which inherent barriers to effective collective action are overcome by outside support, but also to show how foreign economic policy can have an impact on political processes in the target country even when that policy itself has minimal economic effects.     

E‐Participation and Environmental Protection: Are Local Governments Really Committed?

There is widespread acceptance that current institutions are inadequate to address the challenges of sustainable development. At the same time, there is an urgent need to build awareness and increase capacity for promoting action with respect to environmental protection at the local level. This article analyzes the Web sites of the environment departments of European local governments that signed the Aalborg Commitments to determine the extent to which they are using the Internet to promote e‐participation in environmental topics and to identify the drivers of these developments. Potential drivers are public administration style, urban vulnerability, external pressures, and local government environmental culture. Findings confirm that e‐participation is a multifaceted concept. External pressures influence the transparency of environmental Web sites, while public administration style and local government environmental culture influence their interactivity.     

An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods

How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. However, we also observe outcomes in which a minimum winning coalition exploits the contributions of the remaining players. A second experiment demonstrates that when electoral delegation must be endogenously implemented, individuals voluntarily cede authority to an elected agent only when preplay communication is permitted. Our combined results demonstrate that democratic delegation helps groups overcome the free‐rider problem and generally leads to outcomes that are often both efficient and equitable.     

Fair-Play Obligations: A Critical Note on Free Riding

McDermott rejects the argument that an individual, in receiving benefits from a political community, thus incurs a 'fair-play obligation' to contribute to the provision of these benefits. While acknowledging that an individual receiving benefits without contributing is 'free riding' and that free riding may be morally wrong, McDermott denies that such moral lapses entail communities having any right to demand support. Not contributing may be morally objectionable, but individuals may still have a right not to contribute. However, both proponents and opponents of the fair-play obligation claim do not sufficiently differentiate between different forms of free riding. Arguments tend to be based on rights that may or may not be invoked when individuals free ride through consuming externalities. However, this form of free riding does not entail any reciprocal obligations. Yet it can plausibly be argued that when free riding occurs in the case of the production of public goods, then communities can demand support from individuals, and can have a right to do so.     

Why societies need public goods

The most distinctive features of public goods are usually understood to be the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries and the fact that one appropriator’s benefits do not diminish the amount of benefits left for others. Yet, because of these properties (non-excludability and non-rivalry), public goods cause market failures and contribute to problems of collective action. This article aims to portray public goods in a different light. Following a recent reassessment of public goods in political philosophy, this contribution argues that public goods are particularly suitable for sustaining a well-ordered society. Public goods contribute to social inclusion, they support the generation of the public, and they strengthen a shared sense of citizenship. This article scrutinizes these functions of public goods and offers a discussion of the interventionist thesis which states that governments should sustain public goods.     

Counterterrorism strategies in the lab

We conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies. Defensive policies are associated with creating public ??bads' (e.g., a commons) whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods. When combined, the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated, resulting in a situation known as a Prisoner??s Dilemma squared (PD²). Deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting. Experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments, and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome; as individuals gain more experience, they become even more self-interested.     

When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization

Government policies can activate a political constituency not only by providing material resources to, or altering the interpretive experiences of, individual citizens, but also by directly subsidizing established interest groups. We argue that state laws mandating collective bargaining for public employees provided organizational subsidies to public sector labor unions that lowered the costs of mobilizing their members to political action. Exploiting variation in the timing of laws across the states and using data on the political participation of public school teachers from 1956 to 2004, we find that the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law significantly boosted subsequent political participation among teachers. We also identify increased contact from organized groups seeking to mobilize teachers as a likely mechanism that explains this finding. These results have important implications for the current debate over collective bargaining rights and for our understanding of policy feedback, political parties and interest groups, and the bureaucracy.     

Political-economic context and partisan strategies in the German federal elections, 1990–2002

This contribution develops a theory of the impact of differentiation on integration and unity among EU member states and discusses empirical evidence from four policy areas. According to the theory, the centripetal effects of closer co‐operation among willing EU members on initially unwilling non‐participants are strongly influenced by the character of the respective policy area in terms of public goods theory. The eventual participation of initially reluctant member states, which leads to the re‐establishment of long‐run unity despite short run differentiation, is most likely in policy areas involving excludable network effects, and most unlikely in areas dealing with common pool resource problems (the four remaining types of goods ranking in between these two extremes). The theoretical conclusions are supported by empirical evidence from four EU‐related policies: the successful three show strong characteristics of excludable network goods (EMU, Schengen and the Dublin Convention), while the one which has proved extraordinarily difficult so far involves a common pool resource problem (tax harmonisation).     

村庄公共品供给中的“好混混”

1990年代以后,两湖平原村庄中出现了好混混。好混混的出现源于村庄公共品供给的困境。乡村组织难以抑制公共品供给中的搭便车行为,村庄公共品合作常常因此难以达成。好混混则可以依靠暴力和暴力威胁遏制搭便车行为,维系村庄公共品合作和供给,他们的好由此体现出来。取消农业税后,乡村组织的公共品供给能力更加弱化,农民因此对好混混的需求更甚。好混混这一怪异现象,反映了国家权力在基层社会存在局部不足。     

税收负担、公共品层次与私人公共品需求——以山东省面板数据为例

个人税收负担的增长会对公共品需求产生负向影响,这一结论在西方的研究中被普遍证明。本文从中国实际出发,借助经典的中位选民模型,考察了个人税收负担对公共品需求的影响。通过对山东省17市1997～2007年的面板数据进行实证分析,发现个人税收负担对公共品需求的负向影响在中国并不普遍存在。就影响公共品需求的各因素来看,公共品需求的收入弹性以及人口拥挤效应普遍存在;个人税收负担对济南、烟台两市一般公共品需求产生负向影响,对其余15个市产生正向效应。为进一步揭示税收负担对不同层次公共品需求的影响差异,选取了教育和公共安全这两类特殊公共品进行研究。山东省17地市的个人税收负担对教育这类公共品普遍产生负向影响;对公共安全类公共品产生完全正向效应。因此,本文认为山东省一般公共品市场是供给导向的市场,税收弹性与公共品需求层次相关,建议建立引导公民合理表达公共品需求意向机制。     

Exclusivity of citizens’ initiatives: Fuel for collective action?

ABSTRACT

Self-organized citizens’ initiatives are a form of collective action and contribute to society through the production of public goods and services. Traditional collective action theory predicts that such initiatives are near impossible because of the persistent problems of free-riding. Citizens’ initiatives however do exist and function properly, and their numbers seem to be increasing in countries such as the Netherlands. This article argues that free-riding problems can be overcome when some form of exclusivity is arranged in citizens’ initiatives. We assume that citizens’ initiatives use active and/or passive strategies to limit free-riding behaviour. Using three illustrative cases, our research shows that position rules, boundary rules, and authority rules are used in a subtle and often implicit way to differentiate the level of influence and authority between the more and the less committed members, enabling collective action. Such rules, though advantageous, may be paradoxical to the goals of the citizens’ initiatives and can undermine the virtues associated with them.