Addressing the Issues: The Choice of Environmental Conflict‐Resolution Venues in the United States

Environmental conflicts are the catalyst for policy and institutional changes, and they are expected to increase due to rising populations, economic growth, and climate change impacts. Yet, environmental conflicts and the venues used to address them have not been thoroughly examined. A common‐pool resource dilemmas typology is used to categorize environmental conflict issues and to develop hypotheses relating conflict issues to resolution venues. The hypotheses are tested on western water‐resource conflicts. The capacity of venues to address the underlying conflict issues as well as how some venues tend to work in tandem are important for explaining the matching of conflict type to venue.     

Pay‐as‐You‐Go Financing and Capital Outlay Volatility: Evidence from the States over Two Recent Economic Cycles

Pay‐as‐you‐go (pay‐go or cash) and pay‐as‐you‐use (pay‐use or debt) are two mechanisms to finance capital projects. While pay‐go faces multiple constraints, pay‐use smoothes outlays, stabilizes tax rates, and improves inter‐generational equity. Thus, pay‐use has dominated infrastructure financing for decades. In recent years, there has been revived academic interest in pay‐go as an alternate financing mechanism; however, there is a large gap in the literature and inadequate evidence on the effects of pay‐go, especially its effects on capital outlay volatility. This paper fills in the niche. Examining state experience over the two recent economic cycles, this paper finds evidence that suggests that pay‐go is associated with lower volatility in capital spending in the long run, but may increase short‐run variability. We recommend that states couple pay‐go in boom years with pay‐use in lean years. In unison, the two mechanisms can reduce aggregate volatility and increase long‐run stability of capital expenditures.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Virginia

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Budget Deficits in the States: Illinois

During FY 2009 and FY 2010, the State of Illinois was faced with significant fiscal challenges. The national recession was adversely impacting the state's economy, while the state had been struggling since the last recession with operating budget deficits and large unfunded pension liabilities. In the spring of 2009, the Governor's Office of Budget and Management estimated that in the absence of any intervention, there would be a $4.3 billion budget deficit in FY 2009 and a $7.3 billion budget shortfall in FY 2010. This paper discusses the magnitude and nature of Illinois' fiscal problems and the factors that have contributed to this situation. It also discusses Governor Quinn's proposed budget for FY 2010, as well as the legislative response. Although the state passed a capital budget and an operating budget, the outlook for the future remains uncertain. The operating budget significantly relies on one-time revenue and funding sources (including $3.4 billion in debt) and the state has approximately $100 billion in unfunded accrued liabilities for pensions and other postemployment benefits.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Connecticut

Like many states, the State of Connecticut has recently faced substantial budget problems. This article is one of several that explore budget deficits in the states. We explore the reasons, extent, and current solutions to the budget deficits in Connecticut. Connecticut's fiscal circumstances include very poor accounting practices; dueling revenue estimates; large amounts of debt (both bonded and for post-employment benefits); a structurally strong legislature and governor; a governor and legislative majority of different political parties and fiscal philosophies; and a legislature with the ability to override gubernatorial vetoes. The combination of these ingredients has led to a highly partisan and contentious approach to budget discussions amid some of the largest budget deficits the state has ever experienced.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Massachusetts

Massachusetts entered the current recession carrying a structural deficit counterbalanced by a healthy, $2.1 billion stabilization fund, equal to 10 percent of total tax revenue. Like most states, Massachusetts only dimly realized the depth of the current recession in October 2008 when revenue collections began to slip and welfare caseloads began to increase. By May of 2009, a total FY2009 budget gap of $4 billion had been identified, the combined effect of plummeting revenues and increased costs for welfare and medical assistance. The Commonwealth closed the FY2009 budget gap through a combination of budget cuts, stabilization fund transfers, and federal stimulus funds. The Commonwealth faced an even larger $4.8 billion budget gap in FY2010. With the stabilization fund severely depleted, the FY2010 budget gap was closed primarily by budget cuts, federal stimulus money, and a sales and use tax increase. Because of the Commonwealth's reliance on one-time money to close current budget gaps, a significant budget gap of at least $2.8 billion for FY2011 was identified soon after passage of the budget. In this paper we discuss the political and historic context in which the budget gaps occurred, outline the causes of the budget gaps, and evaluate the strategies employed to close them.     

Budget Deficits in the States: New York

New York faces large projected budget shortfalls. Although the recession has contributed, a large part of the shortfalls are due to long standing structural imbalances. The structural imbalances result from high spending levels, particularly on Medicaid and education, a volatile revenue structure, and political forces that make it difficult to achieve recurring spending reductions. In the most recent budget session, federal stimulus money allowed legislators to avoid the tough decisions needed to move the state toward long-run fiscal balance, and the adoption of increased income tax rates for high earners is likely to increase revenue volatility moving forward.     

Determinants of Pay‐as‐You‐Go Financing of Capital Projects: Evidence from the States

Although states have long practiced pay‐as‐you‐go in financing their capital projects as a supplement to debt, academia has paid scarce attention to pay‐go financing. This study fills in the niche by providing empirical evidence on what determines the use of pay‐go in financing capital projects. It develops a model that considers the preferences of both voters and politicians when they make capital financing decisions in a given institutional setting. The empirical results suggest that the use of pay‐go is affected by a state's income level, its economic conditions, the presence of a divided government, as well as its budgetary institutions.     

Implementing Joined‐Up Government: Lessons from the Australian Social Inclusion Agenda

‘Joined‐up government’ (JUG) approaches have emerged in many industrialized countries as a means to tackle persistent ‘wicked’ public and social policy problems (Pollit 2003 ). Despite this, limited evidence exists concerning their implementation or effectiveness. ‘JUG’ was popularized by the Blair Government (UK) with its focus on addressing social exclusion. Following in these footsteps, in 2007 the Australian Government launched the Social Inclusion Agenda: a joined‐up approach to improving the wellbeing of all Australians and addressing disadvantage. This paper focuses on findings from a study that examined the SIA as a natural experiment in JUG. Drawing on the implementation experiences of federal policy makers, our findings lend weight to emerging research into JUG that suggests that compatibility and consistency between goals, instruments, and processes is critical to success. We argue that closer attention needs to be given to developing ‘supportive architecture’ around joined‐up initiatives to facilitate implementation.     

Linking program implementation and effectiveness: Lessons from a pooled sample of welfare‐to‐work experiments

This paper addresses the question: How does implementation influence the effectiveness of mandatory welfare‐to‐work programs? Data from three large‐scale, multi‐site random assignment experiments were pooled; quantitative measures of program implementation were constructed; and multilevel statistical modeling was used to examine the relationship between program implementation and effects on short‐term client earnings. Individual‐level data were analyzed for 69,399 sample members and group‐level implementation data were analyzed for 59 local programs. Findings indicate that, other things being equal, earnings effects are increased by: an emphasis on quick client employment, an emphasis on personalized client attention, staff caseloads that do not get too large, and limited use of basic education. Findings also show that mandatory welfare‐to‐work programs can be effective for many types of people, and that focusing on clients who are especially job‐ready (or not) does not have a consistent influence on a program's effectiveness. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Accounting for coalition‐building in the European Union: Budget negotiations and the south

Which parameters affect coalition building in budgetary negotiations? In this article, three distinct levels of analysis are identified to account for coalition building patterns, associated with domestic politics, domestic socioeconomic structures and EU politics. At the level of domestic politics, ideology points to cross‐governmental affinity of a partisan nature; at the level of socioeconomic structures, similarity of policy interests, generated by cross‐national socioeconomic convergence with EU policy standards, informs coalition formation patterns; at the EU politics level, the intergovernmental power balance influences the political aspirations of each Member State in the integration process and coalition‐building decisions. Two sets of parameters affect the evolution of EU coalition patterns, corresponding to the integration impact on the EU (new cleavages) and on the Member States (the impact of Europeanisation). This analytical framework is used to examine the southern coalition (Spain, Greece, Portugal) in the four multi‐annual financial frameworks (1988, 1992, 1999 and 2005).     

Budget deficits and interest rates in the United States

In this paper, an attempt has been made to reexamine the effect of budget deficits in the United States on interest rates. Unlike the previous studies which use only one definition of the dependent variable, we have used all three, namely, the nominal and the ex-post and the ex-ante real interest rate. Further, unlike previous studies, we considered both short-term and long-term interest rates. Our results provide absolutely no support for the proposition that federal deficits affect interest rates and thus contradict the recent findings by Cebula (1987) and Kolluri and Giannaros (1987). Finally, the paper provides some further support for the inverted Fisher hypothesis proposed by Carmichael and Stebbing (1983).Thanks are due to Zheng Wei for research assistance.     

Improving the Implementation and Effectiveness of Out‐of‐School‐Time Tutoring

School districts are spending millions on tutoring outside regular school day hours for economically and academically disadvantaged students in need of extra academic assistance. Under No Child Left Behind (NCLB), parents of children in persistently low‐performing schools were allowed to choose their child's tutoring provider, and together with school districts, they were also primarily responsible for holding providers in the private market accountable for performance. We present results from a multisite, mixed‐method longitudinal study of the impact of out‐of‐school time (OST) tutoring on student reading and mathematics achievement that link provider attributes and policy and program administration variables to tutoring program effectiveness. We find that many students are not getting enough hours of high‐quality, differentiated instruction to produce significant gains in their learning, in part because of high hourly rates charged by providers for tutoring. We identify strategies and policy levers that school districts can use to improve OST tutoring policy design and launch improved programs as waivers from NCLB are granted.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States,France and Germany

The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democratisation across the world as an important element of the new constitutionalism. These courts play an important role in day‐to‐day politics as they can nullify acts of parliament and thus prevent or reverse a change in the status quo. In macro‐concepts of comparative politics, their role is unclear. Either they are integrated as counter‐majoritarian institutional features of a political system or they are entirely ignored: some authors do not discuss their potential impact at all, while others dismiss them because they believe their preferences as veto players are entirely absorbed by other actors in the political system. However, we know little about the conditions and variables that determine them as being counter‐majoritarian or veto players. This article employs the concept of Tsebelis’ veto player theory to analyse the question. It focuses on the spatial configuration of veto players in the legislative process and then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in the pareto‐efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is absorbed by other veto players should not in theory veto new legislation. It is argued in this article that courts are conditional veto players. Their veto is dependent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empirically support the analysis, data from the United States, France and Germany from 1974 to 2009 is used. This case selection increases variance with regard to system types and court types. The main finding is that courts are not always absorbed as veto players: during the period of analysis, absorption varies between 11 and 71 per cent in the three systems. Furthermore, the pattern of absorption is specific in each country due to government control, court majority and legislative procedure. Therefore, it can be concluded that they are conditional veto players. The findings have at least two implications. First, constitutional courts and supreme courts with judicial review rights should be systematically included in veto player analysis of political systems and not left aside. Any concept ignoring such courts may lead to invalid results, and any concept that counts such courts merely as an institutional feature may lead to distorted results that over‐ or under‐estimate their impact. Second, the findings also have implications for the study of judicial politics. The main bulk of literature in this area is concerned with auto‐limitation, the so‐called ‘self‐restraint’ of the government to avoid defeat at the court. This auto‐limitation, however, should only occur if a court is not absorbed. However, vetoes observed when the court is absorbed might be explained by strategic behaviour among judges engaging in selective defection.     

Decentralizing the Development Budget Process in Indonesia: Progress and Prospects

Decentralization of the development budget process in Indonesia has been a high priority of official reform efforts for over fifteen years, but in many respects the process remains highly centralized. This article describes the forces that helped shape this centralized process, in which central planners traditionally have had a degree of influence over budgeting that is unusual in the developing world. Efforts to help local officials play a more meaningful role in this process are reviewed, including innovative training programs introduced recently in response to enduring problems affecting local level participation. Although these recent efforts appear to be productive, government reformers recognize that meaningful decentralization over the longer term will be difficult to achieve without more fundamental changes in policies, procedures, and attitudes at the central level of government.     

State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress

During the last several decades, state officials increasinglyconcluded that their interests are not adequately representedin national policymaking and sought to increase their influencethrough the constitutional amendment process, the federal judiciary,and the political process. This article evaluates the extentto which these institutional mechanisms were effective in advancingstate interests during the 104th Congress. United States Constitutionalamendments were improbable and ineffective devices. Litigationwas slightly more successful, though it provided an uncertainsource of long-term security for state interests. Efforts towork through the political process, either through securingthe passage of legislation that increases congressional responsivenessor by engaging in direct lobbying, were moderately effectiveunder certain conditions.     

美国农业发展的历程及对我们的启示

美国自独立以来,特别重视农业的发展。十九世纪六十年代至二十世纪初期农业完成了手工劳动向半机械化的过渡,二十世纪二十年代到五十年代完成了向机械化过渡,五十年代以后美国农业实现了全面的现代化。美国农业现代化的过程中,政府扮演了重要的角色,其间接的、必要的调控是美国农业健康发展的根本保证。其农地所有权的相对稳定为农业的发展提供了基本条件。这些都给我国农业发展许多有益的启示。     

Political Control for China's State‐Owned Enterprises: Lessons from America's Experience with Hybrid Organizations

China's reform of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) is intended to liberate the companies from bureaucratic control that hinders their management. Discussions of SOE reform, however, downplay the policy consequences. Can SOEs be “free” to succeed economically while some political control is maintained? Surprisingly, American experience with hybrid organizations—government‐created companies that straddle the line between public and private—offers some precedent for managing the balance between political control and enterprise independence. Three strategies are derived for China. First, welfare functions must be stripped from SOEs and replaced by policy objectives compatible with commercial purposes. Second, reducing financial dependence on SOEs will remove a barrier to rational control. Third, and most importantly, a robust regulatory framework for control must be developed as a substitute for the weakened administrative linkages. The emerging control infrastructure rooted in state asset commissions is likely to prove ineffective for its blurring of ownership, administration, and regulation.