Power Sharing: Institutions,Behavior, and Peace

Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power‐sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power‐sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power‐sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power‐sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power‐sharing behavior that these institutions induce.     

Extremist Outbidding in Ethnic Party Systems is Not Inevitable: Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland

The ethnic outbidding thesis predicts centrifugal polarisation in ethnically divided party systems. We argue instead that the incentives of power-sharing institutions can encourage the development of electoral strategies based on 'ethnic tribune appeals' in which parties combine robust ethnic identity representation with increased pragmatism over resource allocation. We test these arguments in Northern Ireland and show that though evidence of direct vote switching from moderate parties to ostensibly 'extreme' parties is prima facie consistent with the outbidding thesis, attitudinal convergence between the nationalist and unionist communities on the main political issues is not. The recent electoral success of the DUP and Sinn Féin can instead be explained by these parties' 'ethnic tribune' appeals. Many voters simultaneously endorse peace, prosperity and (increasingly) power sharing but also want the strongest voice to protect their ethnonational interests. Identity voting for ethnic tribune parties implies a degree of resolve in advocating ethnic group interests, but does not entail the increased polarisation implied by outbidding models. Like their voters, ethnic tribune parties can be simultaneously pragmatic (with regard to resources) and intransigent (with regard to identity), so that despite appearances to the contrary, the power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland incentivise centripetal dynamics that inhibit outbidding.     

The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research – either theoretical or empirical – that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties’ election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government.     

Economic Aid and Peace Implementation: The African Experience

Abstract

This paper examines the potential importance of externally-facilitated peace dividends and donor coordination in sustaining peace after the signing of an accord. We extend our previous research on US performance after civil wars to learn if adversary assumptions on peace dividends have additional positive impact when a wider sample of major Western European donors is included. Was the lack of US follow-through compensated for in whole or in part by the extension of development assistance allocations from European allies? We find that cases in which donors provide significant and sustained post-conflict aid are somewhat less likely to return to civil war than those who do not receive comparable assistance. Moreover, we find in such cases that donor coordination reinforced behaviour that encouraged the implementation process, providing an extra incentive for maintaining the peace agreement over the five-year threshold and beyond.     

If They Endorse It,I Can't Trust It: How Outgroup Leader Endorsements Undercut Public Support for Civil War Peace Settlements

Civil wars are a greater source of violence than any other type of conflict, yet little is known about one of the key determinants of civil war peace settlement success: civilian support. We evaluate how a core component of nearly all peace settlements, leader endorsements, affects public support. We predict that individuals in conflict settings will view settlements endorsed by outgroup leaders as less trustworthy and that they will become less supportive. We conduct an endorsement experiment with nearly 1,000 respondents in South Sudan in 2016, taking advantage of a brief cessation in a devastating civil war. Public support for a tentative settlement drops precipitously when it is endorsed by an outgroup leader but does not increase when it is endorsed by an ingroup leader. We find suggestive evidence that effects are strongest for individuals with the greatest reason to fear outgroup leaders: those whose communities were targeted most violently by that outgroup.     

Divided We Stand? Democracy as a Method of Processing Conflicts1

Conflicts, liberty and peace do not coexist easily. Through most of history, civil peace was maintained by the threat of force. Contemporary ideologues of authoritarian regimes maintain that political conflicts inevitably result in violence, and the founders of modern representative institutions in the West have shared this view. Yet we now know that political institutions can cope with conflicts, that conflicts can be structured, regulated and contained, and that purely procedural rules can be effective in processing conflicts. Most importantly, we have come to realise that choosing governments through competitive elections is the only way to foster political freedom in divided societies. Competitive elections support social peace by enabling political forces to think in inter‐temporal terms. In turn, civil peace is maintained between elections when when opposition groups expect to be reasonably successful within the halls of representative institutions.     

Building peaceful citizens? Nation-building in divided societies

ABSTRACT

Interventions aimed at citizenship formation and nation-building in divided and post-conflict societies place great emphasis on promoting and entrenching peace as a cornerstone of economic development and statehood. Such efforts are multi-scalar, encompassing interventions to build democratic institutions and responsible citizens with the pursuit and maintenance of peace at the heart of these ideals. Dominant international pedagogies and policies for liberal-peace-building in divided societies can be used to maintain existing power relations and hierarchies, and may prevent the realization of social (and other forms of) justice while stifling dissent and criticism through exhortations to patriotism, unity, civility, and nation-building. Thus, the ‘goodness’ of peace makes this concept particularly useful as a technique of governance. However, ‘peace’ can also be reworked to suit counter-hegemonic political purposes that open up rather than shut down the question of what peace means. Through an exploration of contestations around the notion of ‘peace’ and its deployment in efforts to promote particular foreign policy agendas we highlight the incongruities in civil society actors’ approaches to peace, and their efforts to achieve sometimes conflicting aims, within divided societies.     

Peace Diplomacy and the Domestic Dimension of Norwegian Foreign Policy: The Insider's Accounts

By focusing on the internal conditions and rationale behind the development of Norwegian peace diplomacy (as seen by Norwegian diplomats and nongovernmental organisation representatives), this study argues that the high level of the country's engagement in international peace efforts and its success in pursuing a ‘niche diplomacy’ can be attributed to two factors. First, it is the ability of the Norwegian government to capitalise on the society's belief that Norwegians are a ‘Peace Nation’ with a missionary obligation. Second, it is the existence of the so‐called ‘Norwegian Model’, which allows creating efficient interactions between government, civil society and research institutions in specific foreign policy efforts. Both factors combined make Norwegian peace diplomacy a model example representing New Public Diplomacy, where domestic civil society remains both an audience (‘Norway as a Peace Nation’ notion) and a driver (Norwegian model of cooperation) of state public diplomacy efforts.     

Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes

I examine a fundamental problem of politics in authoritarian regimes: the dictator and the ruling coalition must share power and govern in an environment where political influence must be backed by a credible threat of violence. I develop a model of authoritarian politics in which power sharing is complicated by this conflict of interest: by exploiting his position, the dictator may acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, which may attempt to deter such opportunism by threatening to stage a coup. Two power-sharing regimes, contested and established dictatorships, may emerge as a result of strategic behavior by the dictator and the ruling coalition. This theory accounts for the large variation in the duration of dictators' tenures and the concentration of power in dictatorships over time, and it contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of power sharing and accountability in authoritarian regimes.     

Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion

This article quantifies the impact of civil wars on economic growth at home and in nearby countries. Three alternative measures of nearness—contiguity, length of contiguous borders, and distance of closest approach—are used to capture the spatial dispersion of civil war consequences. We present short-run panel estimates (at five-year intervals) and long-run (1961–95) panel estimates for the world. Generally, the distance measures, novel to this study, and not contiguity provides the most accurate measure of the diffusion of the negative economic consequences of civil wars on other countries. Unlike earlier studies, we also investigate the temporal influence of civil wars on growth at home and in nearby countries. Both the duration and the timing of civil wars have an economic impact.     

The Capitalist Peace

It is widely accepted that democracies are less conflict prone, if only with other democracies. Debate persists, however, about the causes underlying liberal peace. This article offers a contrarian account based on liberal political economy. Economic development, free markets, and similar interstate interests all anticipate a lessening of militarized disputes or wars. This "capitalist peace" also accounts for the effect commonly attributed to regime type in standard statistical tests of the democratic peace.     

Politische Institutionen und die Entwicklung generalisierten Vertrauens. Ein internationaler Vergleich

Trust functions as an instrument for establishing long-term and mutually beneficial cooperative relationships. In this paper we investigate the sources of generalized trust. The main focus of the research is the role of the political-institutional context in allowing trust-based relationships to form, controlling for the attributes and motives of individual agents. The central contention of the paper is that political institutions that support norms of fairness, universality, and the division of power contribute to the formation of inter-personal trust. Using data from the World Values Survey we run multi-level models to test for links between differences between the responses of individuals in various countries and the trust-supporting context, in terms of different institutional configurations. Alongside individual resources and attitudes, aspects of social integration and other sociodemographic characteristics, we test for significant effects of contextual factors — such as the influence of formal rule-of-law institutions, social inequality, and the division of power or pluralistic democratic procedures. The study comes to the conclusion that universalistic, impartial and power-sharing institutions increase the prospects for the development of generalized trust.     

The political economy of the peace dividend

We develop a model of the peace dividend and use it to predict the fiscal consequences of a reduction in the demand for military spending. The model is based on the assumption that the political process responds to political demands and costs in a way that maximizes net political benefits. The predictions of our model on how a peace dividend will be allocated over nonmilitary spending, tax relief, and deficit reduction is tested against the experience of eight major wars in United States history.     

Information,Agreement Design,and the Durability of Civil War Settlements

Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil‐war‐torn societies.     

Succession,power-sharing and the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe

Historians have documented that in medieval Europe, bargaining over the loyalty of lay magnates and high clergy was most intense during successions and that this often forced monarchs to give political concessions. We argue that matters related to succession predict short-term power-sharing concessions by rulers but that – because they do not permanently alter the balance of power between ruler and elite – they only trigger lasting changes of political institutions if these changes are in the mutual interest of the ruler and the elite groups. It follows that successions are unlikely to have long-term effects on representative institutions but that they may consolidate the rules regulating succession (the succession order). Using the natural deaths of monarchs as an instrument for successions, we confirm these claims with a new dataset that includes fine-grained data on succession and parliament-like assemblies in 16 European polities between 1000 and 1600. These findings shed new light on the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe, on the changes in succession orders that brought about clear rules about primogeniture and on the political leeway of legislatures in authoritarian regimes more generally.     

Foreign Aid,Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?

It has been suggested that democratizing states are prone to civil wars. However, not all democratizing states experience domestic political violence. We argue that one of the key factors that “shelters” some democratizing states from domestic political violence is the receipt of democracy aid. Democratizing states that receive high levels of democracy assistance are less likely to experience civil conflict than countries that receive little or no external democracy assistance. During democratic transitions, the central authority weakens and uncertainty about future political commitments and promises among domestic groups increases. Democracy aid decreases the risk of conflict by reducing commitment problems and uncertainty. Using an instrumental variables approach that accounts for potential endogeneity problems in aid allocation, we find empirical support for our argument. We conclude that there is a potential path to democracy that ameliorates the perils of democratization, and democracy assistance programs can play a significant positive role in this process.     

South Sudan: The Elusive Quest for a Resilient Social Contract?

ABSTRACT

After its hard-won independence in 2011, South Sudan slid quickly into violent conflict and became a theatre of enormous human suffering. This article attempts to answer the question of what went wrong, and what prospects exist for South Sudanese to forge a resilient social contract to build and sustain peace. It employs an analytical framework postulating three drivers of such a contract, at the heart of which is how core issues of conflict that underpin violent conflict and fragility have been addressed. The research findings underscore that the way the ruling elites managed the transition to statehood, the development of exclusive weak institutions, and frail social cohesion have all served to undermine peace and the development of a resilient social contract. Core issues of conflict have not been addressed, witnessed by the eruption of civil war in 2013. While the 2015 Peace Agreement provides, at least on paper, the basis for forging a new social contract that holds promise for sustaining peace, building inclusive institutions and nurturing social cohesion, its realization requires political will, strategic leadership, and a national vision, which are currently in short supply.     

Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Liberia: A Practitioner's Reflection from the Field

Liberia presents an important opportunity for civil society,national government and the international community to cooperatein rebuilding a post-conflict country in a way that addressesthe essential and elemental basis for building a just and durablepeace. In other words, the country is poised to be a potential‘success story,’ one that could set new trends inhow African people negotiate a post-conflict coexistence onthe basis of shared values, popular participation and economicand social justice. The role of civil society in particularin this process of reconstruction, and specifically issues oftransitional justice, is central to ensuring that policies havebroad input amongst the Liberian population, all of whom havebeen directly impacted by the war. This article outlines thecountry's trajectory from conflict to peace, the challengesof addressing the crimes of the past, the risks to newly establisheddemocratic institutions posed by a truncated or incomplete transitionaljustice program and the role of Liberian civil society bothbroadly in a newly democratic Liberia as well as specificallyin regards to the establishment and functioning of the Truthand Reconciliation Commission.     

Federal Arrangements as a Peacemaking Device During South Africa's Transition to Democracy

Federal arrangements are often used as a way of keeping deeplydivided societies together. In particular, where divisions,be they ethnic, linguistic, or religious, develop in violentconflict or the threat of civil war, constitutional arrangementsfor self-rule and shared rule have been put forward as a keyto peace. The federal distribution of power is then used tosatisfy sectoral demands for self-determination.