Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking

Recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either (1) extreme restrictions upon preferences or (2) constraints upon the agenda. The implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics. This paper argues to the contrary, that legislatures (and other political processes) are characterized by some regularities, and that equilibrium models are the appropriate technique to use in describing these regularities. Examples from economic theory are used to illustrate this principle. The assumption of equilibrium is methodological, committing the researcher to develop models that have specific empirical implications. Using analogies from the economic theories of general equilibrium, oligopoly, and demand revealing processes, some potentially fruitful means of developing equilibrium political models are described. Assuming that legislators may freely make binding contracts has both empirical and normative advantages. Finally, institutional restrictions on legislative agendas may assure equilibrium. These include ‘constitutional’ rules, agreements to share ‘pork barrel’ projects evenly, limitation of committees to specific policy arenas, and the election of leaders who then determine the voting agenda.     

The evaluation of economic development conflict is present: Projects where military investing in health care in el salvador

Increasingly, U.S. policymakers have proposed development projects in areas of the world undergoing rapid, disruptive, and often violent challenges to existing political regimes. The U.S. government typically requires that these projects undergo an economic evaluation before they can be implemented. While benefit-cost theory and practice have made substantial gains over the last 20 years, they are more easily and aptly applied to stable economic and political conditions. This paper raises several issues concerning the theory and practice of benefit-analysis in an environment where there is political instability and military conflict. The discussion is illustrated by reference a proposed health care project in El Salvador. I t concludes summarizing the options available to policy analysts who conduct evaluations in such situations.     

“Selling out” and the sociology of knowledge

Personal experience suggests that it is a great oversimplification to assume that those analysts or scientists who work on government sponsored contracts are forced by their personal economic and power interests to make their work conform to the ideology of the military-industrial establishment. The sociology of knowledge on which this assumption is based must be supplemented by a culturology of knowledge. In terms of the latter an important obstacle to good policy analysis for government comes from the fact that most analysts are heavily influenced by a rather narrow academic and intellectual subculture that makes it difficult for them to understand with sufficient balance the problems that face decisionmakers in the real world.     

A Unified Method for Dynamic and Cross‐Sectional Heterogeneity: Introducing Hidden Markov Panel Models

Conventional statistical methods for panel data are based on the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is time constant. Despite the central importance of this assumption for panel data methods, few studies have developed statistical methods for testing this assumption and modeling time‐varying unobserved heterogeneity. In this article, I introduce a formal test to check the assumption of time‐constant unobserved heterogeneity using Bayesian model comparison. Then, I present two panel data methods that account for time‐varying unobserved heterogeneity in the context of the random‐effects model and the fixed‐effects model, respectively. I illustrate the utility of the introduced methods using both simulated data and examples drawn from two important debates in the political economy literature: (1) the identification of shifting relationships between income inequality and economic development in capitalist countries and (2) the effects of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade volumes.     

Economic policy advice and political preferences

This essay argues that public choice offers an appropriate approach for thinking about economic policy advice. First I discuss the nature of the policy advice that is proffered by economists. Then I specifically suggest that one of the most common modeling features in the public choice literature (viz., the assumption that individuals have political preferences) may be useful in helping us understand the nature of this advice. Finally, I also carry out a tentative exploration of the implications of accepting the perspective that is provided when the suggested modeling feature is used in this context.     

Endogenous Parties in an Assembly

In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.     

The rhetorics of policy analysis

This paper claims that policy analysis is inherently rhetorical, that it cannot be fully understood apart from the audiences to which it is directed and the styles in which it is communicated. Defining rhetoric as persuasive discourse within and between interpretive communities, I argue that policy analysts are embedded in a complex rhetorical situation created by the interaction of three primary audiences (scientists, politicians, and lay advocates), each of which has its own normal discourse and agreed-upon conventions of persuasion, and that failure to persuade any one of these audiences will cause analysts to appear incompetent, impractical or illegitimate. To support and illustrate this claim I reconstruct the theoretical literature about policy analysis in rhetorical terms, then review events that occurred at Love Canal, New York, in the late 1970s. I conclude by suggesting that policy analysts need to actively mediate the policy discourse between scientists, politicians, and advocates.     

Taiwan’s presidential election and sino-U.S. relations

This article analyzes the dyadic relationship between mainland China and Taiwan and between China and the United States by focusing on the internal factors in the three countries. It has been an important assumption in theories of international relations that there is an inextricable linkage between foreign policies and domestic socio-economic and political conditions. Yet, policy makers as well as some policy analysts in Beijing, Taipei and Washington still do not pay enough attention to the internal factors in each of the three countries. Misperceptions continue to be a major source for the conflicts in the bilateral relations between mainland China and Taiwan and between China and the United States. More often than not, the misperceptions are culturally and ideologically based. Until the three sides can minimize their misperceptions of the other parties, the future relationships between Beijing and Taipei and between Beijing and Washington look grim indeed. His research interests include East Asian and Chinese politics, political culture and participation in China, Sino-American and cross-Taiwan Strait relations. His publications have appeared in journals such asAsian Survey, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, East European Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Journal of Contemporary China, Political Research Quarterly, PS: Political Science and Politics, andProblems of Post-Communism.     

Theory to Practice: Policy Recommendations for Fostering Economic Development through Social Capital

Proponents of social capital theory have long argued not only that it is in the best interest of civic life to build social capital but also that social capital is vital for the economic health of communities. This has been confirmed by recent research showing that social capital, especially in its bridging form, is positively associated with job creation at the metropolitan statistical area level. At the same time, social capital is often viewed as something either inherent or absent within a community. This article takes on that assumption by presenting a policy‐based approach to developing social capital. It provides two theoretical explanations for how social capital affects economic development and identifies four lessons for economic development practitioners to use to enhance social capital. These research‐based recommendations for economic development practitioners and policy makers seek to improve the social capital and, consequently, the economic development of their community.     

Making policy for complex systems: A medical model for economics

In recent years, policy analysts have shown a growing interest in less rationalistic policymaking models. Medical knowledge may be useful to consider in this regard, since it combines practical knowledge with the findings of numerous analytic disciplines, and includes procedures for dealing with high uncertainty. In contrast, economic policymaking often applies analysis from a single discipline directly to a multifaceted problem. A broader “socioeconomic” approach emulating the medical model would incorporate variables such as political, social, cultural, psychic, and environmental factors.     

Through a glass darkly: Cause and effect in refugee resettlement policies

As the ongoing debate among philosophers and social scientists suggests, interpretation of cause and effect in human action is often extremely difficult. Especially complicated for the policy analyst is the problem of determining whether causal relationships are inferred from the evidence or imputed to it. This dilemma characterizes certain types of government activity in which distinctions between policy and implementation, between decisions and actions, and between inputs and outcomes are unclear. The efforts of the federal government between 1960 and 1985 to assist refugees in securing employment illustrate how the flow of events may elude causal explanation, and how conclusions and recommendation for improvement derived from the evidence may prove highly ambiguous. In such instances the most rational course open to policy analysts may be to concede ignorance.     

Through a glass darkly: Cause and effect in refugee resettlement policies

As the ongoing debate among philosophers and social scientists suggests, interpretation of cause and effect in human action is often extremely difficult. Especially complicated for the policy analyst is the problem of determining whether causal relationships are inferred from the evidence or imputed to it. This dilemma characterizes certain types of government activity in which distinctions between policy and implementation, between decisions and actions, and between inputs and outcomes are unclear. The efforts of the federal government between 1960 and 1985 to assist refugees in securing employment illustrate how the flow of events may elude causal explanation, and how conclusions and recommendation for improvement derived from the evidence may prove highly ambiguous. In such instances the most rational course open to policy analysts may be to concede ignorance.     

Using threshold models to explain international relations

The outcome of political opposition or revolution is a public good, which suggests that free riding will diminish the effectiveness of these forms of collective action. The private gains from contributing to collective goals are increased, however, if individuals place some value on ideological conformity or group identity. Nevertheless, some external stimulus is often needed to set in motion a tendency toward social motivation that is strong enough to outweigh the free rider incentive. This paper investigates the extent to which international pressure and demonstration effects can serve to signal support for the objectives of domestic groups in a target country and thereby mobilize collective action in pursuit of their goals. It is of interest to know not only the extent to which inherent barriers to effective collective action are overcome by outside support, but also to show how foreign economic policy can have an impact on political processes in the target country even when that policy itself has minimal economic effects.     

Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy

Most analyses of US congressional votes on trade policy identify political and economic factors, and general economic conditions as significant factors. In this paper we examine whether simulated state-level impacts of trade policy changes obtained from an applied general equilibrium model explain recent US Senate votes on trade bills. We find that simulated gross state product effects are good predictors of recent trade-policy votes. Our model-based measures of trade sensitivity perform slightly better in statistical terms than the more traditional economic measures. For the Senate as a whole, import considerations have a larger impact on senate voting than export considerations.     

Campfire decision-making and strategic management: A politics and leadership approach to economic development

Privatization is recommended unconditionally by some scholars as the optimal means for achieving economic development. While privatization can be helpful medicine, it provides no universal cure for all the ills associated with low economic growth. A country's economic and political institutions are intertwined. Mandating privatization without being mindful of both political and economic consequences to such a policy can bring undesirable consequences during and after policy implementation. This paper proposes that to enhance the likelihood of economic growth a leader should blend economics with politics. Sensitive political leadership can stimulate a bonding among citizens, a bonding which can generate the commitment to risk by investing personal savings, to work the long hours which much precede the rewards, and often to be satisfied by a job well done rather than with material reward. Analogous to the chief executive officer of a successful corporation, the effective political leader involves stakeholders, steers decision processes, takes reasonable risks, encourages private investment, and rations public resources according to national priorities. Collective decision-making guided by the political leader, who also acts as a strategic manager during implementation, is offered as a model for development.     

Local workplace organising in the wake of globalisation: Street vendors and autoworkers in Puebla,Mexico

Global changes that seem to limit the intellectual and physical space in which workplace organising takes place, have led many analysts to suggest that labour organisations have become less important politically in recent years. While conceding that global processes have made the workers’ task more difficult, the argument here is that the nature and character of resistance by workers continues to influence political and economic outcomes. When that resistance is ineffective, as is the case to varying degrees with the disparate groups of Pueblan workers compared here, it may appear that global forces are too strong to be challenged. This paper argues, however, that workplace organisations that creatively adapt their structures and strategies to changing circumstances should be able to defend the interests of their constituents, as well as potentially influence political outcomes at local, national and perhaps even international levels.     

Contexts and epiphanies: Policy analysis and the humanities

As policy analysts have discovered the limitations of quantitative tools and economic analysis in confronting complex social and political issues, members of the profession have turned increasingly to the ideas and perspectives of the humanities. For the analyst who faces ethical questions, whether they involve personal conduct or broad social judgment, insights from history, philosophy, literature, and political theory may offer breadth and understanding. Attention to the humanities—whose concerns are the uncertain realms of thought and character and action—may be especially valuable in sensitizing students of policy analysis to the difficulties they will confront.     

Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?

The purpose of political campaigns in democracies is to provide voters with information that allows them to make “correct” choices, that is, vote for the party/candidate whose proposed policy or “position” is closest to their ideal position. In a world where political talk is often ambiguous and imprecise, it then becomes important to understand whether correct choices can still be made. In this paper we identify two elements of political culture that are key to answering this question: (i) whether or not political statements satisfy a so-called “grain of truth” assumption, and (ii) whether or not politicians make statements that are comparative, that is contain information about politicians’ own positions relative to that of their adversaries. The “grain of truth” assumption means that statements, even if vague, do not completely misrepresent the true positions of the parties. We find that only when political campaigning is comparative and has a grain of truth, will voters always make choices as if they were fully informed. Therefore, the imprecision of political statements should not be a problem as long as comparative campaigning is in place.