Institutional resilience of Taiwan’s semi-presidential system: the integration of the president and premier under party politics

Over the past three decades, the semi-presidentialism has been adopted in most new democracies. It is also the constitutional order in most democracies, which can be divided into three categories: established, post-Leninist, and postcolonial democracies. Semi-presidentialism is a political system with dual executive branches. Moreover, because of these dual executive branches, the constitutional order of semi-presidentialism might be similar to a presidential system if the president is the de facto head of government. It might also be similar to a parliamentary system if the prime minister is the de facto head of government with the support of the parliamentary majority. Taiwan has been considered as a semi-presidential country since 1997. According to Taiwan’s constitutional amendments, its president is directly elected, and the premier (prime minister) and cabinet are responsible to the legislature. Dual executive system in Taiwan has been effective and flexible. I attempt to examine the institutional resilience of Taiwan’s constitutional function, which means that, in properly responding to social movements, its government has continued to function well. In addition, the president has been able to continue serving in office in spite of political crises. A vague constitutional design and a presidentialized party system are two reasons for this.     

Public administration,executive power,and constitutional confusion

This article examines the ambiguity in the meaning of executive power in both the text of the U.S. Constitution and in subsequent judicial interpretations. This ambiguity has had a profound impact on the constitutional position of the public administration. In the recent independent counsel case, the U.S. Supreme Court offered a restrictive interpretation of the President's constitutional powers to remove subordinate officers. This new interpretation could lead to increased congressional control over administrative agencies.

The proper place and function of the public administration, unfortunately for the public administration, have been and remain inherently ambiguous because of the longstanding confusion about executive power in the Constitution of the United States. Richard Neustadt captured this ambiguity nicely when he noted that the two great themes that have characterized the American presidency have been “clerkship” and “leadership.”⁽¹⁾ There is no easy formula to bring clerks and leaders together to make them march in lock-step, and yet the President is clearly both. Today we may tend to emphasize his role as leader with imperial pretensions and Nixonian excesses still relatively fresh in our memories, but this is only a question of emphasis. No one denies that the President is a legally accountable officer who must do the bidding of the Congress. This is the clerkship side of the presidency.

Herbert Storing counsels against any effort to cut the Gordian knot and to try to determine once and for all just what it is our President is supposed to be: clerk or leader. “The beginning of wisdom about the American presidency,” Storing maintains, “is to see that it contains both principles and to reflect on their complex and subtle relation.”⁽²⁾ Following Storing's advice, this essay reflects on the inherent ambiguity of the executive power that provides the constitutional foundation of the public administration. First, we examine the text of the Constitution and the meaning of executive power at the time of the founding. Then we study the confusion that the Supreme Court has created in its efforts to draw practical conclusions for presidential personnel management from the constitutional grant of “the executive power” to the President in relation to the removal power. Third, we examine some of the recent problems of executive power that surfaced in Watergate and became salient in the important constitutional debate over the special prosecutors, those most unwelcome intruders into the inner precincts of the Reagan administration.     

Democracy,development and the executive presidency in Sri Lanka

This paper examines the developmental causes and consequences of the shift from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential system in Sri Lanka in 1978, examining its provenance, rationale and unfolding trajectory. Drawing on a wide range of sources, it sets out an argument that the executive presidency was born out of an elite impulse to create a more stable, centralised political structure to resist the welfarist electoral pressures that had taken hold in the post-independence period, and to pursue a market-driven model of economic growth. This strategy succeeded in its early years, 1978–93, when presidents retained legislative control, maintained a strong personal commitment to market reforms and cultivated alternative sources of legitimacy. In the absence of these factors, the presidency slipped into crisis from 1994–2004 as resistance to elite-led projects of state reform mounted and as the president lost control of the legislature. Between 2005–14, the presidency regained its power, but at the cost of abandoning its original rationale and function as a means to recalibrate the elite–mass power relationship to facilitate elite-led reform agendas.     

Parliamentary Oversight in Putin's Neo-patrimonial State. Watchdogs or Show-dogs?

Conceptualising Russia as a neopatrimonial state directs attention to the patrimonial relations that pervaded formal institutions to reveal increasing tensions within the state during Putin's presidency. A case study of parliamentary oversight practices points to the emergence of legitimation as their key purpose, but also to the growing contradictions between the controlling and legitimating impulses of Putin's regime. At the same time deputies responded to the changes in their status and influence by moving their resources towards the patrimonial sphere, most notably utilising oversight institutions for direct and indirect private interests—activities tolerated by the regime in exchange for political loyalty.     

Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia

Why do presidents in semi-presidential regimes sometimes call early elections? Is the behavior of incumbent presidents different from the behavior of presidential contenders when the former do not need to run for office but face the loss of parliamentary majority in a semi-presidential system? Prospect theory claims that agents make risky choices when facing a loss. Consequently, if incumbent presidents face a loss of majority in the parliament, they will call for early election to try to shore up or salvage the majority. To provide empirical evidence supporting this claim, prospect theory has been applied to the two presidential elections in Yugoslavia and Serbia in which two incumbent presidents, Slobodan Milo?evi? (2000) and Boris Tadi? (2012), had lost early presidential elections. The expected contribution of the paper is to deepen our understanding of how semi-presidential regimes resolve the problem of temporal rigidity and offer novel empirical data in support of the application of prospect theory in political science.     

Perilous presidentialism or precarious power-sharing? Hybrid regime dynamics in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Although Myanmar's transition from military rule has been thoroughly studied, research into the evolving presidential system is lacking. This article maps Myanmar's unique hybrid form of presidentialism and characterises executive-legislative relations between 2012 and 2017. It not only examines institutions themselves but also explores how actors within them have acted and shifted strategically. It is argued that elite-behaviour determines how institutions work. Myanmar's 2008 constitution imposed by the military established a hybrid presidential system with a formally powerful president. The first phase under President Thein Sein saw competitive yet cooperative executive-legislative relations between President Thein Sein and the ambitious House Speaker Shwe Mann, both members of the former military regime. However, this power-sharing arrangement of former members of the military regime became increasingly fragile with the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi and her attempt to change the 2008 constitution. After the election victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the passage of the state counsellor law, a de facto semi-presidential system was established – Burmese style. Since then, the frontline has been between the civilian and military parts of the administration.     

Introduction

In this Introduction, Larkin Dudley and Gary Wamsley reveal a dual intent in this project: to reprint the famous Papers on the Science of Administration and to celebrate critically Luther Gulick's contributions to public administration in order that the critique will help us understand ourselves and our conditions. Gulick's contributions as a man of action are praised, but his misplacement of an organizational conception upon a polity with a distinct constitutional design is questioned. In Dudley and Wamsley's view, American public administration is the study and practice of a key component of our governance process, misfounded on a concept of management in monocentric, hierarchical settings and on a focus of power of an elected executive. From the work of the other writers of this symposium, the authors tease out further some of the contradictions in hierarchy and democracy. Finally, they note that Gulick himself at the age of 93 published a repudiation of his early notions of organization based on hierarchy and, instead, called for a more democratic and participatory system in all agencies.     

Problem of early elections and dissolution power in the Czech Republic

Theory of parliamentary regimes presumes that parliament can express vote of no confidence in government. On the other hand executive power (government or head of state) is endowed with right to dissolve the parliament. However, these “doomsday devices” are not in balance in many parliamentary regimes, including the Czech Republic. On the basis of a comparative analysis of dissolution provisions in the constitutions of European states the article argues that the government in the Czech Republic should be given the right to dissolve the lower chamber at least in case that the latter expresses vote of no confidence in the former.     

Legitimacy‐Building in the Macau special administrative region: Colonial legacies and reform strategies

The retrocession of Macau to Mainland China's sovereignty since December 20, 1999 has initiated an unprecedented process of legitimacy‐building in the new Special Administrative Region. The Chief Executive, Edmund Ho, has implemented a multiplicity of reform strategies for the sake of consolidating his legitimacy. The twilight of the Portuguese colonial era was plagued by a rapid deterioration in law and order and the persistence in public maladministration, thus weakening the departing colonial regime's performance legitimacy seriously. As such, the political environment was conducive to Ho's herculean efforts at establishing his performance legitimacy. While the new Chief Executive's procedure legitimacy was enhanced by his election from an Election Committee composed of political elites, Ho's performance legitimacy has been buttressed by depoliticisation, economic development, civil service reforms, and new constitutional conventions. The abolition of the Municipal Councils in 2000 ran the risk of delegitimising the Ho regime. Yet, such delegitimisation was by no means serious given the relatively weak political opposition. Still, in the face of a more active and assertive citizenry, political reforms will have to be pondered and implemented by the post‐colonial regime in Macau. It will be necessary for the Macau government to utilise democratic reforms in a bid to preempt the increasingly vociferous demands for more participatory channels. The case of Macau corroborates the existence of a dialectical process of legitimisation, which has been strengthened mainly by depoliticisation and economic development, and delegitimisation, which is looming in the midst of a steadily growing political activeness on the part of the Macau people.     

Capital punishment: The fragmentation of Colombia and the crisis of the nation-state

The Colombian nation-state is in its worst period of crisis since the infamous Violencia of the late 1940s and 1950s. State power is being contested by a number of groups: paramilitaries, the revolutionary Left, drug cartels and corrupt high-level officials. But these latest challenges must be set in a wider historical context: a 200-year history of failed attempts by the oligarchy to forge a stable modern nation-state without undermining their dominant position in the Colombian polity. The writing of a new constitution in 1991, the first since 1886, was an attempt to address many of the above problems, including the granting of special powers to the executive to deal with civil unrest, the need for a decentralised and pluralised political landscape and constitutional guarantees for minority and indigenous representation and rights. However, constitutional change has also taken place in the context of the consolidation of the globalisation project and the practical effects of the new constitution have been its provision of legal and administrative measures to facilitate the neoliberal restructuring of the economy, a process which, over the past 10 years, has been a devastating form of 'capital punishment' for the Colombian underclasses and has contributed to the further fragmentation of the nation.     

Zambia's 2001 elections: The tyranny of small decisions, 'non-decisions' and 'not decisions'

The course of the 1990s witnessed deterioration in the quality of elections held across sub-Saharan Africa. Zambia's elections for the presidency, parliament and local government held on 27 December 2001 are no exception. They returned the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) to power, but with much reduced popular support and leaving doubts about the legitimacy of the result. A 'tyranny of small decisions', 'non-decisions' and 'not decisions' perpetrated over 12 months or more leading up to these elections combined to influence the outcome. The previous MMD government and the formally autonomous Electoral Commission were primarily but not wholly responsible. For independent analysts as well as for the political opposition, who secured a majority of parliamentary seats while narrowly failing to capture the presidency, identifying the relevant category of 'decisions' to which influences belong and comparing their impact is no straightforward matter. Zambia both illustrates the claim that 'administrative problems are typically the basis of the flawed elections' in new democracies and refines it by showing the difficulty of clearly separating the administrative and political factors. In contrast Zimbabwe's presidential election in March 2002, which had the Zambian experience to learn from, appears a more clear-cut case of deliberate political mischief by the ruling party.     

Women's parliamentary representation: are women more highly represented in (consolidated) democracies than in non-democracies?

Although there have been many studies that address the representation of women in parliament, there are few analyses that compare the current state of gender representation between democracies and non-democracies. Focusing on Africa, Central and South America, as well as Asia and the Pacific region, this paper evaluates whether democracies have more female deputies or whether female representation increases with the maturity of democracy. While controlling for the type of electoral system, quotas, women's participation in the workforce, a state's GDP, as well as its degree of corruption and Communist regime type, this cross-national analysis reveals that the variable democracy does not affect the representation of the genders in parliament. Women's parliamentary representation also does not increase with the maturity of democracy.     

Myanmar's Electoral System: Reviewing the 2010 and 2012 Elections and Looking Ahead to the 2015 General Elections

Myanmar's 2010 multi-party election was the nation's first in two decades, signaling a manufactured transition from nearly half a century of military dictatorship toward parliamentary democracy. The current single-member district, plurality voting electoral system limits the parliamentary representation of smaller, ethnic political parties, and inflates the influence of larger, enfranchised parties, jeopardizing peaceful national reconciliation between various factions and the country's inchoate democratic institutions. Myanmar's Union Electoral Commission should consider electoral reforms that: (a) maximize proportional representation; (b) guarantee peace and political stability; and (c) guarantee a sufficient parliamentary majority that can govern the nascent democracy. The ideal system for the upcoming 2015 general elections is a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) one, with one parliamentary house electing ministers by plurality in regional districts and the other with proportional representation by party list. This paper considers alternative electoral systems in light of the status quo and argues that MMP would produce the most stable and representative results for all parties concerned.     

McIntosh on governance and accountability

Overview and scrutiny committees have been introduced in England and Wales as part of constitutional arrangements designed to improve local accountability. This article presents a conceptual framework for the evaluation of scrutiny arrangements based on five variables which have been identified as impediments to parliamentary scrutiny. A survey of Welsh councillors suggests that they perceive ‘resources and technical support’, ‘one-party dominance’, and ‘the relationship between scrutiny and the executive’ as factors which may influence the effectiveness of local scrutiny. The paper concludes that these findings have important implications for the extent to which political management reforms can enhance local accountability.     

From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe, 1990 – 2005

This article examines how military veterans and political veterans of Zimbabwe's nationalist movements competed for power and access to state resources, using their distinctive contributions to legitimate their claims and de-legitimate others' claims. Drawing on parliamentary debates over state assistance for war veterans and state pensions for heroes, the article seeks to highlight previously unexplored continuities between the political discourses within the ruling party in the 1990s and the ruling party's brand of nationalism after 2000. More generally, the essay suggests a much longer pattern of nationalists using struggle credentials to legitimate themselves and de-legitimate others in competition for power and resources.     

International sanctions against Iran and Tehran's responses: political effects on the targeted regime

This article seeks to explain the combined political effects of international sanctions against Iran and Tehran's domestic responses on the power structure of the targeted regime. It contends that although sanctions have contributed to elite infighting in Iran, they have not weakened the targeted regime. The Iranian leadership's modified reading of the imposed sanctions from targeted United Nations, US and European Union (EU) nonproliferation sanctions as an opportunity to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities to the perception of comprehensive and coordinated US and EU sanctions as regime change efforts marked a critical juncture. Tehran's adjusted responses to these sanctions, shaped by the interplay between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, affected Iran's balance of power to the detriment of the outgoing president and his faction. This impact sheds a light on the workings of a targeted hybrid regime under intensive sanction pressure.     

From reorganizing to reinventing: sixty years and “we still don’t get it”

Sixty years ago the “Brownlow Committee Report” was written by some of the most prominent members of the emerging field of public administration. Its recommendations had serious consequences for the way both our democratic republic and the field of public administration have evolved. In developing principles in which to anchor the recommendations, Luther Gulick, who was both the intellectual and political force behind the committee, contributed to a confusion of the concepts of organizations and the polity and those of management and governance.

Some of the story of how the concepts promoted by Gulick and the Papers on the Science of Administration led to a misconception, which became public administration's living legacy is told in this article. We then discuss the Brownlow Committee Report as something which changed: our very conception of the Constitution; Gulick's rationale for cooperation with Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Report as a misplacement of organizational concepts upon a polity; the dimensions of constitutional change in the report; and the staying power of Gulick's and the Committee's ideas. In conclusion, we contend that if we are to move beyond Gulick's legacy, that the field must learn and act upon the distinctions between organizations and the polity and management and governance.

“The charge that the Brownlow Committee set in train the development of the “imperial presidency” can be advanced only by those who have not read the Committee's report.”

James Fesler, former staff member of the Brownlow Committee Public Administration Review (July/August, 1987)

“How interesting it is historically that we all assumed in the 1930s that all management, especially public management, flowed in a broad, strong stream of value-filled ethical performance. Were we blind or only naive until Nixon came along? Or were we so eager to ‘take politics out of administration’ that we threw the baby out with the bathwater?”

Luther Gulick, member of the Brownlow Committee From Stephen K. Blurnberg, “Seven Decades of Public Administration: A Tribute to Luther Gulick” Public Administration Review (March/April, 1981)

was as old in American politics as it was popular. Yet, before the end of his second term, Roosevelt, with the help of Charles Merriam, Herbert Brownlow, and Luther Gulick, would use such hoary symbolism towards ends that would fundamentally alter our perceptions of the constitutional order, the nature of the presidency, and public administration. How did this come to pass? Barry Karl says that “He (Roosevelt) had continued as President to look at reorganization through the eyes of those who saw in it a means of saving money, balancing the budget, and thereby giving security to the nation's economy.” But Karl adds, “By 1936, this viewpoint had undergone drastic revision.”⁽⁶⁾ The revision in his thinking replaced “saving money” with “managerial control” as the principal aim of reorganization. “Managerial control” by the president would enable him not only to manage New Deal programs but protect them against potential Republican counterattacks, i.e., in short, to strengthen his hand as president.

The impetus for this change apparently came directly from the President's experiences in seeking to administer the government's burgeoning and increasingly chaotic Executive Branch. Roosevelt was a skilled, intuitive, and flexible administrator. But, according to Karl, his experience in seeking to administer the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act with a loose arrangement, quickly dubbed “the five ring circus,” taught the President several lessons. First, “it demonstrated the growing dependence of the President on official staff, other than cabinet members, working exceedingly close to the President's own sphere of daily operation. “⁽⁷⁾ Second, the problems of administering the Act raised questions among the participants themselves as to whether or not the President could “administer and control so complex an operation as federal relief given the inadequate machinery in his possession.”⁽⁸⁾ In other words, the effort was not simply a “five ring circus” because of FDR's famed flexible and informal style, but also because of the inadequacy of the available structures. Karl notes that “despite the problems inherent in the fiscal machinery as it stood, a continued development of governments within governments could only lead to a dangerous chaos over which the President would have no control whatsoever.”⁽⁹⁾ The questions raised suggested to the President that perhaps there was some merit to the position of those urging that emergency agencies be absorbed into the existing framework. This could meet a very practical question by “placing agencies within the purview of budget and accounting procedures already in existence.”⁽¹⁰⁾

According to Gulick, FDR told Brownlow and him at a November 14, 1936, meeting “that, since the election, he had received a great many suggestions that he move for a constitutional convention for the United States” and observed that “with Coughlin and other crackpots about there was no way of keeping such an affair from getting out of hand. But,” he said, “there is more than one way of killing a cat, just as in this job I assigned you.”⁽¹¹⁾ Gulick also quotes FDR as specifically telling the Committee, “We have got to get over the notion that the purpose of reorganization is economy. . . . The reason for reorganization is good management.”⁽¹²⁾ Of course FDR meant management as in “presidential management.”

So it was that President Roosevelt by 1936 was prepared to do something quite beyond “abolishing useless offices” in the words of his 1932 speech--something significantly more constitutional in nature. His other aim was no doubt to strengthen his hand significantly to protect the New Deal programs from Republican counterattack. But whatever his aim, the practical effect was to treat the executive branch as a hierarchical organization headed by a chief executive of corporate or city management conception. In so doing, the delicate constitutional balance among branches was altered. Recommending the reorganization of the executive branch as they did inevitably led to reorganization of the larger whole, the government, which was not an organization, but something qualitatively different.⁽¹³⁾     

Authoritarian Electoral Engineering and its Limits: A Curious Case of the Imperiali Highest Averages Method in Russia

This study examines the limits of electoral engineering in a consolidating authoritarian regime by focusing on the case of the Imperiali highest averages method of proportional seat allocation in Russia's regional legislative elections. The Imperiali method strongly disadvantages the opposition. But, in the absence of political constraint or trends towards liberalisation, most of the regional decision makers still chose a more permissive formula. The trade-off among the incentives to solidify the power monopoly, to maintain the democratic façade of the regime and to co-opt the opposition was achieved by rejecting the least permissive electoral formula and choosing a middle-of-the-road solution instead.     

Kim Jong-il's military-first politics and beyond: Military control mechanisms and the problem of power succession

Military-first politics has been at the heart of the unexpected regime stability in North Korea under Kim Jong-il and his son Jong-un. This article analyzes Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics as a strategic choice for regime survival, in which the locus of political power switched from the party to the military. At the same time, Kim Jong-il formulated a complex system of circumventing the possibility of the armed forces' political domination, including personalistic control using sticks and carrots, fortifying security and surveillance institutions, and compartmentalizing the security institutions for intra- and inter-organizational checks and balances to prevent the emergence of organized opposition to the regime. Although an effective short-term solution, military-first politics could never be a long-term strategy for building gangseongdaeguk (a powerful and prosperous nation). The current Kim Jong-un regime needs to conduct sweeping reforms to address dire economic difficulties, which might result in a departure from his father's legacy and downgrade the military's power. In this process, the current regime's (in)stability will depend on how it maintains a balance between revoking military-first politics and preserving the armed forces' allegiance.     

Truth commissions,trials-or nothing? Policy options in democratic transitions

Gross human rights violations have constituted a hotly contested national issue in many recent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. This article analyses how newly elected democratic governments have dealt with violations committed by officials of previous authoritarian regimes. Empirical evidence from around 30 (mainly) Latin American and African countries undergoing democratic transition after the mid-1970s shows that the government's choice of human rights policy largely depends on the relative strength of the public's demand for truth and justice and the outgoing regime's demand for amnesty and impunity. Policy choice will tend towards trials as the outgoing regime becomes weaker and away from trials as the outgoing regime becomes stronger. Truth commissions are the most likely outcome when the relative strength of the conflicting demands is roughly equal. Where human rights policy deviates from predictions, the government always does less than expected. These arguments hold true both at the time of regime change and during the consolidation phase, as power dynamics often change over time.