Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Russia: The Group Position Model Reconsidered

Abstract

This article analyses the relationship between relative group position in an ethnically stratified social order and anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia. Based on data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of the Higher School of Economics, it studies the role of two objective indicators of group position: relative ingroup size and the group’s dominant political status within a region. The findings show that when a group position is measured in numerical terms, the attitudes of ethnic Russians seem to follow social dominance theory, while titulars tend to conform to the alienation-based extension to the group position model.     

Things Can Only Get Better? Changing Views of the Past,Present and Future in the Former Soviet Union

Previous research has reported substantial levels of nostalgia for the Soviet era among citizens of some of the independent republics that emerged from its collapse. We report new analyses from eight former Soviet republics, and from two surveys, in 2001 and 2010, comparing attitudes to government in the Soviet period and at the time of the surveys, as well as expectations for the future. Everywhere, views of the past have become less positive and those of the present more positive. However, both the views in each survey and the change between each of them vary among countries and socio-demographic groups.     

The muslim slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with reference to the Sandzak of Novi Pazar): Islam as national identity

Using results from a 2010 survey conducted in the Republic of Buryatia, this paper compares the responses of Russians and Buryats on questions of religious practice and belief, as well as the role of religion and religious organizations in the political sphere of contemporary Russia. Buryats more commonly identify with a religion and more frequently attend religious services in comparison to Russians living in the republic. There is greater consonance between the two groups on the public role of religion, with both Russians and Buryats generally supportive of the recent extension of religious education into schools and the creation of national holidays for all traditional religions, among other issues.     

Civil Society,the Economy,and Educational Assistance in Former Soviet Republics

Abstract

Liberal democracies throughout the world are committed to civil society in support of market economics and democratic politics. Through educational assistance programs, the U.S. government demonstrates this commitment by attempting to reinvigorate civil society in former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries in support of their economic and political reform efforts. Of particular interest are the Community Connections and Partners in Education programs conducted by the U.S. Department of State for interns from the former Soviet republics or now Eurasia, who participate in business and other professional internships in various locations in the U.S., including Northern Alabama.     

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania,Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to women's status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.     

Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS?

Historic differences between Russian elites about where the country's future lies are here addressed by examining what the Russian public thinks, using data from the New Russia Barometer survey. More than two thirds see the country's future with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and less than one third see it with Europe. Alternative explanations for these differences are tested statistically. The most important influences making Russians look to the near abroad are traditional identities, national pride and age. Although cosmopolitan contacts of individuals with the West encourage people to be pro-European, Russians are likely to continue to view their world as a CIS space. However, this does not indicate a popular demand to re-establish Imperial dominance but rather a durable commitment among most Russians to a Eurasian rather than European view of the world.     

Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand,Mindanao, and Aceh

Islamic insurgent movements in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and Aceh represent, arguably, the most visible signs of armed separatism in Southeast Asia today. The roots of ethnoreligious unrest in each of these regions stem from the same basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect, military repression and the contemporary force of militant Islam. The longevity of the movements that have arisen in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and Aceh has largely been determined by the degree of popular support each has been able to call on as well as operational considerations such as external support and access to weaponry.     

Citizenship,Identity and Foreign Policy: The Contradictions and Consequences of Russia's Passport Distribution in the Separatist Regions of Georgia

This article examines the role of Russian passports and citizenship in facilitating Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatism in Georgia. It questions Russian leaders' justification of the country's intervention in the August 2008 South Ossetian crisis on the basis of defending co-nationals' human rights, noting the tenuous circumstances under which citizenship was granted and Russian policymakers' general disregard for human rights among non-ethnic russkii groups both domestically and abroad. The rationale for Russian state actions is placed within the desire for geostrategic gain in the former Soviet Union and the restoration of civic national pride.     

Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence,Prospects, and Implications

The persistence of armed Muslim separatist rebellion in Southeast Asia is demonstrated by the ongoing rebellions in Aceh and Mindanao. A strong regional identity infused with Islam has been a binding factor in these separatist movements. Their persistence demonstrates the failure of Indonesia and the Philippines in achieving legitimacy for their post-independence political structures as well as continued internal weakness. The prospects for their quick and peaceful resolution are not good. The external dimension of Muslim separatism has heightened mistrust among states in the region and raised apprehensions over the broader issue of Islamic fundamentalism and the implications for the region should Aceh and Mindanao achieve secession.     

From an Estate to a Cossack Nation: Kuban' Samostiinost', 1917

This paper explores the origins of Cossack separatism in Kuban' during 1917. It investigates the growing tension between the Cossack caste and the civic universalism of the post-February environment, a setting which increasingly made Kuban' Cossackdom an anachronism, obliging Cossacks to search for a modern alternative group identity superseding the old estate one. The Kuban' Cossacks' answer was to justify Cossacks' estate particularism for the sake of ‘civic unity’ by implementing separatism in the name of ‘self-determination’. The result was the emergence of a Cossack nation-building movement during the civil wars, which pursued the separation of a Cossack state from Bolshevik Russia.     

The evolution of Russian federalism and its current fiscal dilemmas: an institutional account

In order to make sense of the fiscal component of the emergent federalism in the post-Soviet Russian political system, this article provides an historical-institutional analysis which charts over time the development both of legal frameworks and informal political contexts, thus providing an overview of the changing mix of constraints, resources, and strategic opportunities present to actors occupying various roles within the federal system. Several discrete stages in the evolution of Russian federalism from the late Gorbachev era to the present are identified. According to this analysis, Russia's political system has elements of genuine federalism, but federalization is constrained by specific attributes of the Soviet legacy. Russian federalism is asymmetrical, that is, ethnically defined subunits (the republics) enjoy greater powers than their non-ethnically defined counterparts. This asymmetry may have been a necessary response to the ethnic ambitions of the so- called “autonomous” entities inherited from the Soviet era. At the same time, however, some of the non-ethnic subunits (principally the oblasts, or regions) have demanded similar rights of autonomy, especially with regard to control of natural resources, shared tax revenues, and other economic concerns. Developments since the mid-1990s suggest a modest return of power to the federal center at the expense of the subunits, but the latter still enjoy a degree of independence unheard of during the Soviet period. Meanwhile, there has been a trend toward equalization of economic powers between the republics and oblasts. Still worrisome, however, are the disparities in wealth among the various subunits and the penchant for self-enrichment on the part of leaders of otherwise impoverished regions and republics.     

The Cossacks: A guarantor of peace or a land‐mine in Russia's federalism?

Russia's policy towards the Cossacks may prove detrimental to the development of federalism in Russia. Their rehabilitation is important for the rebirth of Russian culture. Yet, the Cossacks as a social‐military institution, may further harm the relations between ethnic Russians and non‐Russians in the Caucasus, which may revive the dispute over the preservation of the ethnic principle in Russia's federalism.     

Elections and democracy in Russia

The word `democracy' has predominantly negative connotations when referring to its practical implementation in Russia. However, Russians are favourable to the idea of democracy in principle, and support the establishment of genuine democracy in the country. Beliefs that elections ensure accountability of elected officials, allow public input on the policy direction of government, and give personal benefits to individuals would help to increase acceptance of the value of Russian democracy. A combination of factors, however, makes it doubtful that the current negative attitudes can be overcome quickly.     

Constrained, pragmatic pro-democratic appraising constitutional review courts in post-Soviet politics

This paper conceptualizes the behavior of higher courts in the politics of former Soviet republics and attempts to set up a framework for the study of democratic contributions by post-Soviet constitutional courts. Although political expediency is noted to be the central driving force behind the judges’ decisions in politically sensitive cases, as courts are subject to different constraints from quasi-autocratic executives, it is argued that constitutional review tribunals are generally pro-democratic in their political orientation and that they can become the allies of pro-democratic parties in transitional periods of elite change. To support this proposition, this paper proceeds from a series of theoretical arguments to empirical observation of judicial behavior in times of political uncertainty, the latter being a perfect test for probing the political orientation of the courts.     

Trust in public institutions in Russia: The lowest in the world

The article's topic is the attitudes of the Russians toward their social institutions. As it will be shown, Russia is a country, much more than any other, that mistrusts its social institutions, political institutions in particular. There is no one institution that can garner more than 40 to 50 percent of the nation's trust. Indeed, in terms of their lack of confidence in social institutions, the Russians are behind not only the most advanced countries in the world, but even countries known for their unstable political systems, such as Colombia or Nigeria.     

History education and historical remembrance in contemporary Russia: Sources of political attitudes of pro-Kremlin youth

Why during the last decade have many young Russians become politically active well beyond simply voting? Particularly striking among youth activists is their enthusiastic support for Putinism and a resounding rejection of the policies, symbols and political figures of the era of President Boris Yeltsin (1992–2000). The vast majority of youth activists are of college age (18–24), which means they were far too young to be aware of what was happening in the country in the 1990s, the period that while democratic and pro-Western, also represents a failure of the Russian state in their imagery. To what degree do the opinions and world views of politically active pro-Kremlin youth reflect the recently emerged, nearly ubiquitous interpretation of recent history as presented in the high school curriculum? To that end, we undertake a content analysis of 47 high school textbooks in Russian history, followed by open-ended interviews with 37 activists from the three most visible youth organizations, all of whom are pro-Kremlin in their orientation. Although demonstrating a causal relationship is methodologically unfeasible, we find a marked correlation between the views of both the Yeltsin and Putin eras presented in those textbooks and in the political beliefs of the youth groups.     

Islam and nationalism in west Turkestan (Central Asia) on the eve of October revolution 1

West Turkestan at the eve of the October revolution was a colony of the tsarists with the exception of the Amaret of Bukhara, which was a pro‐tecterate without any right in conducting its external affairs. The colonizers believed in the supremacy of the Russian way of life, and after witnessing the resistance of the Muslims to russification, they attempted in destroying Islamic institutions by outlawing their sources of support (such as waqf), and also coopting many of the Muslims into the colonial bureaucracy. In general, the tsarists tried to rule the area indirectly and did not interfere with the religious and civic ceremonies of the Muslims. They, however, did manipulate the population of the area by dividing them into many administrative units and inflaming ancient rivalaries among various ethnic groups when suited them. They destroyed any movement which tended in wresting the power from the colonialists. Various societies were organized by the Turkestanis in order to modernize their society and eventually rid their lands from the invaders. Many of the membership of these local organizations advocated Pan‐Islamism and/or Pan‐Turkism, both of which aimed at the liberation of Turkestan. They were crushed by the Russians. A group of mostly intellectuals, the Jadidists, who had the backing of the very small middle class such as the merchants and some Russian inteligentsia aimed in reforming their societies from within. Their programs which aimed at the modernization of the area was resisted by the Amirs and also by some of the ‘uluma, the religious leaders. The Russians also saw in the Jadidis't program a program for national liberation. Consequently at the eve of the October revolution these intellectuals (the Jadidists) were caught between the Amir and the ‘uluma on the one hand, and the Russian colonizers on the other, and were rooted out completely. Some who survived joined the Soviets (who came to power in 1918) and others, usually the betteroff ones either left the area or joined with beks, bais, and the ‘uluma to organize a grassroot opposition to the Soviets, the Basmachi movement which plagued the Red army for many years.     

The Russian proto-parties and the national republics: Integrative organizations in a disintegrating world?

This article examines the nomination choices of the major Russian political parties for the single-member districts in the ethnic republics for the December 1993 and December 1995 State Duma elections. Using western-based theories on party behavior in multi-ethnic societies, this article tests several hypotheses relating to the factors which affect where parties were active and examines the different recruitment strategies of individual parties. In general, it was found that the Russian proto-parties tended to be most active in urban and predominantly Russian areas of the republics. However, there were differences between the parties, with notable parties more likely to recruit non-Russian elites to their banners as opposed to program parties. Moreover, when comparing across time, the party which most increased its recruitment of non-Russian elites from 1993 to 1995 was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).     

Retrenched,but Still Desired? Perceptions Regarding the Social Legitimacy of the Welfare State in Russia Compared with EU Countries

Abstract

This article explores how the retrenchment of the Russian welfare state has affected Russians’ attitudes towards it. Using European Social Survey data, we find that the retrenchment has not eroded Russians’ strong preference for a comprehensive system, despite their dissatisfaction with its outcomes. Further, we find that in Russia, some of the individual socioeconomic characteristics have a different effect on people's attitudes to social welfare compared to equivalent groups in EU countries. Overall, as in the EU, attitudes are multidimensional: a positive stance towards some aspects of the welfare state coexists with a critical approach towards others.     

Socialism after communism?: The socioeconomic and cultural foundations of left politics in post-soviet russia

This article examines socioeconomic foundations of leftist politics in post-Soviet Russia. It is often argued that the reemergence of left politics is the result of contingent factors connected to transitional crises. While this is one source of strength for the left, there are two more important and enduring sources: a “socialist value culture” among a large majority of Russians, and an emerging pseudo-capitalist system that is creating “traditional” class-based and left-leaning attitudes and affiliations among particular social groups. The article examines the extent of this value culture and the emergence of these attitudes and affiliations through an analysis of statistical data and interviews conducted with Russian workers and intelligentsia figures from 1994–1997.