Public pensions and voting on immigration

In a recent paper, Scholten and Thum (1996) analyze the impact of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system with a fixed replacement ratio on the immigration policy in a democracy. We extend the analysis of median voter's choice in two respects. First, in contrast to Scholten and Thum (1996) who assume myopic voting behavior, our paper considers fully rational agents and provides a solution under this more complex behavioral assumption. Voting with rational agents yields a more liberal immigration policy than with myopic voters. Second, we examine a different decision structure with a fixed contribution rate to the pension system. In this case the majority rule leads to a completely different solution.     

Controlling Migration in an Open Labor Market

A direct immigration policy is no longer feasiblefor a single region in a common labor market. Within apolitical economy approach, this paper focuses on the question ofwhether migration can be controlled through the composition ofgovernment expenditures. Taking into account both capital and laborincome, it turns out that the median voter's income is U-shaped in thenumber of immigrants. Therefore, the government can eitherprovide less of the goods preferred by foreigners in order to minimizeimmigration or carry out an active immigration policy byshifting its expenditures towards those publicly provided goods. Thepaper identifies the factors that determine the government'schoice between the two strategies.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.     

Freedom and Other Variables in the Choice of Public Pension Systems

There are three types of public pension systems popularthroughout the world: Pay-As-You-Go (defined benefit), Funded(defined contribution), and Mixed. The latter two systems werelargely adopted in the 1990s after Chile successfully builtits Funded system. In this paper we analyze the choice ofthese types of pension system, identifying factors that affectcountries' choice. Several measures of freedom – economic andpolitical – are associated with these choices. The estimatedeffects of the two freedoms on pension choice and percentelderly are quite interesting and intuitive.     

Voting as an act of contribution

This paper presents a theory which rationalizes voting in terms of the marginal utility a citizen derives from contributing a small amount of effort in the political process when the cost of voting is small. Citizens abstain when the marginal cost of voting exceeds the marginal perceived benefit. A simple choice rule for voting in a two candidate race is derived from the theory. This rule depends on the voter's subjective belief about the election outcome as well as his preferences for the candidates. The key assumption is that the voter's utility increases if he votes for a winner, or decreases if he votes for a loser. This assumption is no less plausible than the assumption that voters believe they can be pivotal.     

Expected utility or learned familiarity? The formation of voters' coalition preferences

In most modern parliamentary democracies, it is unlikely that single party governments will be formed, meaning that a voter's preferred party presumably has to share cabinet offices and negotiate policy compromises in a coalition government. This raises the question of how voters evaluate potential (coalition) governments, especially since recent studies have shown that coalition preferences influence voting behaviour. In this paper, we combine theories of voting behaviour, government formation and political learning to derive expectations regarding the factors that may impact voters' coalition preferences. We test our hypotheses by analysing survey data from the German federal and state levels. The results of a mixed logit regression analysis support our arguments: Voters' coalition preferences not only depend on the perceived policy distance between the positions of voters and the most distant party within combinations of parties, but also on predominant patterns of government formation.     

Immigration,asylum and citizenship in Germany: The impact of unification and the Berlin republic

In recent years, there has been much debate over whether post‐unification Germany, often termed the ‘Berlin Republic’, represents a substantive change from the ‘Bonn Republic ‘, that is, West Germany. This article analyses Germany's immigration and citizenship policy against this background by examining various dimensions of immigration before and after unification. The article argues that both unification itself and Germany's changed international environment have resulted in far‐reaching changes in policy, which have forced a reappraisal of Germany's traditional self‐image as a ‘non‐immigration country’.     

The Polarization of American Environmental Policy: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Senate and House Votes, 1971–2013

The partisan polarization of environmental policy is an important development in American politics, but it remains unclear how much such polarization reflects voter preferences, as opposed to disagreements between partisan elites. We conduct a regression discontinuity analysis of all major environmental and energy votes in the Senate and the House, 1971–2013. In total, we have 368,974 individual roll call votes by senators and House Representatives. The causal effect of electing a Democrat instead of a Republican in close elections on pro‐environmental voting is large: when a Democrat wins, pro‐environmental voting increases by over 40 percentage points. Because of the quasi‐experimental research design, this difference cannot be attributed to the median voter's preferences. Next, we test hypotheses concerning possible explanations for the elite partisan conflict. The Democrat–Republican gap is the widest when fossil fuel interests make contributions exclusively to Republicans and when state‐level public opinion is polarized.     

The median voter model across levels of government

The median voter model provides a method of aggregating individual voter's demands to obtain community demand. Although higher level governments are often assumed to be less responsive to voters than lower level governments, it remains an open question whether or not the median voter model, which has been found to apply to the lowest tier of the federalist system, extends to higher level governments. We use the Cox specification test to find that the ad hoc model dominates the median model for counties and states. The county results are sensitive to the time periods, budgetary structure, and degree of urbanization.     

Structural Models of Voter Behavior in the 2000 Polish Presidential Election

Abstract

The data of the 2000 Polish presidential election have been analyzed according to Newman and Sheth's model of voter's choice behavior (1985). Although this model was originally interpreted within the statistical perspective of discriminant analysis, it could be also extended within the framework of structural equation methodology. Namely, if the seven cognitive domains (Issues and Policies, Emotional Feelings, Candidate Image, Current Events, Epistemic Issues, Social Imagery and Epistemic Issues) are assumed to be distinct and separate, they can be treated as independent (predictive) variables with the voter's intention as a dependent or predicted variable. The three models were tested and the resuits of path analysis show the complex pattern of mutual interdependence between the cognitive domains and voter behavior. The specificity of the cause-effect relationship obtained by the structural equation methodology presented in the paper allows us to put forward some practical suggestions regarding the way electoral campaigns should be conducted.     

Easy Money: Tax Exporting and State Support for Higher Education

There is a substantial literature that assesses the effects of tax‐exporting capacities on the tax structures and aggregate spending levels that state governments choose to implement, but no work exists that isolates the effects of state tax exporting on higher education spending. Using state‐level data for 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2007, we estimate for the median voter in each state the change in the marginal cost of higher education subsidization generated by tax exportation, and calculate the increased higher education spending that results. We consider three types of spending: state appropriations to public universities as well as need‐ and non‐need‐based aid awarded to in‐state students. We find that neither type of aid is responsive to the marginal cost, or tax price, faced by the median voter. However, the median voter's price elasticity of demand for state appropriations is statistically significant and negative. We find that the median voter's tax price is substantially reduced by the presence of prominent mining and tourism industries and by the federal deductibility offset available to firms. Thus, these tax‐exporting capacities exert upward pressure on voter demand for state appropriations to public universities.     

How Do States Implement Liberal Immigration Policies? Control Signals and Skilled Immigration Reform in Australia

States often face immigration “control dilemmas” between popular pressures for tighter immigration controls versus economic pressures for more liberal work visa controls. Using a systematic process analysis of recent policy developments in Australia, this article argues that the Howard government's large expansion of “wanted” forms of immigration hinged upon its ability to control “unwanted” forms of immigration. The concept of “control signals” is introduced to account for the government's success in exiting an immigration control dilemma, which allowed it to pursue skilled immigration reforms that would have otherwise proven difficult. A research agenda is established for examining the conditions under which the use of control signals is likely to be successful and for applying the concept to other realms of public policy where states face control dilemmas.     

Policy Legacies,Visa Reform and the Resilience of Immigration Politics

Comparative scholarship tacitly assumes immigration politics to be relatively rigid. A state's immigration policy legacy is said to institutionalise policy preferences, thereby making it difficult to implement lasting reforms that are inconsistent with that legacy. This presents difficulties for states with restrictionist legacies wanting to implement liberal reforms in response to the emergence of labour shortages or demographic problems. The supposed rigidity of immigration politics is scrutinised in this article through a systematic process analysis of developments in the United Kingdom over the past decade, where the Blair government confounded the UK's characterisation as a ‘reluctant immigration state’ to implement various liberal work visa reforms. The uncoordinated nature of policymaking and implementation, and the limited involvement of state and societal institutions in the reform process, reflect the UK's historical experience with restrictionist policies, and help to explain the subsequent reintroduction of strict visa controls. The case demonstrates that policy legacies indeed play a significant role in defining the character of the policymaking institutions that shape a state's immigration politics.     

Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition

This paper models balanced-budget redistribution between socio-economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. Equilibrium is unique in the present model, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be enough ‘stochastic heterogeneity’ with respect to party preferences in the electorate. The validity of Hotelling's ‘principle of minimum differentiation’, and of ‘Director's Law’, are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions, and voter's possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties. The policy strategy of expected-plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality. Incomes are fixed and known, so lump-sum taxation is feasible. However, constraints on tax/transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis.     

Efficient use of reference group cues in a single dimension

If there are groups whose endorsements voters can use as positive (or negative) cues, we demonstrate that voters do not need to know anything directly about candidate positions to be able to identify the candidate whose issue positions and performance is likely to be closest to the voter's own preferences. In one dimension we show that, given certain simplifying assumptions, voters are best off adopting the choice recommended by the single reference group to which they are closest. We also show that even a decision by reference groups not to endorse any candidate may be informative to voters.     

Immigration and Refugees: Punctuations in the Commonwealth Policy Agenda

In April 2013, Australia's population reached 23 million. Up to 60 percent of population growth in Australia comes from immigration and 40 percent of population growth comes from natural increase. It is therefore not too surprising that the issue of immigration receives a considerable amount of attention in the overall Commonwealth policy agenda. However, immigration policy is a complex policy area that is vulnerable to sudden increases in policy attention. Such increases in policy attention may be related to external shocks, wars or changing global economic conditions. This article charts some of the contextual factors, which result in high‐salience punctuations and intense policy activity in the area of immigration.     

A voter-centric explanation of the success of ideological candidates for the U.S. house

In recent years, ideological candidates for the U.S. House have become increasingly successful, to the point where their chances of being elected are indistinguishable from moderates. However, scholars have still not uncovered exactly why this is happening. Using survey data from the American National Election Studies, I find that voter-centric explanations of vote choice – a voter's partisanship, ideology, and presidential approval rating – have increasingly predicted their vote choice in U.S. House elections from 1980 to 2016. Using data on candidate ideology, I find that candidate ideology is an increasingly poor predictor of individual vote choice over time. Original experimental data supports these claims, finding only a small electoral advantage for moderates, compared to ideologues of their own party, and evidence suggesting that, at least among Democrats, ideological candidates are rated more favorably than moderates. Taken together, these results suggest that the increased electoral success of ideological candidates can be attributed to changes in voters' decision calculus, rather than structural or candidate-centric explanations.     

Perceptions and Reality: Ten Things We Should Know About Attitudes to Immigration in the UK

Immigration is one of the most frequently covered issues in opinion surveys—but the volume and type of questions asked has actually obscured many of the key facts about our attitudes. This article summarises a year‐long project to draw together as much of the published polling as possible in one place, in as neutral a way as possible. The overall picture is one of genuine concern about immigration among a large proportion of the population—but more nuance on specific aspects, and a number of important gaps between perceptions and reality. Also highlighted are the increasingly polarised views on immigration between generations and different class and education groupings. The lower level of concern among younger generations and the growing graduate class suggests that immigration may be less of a concern in the future—but that the electoral weight of the more concerned older generations means that restrictive rhetoric and policy on immigration will be a key feature of the 2015 general election.     

Policy-Motivated Candidates,Noisy Platforms,and Non-Robustness

This paper develops a model of a two-candidate election inwhich the candidates are mainly office-motivated but also tosome (arbitrarily small) extent policy-motivated, and theirchosen platforms are to some (arbitrarily small) extent noisy.The platforms' being noisy means that if a candidate haschosen a particular platform, the voter's perception is thatshe has, with positive probability, actually chosen some otherplatform. It is shown that (i) an equilibrium in which thecandidates play pure exists whether or not there is aCondorcet winner among the policy alternatives, and (ii) inthis equilibrium the candidates choose their own favoriteplatforms, which means that the platforms do not converge.     

Explaining the immigration policy mix: Countries' relative openness to asylum and labour migration

Western democracies have developed complex policies to manage migration flows. Much of the scholarly literature and political discourse assume that countries have become increasingly selective and that they prioritise economic intakes. Despite clear efforts by policymakers to distinguish between refugees and migrant workers, we know surprisingly little about how countries combine different policy dimensions and which factors shape their relative openness to different target groups. In this article, we shed light on how countries combine two of the main admission channels, asylum and labour migration, by introducing the concept of the ‘immigration policy mix’. A comparative analysis of 33 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010 examines the pattern and drivers behind their immigration policy mix: Does the policy mix follow a pattern of convergence, is it subject to political dynamics or is it path dependent? The results reveal that despite a shift in political sympathies from asylum to labour migration, countries' immigration policy mixes have strongly converged into more liberal policies overall. The immigration policy mix primarily reflects governments’ limited room to manoeuvre due to competing political pressures. These insights demonstrate that the immigration policy mix serves to enhance our understanding of countries’ complex regulation of immigration.