The hazard rate of political regimes

We present a preliminary study on the stability of political regimes. In a longitudinal data set we study the effect of some observable economic and political conditions on the hazard rate of different types of political regimes. We find that economic development has a stabilizing effect in countries with democratic political institutions, but rich autocracies do not show a lower hazard rate than less developed autocracies. While the stability of autocracies is not affected by their degree of economic development, it is greatly associated with the degree of popular discontent. Widespread discontent with leaders in autocratic regimes highly increases their hazard rate. This relationship is much weaker for regimes with democratic institutions. We also find a non-monotonic time dependence pattern for the hazard rate of political regimes. Political regimes are found to be at an increasing risk of collapse during the first years, with their hazard rates reaching a peak around the fourth year.     

Should We Support Illiberal Religious Democracies?

The terms on which the US will agree to settle the conflict in Afghanistan reflect a much greater issue that the US faces in the Middle East: will it support only those who seek to establish democratic regimes that also respect individual, or ally itself with the often much more powerful groups that may be democratic, but are likely to foster regimes based on Shari'a law? At the very least, the West should urge all to respect the right to life, call on regimes to negotiate with protesters rather than machine‐gunning them, and insist that protesters follow the Egyptian and Tunisian model of peaceful uprising. Beyond such liberal basics, it is best to let each nation work out its own regime. As a matter of policy, in order to support democratic groups and evolving democratic regimes in the Middle East, western governments had best be prepared to ally themselves with political forces whose liberal credentials, one must recognise, are evolving but not yet particularly high.     

Economic Performance and Regime Legitimacy in Post-Communist Bulgaria

It is commonly assumed that socio-economic conditions strongly influence political attitudes. Since democratic rule is based on the consent of the ruled, a secure and stable democracy cannot be established and maintained without broad-based popular endorsement, which is especially important for nascent post-communist democracies. Painful economic difficulties may engender deep anti-system sentiments at the mass level, encouraging anti-regime activism at the elite level. From this perspective, democratic legitimacy is a function of regime performance. But the Bulgarian evidence fails to validate the hypothesis that system legitimacy depends on regime effectiveness or that socio-economic conditions determine mass-level political attitudes. In spite of the economic fiasco, Bulgaria's democratic regime remains capable of commanding popular support. While the economic performance deficit of catastrophic proportions has become a source of widespread popular dissatisfaction threatening regime stability, it has not led to democratic backsliding or collapse.     

Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000

This article examines how political institutional structures affect political instability. It classifies polities as autocracies or democracies based on three institutional dimensions: election of the executive, constraints on executive decision-making authority, and extent of political participation. It hypothesizes that strongly autocratic and democratic regimes will exhibit the greatest stability resulting from self-enforcing equilibria, whereby the maintenance of a polity's institutional structure is in the interest of political elites, whether through autocratic or democratic control. Institutionally inconsistent regimes (those exhibiting a mix of institutional characteristics of both democracy and autocracy) lack these self-enforcing characteristics and are expected to be shorter-lived. Using a log-logistic duration model, polity survival time ratios are estimated. Institutionally consistent polities are significantly more stable than institutionally inconsistent polities. The least stable political systems are dictatorships with high levels of political participation. The most unstable configuration for polities with an elected executive is one where the executive is highly constrained, but the electorate is very small.     

Sustaining democracy: folk epistemology and social conflict

When political philosophers ask whether there is a philosophical justification for democracy, they are most frequently concerned with one of two queries. The first has to do with the relative merits of democracy as compared with other regimes. The second query has to do with the moral bindingness of democratic outcomes. But there is a third query we may be engaging when we are looking for a philosophical justification of democracy: what reason can be given to democratic citizens to pursue democratic means of social change when they are confronted with a democratic result that seems to them seriously objectionable or morally intolerable? In this paper I develop an epistemological response to the third query. The thesis is that we have sufficient epistemological reasons to be democrats. The epistemological norms that we take ourselves to be governed by can be satisfied only under certain social conditions, and these social conditions are best secured under democracy.     

Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions

The original studies of "competitive authoritarianism" and "hegemonic authoritarianism" inspected the occurrence of hybrid regimes during the 1990s but stopped short of testing their propensity for democratic change. This article assesses the causal effects of hybrid regimes, and the post–cold war period itself, on regime breakdown and democratization. Using a dataset of 158 regimes from 1975 to 2004, and a discrete measure for transitions to electoral democracy, I find that competitive authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power but are significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy: vigorous electoral contestation does not independently subvert authoritarianism, yet it bodes well for democratic prospects once incumbents are overthrown.     

How Authoritarianism Intensifies Punctuated Equilibrium: The Dynamics of Policy Attention in Hong Kong

The punctuated equilibrium theory contends that government attention allocation is universally leptokurtic in that long periods of stability are punctuated by bursts of rapid and radical change; the empirical evidence in support of this claim is however exclusively drawn from democratic systems. The absence of electoral politics and institutional decentralization in authoritarian regimes could presumably affect institutional friction; whether and how this might pose as a qualification to the thesis is of major interest. By analyzing four streams of government actions in Hong Kong from 1946 to 2007 straddling the colonial and postcolonial regimes, we have found that government processes are generally leptokurtic even under authoritarian regime institutions, with the degree of the dispersion of decision‐making power across the streams of actions affecting the magnitude of punctuation. We have also found that punctuation was greater when the political system was more centralized but declined as the political system democratized.     

Economic Development,Violent Leader Removal,and Democratization

This article argues that autocratic regime strength plays a critical mediating role in the link between economic development and democracy. Looking at 167 countries from 1875 to 2004, I find that development strengthens autocratic regimes, as indicated by a reduced likelihood of violent leader removal. Simultaneously, greater development predicts democratization, but only if a violent turnover has occurred in the recent past. Hence, development can cause democratization, but only in distinctive periods of regime vulnerability. Although development’s stabilizing and democratizing forces roughly balance out within autocracies, they reinforce each other within democracies, resolving the puzzle of why economic development has a stronger effect on democratic stability than on democratization. Further, the theory extends to any variable that predicts violent leader removal and democracy following such violence, pointing to broad unexplored patterns of democratic development.     

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

The dictators’ domino theory: a Caribbean Basin anti-communist network, 1947–1952

This article uncovers a Caribbean Basin anti-communist intelligence network independent of the U.S. government and the international Cold War. Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, Honduran dictator Tiburcio Carías, and Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo characterized local democratic developments as communist threats to their regimes’ national security. With the 1947 Cayo Confites expedition and the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, the military dictators coalesced into an informal network that increasingly shared intelligence. Joined by the Venezuelan military junta and Fulgencio Batista’s Cuban dictatorship, members nurtured a Caribbean Basin anti-communist domino theory characterising threats to one regime as a transnational danger to regional stability.     

Democratic Transitions

Przeworski et al. (2000) challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski et al. (2000) we find that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. We also find that partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types.     

Political actors,linkages and interactions: Democratic consolidation in Southern Europe

While it is assumed that the new regimes in Spain, Greece and Portugal are fully liberal democratic, the question of their consolidation remains to be assessed. Although this raises problems about the nature of that process, focusing on the role of political parties provides a crucial means for determining the extent to which democratic consolidation has been achieved so far and for identifying any problems here. This is done by constructing a comparative approach based on three relationships: parties with the state; inter‐party relationships; and, parties with society. In applying this approach to the three cases, it is hypothesised that regime consolidation may well proceed at variable paces at the different levels.     

Neoliberalism,embedded neoliberalism and neocorporatism: Towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe

This article analyses the key features and origins of three variants of transnational capitalism emerging in Central-Eastern Europe: a neoliberal type in the Baltic states, an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrád states, and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia. These regimes are characterised by their institutions and performances in marketisation, industrial transformation, social inclusion, and macroeconomic stability. Explanations for regime diversity are developed at two levels. First, it is argued that the legacies of the past, and their perceptions as either threats or assets to these countries' future, have had deep impact on regime types. Legacies and initial choices were no less crucial for the degree of democratic inclusion, and the different patterns of protest and patience on the paths towards the new regimes. Second, the article demonstrates the importance of transnational influences in industrial transformation and social inclusion.     

Solace for the Frustrations of Silent Citizenship: the Case of Epicureanism

Insofar as no democratic society can fully realize norms of free and equal citizenship, citizens in such regimes are likely to experience some degree of discontent with their political lives. This raises a second purpose for democratic theory beyond the usual focus on improving democratic institutions: the psychological issue of how ordinary citizens might find solace in the face of disappointment. Democratic theory is capable of providing solace because egalitarian commitments – equality, free speech, solidarity, and self-sufficiency – have a double potential: they not only ground efforts to democratize institutions, but when sublimated in apolitical form also have the capacity to generate a transcendence of the political form itself. In this essay, I pursue both ideas – the need for solace and egalitarianism's ability to provide it – through analysis of the way Epicureanism may have functioned for the ordinary, plebeian citizens in late Republican Rome.     

Women in contemporary Soviet society

What enables democracies to succeed has much in common with what enables other forms of modern rule to succeed: notably the capacity for effective military selfdefence and the reasonably efficient functioning of a domestic economy. When the factors favouring the success of any form of modern regime are broken down, most of them may readily be secured for a time under autocratic rule, and none is strucurally ensured by democratic rule. At present there is good reason to believe that the special advantages of democratic rule - above all the heuristic merits of open and competitive political deliberation - at least offset the inherent disadvantages long ago identified by its enemies. The distinctive preconditions for the success of democratic regimes are furnished, if at all, only by the workings of democracy itself. They are both instances and products of success in learning how to live freely as, and within, a large collectivity. That outcome can be menaced or precluded by the causal properties of ill-conceived institutions. But it can only be brought about by free and practically intelligent political action. This is a task for citizens and career politicians, not a potential gift from the social sciences.     

Institutions,governmental performance and the rise of political newcomers

This article analyses the institutional and contextual factors that facilitate the election of political newcomers as heads of government in democratic regimes. Using data from 870 democratic elections between 1945 and 2015, it is found that political newcomers are more likely to be successful in presidential systems, in new democracies and when party systems are weakly institutionalised. The election of politically inexperienced candidates is also related to governmental performance. Political newcomers are more successful when the economic performance of the government is bad and when the government engages in high‐level corruption.     

Growth trajectories in the strength of party identification: The legacy of autocratic regimes

While some scholars interpret the frequently documented association between age and the strength of party identification as evidence of accumulated political learning, others stress the importance of critical life stages. Germany's turbulent last century, with its suspensions of democratic processes, provides the unique opportunity to empirically disentangle both effects and to also study the consequences of early experiences of autocratic regimes on later growth rates in partisan strength. Random growth curve models based on multi-cohort panel data emanating from the German Socio-Economic Panel show that the growth trajectory in the strength of party identification largely depends on the number of electoral experiences. Moreover, the analysis documents few differences in growth rates between individuals socialized in democratic versus autocratic regimes.     

When Practice Oversteps the Limits of Theory: An Assessment of Fair Media Coverage for Political Parties in Great Britain and Mexico

Over stressing the rights‐safeguarding role of democracy has led to a widespread neglect of democracy's essential function: to ensure the legitimacy of elected rulers and by doing so, to ensure political stability. The effects of this neglect are apparent in the disputes that arise concerning media coverage of elections. This article examines the difficulties democratic statesmen face to justify and consistently implement arrangements that limit the freedom of expression of the media in order to minimize the challenges to the legitimacy of electoral outcomes that a biased coverage of elections could incite. Current democratic theory does not address this problem. Indeed its emphasis on safeguarding the rights of citizens can suggest that the freedom of expression of the media should prevail over considerations of legitimacy and stability. This study examines the justifications adduced, and the implementation of, arrangements that curtail the right to advocacy of broadcasters and limit their right to editorial discretion in order to provide political parties with what I refer to here as “fair media coverage.” In particular, the article highlights and assesses the experiences in fair media coverage of election campaigns in the British General Election of 1997 and the Mexican Federal Election of 2000. In full view of these case studies, and on the basis of the theoretical guidelines I develop at the beginning of this article, I argue for limiting freedom of expression and stress the urgent need for democratic theories to address the practical problems that trouble democratic authorities.     

Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival

Authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure in power. Yet, there is also evidence that multiparty competition makes electoral authoritarianism more vulnerable to failure. Proceeding from the assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian electoral openings are inherently uncertain, it is argued in this article that the institutionalisation of elections determines whether electoral authoritarianism promotes stability or vulnerability. By ‘institutionalisation’, it is meant the ability of authoritarian regimes to reduce uncertainty over outcomes as they regularly hold multiparty elections. Using discrete-time event-history models for competing risks, the effects of sequences of multiparty elections on patterns of regime survival and failure in 262 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are assessed, conditioned on their degree of competitiveness. The findings suggest that the institutionalisation of electoral uncertainty enhances authoritarian regime survival. However, for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes this entails substantial risk. The first three elections substantially increase the probability of democratisation, with the danger subsequently diminishing. This suggests that convoking multiparty competition is a risky game with potentially high rewards for autocrats who manage to institutionalise elections. Yet, only a small number of authoritarian regimes survive as competitive beyond the first few elections, suggesting that truly competitive authoritarianism is hard to institutionalise. The study thus finds that the question of whether elections are dangerous or stabilising for authoritarianism is dependent on differences between the ability of competitive and hegemonic forms of electoral authoritarianism to reduce electoral uncertainty.     

Planning democracy in Africa: A comparative perspective on Nigeria and Ghana

Ghana and Nigeria are in the midst of government-initiated democratization programs. This paper compares the different settings, reasons, strategies, procedures, and implementation of democratization efforts in these two countries. While Nigeria's comprehensive approach to democratic planning has enabled elite continuity, it has neither assured regime stability nor enhanced state capacities. In contrast, Ghana's plan for democratic transformation, pursued in a piecemeal fashion, has resulted in regime stability and some state consolidation, but not in democratization. In both countries, there is little doubt that the unintended consequences of each approach may prove more significant than the direct results of successful policy implementation. Thus, even if the specific design for democracy may fail, the democratic project in these West African states may nevertheless be progressing.