Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play

The impact of the cardinal relationships amongpecuniary payoffs, and of social history and reputation, on thechoice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games isexperimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoffvalues linked to ``fear'' and ``greed'' are important as predictorsof behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating on the payoffdominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games alsoincreases the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. Theeffect of past play is strongest when individuals are matchedrepeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted tobeing matched randomly with another player.     

Binary Games as Models of Public Goods Provision*

Problems of public goods provision are categorized according to attributes of the good to be provided, and properties of the group of potential beneficiaries. It is argued that not all such problems are Prisoner's Dilemmas. Other games of interest include Chicken, the Volunteer's Dilemma, a variant of the Assurance Came and several others. Which particular model is relevant in a given context depends critically on the specific characteristics of the situation under consideration.     

Introducing “Cooperative Push”: How Inefficient Environmental Policy (Sometimes!) Protects the Global Commons Better

In this paper we argue that the incentive structures of the gamesnations play in international environmental negotiations dependupon the choice of environmental policy instruments. Bargainingon the use of some instrument (e.g. an effluent charge) mayput the players into a dilemma game (like Chicken). Negotiationsto apply a different instrument (say, an emission reductionquota) may lead to a cooperation game (like Stag Hunt). The higherthe incentive to cooperate in the type of game which is built upby a specific instrument, the higher is this instrument's``cooperative push''. Of course, comparing two instruments,the one with the higher cooperative push might well be the lessefficient one. In this Paper, we analyse a situation where thehigher cooperative push of an instrument overcompensates thisinstrument's lower efficiency: Aggregate welfare withbilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of Stag Hunt) is higher than withunilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of the Chicken game).The question remains whether sovereign countries decide to playStag Hunt ending up in the welfare superior equilibrium. It isshown below that they do not in an uncoordinated optimising setting.However, we develop a particular frame where the proposedsolution meets the criteria of individual rationality,stability and fairness. It thereby establishes the politically mostdesired result – international cooperation.     

Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real-world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases, two-sided incomplete information actually incentivizes honest behavior and facilitates credible signaling. Because uncertain senders do not know whether a particular action will be interpreted as cooperative, they have little incentive to misrepresent, and instead honestly pursue their true goals. Thus, where cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty is “offsetting,” such that credible signals allow actors to quickly and accurately update their beliefs. We illustrate this logic through a case study of the Sino–Soviet split, and highlight the model's implications for contemporary U.S.–China relations.     

What motivates adherence to medical recommendations? The procedural justice approach to gaining deference in the medical arena

Although it is within their long‐term interest, patients often fail to follow health care recommendations made by medical experts. This failure results in the widespread occurrence of preventable health problems and a significant increase in health care costs. Taking a new approach to confronting this issue, this paper examines whether the procedural justice model, which has been useful in explaining cooperation with legal and managerial authorities, can provide a basis for increasing patients' willingness to voluntarily adhere to health care recommendations. Three studies tested and supported this proposition. Study 1 experimentally manipulated physicians' procedural fairness or unfairness to explore its influence on patients' acceptance of doctors' recommendations. Study 2 used patients' reports about the fairness of their personal physicians and linked those evaluations to their willingness to follow their doctor's recommendations. Finally, study 3 explored the role of general procedural justice judgments in promoting willingness to accept health policies when they are advocated by private doctors and government health care authorities. The results of all three studies support the argument that when health care authorities use fair procedures, patients are more likely to accept their recommendations. Importantly, this procedural justice effect is distinct from, and in some cases stronger than, the influence of competence.     

Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games

Axelrod has developed an evolutionary approach to the study of repeated games and applied that approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma. We apply this approach, with some modifications in the treatment of clustering, to a game that has the Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken as special cases, to analyze how the evolution of cooperation differs in the two games. We find that the main barrier to the evolution of cooperation in Chicken is that cooperation may not always be correctly thought of as socially optimal, but that strong forces do push the players toward socially optimal action. We derive some of the results on mixed populations for any game with pairwise interaction.     

Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences

In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other’s preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society’s ability to generate cooperative outcomes.     

War,pillage, and markets

Neoclassical economic theory has produced an extensive body of knowledge about market exchange based on cooperative relations: private property. This leads to an artificial dichotomy between cooperation and conflict though. It is best to view market exchange as lying along a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are intertwined. From a game theoretic model of Hobbes' world, I show that a number of property rights structures are possible. Each is characterized as possessing varying degrees of conflict and cooperation. Finally, from a repeated game, I show how conflictual relations (mutual predation) may support more cooperative relations (private property). This new equilibrium is sub-game perfect.     

Does appealability foster more citizen-friendly decisions at the street level?

Unbiased conduct is an essential part of the social contract between the state and its citizens. Yet, when tasked with settling disputes between citizens and other state officials, are public administrators truly impartial in their resolutions? Such a question is vital for street-level bureaucrats whom the public perceives as the face of governance. This study investigates the relations between the pro-citizen tendencies in street-level bureaucrats' resolutions, their internal appealability, and the discretionary space under which they are made. Using quantitative analysis of real-world lower-court rulings in Israeli tax disputes between 1980 and 2021, the research findings indicate that unregulated expansion of street-level bureaucrats' discretionary space relates to favoring the state's arguments in their resolutions and may impair procedural fairness. The findings also imply that regulation promoting citizens' right to appeal such resolutions within their agency, can increase street-level bureaucrats' pro-citizen tendencies and potentially counteract such outcomes.     

Understanding Cooperative Behavior in Labor Management Cooperation: A Theory-Building Exercise

This article proposes a theory of how mandated institutional cooperation transforms into individual cooperative behavior. Using qualitative strategies, we draw insights about cooperation in three public-sector efforts of labor-management cooperation (LMC). We report an association between critical shifts in the roles of stakeholders and the change from adversarial to cooperative labor relations. While managers became team players along with their employees, labor representatives assumed managerial responsibilities. These changes were also associated with a service-oriented perspective, better understanding of the other's experiences, and a view of cooperation as partnership. At the heart of these transformations, we found critical changes in communication patterns associated with incrementally growing levels of trust. We propose a model that depicts the links between collective and individual levels of organizational action related to LMC. We conclude that the positive shifts in mental models regarding work and the value of cooperation justify the promotion of LMC efforts.     

Red Lines and Compromises: Mapping Underlying Complexities of Brexit Preferences

The political discourse is characterised by two opposing ideals of hard and soft Brexit. In this article, we present evidence of attitudinal types that map neatly onto these archetypal views. The hard Brexit view is defined by issues that eurosceptics prioritise, most prominently sovereignty. By contrast, europhiles prioritise cooperation with Europe in terms of scientific collaboration and market access. However, attitudinal types are not either/or in the minds of the British public, and many prioritise all or none of the issues. Further, the two opposing positions together account for 37 per cent of the public's view. That is, just over one‐third differentiate between the salient issues in ways congruent with political ideals. National identity plays a particular role in the sociodemographic profiles of these attitude types. Older people have a strong stance in any direction (sovereignty, cooperation, or both), but national identity is linked to differentiated positions (sovereignty only or cooperation only).     

What price fairness when security is at stake? Police legitimacy in South Africa

The legitimacy of legal authorities – particularly the police – is central to the state's ability to function in a normatively justifiable and effective manner. Studies, mostly conducted in the US and UK, regularly find that procedural justice is the most important antecedent of police legitimacy, with judgments about other aspects of police behavior – notably, about effectiveness – appearing less relevant. But this idea has received only sporadic testing in less cohesive societies where social order is more tenuous, resources to sustain it scarcer, and the position of the police is less secure. This paper considers whether the link between process fairness and legitimacy holds in the challenging context of present day South Africa. In a high crime and socially divided society, do people still emphasize procedural fairness or are they more interested in instrumental effectiveness? How is the legitimacy of the police influenced by the wider problems faced by the South African state? We find procedural fairness judgments play a key role, but also that South Africans place greater emphasis on police effectiveness (and concerns about crime). Police legitimacy is, furthermore, associated with citizens' judgments about the wider success and trustworthiness of the state.     

Accounting for Future Generations: Intergenerational Equity in Australia1

Australian governments have published three intergenerational reports since 2002. In line with a general international trend these reports pointed to a problem said to arise from an ageing population which exposes Australia to the risk of a future major fiscal crisis. In this article we argue that by failing to use a generational accounting framework, the reports privilege the elderly at the expense of young people. Added to this, they fail to engage any discussion of intergenerational equity defined as distributive fairness and justice. In this article we explore the value of various approaches to intergenerational justice, focusing on the Principle of Intergenerational Neutrality derived from Rawls' theory of justice. We argue that this does not work as well from a policy point of view as Sen's freedom‐as‐capabilities approach. We conclude that linking Sen's approach to justice to a generational accounting will enable governments to address future issues of equity.     

博弈问题的哲学分析

自纳什以来,非合作博弈理论已经广泛应用于经济学、政治学、社会学、生物学等领域.本文从哲学角度分析了博弈中的理性和合作问题,试图指出,博弈论关于理性和合作的理解是非常单薄的,基本上局限于经济学的理解,而这可能误解人类行为.     

Explaining the depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation: towards a comprehensive understanding

ABSTRACT

Despite neorealism's predominance in the academic debate, it is too narrow a basis for the comprehensive understanding of present-day international intelligence cooperation. This approach is perfectly capable of explaining what is currently not happening in international intelligence cooperation and why this is the case. However, it is inadequate to understand what does happen in international intelligence cooperation. To explain international intelligence cooperation, especially in long-standing multilateral arrangements such as the EU and NATO, additional approaches are needed. This article advocates stepping beyond a state-centric approach of international intelligence cooperation, viewing it as a process and using a sociological perspective.     

The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia

This study considers the effects of ethnic violence on norms of fairness. Once violence is a foregone conclusion, will cooperative norms ever (re‐)emerge beyond ethnic boundaries? We use an experiment that measures how fairly individuals in a postconflict setting treat their own ingroup in comparison to the outgroups—in this case, examining the behavior of 681 Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in postwar Bosnia‐Herzegovina. To assess fairness, we use the dictator game wherein subjects decide how to allocate a sum of money between themselves and an anonymous counterpart of varying ethnicity. We find that the effects of ethnicity on decision making are captured by our experiments. Although results indicate preferential ingroup treatment, the incidence and magnitude of outgroup bias is much less than expected. We conclude that norms of fairness across ethnicity are remarkably strong in Bosnia, and we take this to be a positive sign for reconciliation after violent conflict.     

Swiss banking secrecy and the problem of international cooperation in tax matters: A nut too hard to crack?

How was Swiss resistance to international cooperation in tax matters overcome? This article argues that while Swiss banks are structurally dependent on access to the United States (US) financial market, Switzerland is structurally dependent on the economic welfare of its largest banks. Taking advantage of a tax evasion scandal in the midst of the global financial crisis, this indirect dependence gave US law enforcement authorities the opportunity to exercise pressure on Switzerland by threatening to criminally indict Switzerland's largest bank. The tax evasion scandal and subsequent Swiss concessions to the US had two important consequences for international tax cooperation. First, the scandal provided a focal point for collective action that allowed other countries to coordinate their strategies and direct them against the country that had been identified as uncooperative. Second, the scandal undermined Switzerland's ability to impede collective action because the bank's public admission of wrongdoing demonstrated the necessity of international tax cooperation.     

Brazil's South–South development cooperation: Principles and experiences of the domestic bureaucracy

How did Brazilian bureaucrats view President Lula's approach to the provision of development assistance in the context of South–South cooperation (SSC)? How did they see their own bureaucracy's role, as a provider of such assistance? This paper addresses these questions within the broad context of Brazil's development assistance program. The analysis begins with an elaboration of the internal legal and political structure supporting the country's provision of development assistance. Then, it addresses the research questions by drawing on original material obtained from 54 interviews, conducted in Brasilia, with diplomats and public servants from 25 federal ministries and institutions directly involved with implementing technical cooperation agreements. Evidence leads to three main observations: (a) the bureaucracies' limited autonomy vis‐à‐vis the Presidency's command of the Brazilian development assistance program; (b) great convergence in the worldviews and principled values upheld by public servants and diplomats in regard to Brazilian foreign policy; and (c) the existence of interbureaucracy complaints and struggles related to the operational side of agreement implementation. These findings are relevant for understanding the inner workings of Brazilian SSC, as well as in comparison to other national bureaucracies' involvement in the conceptualization and implementation of South–South knowledge transfers.     

The layered prisoners' dilemma: Ingroup versus macro-efficiency

In the N-prisoners' dilemma (NPD), cooperation produces ingroup efficiency. But if ingroup gains from cooperation are less than outgroup losses, then macro-efficiency for the collectivity (defined as ingroup plus outgroup) is harmed. We call this situation a layered prisoners' dilemma (LPD). The LPD models diverse real world situations — from OPEC's effect on consumers to interest groups' effect on citizens. We developed an experimental analogue to test three hypotheses about LPD behavior. We found that subjects' behavior was not motivated by a concern for macro-efficiency but, instead, was a function of ingroup interaction. Specifically, ingroup discussion decreased macro-efficient behavior, but the amount of the decrease depended on decision-making structures and ingroup perceptions of outgroup worthiness. The results suggest that macro-inefficient behavior will be ubiquitous due to the ease with which subjects form ingroups. But the results also suggest tactics for constraining macro-inefficient behavior, though the success of the tactics depends on the existence of crosscutting group loyalities. We wish to acknowledge with graditude the help of Robyn Dawes, Carnegie Mellon University; John Francis, University of Utah; Mike Lyons, Utah State University; and John Orbell, University of Oregon.