The effect of incomplete information in a threshold public goods experiment

Fiscal stress and decreasing government budgets have led to renewed interest in voluntary contributions for the funding of public goods. This paper experimentally examines the Provision Point Mechanism (PPM), a voluntary contribution mechanism for the funding of lumpy public goods. Previous research has demonstrated the effectiveness of this mechanism at providing public goods, however all were conducted in an environment of complete information, which fails to capture the uncertainties of the real world. This study tests the efficacy of the PPM in informationally limited settings. We find no significant differences in the rate of successful provisions or level of group contributions when subjects have limited information about the valuations of others than when they have complete information.     

The effects of group size and income on contributions to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting

This paper examines the extent to which individual contributions to public television are explained by the size of the audience which receives the individual station's television signal. It also incorporates the effects of income on contributions to public television in order to assess the combined effects of income and group size on contributions to public goods.The existing literature on contributions to public goods differs from this paper in several respects. First, this study uses field data to test the effects of group size on a public good. The majority of the existing literature on public goods contributions is based on experimental data. Most of this literature addresses the issue of free riding behavior, not the effects on contributions of different sized groups. Finally, the theory of group size developed in prior work does not address the issue of how contributions differ for groups which are very different in size.     

Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study

This paper uses a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from a public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions. Estimates of individual risk preferences are obtained using data from second-price auctions over lotteries. The results show that limited information about the value of the public good significantly lowers average contributions in all periods but the last. Moreover, the results support the interpretation that subjects bid “as if” they were risk averse, and suggest that “as if” risk-averse behavior is negatively correlated with willingness to contribute.     

Performance‐Related Pay and the Crowding Out of Motivation in the Public Sector: A Randomized Field Experiment

This article advances our understanding of the effects of monetary rewards on public employee performance and of the contingencies that may moderate these effects. In a randomized control‐group experiment with nurses working at a local health authority in Italy, performance‐related pay (PRP) had a larger effect on task performance when the rewards were kept secret than when they were disclosed. The negative interaction between PRP and visibility was stronger among participants who were exposed to direct contact with a beneficiary of their efforts, which heightened their perception of making a positive difference in other people's lives. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions that monetary incentives for activities with a prosocial impact may crowd out employee image motivation. There were no crowding‐out effects when a symbolic reward was substituted for the monetary incentive.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Government subsidies to private spending on public goods

This paper examines how the size of an efficient subsidy varies with the amount of free-riding and the presence of distorting taxation. Ironically, the existence of free-riding, where some individuals make no voluntary contribution at all, reduces the size of an efficient subsidy and makes a subsidy more attractive compared to direct taxation. For the gain to be significant, the number of donors must be extremely few in number. Even when the gains from a subsidy relative to direct taxation are small, a subsidy may dominate direct taxation because it can reveal an efficient level of the public good. The analysis distinguishes between traditional public goods such as national defense, and what I call transfer public goods, where members of society care about the consumption of a particular group in society such as the poor. I generalize the Samuelson (1954) results to derive conditions for efficiency in providing transfer public goods.     

Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good

Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjects’ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large.     

Building Support? The Importance of Verbal Rewards for Employee Perceptions of Governance Initiatives

The relationship between managers’ use of rewards and employees’ motivation is controversial, but recent research suggests that employee perceptions of governance initiatives can help us understand the association. Experimental evidence further emphasizes the difference between verbal and material rewards, and this study therefore analyzes real-world public managers’ use of these different rewards and their employees’ perceptions of a governance initiative. This enables us to shed light on a mechanism through which rewards can be connected to motivation. Can rewards contribute to a supportive perception of governance initiatives and potentially crowd-in motivation? This is analyzed in a multi-level dataset with 82 Danish school principals and their 1,273 employees. Managers’ use of contingent verbal rewards is positively associated with employees’ perceptions of the relevant governance initiative, while the corresponding association between material rewards and employee perceptions is weak and statistically insignificant when controlling for other types of managerial behavior. Although the findings need to be tested in an experimental design, they suggest that verbal rewards are a promising tool for public managers.     

Free riding with discrete and continuous public goods: Some experimental evidence

Two experimental designs were employed in which subjects were offered either a “discrete” public good, for which group contributions must meet a provision point before subjects receive payoffs; and a “continuous” public good, which returned 30 percent of group contributions to each subject at all contributions levels. Free riding, or non-contribution, is a dominant strategy in the continuous case. Non-contribution is not a dominant strategy in the discrete case; there are multiple equilibria. Contribution levels were similar in both cases, and did not vary significantly with method of payment (hypothetical versus real money); earnings, however, were higher in the continuous and realmoney versions of the experiment. Subjects' demographic characteristics made little difference to contribution patterns. The most significant determinant of contributions was the round of the “game.” Roughly speaking, subjects contributed less the longer they played, regardless of other factors.     

Inefficiency in public organizations

Theories of market and government failure provide resources for diagnosing intra-organizational inefficiency in public organizations and for identifying possible solutions. Public goods, externalities, information asymmetries, monopolies, uncertainty, inappropriate reward systems, and interest group behavior create inefficiencies within organizations just as they do in the larger economy. Associated with many of these problems are generic solutions that can usefully inform leaders in their efforts to improve efficiency within their public organizations.     

International Comparison of Public and Private Employees’ Work Motives,Attitudes, and Perceived Rewards

This article presents a conceptual perspective on the distinctive characteristics of public organizations and their personnel. This perspective leads to hypotheses that public organizations deliver distinctive goods and services that influence the motives and rewards for their employees. These hypotheses are tested with evidence from the International Social Survey Programme in order to compare public and private employees in 30 nations. Public employees in 28 of the 30 nations expressed higher levels of public‐service‐oriented motives. In all of the countries, public employees were more likely to say they receive rewards in the form of perceived social impact. In most of the countries, public employees placed less importance on high income as a reward and expressed higher levels of organizational commitment.

Practitioner Points

• The findings presented here add to previous evidence that public employees seek and attain more altruistic and public‐service‐oriented rewards than private sector employees. In particular, we add evidence that these differences hold in many different nations and cultural contexts.
• Compensation and incentive system reforms in many governments have often concentrated on financial incentives and streamlining procedures for discipline and removal. Such matters are important but should not drive out concerns with showing public employees the impact of their work on the well‐being of others and on the community and society. Leaders and managers should invest in incentive systems that emphasize such motives and rewards.
• Leaders and managers should invest in the use of altruistic and socially beneficial motives and rewards in recruiting systems.

     

Experiments With the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods

Interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades. The possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here. The specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms. Failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected, even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms. The reason for this remains an open question.     

对传统公共物品理论的破与立——兼论后公共物品时代的政府职能定位理论

对于公共物品的界定,西方学者见仁见智,而国内学者大多以消费上的非竞争性和非排他性作为公共物品的充分条件和必要条件。本文否定了物品(包括服务)存在消费上的非竞争性和非排他性,进而否定了以物品的客观属性来界定公共物品的传统公共物品理论,主张以需求溢出理论作为后公共物品时代的政府职能定位理论。     

Voluntary purchase of public goods

This paper examines the application of Buchanan's ‘independent adjustment’ model of public good provision to individual donations to voluntary or non-profit organizations. An individual's donation function is a simple transformation of the Marshallian demand function; consequently donation functions ‘reveal,’ in principle, preferences for public goods. The existence of a tax-subsidy system sustaining a Pareto optimal level of provision is demonstrated, and the relationship to the existing subsidy scheme in the U.S. is examined. Finally, two implications of the model suggest that it is not appropriate as a representation of actual donor behavior.     

Fair-Play Obligations: A Critical Note on Free Riding

McDermott rejects the argument that an individual, in receiving benefits from a political community, thus incurs a 'fair-play obligation' to contribute to the provision of these benefits. While acknowledging that an individual receiving benefits without contributing is 'free riding' and that free riding may be morally wrong, McDermott denies that such moral lapses entail communities having any right to demand support. Not contributing may be morally objectionable, but individuals may still have a right not to contribute. However, both proponents and opponents of the fair-play obligation claim do not sufficiently differentiate between different forms of free riding. Arguments tend to be based on rights that may or may not be invoked when individuals free ride through consuming externalities. However, this form of free riding does not entail any reciprocal obligations. Yet it can plausibly be argued that when free riding occurs in the case of the production of public goods, then communities can demand support from individuals, and can have a right to do so.     

An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods

How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. However, we also observe outcomes in which a minimum winning coalition exploits the contributions of the remaining players. A second experiment demonstrates that when electoral delegation must be endogenously implemented, individuals voluntarily cede authority to an elected agent only when preplay communication is permitted. Our combined results demonstrate that democratic delegation helps groups overcome the free‐rider problem and generally leads to outcomes that are often both efficient and equitable.     

Prosocial Behavior and Public Service Motivation

Although research on public service motivation (PSM) is vast, there is little evidence regarding the effects of PSM on observable behavior. This article contributes to the understanding of the behavioral implications of PSM by investigating whether PSM is associated with prosocial behavior. Moreover, it addresses whether and how the behavior of other group members influences this relationship. The article uses the experimental setting of the public goods game, run with a sample of 263 students, in combination with survey‐based PSM measures. A positive link is found between PSM and prosocial behavior. This relationship is moderated by the behavior of other group members: high‐PSM people act even more prosocially when the other members of the group show prosocial behavior as well, but they do not do so if the behavior of other group members is not prosocial.     

社区公共物品与社区治理--论城市社区"四轮驱动、一辕协调"的治理结构

城市社区日益成为社会公共物品供给与消费的基本单元.然而,在既有的政府垄断性供给体系下,社区普遍存在公共物品供给短缺.改革传统的管理与服务方式,建立新的公共物品供给体系,满足社区不断增长的需求,已成为城市社区建设的中心任务.在众多的创新实践中,"社区治理"不失为一种可行的思路.本文遵循社区治理的理念,尝试将其深化并落实到体制层面,提出"四轮驱动、一辕协调"的社区治理结构与运作模式,并建议首先在"危改回迁社区"中试点.     

Revealed public preference and social utility

Methods of demand theory are applied to the problem of the existence of a social welfare function under specific public choice algorithms. Integrability conditions, necessary for the derivation of social demand functions from utility maximization, are used. The social choice function, which chooses the mean of all voters demand for public goods to be the public provision, is analysed in detail. Necessary conditions for the existence of a social utility function, and by implication, a transative social ordering, are derived for this case. These conditions imply restrictions on individual preferences.     

Does Spatial Variation in Heterogeneity Matter? Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts

Because they supplement the municipal provision of local public goods, Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) provide an opportunity to examine the space, scope, and determinants of the provision of local public goods. A BID is formed when a group of merchants or commercial property owners in a neighborhood vote in favor of package of self‐assessments and local public goods to be funded with those assessments. These districts solve a collective action problem in the provision of public goods because once a majority has voted in favor, participation is compulsory for all merchants or commercial property owners in the neighborhood. I use a unique dataset on adoption patterns of BIDs in California to test two main claims suggested by the theoretical literature: first, that businesses respond to individual heterogeneity that determines the quality of local public goods, and second, that the type of heterogeneity—overall or spatial—matters. In contrast to the literature on residents, this study finds at best a weak correlation between a city's adoption of a BID and heterogeneity. In addition, despite the theoretical preference for spatial over overall heterogeneity, BIDs are not more likely to be adopted by spatially heterogeneous cities.