Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies

We construct a spatial election model in which candidates inherit initial positions in the strategy space, presumably from previous political activity, and they are restricted to strategies close to their initial positions. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. The equilibrium need not entail an expectation of a zero plurality for each candidate. We then apply this model to a sequence of elections in which a series of opposition candidates challenge incumbents. Given certain regularity conditions, the result will be an apparent incumbency advantage, corresponding to that observed in recent congressional elections.     

Electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe: A hierarchical selection model

The paper examines determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. The application of a hierarchical selection model shows that the strategic entry of minority parties depends on their expected electoral success due both to observed and unobserved factors. Drawing on formal models of electoral entry, the electoral success of new (or niche) parties is expected to be influenced by the costs of entry (determined by electoral thresholds) and the potential for electoral support. The latter depends on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand, measured here as the size of ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues. In line with these expectations, parties only run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. This finding would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-selection into account.     

Electoral Reform and Party System Change: An Analysis of Nordic Elections with Two Different Electoral Systems

Electoral system reforms are frequently discussed in various parts of the world, although major electoral system changes have been quite rare in established democracies. This article aims at predicting how the party systems in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden would change if elections were conducted under a plurality system or a mixed‐member majoritarian system. To this end, results of the last parliamentary elections are recalculated. The analyses show that the Nordic party systems would be subjected to drastic change. In Denmark, plurality elections would create a two‐party system; in Finland, Norway and Sweden, one party would be much larger than the others. Keskusta and Arbeiderpartiet would be superior to the other parties in Finland and Norway, respectively, whereas Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet would almost take complete control over the Swedish legislature. In practice, smaller parties would have to team up with larger ideologically similar parties. Under a mixed electoral system, several small and medium‐sized parties would survive, but in most countries, the main competition would take place between two basic political alternatives. Smaller parties are well‐advised to go against electoral system reforms that involve single‐member districts.     

The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems

Can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments? The academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types, majoritarian and proportional, and implies a straightforward trade‐off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what proportional representation (PR) delivers. We posit that these trade‐offs are better characterized as nonlinear and that one can gain most of the advantages attributed to PR, while sacrificing less of those attributed to majoritarian elections, by maintaining district magnitudes in the low to moderate range. We test this intuition against data from 609 elections in 81 countries between 1945 and 2006. Electoral systems that use low‐magnitude multimember districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions.     

Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries

We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and both primary and general elections may reveal candidate valences. Our main theoretical result is that while primaries raise the expected quality of a party’s candidates, they may hurt the ex ante preferred party in a competitive electorate by increasing the chances of revealing the opposing party’s candidates as superior. Thus, primaries are adopted in relatively extreme districts where a clear favorite party exists. An empirical analysis of the adoption of direct primaries and the competitiveness of primary elections across U.S. states supports these predictions.     

Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective

Abstract The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single–member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.     

Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective

The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single–member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.     

Electoral Registration: Time for Change

Electoral registration is the key building block for the administration of elections. It is the gateway to voting: people cannot vote at elections in the UK if their name is not on the register. In recent times there has been much debate in media and Westminster circles about current arrangements for electoral registration and the related issue of the future of postal voting.
This article presents new research published by the Electoral Commission in September 2005 investigating non-registration and its causes. It reviews the case for reform, considers the current policy debate and outlines some of the challenges involved in maximising registration rates. It summarises the Commission's policy recommendations and the reasoning behind them, focusing in particular on the suggested move from the current household-based system of registration to a system of individual registration     

Congressional Intelligence Oversight: The Electoral Disconnection

This article seeks to reconcile congressional oversight models in theory with oversight realities in intelligence. For nearly three decades, political scientists have argued that Congress controls the bureaucracy – and in surprisingly efficient ways. Yet the history of intelligence oversight suggests the opposite. We take a fresh look at the logic and empirics of police patrol and fire alarm models and find that neither explains intelligence oversight well. Both rely on assumptions, such as the presence of strong and plentiful interest groups, which characterize domestic policy but not US intelligence policy. Our data – comparing committee hearing activities, legislative productivity, and interest groups across different policy domains between 1985 and 2005 – reveal that oversight varies dramatically by policy issue, and that intelligence almost always ranks at the bottom. Ironically, the same electoral incentives that generate robust oversight in some policy areas turn out to be far weaker in intelligence.     

Comparing Electoral Systems: A Geometric Analysis

This paper constructs a game-theoretic model of elections inalternative electoral systems with three or four candidates.Each electoral system specifies how the platforms of thecandidates and their scores give rise to an outcome. Whengeometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can competeagainst each other for victory, a pivot probability isassociated to that pair. Each voter is rational and picks thecandidate that maximizes her expected utility, which resultsfrom the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about thepivot-probabilities. Candidate positioning is endogenous andthe result of a Nash game. The possible equilibria arecomputed for plurality and runoff majority systems.     

Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government

In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters?? interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

Abstract The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

The Politics of Electoral Reform Abolition: The Informed Process of Israel's Return to Its Previous Electoral System

This article examines the process that led to the repeal of Israeli electoral reform (1992–2001) and compares it with that of reform adoption (1987–92). The most significant difference between the two processes is in the kinds of information that were available in them. In the politics of reform adoption, information was susceptible to manipulation and its supply was a crucial part of the struggle itself. In the politics of reform abolition, the real consequences of reform were constantly unfolding. This substantial difference resulted in other differences – not in type but in extent. First, while both were ongoing processes in which coalitions of supporters and opponents had to be built and then rebuilt several times, the cohesion of the camps throughout the struggle for reform abolition was higher than in the struggle for reform adoption. Second, while office-seeking successfully served as a basis for understanding the behavior of most parliamentary actors, the actual perceptions of its exact contextual meaning was dependent upon different available information. The two processes also had two common characteristics: power was diffused in both arenas of the politics of reform and in both instances the selection of the right timing proved to be necessary for successfully promoting the initiatives against veto players who were interested in preserving the status quo.