Endogenous Parties in an Assembly

In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.     

Reassessing the “freshman effect”: The voting bloc alignment of new justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921–90

Part of the conventional wisdom about the United States Supreme Court is the presumed existence of a freshman effect, a distinct pattern of behavior thought to be associated with newly appointed justices. Among other things, freshman justices are thought to be less likely than their senior colleagues to vote with established ideological blocs on the Court. The empirical evidence for the freshman effect in voting on the Court is somewhat ambiguous, however. In order to test for a freshman effect in the voting behavior of new justices on the Supreme Court, we examined the behavior of all justices on the Court between 1921 and 1990. Voting blocs were determined from the justices' interagreement scores, using the widely employed criterion developed by Sprague (1968). We found no evidence of a freshman effect during the time frame under study. Freshman justices do not differ from their senior colleagues with respect to bloc voting. We conclude that the freshman effect hypothesis is erroneous, at least with respect to the supposed nonalignment behavior of neophyte justices.     

Voting power and voting blocs

We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that has voting blocs. Our analysis is theoretical, intended to contribute to a theory of positive political science in which social actors are motivated by the pursuit of power as measured by objective power indices. Our starting points are the papers by Riker (Behavioural Science, 1959, “A test of the adequacy of the power index”) and Coleman (American Sociological Review, 1973, “Loss of Power”). We argue against the Shapley–Shubik index and show that anyway the Shapley–Shubik index per head is inappropriate for voting blocs. We apply the Penrose index (the absolute Banzhaf index) to a hypothetical voting body with 100 members. We show how the power indices of individual bloc members can be used to study the implications of the formation of blocs and how voting power varies as bloc size varies. We briefly consider incentives to migrate between blocs. This technique of analysis has many real world applications to legislatures and international bodies. It can be generalised in many ways: our analysis is a priori (assuming formal voting and ignoring actual voting behaviour) but can be made empirical with voting data reflecting behaviour; it examines the consequences of two blocs but can easily be extended to more.     

The Alma Mater effect: Does foreign education of political leaders influence UNGA voting?

Public Choice - We study whether national leaders’ foreign education influences their voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly. We hypothesize that...     

Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations?

We investigate whether countries with poor human rights records oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly. An instrumental account of voting would suggest that these countries aim to weaken resolutions since they could be future targets of these policies. We estimate determinants of voting using 13,000 individual voting decisions from 1980 to 2002. Our results from ordered probit estimation show that a country??s human rights situation is irrelevant to voting behavior if regional dependence of voting is controlled for. The results also show that simple rules for aggregating voting choices can lead to misleading results.     

The illusion of state neutrality in a secularising Ireland

It is argued that although the importance of party identification and social cleavages is declining, the bipolarity of the Swedish party system is sustained by voters’ identification with political blocs rather than with parties. Using data from the Swedish election of 2010, the article shows that voters’ bloc identification structures their voting behaviour and stabilises the party system. Four hypotheses are tested and supported. H1: Declining party identification has been replaced by bloc identification. H2: Voters with a strong bloc identification are often detached from a strong party identification, while almost all of the few voters with a strong party identification are also attached to a strong bloc identification. H3: Bloc identification has an effect on voting for parties belonging to one of the political blocs, even when party identification is controlled for. H4: Bloc identification has a small effect on electoral support for anti-establishment parties (such as the Sweden Democrats).     

Voting in the UN: a Second Image of China’s Human Rights

It is generally agreed that China has a poor domestic human rights practice. In contrast, China has a better-than-average voting record on human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Based on a new UNGA human rights dataset that we identified, we found that since joining the United Nations (UN) in 1971, China voted in the affirmative on human rights resolutions 79 % of the time, compared to the world average favoring ratio of 75 %. This positive image of consistently voting in the affirmative on UNGA human rights resolutions suggests a second image of China’s human rights. However, while the Chinese government is willing to accept the international human rights regime, it also strategically alters its endorsement of UNGA human rights resolutions based on changing levels of domestic threats.     

Expressions of Distrust: Third-Party Voting and Cynicism in Government

Voter distrust of the national government is an ongoing theoretical concern for scholars who study voting behavior in the United States. Previous research demonstrates that distrustful voters are less likely to vote for major party candidates than their more trusting counterparts. Using the American National Election Survey, we explore the relationship between citizen distrust and voting for three major third-party challengers (Wallace, Anderson, and Perot) and the use of trust levels as predictors of third- party voting. We find citizen trust levels are significant and strong predictors of third-party voting, independent of other common explanatory variables of vote choice. We also find trust levels are stable over time, and we find little evidence to support the argument that trust levels measure trust of incumbent political figures.     

An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices

Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful for both positive and normative analysis of voting bodies particularly those using weighted voting. This paper applies new algorithms for computing the rival Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for large voting bodies to shareholder voting power in a cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in ownership between them resulting in different power structures. Because the data are incomplete, both finite and 'oceanic' games of shareholder voting are analysed. The indices are appraised, using reasonable criteria, from the literature on corporate control. The results are unfavourable to the Shapley-Shubik index and suggest that the Banzhaf index much better reflects the variations in the power of shareholders between companies as the weights of shareholder blocs vary.     

Voting strength in the European Parliament: The influence of national and of partisan actors

Abstract. Most decisions by the European Parliament are taken by an absolute majority of its members. Some decisions however – such as the approval of the budget of the European Union – require a two-thirds majority. The paper analyzes the a priori voting strength of the member states when their representatives vote coherently. It is shown that the increase in votes for Germany in the 1994 reallocation enhanced its position. A less favourable effect, however, can be seen for the other large members (France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain). However, since votes in the EP tend to be cast according to partisan rather than national affiliation, the relative voting power of the political groups with respect to the two quotas is also analyzed. The tool to measure this is the (normalized) Banzhaf power index, partially extended to account for connected coalitions. The paper demonstrates that the distribution of votes between the present EU member states as allocated in proportion to their population size indeed roughly corresponds to their a priori voting power. However, the relative influence of the largest political groups, the European Socialists and the European People's Party, tends to be overestimated by their share of seats in the framework of the simple majority rule, but it is considerable if the quota is two-thirds. Finally, under the two-thirds majority rule, the European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Party as well as the small groups appear to be almost powerless. The more the EP gains political leverage – a further increase in its institutional powers is to be expected in the framework of the ongoing Intergovernmental Conference – the more the distribution of voting power between the member states and between the political groups will be a crucial factor in the shaping of EU policies.     

An assessment of voting systems under the proximity and directional models of the vote

I evaluate five single-winner voting systems according to their tendency to elect Condorcet candidates under alternative models of issue voting derived from behavioral research. These behavioral models posit that voters have both issue and nonissue motivations; within this framework, I study the effects of both the directional and proximity voting models, with varying degrees of issue voting. Under the proximity metric, all voting systems are most efficient when voters attach little importance to issues, while the opposite is generally the case under directional voting. In contrast to previous results, voting systems tend to be more efficient for large than for small electorates. All voting systems – including the widely-criticized plurality method – are extremely efficient when voters in mass elections are inattentive to issues.     

A two-dimensional analysis of seventy years of United Nations voting

International relations scholars frequently use roll-call votes on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to measure similarity in the foreign policy ideologies of states. They then correlate those measures with consequential outcomes, such as development lending, trade, or military disputes. Dynamic ideal point models of UNGA voting thus far have been restricted to a single dimension. We examine the existence of a stable, important, and interpretable second dimension underlying contestation in the UN. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, North–South conflict constitutes a stable second dimension, shaped heavily by the agenda-setting powers of the so-called Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77. In the periods before and after, the second dimension neither is stable nor easily interpretable, though it is sometimes important. We suggest that in most applications, our original one-dimensional estimates have conceptual advantages with minimal losses in explanatory value. We illustrate that conclusion with an analysis that correlates ideal point changes with militarized interstate disputes. Yet, our findings also suggest that scholars interested in specific issues, such as the Middle East, human rights, or arms control, might benefit from more specifically tailored ideal point estimates.     

Shaping China’s Climate Diplomacy: Wealth,Status, and Asymmetric Interdependence

China’s diplomacy in the post-Kyoto Protocol international climate change negotiations (ICCN) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) bears proactive and reactive feature. On the one hand, China has proactively built several new coalitions including its bilateral climate coalition with India, the BASIC group and the Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) while maintaining its traditional coalition with the Group-77 and China to facilitate its bargaining power against developed countries and their negotiating blocs. On the other hand, however, China has reactively made significant compromises to its negotiation partners on mitigation obligations of greenhouse gas emissions. Such a proactive and reactive feature of China’s climate diplomacy has been mainly shaped by: first, China’s desire to maximize its wealth/profits from its participation in the Clean Development Mechanism; secondly, its desire to build a responsible great power status in the international system; and thirdly, its asymmetric dependence on the developed countries especially the US and the EU for transferring climate mitigation-related technologies.     

Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?

One criterion for evaluating voting rules is the frequency with which they select the best candidate. Using a spatial model of voting that is capable of simulating data with the same statistical structure as data from actual elections, we simulate elections for which we can define the best candidate. We use these simulated data to investigate the frequencies with which 14 voting rules chose this candidate as their winner. We find that the Black rule tends to perform better than the other rules, especially in elections with few voters. The Bucklin rule, the plurality rule, and the anti-plurality rule tend to perform worse than the other 11 rules, especially in elections with many voters.     

The microeconomic voter

In the United States, aggregate and individual level studies of economic voting for the Congress have produced contradictory findings. The same is true for models of economic voting for the Australian Parliament. This paper presents data taken from a series of individual level studies which show that voters' attitudes towards fiscal and microeconomic issues have been better predictors of the vote for the Australian House of Representatives over the last four elections than their attitudes towards macroeconomic issues. This finding suggests that the cause of the inconsistency between aggregate and individual level models of voting may be that aggregate models of economic voting which include only macroeconomic variables are inadequately specified, since they do not take broader aspects of the economy into account.     

Truth and Fiction: A Study of the Gender Gap in the US National Legislature

In the United States, women are generally perceived to vote more liberally than men. Analysing voting patterns from 12 US Congresses (the 94th to 105th Congress) on a range of political issues, I conduct an estimation explaining voting behaviour by gender, differences in party identification and affiliation with different geographical regions in the United States. My results indicate that women do generally vote more liberally than men, but this difference can be attributed to differences in party identification and regional representation more than to gender differences.     

Comparing Group and Subgroup Cohesion Scores: A Nonparametric Method with an Application to Brazil

This article builds a nonparametric method for inference fromroll-call cohesion scores. Cohesion scores have been a stapleof legislative studies since the publication of Rice's 1924thesis. Unfortunately, little effort has been dedicated to understandingtheir statistical properties or relating them to existing modelsof legislative behavior. I show how a common use of cohesionscores, testing for distinct voting blocs, is severely biasedtoward Type I error, practically guaranteeing significant findingseven when the null hypothesis is correct. I offer a nonparametricmethod—permutation analysis—that solves the biasproblem and provides for simple and intuitive inference. I demonstratewith an examination of roll-call voting data from the BrazilianNational Congress.     

The problem of polarization

This paper offers a unified political economy explanation of political extremism and moderation regarding income redistribution. Unlike the standard spatial voting model, the explanation herein recognizes that extremists are distinguished not only by their political positions, but also by the intensity with which they hold them. The paper uses an extension of Aumann and Kurz’s (Econometrica 45(5):1137–1161, 1977) bargaining model to endogenize moderation and extremism in the context of democratic voting. The extension shows that low-income voters tend to be bolder in their redistributive demands and high-income voters tend to be more tenacious in defending them. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically using the Political Action Panel Study.     

Sincere and strategic voters: An Israeli study

The theoretical literature on voting behavior has shown that a rational voter may sometimes decide to vote for a candidate or party that does not constitute his or her first preference. Such voters are traditionally called strategic voters, in contrast to voters who act sincerely, i.e., those who always vote for their first preference regardless of how others are likely to vote. After discussing some of the problems associated with the definition of these two types of voters and suggesting a new operational definition, some attitudes and characteristics of these two types of voters are investigated. It was found that strategic voters constitute a very small percentage of the entire electorate, that their education level is significantly higher than that of sincere voters, that they tend more often to believe that polls influence voters' decisions and hence tend to delay their own final voting decision, that they tend more often than sincere voters to support small parties but do not tend more often than sincere voters to switch the party they decide to support from one election to the next, and that there is no significant difference between them and sincere voters regarding which governing coalition should/will form following an election.     

Young people,parents and radical right voting. The Case of the Swiss People’s Party

It is commonly found that young people tend to adopt the political party choice of their parents. However, far less is known about the applicability of this theory when investigating radical right support. Using the Swiss Household panel data (1999–2007), this study empirically identifies the relationship between parents’ preference for the Swiss radical right party SVP and their attitudes toward immigrants and the EU, and their offspring’s preference for the SVP. Disaggregating fathers’ and mothers’ influence reveals that in particular, mothers’ SVP support plays a role in SVP support among young people, even after controlling for educational similarities. We also demonstrate that girls are more likely to be influenced by their mothers than are boys. Furthermore, parents’ negative attitudes toward the EU exert a positive influence on their children’s radical right voting, independent of their voting pattern.