The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

Day care and female employment in Mexico: descriptive evidence and policy considerations

"This paper analyzes the supply and organization of public day care in Mexico and presents a series of considerations as to the formulation of future policy. The research concentrates on the evolution of public policies to provide day care to working women in the formal sector through the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). Data on the evolution of female labor force participation, changes in family structure, the supply of day care and patterns of child care arrangements, suggest that access to formal facilities falls short of demand.... Innovative policies for the reorganization and expansion of the provision of day care are presently under consideration." (EXCERPT)     

Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market

Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork‐ridden political systems? This article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others. We explain such differences by focusing on political parties' access to resources (supply side) and voters' dependence on fiscal largesse (demand side). We show how these differences affect the patron's choice of public sector wages and employment. We use subnational level data to show different electoral returns from patronage for the two major political coalitions in Argentina—Peronism and the UCR‐Alianza—and their effect on preferences over public sector wages and employment.     

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.     

Continuity and Change: The New South Wales Public Sector Under Labor

This paper analyses recent developments in wage bargaining in the New South Wales public sector under the Labor government. It contrasts the approach taken by the former Coalition government with that of its successor. The discussion is focused on the Memorandum of Understanding between the Labor government and the public sector unions. With the agreement of the unions, the government has reasserted both substantive and procedural control over public sector industrial relations. This has not, however, prevented widespread industrial action in schools, hospitals and public transport and continuing tensions between the principal public service union and the government.     

Collective Bargaining and The Performance of the Public Schools

Students of American politics rarely study public sector unions and their impacts on government. The literature sees bureaucratic power as rooted in expertise, but largely ignores the fact that bureaucrats often join unions to promote their own interests, and that the power of their unions may affect government and its performance. This article focuses on the public schools, which are among the most numerous government agencies in the country, and investigates whether collective bargaining by teachers—the key bureaucrats—affects the schools' capacity to educate children. Using California data, analysis shows that, in large school districts, restrictive labor contracts have a very negative impact on academic achievement, particularly for minority students. The evidence suggests, then, that public sector unions do indeed have important consequences for American public education. Whether they are consequential in other areas of government remains to be seen, but it is an avenue well worth pursuing.     

Industrial Relations and Public Sector Reform: The Victorian Case

Few anticipated the radical program of public sector reform introduced by the Kennett government. A commitment to downsizing, markets and privatisation has transformed employment relations in the Victorian public sector. Familiar institutions have disappeared, major employment areas have been restructured, and jurisdiction for much public sector industrial relations has been transferred to the Commonwealth. Despite some industrial unrest, and occasional successes, public sector unions have been unable to fend off this ideological assault on traditional patterns of public sector employment.     

Public Sector Labor Relations Scholarship: Is There a “There,” There?

Public sector union membership is thriving compared to the private sector. Moreover, public employee unions play a significant role in policy making at every level of government. Yet research on public sector labor relations is sporadic and uneven, perhaps negligible. Why so? This article surveys the literature on public sector unionism and seeks to answer that question. Its conclusion points to a course of action for renewing interest in this seminal field among public administration, management, and policy scholars.     

Interest group demand for taxation

Researchers have typically ignored the determinants of the tax structure of the public sector. Political scientists have concentrated their analyses on the expenditure side of the public ledgers while economists have avoided the issue by assuming that taxes are exogenously determined. In this paper we have shown that a behavioral model of political interest groups can be employed to gain insights into the political selection of taxes. The theory provides a general complement to the well-documented analysis of special interest demand for public expenditures.Our analysis raises several important policy questions. First, is the influence of interest groups on the determination of tax systems desirable from a public policy perspective? For example, special interest groups dominated by high and middle income individuals may prefer regressive tax systems which reduce their own tax burden. Certainly the impact of interest groups on the well-known regressivity of state and local tax systems is an area worthy of additional investigation.     

Overlapping jurisdictions: Substitutes or complements?

This paper presents a simple model of the demand relationship between the activities undertaken by overlapping governments and uses the framework to estimate the relationship between municipal and county expenditures. The empirical results reveal a complementary relationship between county and city general expenditures; any public sector expansion effects of monopoly power at the county level will therefore be reinforced by greater municipal spending, further expanding the total size of the local public sector. On the other hand, changes in county police and roads expenditures appear to have no strong stable impact on municipal police and roads expenditures, respectively, providing no reinforcing or offsetting municipal spending responses to decisions at the county level.     

Policy Tool Interactions and the Adoption of State Renewable Portfolio Standards

We contribute to extant policy theory by focusing on interrelationships between existing policies and innovation. In particular, we call attention to the link between supply‐side incentives and demand‐side innovation, which has not been systematically investigated. Our research expectation is that supply‐side policies generally will complement demand‐side policy, leading to a positive impact on the adoption of demand‐side innovations. We test this idea by examining adoptions of renewable portfolio standards (RPS), a demand‐pull approach targeted to renewable energy generation by utilities, in the American states from 1991 to 2008. Event history models show that an index of supply‐side financial incentives has a strong positive influence on RPS adoption. We do not find support for the hypothesis that this effect is contingent on in‐state carbon‐based energy generation. In conclusion, we argue that the study of policy adoption needs to give greater consideration to the interrelationships among policy instruments.     

Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.     

A Changing Public Sector: Developments at the Commonwealth Level

Over the last three decades the federal public sector has been the focus of government policies aimed at recasting federal public sector employment arrangements from a structure characterised by a considerable autonomy from government to a set of institutions more responsive to government direction; and more recently to a regime marked by considerable operational autonomy within a framework of substantive and substantial government control. These developments had the consequence of promoting a more explicitly managerial employment framework and a more individualised workforce. As part of this process the federal public sector was reorganised as a series of agencies. These 'managerial agents' of governments were authorised to secure more effective employee compliance with these changes. A key element in this process is the response of public sector unions to these developments and the way they have both contributed to, and been affected by, the construction of a more explicitly managerial public sector.     

Gauging the Effects of Social Accountability on Services,Governance, and Citizen Empowerment

Engaging citizens in holding public officials and service providers accountable, referred to as social accountability, is a popular remedy for public sector performance weaknesses, figuring prominently in many international donor‐funded projects and leading to widespread replication. However, the contextual factors that influence the successful transfer of social accountability are debated. Demand‐side factors (civil society and citizens) are overemphasized in much of the literature. Yet supply‐side factors (state structures and processes) and the nature of state–society relations are also important. This article examines four projects in developing countries to explore how these contextual factors influenced social accountability aims and outcomes. The salience of supply factors in enabling social accountability for service delivery and government performance stands out, particularly the degree of decentralization and the availability of space for citizen engagement. The capacity and motivation of citizens to occupy the available space, aggregate and voice their concerns, and participate with state actors in assessing service delivery performance and problems are critical.     

Privatization of public-sector services in practice: Experience and potential

Privatization—the transfer of assets and service responsibility from the public to the private sector—has been expanding at the state and local level. Empirical studies document significant cost savings, apparently due to incentives introduced by competition. The outlook is for continued expansion of privatization, including such areas as highways, transit, water supply, and education.     

The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union

In the recent economic literature the independence of the central bank is often considered to be one of the most effective guarantees to achieve price stability. A strong theoretical basis for this proposition is that the monetary policy delegation given to an independent central bank is an optimal instrument to avoid the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability properties of this solution in a simple game in which the private sector (i.e. the trade unions) and the public sector (i.e. the central bank) simultaneously interact. A representative monopoly union is considered, and – in line with the recent economic debate – two types of unions are investigated: (i) the standard micro-founded trade union; (ii) the inflation-averse trade union. In both cases, we find that the requirement for the Nash equilibrium to be stable imposes a limit to the conservativeness of the central bank. Instability of the Nash equilibrium reveals a strategic co-ordination failure between the public and the private sector.     

Unions in Restructured States: Laborism in Australia and Economic Liberalism in the United Kingdom

There have been major reforms in the public sector in both Australia and the United Kingdom from the 1980s onwards. In each case, governments restructured their state sectors. These initiatives brought about not only widely acknowledged changes in organisation but also changes in the labour process and class relations as well as differing prospects for state sector trade unions.     

税收负担、公共品层次与私人公共品需求——以山东省面板数据为例

个人税收负担的增长会对公共品需求产生负向影响,这一结论在西方的研究中被普遍证明。本文从中国实际出发,借助经典的中位选民模型,考察了个人税收负担对公共品需求的影响。通过对山东省17市1997～2007年的面板数据进行实证分析,发现个人税收负担对公共品需求的负向影响在中国并不普遍存在。就影响公共品需求的各因素来看,公共品需求的收入弹性以及人口拥挤效应普遍存在;个人税收负担对济南、烟台两市一般公共品需求产生负向影响,对其余15个市产生正向效应。为进一步揭示税收负担对不同层次公共品需求的影响差异,选取了教育和公共安全这两类特殊公共品进行研究。山东省17地市的个人税收负担对教育这类公共品普遍产生负向影响;对公共安全类公共品产生完全正向效应。因此,本文认为山东省一般公共品市场是供给导向的市场,税收弹性与公共品需求层次相关,建议建立引导公民合理表达公共品需求意向机制。     

Understanding Employee Turnover in the Public Sector: Insights from Research on Teacher Mobility

Employee turnover is a key area for public administration research, but one about which there is much still to be learned. Insights from an extensive body of research on employee turnover in a specific area of the public sector—public education—contributes to the understanding of employee mobility in public organizations more generally. The authors present a conceptual framework for understanding employee turnover that is grounded in economic theories of labor supply and demand, which have formed the foundation of many studies of teacher turnover. The main findings of this body of work are documented, noting connections to the literature on public employee turnover, lessons that can be learned, and potential new areas for empirical inquiry for scholars of turnover in the public sector.     

Institutional Constraints,Managerial Choices,and Conflicts in Public Sector Supply Chains

In this research, we compare the governance mechanisms that public sector managers and private sector managers leverage when responding to conflict in supply chain relationships. We find evidence that public sector managers are more likely than private sector managers to rely on written (formal) contract mechanisms, but that both public and private managers use relational (informal) governance mechanisms to similar extents. We also find that managers from both sectors perceive an improvement to the quality of the exchange relationship when a relational approach is emphasized in managing the conflict. Our research provides an important contribution to our understanding about the actions public managers take in dealing with supply chain conflicts and suggests potential policy alternatives to foster contracting efficiency and effectiveness.