On Two Distinct and Opposing Versions of Natural Law: “Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”

Abstract. This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural‐law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural‐law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural‐law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies moral rules and specifies their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude. *

相似文献   

Libertarian Paternalism,Externalities, and the “Spirit of Liberty”: How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us toward an “Overlapping Consensus”

In their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”     

The Odyssey of the Regulatory State: From a “Thin” Monomorphic Concept to a “Thick” and Polymorphic Concept

This article assesses the “odyssey” of the regulatory state from a mere American thin and monomorphic concept to a global, thick and polymorphic concept that captures some of the more important features of the capitalist–democratic state. The burgeoning literature on the regulatory state presents a confusing number of images and characterizations that are increasingly conflicting, and it too often presents a monomorphic conception of the regulatory state. The article suggests that we need to define the regulatory state rather than merely characterizing it. And we need to do so in a manner that will allow us to move beyond the specific institutional features of a certain era, nation, region, or sector. Rather than contrasting regulation with distribution and redistribution, and contrasting the regulatory state with other forms of state, I treat the regulatory state as one morph of the polymorphic capitalist state, a morph that may help constitute other morphs (such as the welfare state and the developmental state) instead of replacing them. This in turn may help remove the artificial walls between the regulatory scholarly community and other social scientists, and promote more fruitful social science.     

Foucault on “Avowal”: Theatres of Truth from Homer to Modern Psychology

FOUCAULT, MICHEL. 2014 . Wrong‐Doing, Truth‐Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice . Ed. Fabienne Brion and Bernard Harcourt, trans. Stephen Sawyer. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Cloth $35.00, E‐book $7.00 to $30.00. The publication of a previously unknown set of lectures delivered by Foucault in 1981 at Louvain's criminology institute constitutes a major revelation for legal and criminological scholars (Wrong‐Doing, Truth‐Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice, 2014). The lecture material includes an extended discussion of the techniques used by Oedipus to establish the truth of his familial crime, a reflection on the beginnings of the inquisitorial justice system (which Foucault here argues paved the way for the scientific revolution), and analyses of contemporary forensic confessions. Throughout these meticulously edited lectures, the scientific and philosophical “inquiries” that revolutionized modern European knowledges are shown to be rooted in embodied practices of confession and avowal that go back to ancient Greece.     

“Scared Straight”: Ideology and the media

One of the more widely publicized presentations about crime is “Scared Straight,” a documentary about a program in which juveniles visit inmates in a New Jersey penitentiary. It is the contention of this article that this film and the accompanying media coverage of it convey an ideology message concerning crime and criminals. Crime is presented as a matter of individual choice that has little relationship to any social variables. Criminals are portrayed in a one-dimensional manner as evil, vicious, and barely human. The documentary is a success because these images of crime and criminals conform to existing stereotypes. Based on these distorted images, the film and media coverage “market” a simplistic solution to crime that is compatible with their presentation of the crime problem.     

Efficient,Fair, and Incomprehensible: How the State “Sells” Its Judiciary

Socio‐legal scholars often approach dispute resolution from the perspective of the disputants, emphasizing how the resources on each side shape the course of conflict. We suggest a different, “supply‐side,” perspective. Focusing on the state's efforts to establish centralized courts in place of local justice systems, we consider the strategies that a supplier of dispute resolving services uses to attract disputes for resolution. We argue that state actors often attempt to “sell” centralized courts to potential litigants by insisting that the state's services are more efficient and fair than local courts operating outside direct state control. Moreover, we argue that state actors also invest significant energy in claiming that the local courts are incomprehensible. Thus, in its efforts to introduce and advance centralized courts, the state argues not only that it offers the best version of what the citizenry wants, but also that it is impossible to conceive that people would want something other than what the state offers. We illustrate our argument and explain its significance by examining judicial reform in New York, where there has been a decades‐long effort to displace local justice systems.