The Dock on Trial: Courtroom Design and the Presumption of Innocence

This article examines the place of the criminal dock in courtroom design. Challenges to the use of the dock have been based upon the inability of the defendants to hear effectively, to communicate with counsel, to maintain their dignity, and to benefit from the presumption of innocence. Increasingly courts are incorporating secure docks, where defendants are partially or completely surrounded by glass (or in some countries, metal bars). To what extent do these changes and modifications undermine the right to the presumption of innocence? We present the results of an experimental mock jury study that was designed to test whether the placement of the accused influences jurors’ perceptions. We find that jurors are more likely to convict defendants when they are located in a traditional dock or a secure dock, compared to sitting next to their counsel at the bar table. We conclude by discussing the implications for trial procedures, counsel communications, and courtroom design.     

Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a Mock Sabotage Crime*

Abstract: Using Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) functional MRI (fMRI) to detect deception is feasible in simple laboratory paradigms. A mock sabotage scenario was used to test whether this technology would also be effective in a scenario closer to a real‐world situation. Healthy, nonmedicated adults were recruited from the community, screened, and randomized to either a Mock‐crime group or a No‐crime group. The Mock‐crime group damaged and stole compact discs (CDs), which contained incriminating video footage, while the No‐crime group did not perform a task. The Mock‐crime group also picked up an envelope from a researcher, while the No‐crime group did not perform this task. Both groups were instructed to report that they picked up an envelope, but did not sabotage any video evidence. Participants later went to the imaging center and were scanned while being asked questions regarding the mock crime. Participants also performed a simple laboratory based fMRI deception testing (Ring‐Watch testing). The Ring‐Watch testing consisted of “stealing” either a watch or a ring. The participants were instructed to report that they stole neither object. We correctly identified deception during the Ring‐Watch testing in 25 of 36 participants (Validated Group). In this Validated Group for whom a determination was made, computer‐based scoring correctly identified nine of nine Mock‐crime participants (100% sensitivity) and five of 15 No‐crime participants (33% specificity). BOLD fMRI presently can be used to detect deception concerning past events with high sensitivity, but low specificity.     

Defendant and juror race in a necessity case: An ultimate attribution error

This study investigated whether Black and White mock jurors would commit the ultimate attribution error (i.e., over-rely on dispositional explanations to understand the negative actions of out-group members) in a necessity defense case. Participants (N = 97) read a fictional looting case, in which the race of the defendant varied. Mock jurors were expected to show out-group severity through more guilty verdicts and blame attributions. Mock juror and defendant race were not significantly related to verdicts, but for the Black defendant, White mock jurors attributed more control to him, and believed he was likely to reoffend more so than did Black mock jurors. This study adds to the literature on the mechanism by which racial bias interferes with juror decisions.     

The role of neurological and psychological explanations in legal judgments of psychopathic wrongdoers

Although brain imaging has recently taken center stage in criminal legal proceedings, little is known about how neuroscience information differentially affects people’s judgments about criminal behavior. In two studies of community participants (N = 1161), we examined how mock jurors sentence a fictional psychopathic defendant when presented with neurological or psychological research of equal or ambiguous scientific validity. Across two studies, we (a) found that including images of the brain did not alter mock jurors’ sentencing judgments, (b) reported two striking non-replications of previous findings that mock jurors recommend less severe punishments to defendants when a neuroscientific explanations are proffered, and (c) found that participants rated a psychopathic individual as more likely to benefit from treatment and less dangerous when a neurological explanation for his deficits was provided. Overall, these results suggest that neuroscience information provided by psychiatrists in hypothetical criminal situations may not broadly transform mock jurors’ intuitions about a psychopathic defendant’s sentence, but they provide novel evidence that brain-based information may influence people’s judgments about treatability and dangerousness.     

Complex scientific testimony: How do jurors make decisions?

Critics of the civil jury system question whether jurors can adequately evaluate complex expert testimony. Based on current models of research in persuasion, we hypothesized that when expert testimony is complex, factors other than content will influence persuasion. Participants, serving as mock jurors, watched a videotaped trial in which two scientists provided evidence on whether PCBs could have caused a plaintiff's illness. The complexity of the expert's testimony and the strength of the expert's credentials were varied in a 2×2 factorial design. After watching the videotape, mock jurors rendered a verdict and completed a number of attitude measures related to the trial. Overall, consistent with our prediction, we found that jurors were more persuaded by a highly expert witness than by a less expert witness, but only when the testimony was highly complex. When the testimony was less complex, jurors relied primarily on the content of that testimony, and witness credentials had little impact on the persuasiveness of the message.     

Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making

Judges assume that gruesome evidence can influence juror verdicts, but little is known about the manner in which the influence is manifested. In a 2 × 3 study that varied the gruesome content of photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal evidence did not influence mock juror emotional states, and had no impact on the conviction rate. Mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs, compared with those who saw no photographs, reported experiencing significantly more intense emotional responses, including greater anger at the defendant. The conviction rate when visual evidence in the form of gruesome or neutral photographs was included was significantly higher than the conviction rate without photographic evidence. Mean ratings of the inculpatory weight of prosecution evidence by mock jurors presented with gruesome photographs were significantly higher than those by mock jurors who did not view any photographs. Further analyses revealed that mock juror anger toward the defendant mediated the influence of the gruesome photographs in enhancing the weight of inculpatory evidence.     

Error Rates,Likelihood Ratios,and Jury Evaluation of Forensic Evidence

Forensic examiners regularly testify in criminal cases, informing the jurors whether crime scene evidence likely came from a source. In this study, we examine the impact of providing jurors with testimony further qualified by error rates and likelihood ratios, for expert testimony concerning two forensic disciplines: commonly used fingerprint comparison evidence and a novel technique involving voice comparison. Our method involved surveying mock jurors in Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 897 laypeople) using written testimony and judicial instructions. Participants were more skeptical of voice analysis and generated fewer “guilty” decisions than for fingerprint analysis (B = 2.00, OR = 7.06, p = <0.000). We found that error rate information most strongly decreased “guilty” votes relative to no qualifying information for participants who heard fingerprint evidence (but not those that heard voice analysis evidence; B = −1.16, OR = 0.32, p = 0.007). We also found that error rates and conclusion types led to a greater decrease on “guilty” votes for fingerprint evidence than voice evidence (B = 1.44, OR = 4.23, p = 0.021). We conclude that these results suggest jurors adjust the weight placed on forensic evidence depending on their prior views about its reliability. Future research should develop testimony and judicial instructions that can better inform jurors of the strengths and limitations of forensic evidence.     

Taking the bait: interrogation questions about hypothetical evidence may inflate perceptions of guilt

ABSTRACT

During suspect interviews, police will sometimes ask about hypothetical incriminating evidence to evoke a cue to deception – a technique known as a bait question. Previous research has demonstrated such questions can distort peoples’ memory for what evidence exists in a case. Here, we investigate whether such memory distortion can also cause people to see the suspect as more likely to be guilty. Across three experiments, we find exposure to bait questions led to participants hold inflated views of a suspect’s guilt. Further, we demonstrate bait questions cause reliable, robust memory distortion, leading participants to believe non-existent, incriminating evidence exists. However, we found no evidence to support the speculated mechanisms for this inflation – namely, (1) that source monitoring errors could lead people to misremember false evidence as real evidence and (2) that bait questions provide ‘key evidence’ to fill in the gaps of an incomplete theory of a case. In sum, bait questions have the problematic potential to shift jurors towards guilty verdicts. We suggest future research directions on bait questions, including the need for different designs to clarify why bait questions inflate guilt, and recommend practitioners avoid the use of bait questions.     

Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match

This experiment tested the ability of undergraduate mock jurors (N=295) to draw appropriate conclusions from statistical data on the diagnostic value of forensic evidence. Jurors read a summary of a homicide trial in which the key evidence was a bullet lead "match" that was either highly diagnostic, non-diagnostic, or of unknown diagnostic value. There was also a control condition in which the forensic "match" was not presented. The results indicate that jurors as a group used the statistics appropriately to distinguish diagnostic from non-diagnostic forensic evidence, giving considerable weight to the former and little or no weight to the latter. However, this effect was attributable to responses of a subset of jurors who expressed confidence in their ability to use statistical data. Jurors who lacked confidence in their statistical ability failed to distinguish highly diagnostic from non-diagnostic forensic evidence; they gave no weight to the forensic evidence regardless of its diagnostic value. Confident jurors also gave more weight to evidence of unknown diagnostic value. Theoretical and legal implications are discussed.     

The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors' Reasoning Skills

The effect of jury deliberation on jurors' reasoning skill in a murder trial was examined. Specifically, the effect of deliberating on reasoning competence (as defined by Kuhn, Weinstock and Flaton, 1994) was explored. One hundred and four participants viewed a videotaped murder trial and either deliberated in 12-person juries or ruminated on the case individually. Among those assigned to juries, half had their reasoning skill assessed prior to deliberations, while the others were tested after deliberating. Jurors in the individual rumination condition were assessed after they had the opportunity to reflect on the case alone. As hypothesized, post-group-deliberation jurors were more likely to discount both the selected verdict and alternative theories and incorporate judgmental supporting statements than were the other mock jurors. However, the mock jurors did not differ with regard to making statements that supported alternative verdicts or including judgmental statements that discounted their chosen verdict. In terms of Kuhn's reasoning continuum from satisficing (low level) to theory–evidence coordination (high level), there is some evidence that post-group-deliberation jurors may be closer to the high end than predeliberation jurors or post-individual-rumination jurors in some aspects of the task, but not in others.     

Knowing when the camera lies: Judicial instructions mitigate the camera perspective bias

Purpose. Videotaped confession evidence elicits harsher evaluations against a defendant if initially recorded with the camera focused primarily on the suspect, compared with other presentation formats. Unfortunately, most videotaped confession evidence employs this biasing suspect‐focus camera perspective format, leaving defendants with no recourse. The present study examined the utility of judicial instructions in mitigating the effects of the camera perspective bias on individual juror verdicts. Methods. Through random assignment, 156 mock jurors did or did not receive explicit instructions to correct for the camera perspective bias prior to viewing a video recording of an authentic true or false confession. Results. As expected, mock jurors who received instructions to correct for the camera perspective bias reported more lenient judgments of confessor guilt after viewing a suspect‐focus confession recording compared to those who did not receive such instructions. However, this relative leniency emerged only in response to false, and not true, confessions. Conclusions. Results demonstrated that judicial instructions used in the present research mitigated the effect of camera perspective on mock‐juror judgments of suspect guilt.     

Educating Jurors about Forensic Evidence: Using an Expert Witness and Judicial Instructions to Mitigate the Impact of Invalid Forensic Science Testimony

Invalid expert witness testimony that overstated the precision and accuracy of forensic science procedures has been highlighted as a common factor in many wrongful conviction cases. This study assessed the ability of an opposing expert witness and judicial instructions to mitigate the impact of invalid forensic science testimony. Participants (N = 155) acted as mock jurors in a sexual assault trial that contained both invalid forensic testimony regarding hair comparison evidence, and countering testimony from either a defense expert witness or judicial instructions. Results showed that the defense expert witness was successful in educating jurors regarding limitations in the initial expert's conclusions, leading to a greater number of not-guilty verdicts. The judicial instructions were shown to have no impact on verdict decisions. These findings suggest that providing opposing expert witnesses may be an effective safeguard against invalid forensic testimony in criminal trials.     

The CSI Effect and the impact of DNA evidence on mock jurors and jury deliberations

ABSTRACT

The present research examined the CSI Effect and the impact of DNA evidence on mock jurors and jury deliberations using a 3 (Crime Drama Viewing: low, moderate, high)?×?3 (Evidence: DNA innocent, DNA guilty, no DNA control) design. A sample of 178 jury-eligible college students read a case of breaking and entering. Pre-deliberation, some support for a CSI Effect was found with high viewers’ extent of guilt ratings significantly lower than moderate and low viewers’ in the no DNA control and the DNA innocent conditions. This effect was not present for verdicts. Contrary to a CSI Effect, crime drama viewing was not related to guilt judgments with incriminating DNA evidence. A content analysis of comments made during deliberations found little support for the CSI Effect entering the jury room. Specifically, CSI Effect predictions were not supported when examining the discussion of DNA evidence, expressing DNA opinions, or mentioning missing evidence. Overall, the limited CSI Effect found for individuals was attenuated during deliberation. The alarm raised over a possible CSI Effect influencing jury decision making may be unwarranted.     

Understanding juror perceptions of forensic evidence: investigating the impact of case context on perceptions of forensic evidence strength

The most widely accepted model of juror decision making acknowledges the importance of both the case-specific information presented in the courtroom, as well as the prior general knowledge and beliefs held by each juror. The studies presented in this paper investigated whether mock jurors could differentiate between evidence of varying strengths in the absence of case information and then followed on to determine the influence that case context (and therefore the story model) has on judgments made about the strength of forensic DNA evidence. The results illustrated that mock jurors correctly identified various strengths of evidence when it was not presented with case information; however, the perceived strength of evidence was significantly inflated when presented in the context of a criminal case, particularly when the evidence was of a weak or ambiguous standard. These findings are discussed in relation to the story model, and the potential implications for real juries.     

Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence

Questions about how jurors understand and apply scientific evidence were addressed in a mock jury study in which 480 jury pool members watched a videotaped mock trial that included expert testimony about mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) evidence purportedly linking a defendant to a crime. Collectively, jurors showed moderately good comprehension of the mtDNA evidence, although some made definitional and inferential errors. Comprehension was better among jurors with higher educational attainment and more mathematics and science courses. Lower comprehension was associated with jurors’ reservations about science and concerns about the contamination of mtDNA evidence. The results suggest that most jurors are capable of comprehending and employing scientific evidence presented during trial, although errors and doubts about the evidence should be anticipated.     

The effects of stealing thunder in criminal and civil trials

The effectiveness of a persuasion technique referred to asstealing thunder was assessed in two simulated jury trials. Stealing thunder is defined as revealing negative information about oneself (or, in a legal setting, one's client) before it is revealed or elicited by another person. In Study 1, 257 college students read or heard one of three versions of a criminal assault trial in which a damaging piece of evidence about the defendant was absent (no thunder), brought up by the prosecutor (thunder), or brought up by the defense attorney and repeated by the prosecutor (stolen thunder). In Study 2, 148 college students heard a civil negligence trial in which damaging evidence about the key plaintiff's witness was absent (no thunder), brought up by the defendant's attorney (thunder), or brought up by the witness himself (stolen thunder). In both studies, stealing thunder significantly reduced the impact of the negative information. A path analysis of the processes underlying the effect suggested that verdicts were affected because of enhanced credibility.Often a difficult decision in opening statements is whether, and if so how, to volunteer weaknesses. This involves determining your weaknesses and predicting whether your opponent intends to use them at trial. There is obviously no point in volunteering a weakness that would never be raised at trial. Where, however, that weakness is apparent and known to the opponent, you should volunteer it. If you don't, your opponent will, with twice the impact. (Mauet, 1992, pp. 47–48)We would like to thank Michelle Cox, Gim Koay, Dana Koay, and Ralph Mueller for their helpful input. Thanks also to Irv Horowitz and Steve Karau for their comments on earlier drafts.     

Mock jurors’ perceptions of a child witness: the impact of the presence and/or intervention of a registered intermediary during cross-examination

ABSTRACT

In recent years Registered Intermediaries (RIs) have been involved in facilitating communication in children's investigative interviews and trial proceedings. Their presence and interventions are generally deemed to have a positive impact on child engagement, but their impact on jury appraisal of evidence, during cross-examination is unclear. This study addressed this issue in a more ecologically valid context than that previously used. Adult mock juror participants (N?=?217) watched a video-recording of a mock cross-examination of a child witness in which a RI was present or absent, and in which RI type interventions were either included or omitted. The participants rated the quality of the cross-examination and the child's responses in relation to child credibility, child understanding, legal professional's behaviour, and trial progression. Findings indicated that RI presence or absence, and inclusion or omission of interventions had no effect on mock juror ratings. However, an interaction between these variables demonstrated that mock jurors rated trial progression towards a guilty verdict according to which court professional did, or did, not intervene. The findings also demonstrated that mock jurors based their assessment of trial progression towards a guilty verdict on the evidence presented, and that child understanding per se was irrelevant.