Modeling and testing the diffusion of expectations: An EITM approach

This paper uses the empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM) framework to examine the consequences of the asymmetric diffusion of expectations. In the spirit of the traditional two-step flow model of communication, less-informed agents learn the expectations of more-informed agents. We find that when there is misinterpretation in the information acquisition process, a boomerang effect exists. In this equilibrium the less-informed agents’ forecasts confound those of more-informed agents. We apply the EITM approach to a key economic variable known to have a relation to economic fluctuations – inflation expectations. Using surveyed inflation expectations data for the period, 1978–2000, we find the boomerang effect exists. One implication of this finding pertains to economic policy and economic volatility: because policymakers have more information than the public, the boomerang effect can lead policymakers to make inaccurate forecasts of economic conditions and conduct erroneous policies which contribute to economic instability.     

Rational Ignorance,Rational Voter Expectations,and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion

This paper demonstrates that rational ignorance, properly defined, allows the possibility that fiscal illusion affects policies in a democracy. The implications of rational ignorance are examined in a setting where voters are assumed to completely understand the fiscal environment and make perfect use of any information that they possess. In this setting, it is demonstrated that ignorance may be rational, manipulated, and generate biased expectations over fiscal parameters. The analysis suggests that the electoral impact of voter ignorance is reduced, but not eliminated by electoral competition. Candidate positions only affect the electoral choices of individuals who are at least partially informed about those positions. Consequently electoral competition tends to generate policies that advance the interests of relatively informed voters. This implies that election based public policies are based upon better information than one would expect based on the widespread fiscal ignorance reported in surveys. However, even in this setting, the votes cast and the policies adopted are affected by the estimated marginal rates of substitution between private and governmental services which can not be unbiased if areas of ignorance remain — even if voters make the very best use of information in their possession. The existence of rational ignorance, once carefully defined, is sufficient to generate policy relevant fiscal illusion.     

The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Do better‐informed people vote more? Recent formal theories of voter turnout emphasize a positive effect of being informed on the propensity to vote, but the possibility of endogenous information acquisition makes estimation of causal effects difficult. I estimate the causal effects of being informed on voter turnout using unique data from a natural experiment Copenhagen referendum on decentralization. Four of fifteen districts carried out a pilot project, exogenously making pilot city district voters more informed about the effects of decentralization. Empirical estimates based on survey data confirm a sizeable and statistically significant causal effect of being informed on the propensity to vote.     

Citizen Expectations and Satisfaction in a Young Democracy: A Test of the Expectancy‐Disconfirmation Model

Citizen satisfaction with public services has been shown to depend on citizens’ expectations and their perceptions of performance. If performance exceeds expectations, satisfaction is likely; if performance falls short of expectations, dissatisfaction is likely. The existing evidence on this process covers the United States and the United Kingdom. The authors generalize the idea of expectation‐driven citizen satisfaction (the “expectancy‐disconfirmation model”) theoretically and empirically to an institutional context of limited accountability and widespread citizen distrust. Using a survey of a broad cross‐section of the general adult population in Guadalajara, Mexico, in 2014, this article finds support for the expectancy‐disconfirmation model in this very different context. The authors also test for an effect of the type of expectation using an embedded, randomized experiment but do not find evidence of a difference between normative and empirical expectations. Findings support the usefulness of the expectancy‐disconfirmation model in a wide range of contexts.     

Toward More “Evidence‐Informed” Policy Making?

The quality of public decision making depends significantly on the quality of analysis and advice provided through public organizations. Champions of “evidence‐informed” policy making claim that rigorous evaluation practices can significantly improve attainment of cost‐effective outcomes. After decades of experience, performance information is more sophisticated, but evaluation practices and capabilities vary enormously. Public agencies gather and process vast amounts of information, but there has been little analysis of how this information is actually utilized for policy and program improvement. This article examines how government agencies use evidence about policy and program effectiveness, with attention to four themes: (1) the prospects for improving “evidence‐informed” policy making, (2) the diversity of practices concerning evidence utilization and evaluation across types of public agencies and policy arenas, (3) recent attempts to “institutionalize” evaluation as a core feature of policy development and budget approval, and (4) the relationships between public agencies and nongovernmental sources of expertise.     

Activation,Conversion, or Reinforcement? The Impact of Partisan News Exposure on Vote Choice

This study uses multiwave panel data from the 2008 presidential election to investigate the impact of partisan news exposure on changes in vote preferences over time. Overcoming key limitations of prior research, the analysis distinguishes among the potential effects originally delineated by Lazarsfeld and colleagues ( 1948 ): (1) activation—motivating partisans who initially say they are undecided or planning to defect to shift their vote back to their own party's candidate; (2) conversion—motivating partisans to shift their vote to the opposing party's candidate; and (3) reinforcement—strengthening partisans’ preference for their initial vote choice. The results reveal only modest evidence that partisan news reinforces existing vote preferences. Surprisingly, partisan news plays a more robust role motivating changes in vote choice: news slanted toward citizens’ own partisanship increased the odds of activation and decreased the odds of conversion, while news slanted away from citizens’ own partisanship proved a strong counterforce working in the opposite direction.     

Information, visibility and elections: Why electoral outcomes differ when voters are better informed

This article assesses the aggregate effect of information shortfall on the outcome of the last six Canadian elections. Building on Bartels' analysis, the authors find an information effect in three of the six elections examined, and in each case the information gap benefits the Liberal Party. That finding raises the question: why does information matter in some contexts but not in others? It is argued in this article that the information gap is related to lack of visibility. When and where all political parties have some degree of visibility, the less informed vote like the better informed, but when and where a party is hardly visible, the less informed are less likely to support that party. The less informed appear to consider a smaller set of options when they decide how to vote.     

Never Change a Winning Policy? Public Sector Performance and Politicians' Preferences for Reforms

Despite the increasing stress on performance in public sector organizations, there is still little empirical evidence on whether—and if so, how—politicians respond to performance information. This article addresses this research gap by linking registry statistics on school performance in Norway's 428 municipalities with data from an information experiment embedded in a survey of local politicians. Findings show that school performance bears only a weak relationship to politicians' preferences for resource‐related reforms, but it strongly affects preferences for governance‐related reforms, indicating the importance of accounting for heterogeneity across alternative types of (school) reforms. Moreover, local politicians are, on average, well informed about school performance. This reflects the force of local inhabitants' high information level on politicians' accountability.     

Interpreting Performance Information: Motivated Reasoning or Unbiased Comprehension

A main rationale of performance information is to empower citizens to make informed decisions by presenting them with unambiguous information about the performance of institutions. However, even objective, clear, and unambiguous performance information is subject to biased interpretation depending on whether the information is consistent with the prior beliefs held by those who receive the information. Integrating the theory of motivated reasoning with the literature on performance information, the authors hypothesize that performance information that is inconsistent with prior beliefs is less likely to be interpreted correctly than belief‐consistent information. Using randomized survey experiments in which respondents were presented with quantitative performance data, the authors show that subjects systematically interpret performance information in ways that conform with their prior beliefs. The findings question the assumption that providing performance information automatically increases knowledge about government performance, let alone improves political decisions.     

Empowering Consumers Through Data and Smart Technology: Experimental Evidence on the Consequences of Time‐of‐Use Electricity Pricing Policies

This paper investigates the extent to which technology used to automate household responses to time‐of‐use pricing for electricity leads to higher energy savings than simply providing households with information on current prices and quantities. Using a large randomized field trial, we find that informed households with “smart” thermostats achieve impressive reductions in consumption during on‐peak periods of up to 48 percent, but also engage in substantial load shifting to off‐peak hours. We also document the extent to which household responses to time‐of‐use pricing are heterogeneous and vary significantly by demographics, weather, and across the usage distribution.     

What Can Performance Information Do to Legislators? A Budget‐Decision Experiment with Legislators

Studies on the influence of performance information on budgeting decisions have produced contradictory findings. This article offers a framework of the parliamentary context that links performance information to legislators’ budgeting decisions. The framework suggests that the impact on politicians’ allocations will differ depending on whether performance information is reflected in the budget proposal, whether the allocation issue concerns a politically difficult trade‐off for the decision maker, and whether information falls into a receptive partisan mind. The experimental study uses 57 actual legislators. The results show that the introduction of performance information into legislators’ deliberation process leads to stronger deviations from the status quo allocation. This difference occurs because performance information highlights more clearly the expected consequences of budgetary changes and allows for more pronounced reactions. More informed decisions, however, might make compromise among legislators more difficult because individual positions will become more polarized.     

The Product and Difference Fallacies for Indirect Effects

Political scientists often cite the importance of mechanism‐specific causal knowledge, both for its intrinsic scientific value and as a necessity for informed policy. This article explains why two common inferential heuristics for mechanism‐specific (i.e., indirect) effects can provide misleading answers, such as sign reversals and false null results, even when linear regressions provide unbiased estimates of constituent effects. Additionally, this article demonstrates that the inferential difficulties associated with indirect effects can be ameliorated with the use of stratification, interaction terms, and the restriction of inference to subpopulations (e.g., the indirect effect on the treated). However, indirect effects are inherently not identifiable—even when randomized experiments are possible. The methodological discussion is illustrated using a study on the indirect effect of Islamic religious tradition on democracy scores (due to the subordination of women).     

Opinion formation in foreign policy: the Swiss experience

Applying John Zaller's model of opinion formation to survey data covering 15 years (1981–95) of direct democracy in Switzerland, this paper provides a contribution to the debate about opinion formation in foreign policy. On the one hand, the Swiss experience contradicts the widespread view that citizens are poorly informed about and little interested in foreign affairs. On the other hand, direct democracy often translates into governmental defeats in this field. We address these mixed results and show that opinion formation in foreign policy is not a special case, and differs from that in domestic policy only with respect to the circumstances under which it occurs. In particular, we highlight the unusual type and level of conflict within the elite on foreign policy issues, which translates into distinct patterns of attitudes among the public.     

Bridging the Gap between Evidence and Policy Makers: A Case Study of the Pew‐MacArthur Results First Initiative

Developing ways to bridge the long‐recognized gap between researchers and policy makers is increasingly important in this age of constrained public resources. As noted by recent scholarship, progress toward evidence‐informed policy making requires both improving the supply of research that is reliable, timely, and relevant to the policy process and promoting demand and support for this information among decision makers. This article presents a case study of the Pew‐MacArthur Results First Initiative, which is working in a growing number of state and local governments to build systems that bring rigorous evidence on “what works” into their budget processes and to support its use in resource allocation decisions. The initiative's experience to date is promising, although creating lasting and dynamic evidence‐based policy‐making systems requires a long‐term commitment by both researchers and policy makers.     

In Defense of Factions

We model faction formation in a world where party politicians' objective is the development of an informed program of governance. Politicians' preferences reflect their own views and their information that, when aggregated via intraparty deliberations, influences the party manifesto. By joining a faction, a politician increases the influence of its leader on the manifesto, but foregoes his individual bargaining power. For broad model specifications, we find that a faction formation process allows power to be transferred to moderate politicians. This facilitates information sharing, increasing the capacity of the party to attain its objective. These positive welfare effects may hold even when factionalism restricts intraparty dialogue, and hold a fortiori when information is freely exchanged across factions. We conclude that the existence of ideological factions may benefit a party: It provides a means to tie uninformed or extremist politicians to more moderate and informed faction leaders.     

Forecasts and Preferences in the 1992 General Election

Little attention has been paid to the influence of expectations for victory on the formation of general election preferences in U.S. presidential races. There is good reason to believe, however, that under certain conditions citizens' forecasts of who will win the fall election may influence their preference and their vote. We model preferences during the course of the fall 1992 campaign as a function of two kinds of expectations. First we attempt to identify a component of expectations that is independent of political projection. We discover that expectations based only on information about the race play a prominent role in preference formation early in the fall but decline later as the cost of information drops. Similar results obtain when we include projection in the model of expectations. We conclude that general elections may have some of the same dynamic properties that are observable in primaries. Since early momentum in the fall campaign may influence subsequent preference formation, we contend that leads in early polls are valuable.     

Local economies and national economic evaluations

Underlying the phenomena of economic voting are voters’ perceptions of economic conditions. But from where do these evaluations originate? This work examines the effects of three types of factors influential to the formation of national economic evaluations: predispositions (such as age, gender, income, partisanship), information and attentiveness, and objective local economic conditions (local unemployment rates). Our findings fit with earlier work, broadly confirming the influential role each set of factors plays in shaping national economic perceptions. We then extend the literature - demonstrating that the impact of the local economic environment is conditional on attention to media, political information and education. Using a combined dataset of the 2006 Canadian Election Studies with neighbourhood level economic indicators drawn from Canadian Census data (2006), our findings show that, in developing perceptions of the national economy, more attentive, more informed and more educated individuals are less influenced by local economic conditions than their less attentive, less informed and less educated counterparts. These findings contribute to our understanding of how local economic conditions influence the formation of national economic evaluations.     

网络监督：打破信息不对称的有效途径

信息不对称是导致腐败现象产生的一个重要根源,在我国主要表现为：官员与民众信息的不对称、腐败者所在组织内部和外部的信息不对称、底层与上层的信息不对称及腐败者与监督者的信息不对称。网络监督是新时代产生的新型舆论监督方式,具有监督主体广泛、信息全面、方便快捷、运作高效等特点,能有效地打破监督主客体间的信息不对称,促进反腐倡廉建设。同时,对于网络监督过程中存在的非理性、权责不平衡和监督群体有限性等缺陷,要有清醒的认识,应逐步加以解决与改进。     

Does Disclosure of Performance Information Influence Street‐level Bureaucrats’ Enforcement Style?

Governments use different regulatory instruments to ensure that businesses owners or “inspectees” comply with rules and regulations. One tool that is increasingly applied is disclosing inspectees’ performance information to other stakeholders. Disclosing performance information has consequences for street‐level bureaucrats because it increases the visibility of their day‐to‐day work. Using a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, this article shows that the disclosure of performance information has an impact on enforcement style at the street level. Findings show that perceived disclosed performance information positively enhances all three dimensions of street‐level bureaucrats’ enforcement style (legal, facilitation, and accommodation). This effect is strongest for facilitation and accommodation and weakest for the legal style. Perceived resistance by inspectees partly explains this effect. Contrary to expectations, more perceived disclosure does not result in more but in less perceived resistance of inspectees by street‐level bureaucrats.     

Strategic Human Resource Practices: Introducing Alternatives for Organizational Performance Improvement in the Public Sector

Can public sector organizations increase productivity through competition in spite of inherent limitations, such as budget constraints? This study addresses that question by examining the impact of four factors that contribute to employees’ expectations regarding competitive work environments on organizational performance in terms of overall quality of work and client satisfaction. The four factors measured include rewards for merit such as salary and benefits, opportunities, organizational rules, and the capacity to deal with risks as perceived by employees. Using data on public and nonprofit sector employees, expectations for merit rewards were positively related to employees’ perception of organizational performance when the conditions of performance‐based organizational rules and risk‐taking behaviors were also satisfied. Moreover, employees’ perceptions of organizational performance tended to increase when they felt that organizational rules were oriented toward performance plus organizational members and top leaders exhibited greater risk‐taking behaviors. However, no correlation was evident between employees’ expectations of opportunities and perceived organizational performance.