Proportional Representation in the Welsh Assembly

The proposed rule for electing members to the Welsh Assembly gives each voter two votes, to cast at the Parliamentary constituency level, and at the bigger European constituency level. Half of the members are to be elected for the Assembly by a form of proportional representation, where party support is calculated by aggregating the two votes. The voters will be allowed to cast the second vote for a different party than the one for which they voted at the parliamentary level. This additional degree of freedom can frustrate the objective of obtaining better correspondence between party support and the number ofseats.     

Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance

This article argues that the LDP manufactured its parliamentary dominance in postwar Japan by strategically altering specific facets of the electoral system. More generally, I demonstrate that intraparty politics play a crucial role in determining when and how electoral rules are changed. Despite widespread evidence that the LDP would win more seats under an SMP electoral formula, party leaders were repeatedly blocked from replacing the postwar MMD-SNTV system by intraparty incumbents, who feared that such a change would harm their individual reelection prospects. However, party leaders had greater leeway in altering rules that generated fewer intraparty conflicts. Between 1960 and 1990, the LDP implemented approximately fifty changes to campaign regulations, most of which were aimed at enhancing the incumbency advantage of all rank-and-file MPs. Statistical tests confirm that absent pro-incumbent revisions to the electoral code, the LDP would have succumbed to declining public popularity and lost its majority at least a decade earlier.     

Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

Recent studies on strategic voting and entry in elections that combine plurality or majority and proportional representation (PR) have found candidate placement in single-member district (SMD) races to improve a party's PR performance. The primary implication of the existence of "contamination effects" is that parties have an incentive to nominate candidates in as many single-member districts as possible. Pre-electoral coordination in the majoritarian component of mixed electoral systems, however, is far from uncommon. In this article, we identify a number of institutional incentives that induce political parties to form pre-electoral alliances in spite of contamination effects. By identifying institutions that favor and hamper coordination, we seek to advance the understanding of PR-SMD interactions and to assess their implications for the design, classification, and empirical analysis of mixed electoral rules. Our statistical tests evaluate strategic entry in a diverse sample of countries.     

The Settlement and Process of Devolution: Territorial Politics and Governance under the Welsh Assembly

Devolution has been the most notable feature of the Labour government's plan to modernize the constitution. Principal consideration is given to Wales and to events since the formation of the National Assembly, which are examined by recourse to theoretically informed analysis on territorial politics and the nature of governance. The central question concerns the extent to which the Assembly can develop an autonomous policy position. Contemporary theories argue that internal and external developments have left central government in a less powerful position, which potentially can further augment the prospects for devolution. Events prior to and after the formation of the Assembly question whether government has moved into a new phase of development. Central government still commands an extensive range of resources and powers, especially over territorial bodies. At the same time, comparative analysis shows that such institutional parameters need not remain fixed. There is institutional space within the state for these powers to be contested and that the continued significance of territory can act as the basis of such political struggle.     

Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective

Abstract The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single–member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.     

A Behavioral Theory of Electoral Structure

Why are party systems in modern democracies so essentially robust? We theorize patterns of electoral competition as the outcome of a struggle between entropy and structure. Forces of entropy entail idiosyncratic voting behavior guided by subjective evaluations, while forces of structure entail coordinated behavior emerging from objective aspects of party preference. Our model locates determinants of party preference on a continuum spanning subjective and objective concerns. Entropy is endemic but elections for nationwide executive office periodically prime objective concerns, reinstating structure in party systems. We demonstrate the cyclical pulse of national elections in a comparative analysis of pseudo-randomized survey data from the European Election Studies since 1989. We also show how feedback from differently-sized party systems consolidates different working equilibria.     

Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective

The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single–member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.     

Comparing Electoral Systems: A Geometric Analysis

This paper constructs a game-theoretic model of elections inalternative electoral systems with three or four candidates.Each electoral system specifies how the platforms of thecandidates and their scores give rise to an outcome. Whengeometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can competeagainst each other for victory, a pivot probability isassociated to that pair. Each voter is rational and picks thecandidate that maximizes her expected utility, which resultsfrom the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about thepivot-probabilities. Candidate positioning is endogenous andthe result of a Nash game. The possible equilibria arecomputed for plurality and runoff majority systems.     

Electoral Registration: Time for Change

Electoral registration is the key building block for the administration of elections. It is the gateway to voting: people cannot vote at elections in the UK if their name is not on the register. In recent times there has been much debate in media and Westminster circles about current arrangements for electoral registration and the related issue of the future of postal voting.
This article presents new research published by the Electoral Commission in September 2005 investigating non-registration and its causes. It reviews the case for reform, considers the current policy debate and outlines some of the challenges involved in maximising registration rates. It summarises the Commission's policy recommendations and the reasoning behind them, focusing in particular on the suggested move from the current household-based system of registration to a system of individual registration     

A Fast, Easy, and Efficient Estimator for Multiparty Electoral Data

Katz and King have previously developed a model for predictingor explaining aggregate electoral results in multiparty democracies.Their model is, in principle, analogous to what least-squaresregression provides American political researchers in that two-partysystem. Katz and King applied their model to three-party electionsin England and revealed a variety of new features of incumbencyadvantage and sources of party support. Although the mathematicsof their statistical model covers any number of political parties,it is computationally demanding, and hence slow and numericallyimprecise, with more than three parties. In this paper we producean approximate method that works in practice with many partieswithout making too many theoretical compromises. Our approachis to treat the problem as one of missing data. This allowsus to use a modification of the fast EMis algorithm of King,Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve and to provide easy-to-use software,while retaining the attractive features of the Katz and Kingmodel, such as the t distribution and explicit models for uncontestedseats.     

Differential Influences on Latino Electoral Participation

Relying on the Voter Supplement File of the November 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS), this study assesses sociodemographic influences on the registration status and turnout of Latino citizens in the United States. Latinos' deficits on socioeconomic status and social-connectedness largely account for their lower levels of participation. This study also provides a thorough assessment of whether and of how the influences on electoral participation differ between Anglos and Latinos. Noteworthy findings emerge. Whereas formal education and marriage demonstrate greater influence on the participation of Anglos, Latinos reap greater participatory benefits from age.     

The Purpose of Electoral Reform for Westminster

Britain is facing a referendum on electoral reform for Westminster in 2011, yet there is little debate over the goals of such a change. Arguably, the purposes of political representation should determine the choice of a new system. Thus, ten modernising goals that go further than merely giving more seats to the Liberal Democrats are proposed. In a society made up of women and men, both need balanced representation. In an educated society, citizens need to be kept abreast of their MPs' performance as legislators so they can engage with parliamentary affairs. In an increasingly diverse society, the electoral system needs to improve who gets to be represented by whom, by providing citizens with more than one representative per district. The proposed Alternative Vote would provide few advantages and additional drawbacks, but could stimulate consensus around a modern system in tune with Westminster traditions.