论违约方解除权的教义学构造

违约方解除权本为我国司法实践和学说理论发展出的规则,而《民法典》第580条第2款则是该规则的立法表达。违约方解除权是履行障碍抗辩制度的加重规则,其赋予债务人相较于抗辩权更为强力的救济即解除权。一方面,违约方解除权可以化解合同僵局,促进资源流通整合,体现了效率原则的要求;另一方面,它防止债权人利用合同僵局不正当地损害债务人利益,并鼓励双方善意合作,因此亦建立在诚实信用原则之上。《民法典》第580条第2款是关于违约方解除权的规定,其并非继续性合同重大事由终止规则。违约方解除权也应当与法定解除权截然区分。违约方解除权的适用一方面以履行障碍抗辩事由的存在为前提,另一方面则以合同目的不能实现、债务人非恶意违约和债权人不解除合同违反诚实信用原则为要件。违约方解除合同的法律效果是合同进入返还清算关系。     

根本违约对风险负担的影响 ——以《合同法》第148 条的解释论为中心

关于我国《合同法》第148 条的规范意旨，学界认识未尽统一，学者对该条的批判存有 误解。就该条规范的解释，应使买受人解除合同的场合，标的物毁损灭失的风险回溯自始由出卖人承 担。《合同法》第148 条的调整模式并非孤例，在比较法上有广泛支撑。此一规则蕴含的立法价值判 断是：考虑到买方无辜受害，应以解约制度赋予充分救济，且此种救济的效果，不应受到风险负担常态 规则的减损。在正当性方面，该价值判断有“风险利益相一致原则”支撑，且与《合同法》第143 条和 第146 条相呼应，共同反映了“救济非违约方”的立法旨趣，并可确保双方地位平衡与规范体系评价一 致。在适用范围上，《合同法》第148 条专为应对卖方根本违约而买方解除合同的案型量身定做。本 条中“质量不符合要求”仅属例示，而“合同目的不能实现”才是判定适用范围的根本准据。同时，在 风险损失与违约行为同一的场合，非属本条调整对象，此时应以风险负担规则的法律效果为准据，判 定解除规则的适用与否。     

论合同解除及合同解除权的行使

根据我国合同法的规定,合同解除,一般具有溯及既往的效力,其后果类似于合同无效,应当属于能够引起合同关系产生重大变化的原因。因此,对合同解除问题必须慎重对待。实际上,合同解除权的行使方法,各国因立法不同而有差异。关于我国合同法规定的合同解除及其方法,实践中对于当事人以诉讼方式行使合同解除权是否可以、合同解除权以此方式行使时解除效力从何时起算等问题尚存一定的分歧。此外,由于我国立法也未对合同解除权行使的期限作出明确规定,构成法律漏洞,影响司法实践。为此,本文拟结合审判实践中遇到的问题,如约定解除权的类型及其行使程序、附条件或附期限的解除权的行使、法定解除权的行使、合同解除是否都具有溯及力、合同解除权行使的除斥期间如何确定等等方面进行研究,通过分析、研究,明确合同解除权行使的要件、程序,准确把握其适用标准。     

合同解除与损失赔偿的关系——以《合同法》第94条为视角

就合同解除与损失赔偿的关系而言，认为“合同解除与损害赔偿相互排斥”的选择主义，与我国现行立法相悖；认为“合同解除与因合同消灭之损害赔偿并存的两立主义”，无法实现实质正义。在我国现行法律框架之下，如债权人依法行使一般法定解除权解除合同的，无论是从违约责任制度的目的来看，还是根据民法解释学的一般规则，均应采‘lA同解除与债务不履行的损害赔偿并存的两立主义”，从而将期待利益纳入赔偿范围。     

合同解除异议制度研究

合同解除异议权,即“请求人民法院或者仲裁机构确认解除合同的效力”的权利,性质上属于提起确认之诉的诉权,非解约方和解约方均可依《民事诉讼法》第119条第1项享有。双方的诉权彼此构成限制,可以实现尽早稳定合同关系的目的。《合同法》第96条第3款第1句只是非解约方享有诉权的注意规定。现有研究以及《关于适用〈中华人民共和国合同法〉若干问题的解释（二）》第24条误将异议权作为实体权利,并以此为基础建构旨在限制异议权、稳定合同关系的合同解除异议制度,不仅在逻辑层面无法自圆其说,还在价值层面产生诸多负面影响。适用《解释二》第24条时,应对解除权的有无进行实质审查,并据此判定解除行为的效力,从而架空、虚置该条规定。抵销异议以及其它种类的形成权异议也应遵循这一规则。     

关于合同解除的几个问题

合同解除制度是合同制度的重要内容。合同解除既能引起合同关系的溯及、消灭，也是违约的一种救济方式。约定解除和法定解除是合同解除权发生的原因。在我国的有关合同法的立法中应统一和明确法定解除权发生的原因     

合同解除的疑问与释答

在风险负担规则不完善的背景下,不可抗力致使不能实现合同目的,作为合同解除的条件可以接受。协议解除在事实上属于合同解除制度的组成部分,只是与违约解除不同。合同撤销和合同解除可以竞合。已经成立但未生效的合同可以作为解除的对象。在约定的解除条件没有涵盖全部解除条件的情况下,在未涵盖的领域,法定解除条件仍有其适用余地。违反从给付义务、附随义务,只有在导致合同目的落空的情况下,才可以解除合同。《合同法》第410条关于任意解除合同的规定应当限缩适用。     

行政协议解除权的规则体系建构——兼评《行政协议规定》第27条第2款

行政协议兼具行政性与合同性,在行政协议解除制度中具体体现为直接适用行政优益权模式和参照适用民事法律规范解除权模式。行政优益权应当具有地方行政程序规定、办法或者特定领域单行立法的明确上位法基础,并且遵守行政协议解除程序和正当程序原则。《行政协议规定》第27条第2款规定了参照民事法律规范的要件,不过仍然需要解决三个问题：第一,应当如何选择民事法律规范并进行修正;第二,法院在审理行政协议解除案件时应当从两种解除权中择一适用还是共同适用;第三,何种法律规范应当优先适用。《民法典》第533条的情势变更和第563条的法定解除可以作为民法上解除权的规范基础,不过需要根据行政法的规定进行有条件的修正。《民法典》第565条的通知解除程序规范也应当在适用民法上解除权时被参照。两种解除权构成权利的竞合,行政机关从中择一适用即可,并且应当优先适用民事法律规范。     

论合同解除的溯及力

合同解除的溯及力是合同解除效力的重要内容之一,目前对于合同解除的溯及力的观点主要有三种,即肯定说、否定说和折衷说。这三种观点均具有一定的合理性,但是都不够全面。事实上合同法第九十七条对合同解除的溯及力作出了具体规定,该条创设了一种选择权,即当合同主体的解除权从期待状态变为既得状态时,根据合同法第九十七条规定,合同主体可以对合同解除的后果进行选择,而解除权人选择内容的不同决定了合同解除的溯及力的有无。     

论合同的任意解除制度

我国《合同法》第410条的规定,委托合同的任何一方当事人可以随时解除委托合同,即当事人拥有对合同的任意解除权.但合同法第410条规定的任意解除权适用范围过宽,应当加以限制.在现实经济活动中,如果完全依照法律的规定任意解除,则可能会出现不公平的现象.因而,在委托人和受托人共同分享利益、共担风险的情况下,可以限制委托合同当事人的任意解除权.     

Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana on Avidyā

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana.     

Unraveling the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Kāvyaprakāśa</Emphasis>: Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa’s idiosyncratic sequence of topics in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Candrāloka</Emphasis>

In his twelfth century alaṃkāraśāstra, the Candrāloka, Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa reverses the sequence of topics found in Mammaṭa’s Kāvyapr-akāśa, an earlier and immensely popular work. With such a structural revisionism, Jayadeva asserts the autonomy of his own work and puts forth an ambitious critique of earlier approaches to literary analysis. Jayadeva investigates the technical and aesthetic components of poetry in the first part of the Candrāloka, prior to his formal semantic investigations in the latter half of the text, thus suggesting that aesthetic evaluations of poetry beneficially inform scientific investigations of language. Jayadeva’s organization of his chapters on the semantic operations, moreover, intimates that the study of suggestive and metaphoric functions of language clarifies our understanding of denotation, which is conventionally understood to be the primary and direct path of verbal designation.     

The Supreme Array Scripture: A New Interpretation of the Title “Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra”

This article argues for a new interpretation of the Sanskrit compound gaṇḍa-vyūha as it is used in the common title of the Mahāyāna text the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra.The author begins by providing a brief history of the sūtra’s appellations in Chinese and Tibetan sources. Next, the meanings of gaṇḍa (the problematic member of the compound) are explored. The author proposes that contemporary scholars have overlooked a meaning of gaṇḍa occurring in some compounds, wherein gaṇḍa can mean simply “great,” “big” or “massive.” This general sense is particularly common in the compound gaṇda-śaila (a “massive rock” or “boulder”) and is found in such texts as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Harivaṃśa and the Harṣacarita. Following the discussion of Gaṇḍa, the author examines the term vyūha (“array”) as it is used in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The article concludes with the suggestion that a more appropriate translation of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra would be “The Supreme array Scripture.”     

Evaluation of six presumptive tests for blood, their specificity, sensitivity, and effect on high molecular-weight DNA

Luminol, leuchomalachite green, phenolphthalein, Hemastix, Hemident, and Bluestar are all used as presumptive tests for blood. In this study, the tests were subjected to dilute blood (from 1:10,000 to 1:10,000,000), many common household substance, and chemicals. Samples were tested for DNA to determine whether the presumptive tests damaged or destroyed DNA. The DNA loci tested were D2S1338 and D19S433. Leuchomalachite green had a sensitivity of 1:10,000, while the remaining tests were able to detect blood to a dilution of 1:100,000. Substances tested include saliva, semen, potato, tomato, tomato sauce, tomato sauce with meat, red onion, red kidney bean, horseradish, 0.1 M ascorbic acid, 5% bleach, 10% cupric sulfate, 10% ferric sulfate, and 10% nickel chloride. Of all the substances tested, not one of the household items reacted with every test; however, the chemicals did. DNA was recovered and amplified from luminol, phenolphthalein, Hemastix, and Bluestar, but not from leuchomalachite green or Hemident.     

Monks Who Have Sex: Pārājika Penance in Indian Buddhist Monasticisms

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism.

Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.)

     

Family breakdown and the ‘Welfare Child’ in 19th and 20th century Britain

This article traces new cycles of interest in past children as distinct from past childhood. Recent work highlighting that a conceptualisation of childhood existed even in periods with few written records closes the chapter begun by Philippe Ariès in 1960. Instead, there has been a new surge of interest in children on the edges of family life, as well as children in similarly liminal positions between the worlds of adults and children: runaways, delinquents and orphans. Several themes in the literature are identified, based on the conflicting ideas of ‘body/mind’, ‘victim/threat’, ‘needs/rights’. It is noted that researchers are using more imaginative ways of reaching the lived experience of children than the family or institutional framework, and that an increasing link is drawn between historical and modern concerns such as child abuse and the care of ‘at risk’ children.     

Vedic Language and Vaiṣṇava Theology:Madhva’s Use of Nirukta in his Ṛgbhāṣya

This article explores the way in which Madhva (1238–1317), the founder of the Dvaita Vedānta system of Hindu thought, reformulates the traditional exegetic practice of nirukta or “word derivation” to validate his pluralistic, hierarchical, and Vaiṣṇava reading of the Ṛgvedic hymns. Madhva’s Ṛgbhāṣya (RB) is conspicuous for its heavy reliance on and unique deployment of this exegetical tactic to validate several key features of his distinctive theology. These features include his belief in Viṣṇu’s unique possession of all perfect attributes (guṇaparipūrṇatva) and His related conveyability by all Vedic words (sarvaśabdavācyatva). Such an understanding of Vedic language invokes the basic nirukta presupposition that words are eternally affiliated with the meanings they convey. But it is also based onMadhva’s access to a lexicon entitled Vyāsa’s Nirukti with which his critics and perhaps even his commentators seem to be unfamiliar.While the precise status of this text is the subject of ongoing debate, Madhva’s possession of special insight into the sacred canon is established in part by his unique claim to be an avatāra of the wind god Vāyu and a direct disciple of Viṣṇu Himself in the form of Vyāsa₁. Thus, Madhva’s use of nirukta invokes his personal charisma to challenge not only conventional understandings of the hymns but traditional exegetic norms. Madhva’s provision of an alternative tradition of nirukta provoked sectarian debate throughout the Vijayanagara period over the extent to which one could innovate in established practices of reading the Veda. Articulating the Veda’s precise authority was a key feature of Brahmin debates during this period and reflects both the empire’s concern with promoting a shared religious ideology and the competition among rival Brahman sects for imperial patronage that this concern elicited. By looking at how two of Madhva’s most important commentators (the 14^th-century Jayatīrtha and the 17^th-century Rāghavendra) sought to defend his niruktis, this article will explore how notions of normative nirukta were articulated in response to Madhva’s deviations. At the same time, however, examining Madhva’s commentators’ defense of his niruktis also demonstrates the extent to which Madhva actually adhered to selected exegetic norms. This reveals that discomfort with Madhva’s particular methods for deriving words stemmed, in part, from a more general ambivalence towards this exegetical tactic whose inherent open-endedness threatened to undermine the fixity of the canon’s very substance: its language. Vyāsa’s Nirukti is one of several ”unknown sources” cited in Madhva’s commentaries whose exact status continues to be debated. Some scholars (e.g. Rao, Sharma, Siauve) maintain that these texts are part of a now lost Pāṅcarātra tradition that Madhva is attempting to preserve. This may be true for many of these citations. However, in addition to claiming to be both an avatāra of Vāyu and Viṣṇu-as-Vyāsa’s student, Madhva states in several places (e.g., VTN 42, RB 162) that the canon has suffered loss during transmission and that only Viṣṇu can reveal it in its entirety. Thus, it is possible that Madhva intends texts like Vyāsa’s Nirukti to be viewed as part of an ongoing and corrective revelation, a notion that is compatible with many Vaiṣṇava traditions (Halbfass, 1991: 4).     

Policing Outlawed Desire: ‘Homocriminality’ in Beat Spaces in Australia

Drawing on interview data of gay men who have had their behavior in public spaces scrutinised by agents of the law for signs deviance, this article explores the historical characteristics of police animosity towards such conduct in Australia. This entails examining encounters between police and gay men who pursue desire in ‘beat’ (or ‘cottage’ to the use the UK term) spaces. Exploring why these outlaw gay male subjects are so abject and troubling to the law, the discussion documents how law’s desire to regulate gay men plays out in the masquerade of ‘plain-clothes’ agent provocateur operations where police entrap gay men by mimicking gay bodily appearances, gestures and mannerisms. This article also examines how police regulation of gay desire functions as a form of violence that delimits expressions of same sex desire in public spaces. A key theme that underpins the analyses in this paper is that the policing of desire in ‘beat’ spaces helps produce qualities of illicitness and dangerousness and that this, in turn, fuels the circuit of desire at play between gay men and agents of the law.

Interrupting the Myth of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Partage</Emphasis>: Reflections on Sovereignty and Sacrifice in the work of Nancy,Agamben and Derrida

Agamben traces the bio-political essence of modern politics to the non-sacrificial killing of Homo Sacer in Roman law. Nancy, on the other hand, links the history of Western politics to the fundamental logic of sacrifice in Western metaphysics. He nevertheless contemplates the possibility that Western societies may finally have arrived at the threshold of a non-sacrificial existence. Derrida seeks to resist the sacrificial logic of Western metaphysics and politics, but nevertheless appears to accept it as an irreducible fact of human co-existence. Unlike Nancy, he envisages no actual or actualised beyond beyond the realm of sacrificial metaphysics and politics. He thus can be said to interrupt Nancy’s ‘myth’ of a non-sacrificial partage. This article compares these three philosophical stances in the hope of throwing more light on the role of sacrifice in the law and politics of our time. Professor of Law, Rand Afrikaans University. Conversations with Ann van Sevenant, Carol Clarkson, Louise du Toit, Peter Fitzpatrick, Costas Douzinas and Adam Thurschwell gave impetus to many of the themes developed in this article. Concomitant shortcomings and inaccuracies, as always, are mine.