Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens

This article asks, 'how do practitioners understand the relationship between the prime minister, ministers and the rest of Westminster and Whitehall?' We focus on three topics. First, we review tales of a Blair presidency. Second, we explore the governance paradox in which people tell tales of a Blair presidency as they recount stories of British governance that portray it as fragmented with several decision-makers. Finally, we argue that this paradox reveals the distorting influence the Westminster model still exerts on many accounts of British politics. It acts as a smokescreen for the changes in executive politics.     

After Number Ten: What Do Former Prime Ministers Do?

The article reviews the experience of former British prime ministers in the twentieth century. There is no fixed or predetermined role for former prime ministers. What they do after they leave office depends on personal choices and on circumstances. Some have largely disappeared from the political stage. Others have become active international 'elder statesmen'. A couple-Heath and Thatcher-were embittered 'models to avoid'. A quarter of the former prime ministers since 1900 have served in other government posts in their successors' Cabinets, while a handful have turned down such appointments. Most have gone to the Lords, which offers a political platform, but sometimes they do not think much of the quality of the second chamber. The retirements of some former prime ministers have been clouded by money worries, but they nowadays get substantial pensions and can make money from business directorships, international lectures and writing memoirs. The article concludes with speculation about what Tony Blair's post-premiership might hold.     

Yes, Prime Minister: The key to forecasting British elections

We use our “PM and Pendulum” Model to forecast the outcome of the 2010 General election. The vote function of the model, aside from a cyclical dynamic, relies on approval of the prime minister as the sole predictor. We find that PM Approval predicts the vote (and vote intention between elections) more accurately than does Government Approval. Turning to the forecasting of seats, we examine the accuracy of the autoregressive model of the vote-seat translation against the uniform-swing model, which is widely used by pollsters and the media. Testing the alternatives on election data since 1910, our autoregressive vote-seat translation model proves superior to the uniform-swing model.     

British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British National Security Immediately After the Second World War

Recently declassified Security Service (MI5) records reveal, for the first time, the full extent of the threat that Zionist terrorism posed to British national security immediately after the Second World War. It is well established within the historical literature that after 1945 Britain faced violent campaigns by Jewish terrorist groups in the Mandate of Palestine. Hitherto unacknowledged in the historiography, however, is the fact that the threat of Zionist terrorism extended from Palestine to Britain itself. This article studies the nature of the threat posed by Zionist terrorism within Britain after 1945, and explores the counter-terrorist measures that MI5 devised to meet it. Overall, as this article shows, MI5's concerns with Zionist terrorism after 1945 offer a striking new interpretation of the history of the early Cold War.     

Defensive versus Offensive Approaches to Administrative Reform in France (1988–1997): The Leadership Dilemmas of French Prime Ministers

From 1988 to 1997, all French prime ministers launched administrative reform programs with numerous concerns for increasing efficiency, strengthening responsiveness, or redesigning political and administrative roles within the state. However, these initiatives have never led to radical and disruptive changes. The institutional legacy seems to have strongly constrained the politics of administration. What, then, is the meaning of launching administrative reforms within the French political power configuration, and how does it “fit” with the way leaders try to establish their political authority? This article provides two empirical studies of different prime ministers (Michel Rocard under the Mitterrand presidency and Alain Jupp under the Chirac presidency) that can explain the nature of the French governments' commitments to these issues. It argues that understanding administrative reforms requires a mixture of institutional and actor‐centered explanations, because these policies are really leadership challenges to the preexisting institutional order. As such, they are reflexively shaped or constrained by what they try to control and define. This paper shows that for a French prime minister to define the administration as a problem while building his own leadership can jeopardize the resources he will get from that same bureaucratic administrative system. This “power‐reform dilemma” may explain why administrative reforms have proven more politically effective as an instrument of order‐affirming impulses rather than as a disruptive strategy.     

British Pharmaceuticals: a cautionary tale

British pharmaccuticals is generally represented as a successful sector which illustrates the potential of knowledge-intensive, high-valve-added activities. This article presents a revisionist account based on evidence and argument. Pharmaceuticals is a small sector which combines high-value-added and average wages to benefit capital not labour. The knowledge base in the laboratory creates imitative product with marketing then applied to capture social expenditure. When product-market growth slows, the sector restructures defensively without solving its problems.     

Brexit and the British Constitution: a Long View

The Brexit referendum of 2016 brought a new concept to British politics, namely the ‘people’s will’, one that is seemingly at odds with conventional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, even a threat to its very existence. This article argues that although the device of the referendum is relatively new, the kind of popular control over Parliament and the executive that it invokes has long been a part of British politics. Ranging over 200 years, examples are drawn from the recall and deselection of MPs, mass petitioning campaigns, the role of the Speaker, and the flourishing of independent parties.