The Central Asian muftiate in occupied Afghanistan, 1979–87

Known by the Russian acronym SADUM, the muftiate responsible for overseeing mosques in the five Soviet Central Asian republics conducted pro-Soviet public diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan after the invasion of December 1979. SADUM's engagement with pro-Soviet ulama in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan marks a departure from the character of its extensive propaganda and relationship-building activities elsewhere in the Muslim and developing worlds. The Central Asian Islamic scholars staffing SADUM sought to assist the Soviet Party-state in establishing and consolidating a cadre of Afghan ulama who could achieve legitimacy in the eyes of Afghanistan's overwhelmingly Muslim population while maintaining political support for the Communist-oriented People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.     

Regime Consolidation and Female Status in a Fledgling Theocracy: Khomeini's Vilayet-e-Fiqh, 1979–89

The Iranian Revolution, through Khomeini's consolidation measures, quickly morphed into an ‘Islamic Revolution’. Khomeini's regime abrogated popular legislation such as the Family Protection Laws of 1967 and 1975, which protected the rights of females, as the clerics sought to institute Shariah (Islamic) laws in an ‘Islamic Republic’. The historical record reveals that the precipitous legal transformation from secular to Shariah law under Ayatollah Khomeini's personal tutelage placed females in a dangerous predicament. Regressive gender policies, however, served to mobilize females to push back against the new social paradigm which had emerged under the rubric of Velayat-e-Fiqh. This article examines this misogynistic trajectory during Khomeini's rule and how it served to galvanize many Iranian women to ‘gender activism’.     

Testing Duvergerʼs law: strategic voting in Mongolian elections, 1996–2004

Recent empirical research on voting in single-member districts, based on extensive data-sets of election results, has demonstrated the general (although not universal) validity of Duverger’s law (i.e. that the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition). This article tests Duverger’s law through analysis of a data-set covering Mongolian parliamentary elections in the period of 1996–2004. The results show consistent, but not linear, movement towards the Duvergerian equilibrium in Mongolia, with large part of the districts conforming to the Duvergerian norm of two-party competition. Duverger treated his law merely as an important tendency but insisted that social forces are the main determinants of the number of political parties. The main factor that limited Mongolian voters’ rationality, and created problems with their strategic ability to distinguish and abandon hopeless candidates, was weak institutionalization of the Mongolian party system. Finally, I prove that the emergence of bipolar party politics was not an immediate process and will continue over a series of elections, supporting the so-called “learning hypothesis.”     

Taiwan’s Sub-national Government Relations with Japan: Post-1979 Developments

In 1972 the Japanese government ended its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. And yet it did not. In the aftermath of that decision, colonial legacy ties between Taiwan and Japan were drawn upon to create a new form of relationship, with ties that were official in all but name. Taiwanese cities and counties were also encouraged to develop formal ties with their Japanese counterparts. These sub-national ties are a critical – but little researched – component of the enduring bilateral relationship between these two countries. This article – based on extensive fieldwork in both countries – is an initial effort in understanding how these ties have developed and function, and how they support bilateral relations between Taiwan and Japan. Drawing on additional fieldwork in China, this article also considers what formal limitations exist on the para-diplomatic relations between these countries.     

The political and organizational implications of China's new economic policies, 1976–1979

Abstract

Whatever one may say about China under Mao, it would be terribly difficult to argue that economic development had failed to take place. Of course, measured against some abstract standard of perfection, one could make a case for a disappointing or relatively imbalanced performance. China's performance did not live up to the more extravagant claims made by the Chinese media and by some foreigners. But viewed in historical context, and by comparison with any other third world economy, China under Mao could take credit for successfully overcoming some of the most crucial obstacles to development and for distributing its benefits in an unprecedentedly egalitarian way. Progress was at times uneven, but the unevenness should be attributed more to the serious objective constraints and bottlenecks caused by underdevelopment and poverty, and by the periodic political upheavals which paradoxically were necessary to achieve the very successes. Allegedly “fatal” irrationalities inherent in the Maoist approach to organization and planning or to economic development in general cannot, therefore, be held responsible for non-existent failure, though as will be seen, this approach was not without serious problems. Indeed, if the years during and after the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1975 are taken as a period of “Maoist” approaches to economic development and organization, the following figures tell the story.     

Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president's attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.     

US Covert Operations toward Iran,February–November 1979: Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?

This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so.     

Risk Factors and Pathways to Imprisonment among Incarcerated Women in Victoria, 1860–1920

Criminological studies have found that men’s and women’s pathways to imprisonment differ, with risk factors such as substance abuse, mental illness, socioeconomic circumstances and past victimisation more strongly associated with female prisoners. However, limited quantitative or longitudinal research exists on how the risk factors associated with female offending may have shifted over time. This article investigates the criminal careers and pathways to imprisonment of 6,042 women incarcerated in Victoria between 1860 and 1920, and the risk factors associated with subsequent recidivism. The findings suggest that, while many of today’s risk factors were present historically, there have been notable shifts across time.     

Pacification through decentralization: An explanatory analysis of ethno-territorial cabinet conflict in Belgium (1979–2006)

The impact of decentralization on ethno-territorial conflict is widely debated, but empirical analyses of ethno-territorial party politics are scarce. This paper uses novel data on conflicts in power-sharing cabinets to explore the relation between decentralization and ethno-territorial conflicts in the case of Belgium (1979–2006). These data are analysed with the help of poisson and logistic regressions, which confirm the negative association between decentralization and conflict. In addition to institutions, the analyses also examine the relevance of issue saliency, regionalist parties' strength, regionalist cabinet participation, and the proximity of elections. The results contradict the paradox of federalism and add to contemporary debates on ethno-territorial politics, conflict management, and power-sharing.     

Chinese and Japanese development co-operation: South–South,North–South,or what?

This article compares the evolution and characteristics of Chinese and Japanese aid, assessing the impact of their aid policies in sub-Saharan Africa from the 1950s to the present. It argues that China and Japan's aid programmes share more similarities than dissimilarities. Both pursue aid strategies that spread allocations across a region rather than concentrating upon specific countries. The article seeks to clarify the following questions. In what way are Chinese and Japanese aid strategies different from each other and Western donors? Should their aid be seen as a form of South–South co-operation that provides an alternative to the West's hegemony in Africa? Or is aid from these donors simply another strategy to control African resources and state elites in the guise of a partnership of equals?     

Keeping face in the public sphere: recognition,discretion and Uzbekistan's relations with the United States and Germany, 1991–2006

The manner in which President Karimov's roles were recognized in the global arena affected how Uzbekistan's international relations developed – a perspective that highlights both the form and the content of bilateral relationships. While mutual interests are crucial to beginning a relationship, it is also important to understand how those relations were recognized in public and dealt with in private. If partners managed to recognize Karimov's agenda publicly, or at least act with discretion, this tended to create an atmosphere favouring cooperation. As such, recognition and discretion reveal much about Karimov's concerns with international equality and self-reliance, pointing to the reasons why Uzbekistan's relations fluctuated more with some actors than others. The United States and Germany are ideal examples of that ambivalent situation: Washington often cooperated with Uzbekistan on security matters, but then saw its military personnel excluded from Qarshi-Qanabad after the 2005 Andijan crisis; whereas Berlin witnessed little change in its relationship with Uzbekistan and continued to lease a base in Termez after 2005. This difference in outcomes can be explained in part by a dynamic of recognition and discretion.