Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

Marginal Pricing and Student Investment in Higher Education

This paper examines the effect of marginal price on students’ educational investments using rich administrative data on students at Michigan public universities. Marginal price refers to the amount colleges charge for each additional credit taken in a semester. Institutions differ in how they price credits above the full‐time minimum (of 12 credits), with many institutions reducing the marginal price of such credits to zero. We find that a zero marginal price induces a modest share of students (i.e., 7 percent) to attempt up to one additional class (i.e., three credits) but also increases withdrawals and lowers course performance. The analysis generally suggests minimal impacts on credits earned and the likelihood of meeting “on‐time” benchmarks toward college completion, though estimates for these outcomes are less precise and more variable across specifications. Consistent with theory, the effect on attempted credits is largest among students who would otherwise locate at the full‐time minimum, which includes lower‐achieving and socioeconomically disadvantaged students.     

Liberalization and rent-seeking in China’s labor market

Communist Party membership can generate labor market benefits in at least two ways. First, the Party may hand out direct benefits to favored groups in the form of higher earnings. Alternatively, the Party may function in much the same way as education in Western countries, screening workers for talent and motivation. We find very little evidence of earnings premiums to Party membership or to cadre status prior to Chinese market liberalization. With liberalization comes less emphasis on being “red” and a greater capacity to earn wages that reflect ability, both observed through schooling and identified by the Party. We find that Party premiums are inversely related to education. Modest premiums to cadre status appear in 1995.     

Lifetime earnings patterns, the distribution of future Social Security benefits, and the impact of pension reform

In order to assess the effect of Social Security reform on current and future workers, it is essential to accurately characterize the initial situations of representative workers affected by reform. For the purpose of analyzing typical reforms, the most important characteristic of a worker is the level and pattern of his or her preretirement earnings. Under the current system, pensions are determined largely by the level of the workers' earnings averaged over their work life. However, several reform proposals would create individual retirement accounts for which the pension would depend on the investment accumulation within the account. Thus, the pension would also depend on the timing of the contributions into the account and hence on the exact shape of the worker's lifetime earnings profile. Most analysis of the distributional impact of reform has focused, however, on calculating benefit changes among a handful of hypothetical workers whose relative earnings are constant over their work life. The earnings levels are not necessarily chosen to represent the situations of workers who have typical or truly representative earnings patterns. Consequently, the results of such analysis can be misleading, especially if reform involves introducing a fundamentally new kind of pension formula. This article presents two broad approaches to creating representative earnings profiles for policy evaluation. First, we use standard econometric methods to predict future earnings for a representative sample of workers drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our statistical estimates are based on a simple representation of typical career earnings paths and a fixed-effect statistical specification. Because our estimation file contains information on each worker's annual earnings from 1951 through 1996 as reported in the Social Security Administration's earnings files, we have a record (though an incomplete one) of the actual earnings that will be used to determine future benefit payments. Our estimates of the earnings function permit us to make highly differentiated predictions of future earnings for each member of our sample. By combining the historical information on individual earnings with our prediction of future earnings up through the normal retirement age, our first approach produces tens of thousands of predicted career earnings paths that can be used in microsimulation policy analysis. Our second approach to creating lifetime earnings profiles is similar in some ways to the traditional method. For example, it is based on the creation of only a handful of "stylized" career earnings patterns. An important difference with the traditional method, however, is that we define the career earnings patterns so that they are truly representative of patterns observed in the workforce. We use simple mathematical formulas to characterize each stylized earnings pattern, and we then produce estimates of the average path of annual earnings for workers whose career earning path falls within each of the stylized patterns we have defined. Finally, we calculate the percentage of workers in successive birth-year cohorts who have earnings profiles that match each of the stylized earnings patterns. Although this method may seem simple, it allows the analyst to create stylized earnings patterns that are widely varied but still representative of earnings patterns observed among sizable groups of U.S. workers. The effects of policy reforms can then be calculated for workers with each of the stylized earnings patterns. Our analysis of U.S. lifetime earnings patterns and of the impact of selected policy reforms produces a number of findings about past trends in earnings, typical earnings patterns in the population, and the potential impact of reform. The analysis focuses on men and women born between 1931 and 1960. Along with earlier analysts, we find that men earn substantially higher lifetime wages than women and typically attain their peak career earnings at a somewhat earlier age. However, the difference in career earnings patterns between men and women has narrowed dramatically over time. Workers with greater educational attainment earn substantially higher wages than those with less education, and they attain their peak career earnings later in life. For example, among men with the least education, peak earnings are often attained around or even before age 40, whereas many men with substantial postsecondary schooling do not reach their peak career earnings until after 50. Our tabulations of the lifetime earnings profiles of the oldest cohorts (born around 1930) and projections of the earnings of the youngest profiles (born around 1960) imply that the inequality of lifetime earnings has increased noticeably over time. Women in the top one-fifth of female earners and men in the top one-fifth of male earners are predicted to receive a growing multiple of the economy-wide average wage during their career. Women born between 1931 and 1935 who were in the top fifth of female earners had lifetime average earnings that were approximately equal to the average economy-wide wage. In contrast, women born after 1951 who were in the top fifth of earners are predicted to earn almost 50 percent more, that is, roughly 150 percent of the economy-wide average wage. Women with a lower rank in the female earnings distribution will also see gains in their lifetime average earnings, but their gains are predicted to be proportionately much smaller than those of women with a high rank in the distribution. Men with high earnings are also predicted to enjoy substantial gains in their relative lifetime earnings, while men with a lower rank in the earnings distribution will probably see a significant erosion in their typical wages relative to the economy-wide average wage. That is mainly the result of a sharp decline in the relative earnings of low-wage men born after 1950. In creating stylized earnings profiles that are representative of those of significant minorities of U.S. workers, we emphasized three critical elements of the earnings path: the average level of earnings over a worker's career, the upward or downward trend in earnings from the worker's 30s through his or her early 60s, and the "sagging" or "hump-shaped" profile of earnings over the worker's career. That classification scheme yields 27 characteristic patterns of lifetime earnings. Surprisingly, the differnce between men and women within each of those categories is quite modest. The main difference between men and women is in the proportions of workers who fall in each category. Only 14 percent of men born between 1931 and 1940 fall in earnings categories with the lowest one-third of lifetime earnings, whereas 53 percent of women born in those years have low-average-earnings profiles. On the other hand, women born in those years are more likely to have a rising trend in lifetime earnings, while men are more likely to have a declining trend. We find that the distribution of lifetime earnings contains relatively more workers with below-average earnings and relatively fewer with very high earnings than assumed in the Social Security Administration's traditional policy analysis. For example, the "low earner" traditionally assumed by the Office of the Chief Actuary is assigned a level of average lifetime earnings that we find to be higher than the average earnings of persons in the bottom one-third of the lifetime earnings distribution. The stylized earnings profiles developed here can be used for policy evaluation, and the results can be compared with those from the more traditional analysis. That comparison produces several notable findings. Because earnings profiles that are actually representative of the population tend to have lower average earnings than assumed in the traditional analysis, workers typically accumulate somewhat less Social Security wealth than implied in the traditional analysis. On the other hand, because the basic benefit formula is tilted in favor of lower-income workers, the internal rate of return on Social Security contributions is somewhat higher than detected in the traditional analysis. Moreover, the primary insurance amount measured as a percentage of the worker's average indexed earnings tends to be higher than implied by the traditional analysis. Finally, the stylized earnings patterns can be used to compare benefit levels enjoyed by workers under the traditional Social Security formula and under an alternative plan based on individual investment accounts. That comparison shows, as expected, that the traditional formula favors low-wage workers and one-earner couples, while an investment account favors single, high-wage workers. Comparing two workers with the same lifetime average earnings, the traditional formula favors workers with rising earnings profiles (that is, with lifetime earnings heavily concentrated at the end of their career), while investment account pensions favor workers with declining earnings profiles (that is, with earnings concentrated early in their career).     

Evaluating the initial impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test

Under the retirement earnings test, Social Security benefits are reduced if earnings exceed specified amounts, although the benefit reduction is partly offset by future benefit increases. By imposing a tax on the earnings of beneficiaries, the earnings test provided a disincentive for them to supplement retirement income by working. The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 eliminated the earnings test for Social Security beneficiaries who have reached the full retirement age. This article presents the first study of labor force activity (earnings and employment) among individuals aged 65-69 before and immediately after this sudden rule change. Drawing on Social Security administrative data, the author examines three widely expected reactions: increased return to work, increased hours worked, and accelerated applications for old-age benefits. The analysis finds that removing the retirement earnings test: Encouraged some workers to increase their earnings. The increases in earnings are large and significant among higher earners but are not statistically significant among lower earners. Had little effect on employment. Removing the earnings test appears to have had no immediate, significant effect on the employment rate of older workers. Employment of older people may be affected in the longer run, however. Slightly increased the pace of applications for benefits. Applications rose about 2 percent in the 65-69 age group in 2000. The overall acceleration will probably be small, however, because most individuals in this age group apply for benefits before reaching the full retirement age. Although the current analysis captures the effects of retaining older workers in the labor force, these initial results may not capture all the effects of eliminating the retirement earnings test, however, for two reasons. First, the analysis covers only a single year--the year the earnings test was eliminated. Since eliminating the earnings test may have had little effect on people who had already retired, its full effect may not be apparent for several years. Second, the analysis applies only to workers aged 65-69. Eliminating the earnings test for people above the full retirement age may also encourage younger workers to delay retirement and therefore increase their labor supply. Further analysis will therefore be required to determine the longer-run impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test.     

Multilevel analysis of the effects of antidiscrimination policies on earnings by sexual orientation

This study uses the 2000 U.S. Census data to assess the impact of antidiscrimination policies for sexual orientation on earnings for gays and lesbians. Using a multilevel model allows estimation of the effects of state and local policies on earnings and of variation in the effects of sexual orientation across local labor markets. The results suggest that gay men face an earnings penalty that varies significantly (though not sizably) across local areas, and that state antidiscrimination policies may decrease that penalty in private sector employment. There is, however, no evidence that lesbians in any sector average higher earnings or wages in areas with antidiscrimination policies. The strongest evidence of effects for antidiscrimination policies is for weeks of employment and for gay men who are in the private sector, white, and in the upper half of the earnings distribution. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Does the minimum wage affect welfare caseloads?

Although minimum wages are advocated as a policy that will help the poor, few studies have examined their effect on poor families. This paper uses variation in minimum wages across states and over time to estimate the impact of minimum wage legislation on welfare caseloads. We find that the elasticity of the welfare caseload with respect to the minimum wage is between 0.1 and 0.2, but this estimate is sensitive to the sample period and assumptions about state trends. We tentatively conclude that higher minimum wages increase welfare dependence; however, more research is warranted.© 2005 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

WELFARE LIBERALISM, SOCIAL POLICY, AND POVERTY IN AMERICA

The conservative explanation for the persistence of poverty—that liberal social programs have created with disincentives-explains very little of the poverty that exists. It has gained acceptance because liberal anti-poverty efforts have been based on flawed understanding of the problem that insured their failure. Because of the oversupply of young adult workers in the 1970s, there was a proliferation of jobs paying low wages. Liberal programs that assumed that the poor simply needed training and education to lift themselves out of poverty, ignored the shortage of jobs paying above-poverty-level wages. Liberals also assumed that with the requisite training and jobs, all Americans have the capacity to gain the skills necessary to obtain those jobs. This neglects data showing that a larger proportion of individuals with low native ability have earnings beneath the poverty line than workers with normal ability, even when controlling for educational attainment. A new anti-poverty effort must take into account these realities.     

Changing the method for calculating quarters of coverage: the impact on workers' insured status

The 1977 Social Security Amendments specified that, beginning in 1978, a worker would be credited with one quarter of coverage for a designated amount of annual earnings. For 1978, a worker received one quarter of coverage (up to a total of four) for each $250 in annual earnings from employment or self-employment. Before 1978, a worker who was paid $50 in wages in a calendar quarter was credited with a quarter of coverage. A person who had $400 or more in self-employment income in a year was credited with four quarters of coverage. Some workers received more quarters of coverage under the new provisions than they would have under the old, and other workers received less. Since a worker's receipt of benefits depends on his or her insured status, which is based on quarters of coverage, this change can affect a worker's eligibility for benefits. This study indicates that if $250 in annual earnings had been required for one quarter of coverage in 1977, more than 2.1 million workers would have had a change in their insured status for disabled worker benefits, and about 700,000 workers would have had a change in their insured status for survivor benefits. Those whose insured status was affected were most likely to have had marginal earnings records--for example, they had four to seven quarters of coverage when six were needed. (This effect was expected when the legislation was passed.) This article examines those whose eligibility for benefits was most likely to have been affected.     

Can Financial Aid Help to Address the Growing Need for STEM Education? The Effects of Need‐Based Grants on the Completion of Science,Technology, Engineering,and Math Courses and Degrees

Although workers in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields earn above‐average wages, the number of college graduates prepared for STEM jobs lags behind employer demand. A key question is how to recruit and retain college students in STEM majors. We offer new evidence on the role of financial aid in supporting STEM attainment. Exploiting a regression discontinuity that allows for causal inference, we find that eligibility for need‐based financial aid increased STEM credit completion by 20 to 35 percent among academically‐ready students in a large, public higher education system. These results appear to be driven by shifting students into STEM‐heavy course loads, suggesting aid availability impacts the academic choices students make after deciding to enroll. We also find suggestive evidence that aid offers increase degree attainment in STEM fields, although we cannot rule out null impacts on STEM degree production.     

Social policy implications of the minimum wage law

Poverty and unemployment are two critical issues facing the United States today. Linked to both of these is the federal minimum wage law. Established under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the purpose of the law was—and still is—to eliminate, as rapidly as possible, labor conditions thought to be harmful to the “health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers ... without substantially curtailing employment or earning power.”¹ In other words, to eliminate low wages without eliminating jobs. This is a laudable goal, with which no one is likely to disagree. The question remains as to how effective the law has been in achieving this goal. Has it eliminated poverty? Or has it, to the contrary, had effects detrimental to those the law was designed to help? It is the contention here that the minimum wage law has played a significant role in causing unemployment among the most disadvantaged groups, including blacks, teenagers, unskilled workers, and people living in economically depressed regions. It is therefore proposed that further increases in the minimum wage be blocked and that the rate and coverage be held at the present level.     

The effect of health on retirement

Results from retirement research suggest the following conclusions about health, retirement, and the likely effects of the changes in retirement age made by the 1983 Social Security Amendments. First, after controlling for non-health-related factors, it is clear that older workers who are in poor health retire earlier than workers with similar economic circumstances who are in good health. Second, the research reviewed here tends to indicate that the response of the average worker to the changes made in the social security full retirement age by the 1983 amendments will be small. Estimates suggest than the average increase in the retirement age will be between zero and 3 months. Finally, while the evidence is much less certain, research results suggest that older workers in poor health may respond even less than the average worker. It is not possible to say precisely what will happen to lifetime incomes as a result of these changes. A small labor supply response suggests that not much of the lost social security benefits will be made up by additional earnings, either for workers on average or for workers in poor health. However, earnings are only part of the total income picture. Other than a brief mention, this article has not addressed how workers may adjust their savings behavior, or how private pensions may adjust, and particularly whether the potential for adjustment through these avenues is the same for workers in poor health as for the average worker.     

Points for Place: Can State Governments Shape Siting Patterns of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Developments?

There is considerable controversy about the allocation of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC). Some charge that credits are disproportionately allocated to developments in poor, minority neighborhoods without additional investments and thereby reinforcing patterns of poverty concentration and racial segregation. We examine whether Qualified Allocation Plans, which outline the selection criteria states use when awarding credits, can serve as an effective tool for directing credits to higher opportunity neighborhoods (or neighborhoods that offer a rich set of resources, such as high-performing schools and access to jobs) for states wishing to do so. To answer this question, we study changes in the location criteria outlined in allocation plans for 20 different states across the country between 2002 and 2010, and observe the degree to which those modifications are associated with changes in the poverty rates and racial composition of the neighborhoods where developments awarded tax credits are located. We find evidence that changes to allocation plans that prioritize higher opportunity neighborhoods are associated with increases in the share of credits allocated to housing units in lower poverty neighborhoods and reductions in the share allocated to those in predominantly minority neighborhoods. This analysis provides the first source of empirical evidence that state allocation plans can shape LIHTC siting patterns.     

State Tax Credits and "Making Work Pay" in Post-Welfare Reform Era

This article outlines the work incentives and income support provided by the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and illustrates how state earned income and dependent care credits assist working poor families. State earned income and dependent care tax credits serve as critical complements to the EITC, the federal government's largest antipoverty program. By attending to specific components of each tax credit, state policymakers can maximize state funds that qualify for federal maintenance of effort requirements under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PROWRA), and they can reinforce positive effects and offset work disincentives stemming from current federal tax parameters.     

Caregiver credits in France, Germany, and Sweden: lessons for the United States

Recently, analysts in the United States (US) have proposed adopting caregiver credits, or pension credits, provided to individuals for time spent out of the workforce while caring for dependent children and sick or elderly relatives. The primary objective of these credits, used in almost all public pension systems in the European Union, is to improve the adequacy of old-age benefits for women whose gaps in workforce participation typically lead to fewer years of contributions, lower lifetime average earnings, and consequently lower pensions. This article examines caregiver credits in the context of future reforms to the US Social Security system, with attention given to the adequacy of current spouse and survivor benefits and how changing marital patterns and family structures have increased the risk of old-age poverty among certain groups of women. It then analyzes caregiver credit programs in selected countries, with particular focus on design, administration, and cost.     

The effects of an employer subsidy on employment outcomes: A study of the work opportunity and welfare‐to‐work tax credits

Employer subsidies such as the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and the Welfare‐to‐Work Tax Credit (WtW) are designed to encourage employment by partially reimbursing employers for wages paid to certain welfare recipients and other disadvantaged workers. In this paper, I examine the effects of these subsidies on employment, wages, and job tenure using unique administrative data from Wisconsin. My ability to precisely identify the subsidy‐certified workers allows me to distinguish the effects of program participation from mere eligibility. Using propensity score matching estimation, I find some evidence of short‐term improvements in labor market outcomes, but little evidence of sustained benefits. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

How have people responded to changes in the retirement earnings test in 2000?

This article describes responses to removing the retirement earnings test in 2000 for persons at the full retirement age or older. We examine annual earnings and retirement benefit claims from Social Security administrative data that cover the 4 years before and after the change. Three findings emerge from the study. First, the effect on earnings of removing the earnings test is uneven across people with different earnings levels. We find little effect on earnings at lower levels, but the effect on earnings in the mid to upper levels (50th to 80th percentiles) is large and significant. Such a finding indicates that the removal most affects people with earnings levels above the earnings test threshold. The largest increases in earnings are found at the 70th percentile for persons who have attained ages 65-69 and at the 60th percentile for those turning 65. Second, there is no clear evidence of the effect of the test's removal on the overall rate of labor force participation. A small rise in work participation among individuals aged 65-69 may be at least partially attributable to the trend already under way. Increases in work participation that do occur are mostly attributable to retaining older workers rather than inducing older workers back into the workforce. The effect appears to increase over time, suggesting that the removal has long-lasting effects on work participation. Third, the removal of the earnings test accelerated applications for benefits by 2 to 5 percentage points among individuals aged 65-69 and by 3 to 7 percentage points among those reaching age 65.     

Labor market policy: A comparative view on the costs and benefits of labor market flexibility

I review theories and evidence on wage‐setting institutions and labor market policies in an international comparative context. These include collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection laws, unemployment insurance (UI), mandated parental leave, and active labor market policies (ALMPs). Since it is unlikely that an unregulated private sector would provide the income insurance these institutions do, these policies may enhance economic efficiency. However, to the extent that unemployment or resource misallocation results from such measures, these efficiency gains may be offset. Overall, Scandinavia and Central Europe follow distinctively more interventionist policies than the English‐speaking countries in the Northern Hemisphere. Possible explanations for such differences include vulnerability to external market forces and ethnic homogeneity. I then review evidence on the impacts of these policies and institutions. While the interventionist model appears to cause lower levels of wage inequality and high levels of job security to incumbent workers, it also in some cases leads to the relegation of new entrants (disproportionately women, youth, and immigrants) as well as the less skilled to temporary jobs or unemployment. Making labor markets more flexible could bring these groups into the regular labor market to a greater extent, at the expense of higher levels of economic insecurity for incumbents and higher levels of wage inequality. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The impact of the family and medical leave act

This article uses data from employer surveys and the March Current Population Survey to investigate the impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on coverage, leave‐taking, employment, and earnings. The variation in state laws prior to the FMLA and the variation in coverage under the FMLA provides a “natural experiment” in which the effect of the law can be compared for treatment and con‐trol groups. Although the FMLA covers less than half of workers in the private sector (many of whom already had coverage pre‐FMLA), this article finds that leave cover‐age and usage did increase post‐FMLA. The other surprising finding is that this mandated benefit had no significant negative effects on women's employment or wages. ©1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.