Electoral Democracy during Wartime: The 2004 U.S. Election

The U.S. election of 2004 affords an opportunity to investigate how wartime affects presidential voting. The conventional wisdom is that wartime presidents always get reelected, but previous studies have not examined how citizens' attitudes on the war affect their voting. The papers in this special issue investigate this process, looking at how attitudes on the Iraq War, the larger War on Terrorism, and the so-called cultural war affected attitudes toward the presidential candidates and voting. The studies use a wide variety of datasets and survey questions, showing that the different aspects of the war resonate with different voters and that some of the effects of wartime are indirect through increasing the salience of leadership in the election. Wartime presidents do not get reelected automatically; they have had success in reelection because of how they use the war to build an image that can get them reelected.

The Effect of Fact‐Checking on Elites: A Field Experiment on U.S. State Legislators

Does external monitoring improve democratic performance? Fact‐checking has come to play an increasingly important role in political coverage in the United States, but some research suggests it may be ineffective at reducing public misperceptions about controversial issues. However, fact‐checking might instead help improve political discourse by increasing the reputational costs or risks of spreading misinformation for political elites. To evaluate this deterrent hypothesis, we conducted a field experiment on a diverse group of state legislators from nine U.S. states in the months before the November 2012 election. In the experiment, a randomly assigned subset of state legislators was sent a series of letters about the risks to their reputation and electoral security if they were caught making questionable statements. The legislators who were sent these letters were substantially less likely to receive a negative fact‐checking rating or to have their accuracy questioned publicly, suggesting that fact‐checking can reduce inaccuracy when it poses a salient threat.     

Policy Responsiveness and Electoral Incentives: A (Re)assessment

Political Behavior - Competitive democratic theory predicts that electoral factors enhance policy makers' responsiveness to public opinion. Yet findings on the effects of electoral...     

Public Resource Allocation and Electoral Systems in the U.S. and Japan

This paper introduces alternative measures of net budgetallocation and legislative representation. They are neutral tothe size of total expenditure and tax collection as well as tochanges in the population and the size of the legislature,which makes them suitable for panel data exercises andinternational comparative studies. Regression analyses of 50U.S. states and 47 Japanese prefectures using these indiceshighlight similarities and differences in public resourceallocation between respective democracies that reflect theirpolitical and electoral systems.     

Issues and Institutions: "Winnowing" in the U.S. Congress

“Winnowing” is the pre‐floor process by which Congress determines the small percentage of bills that will receive committee attention. The vast majority of proposals languish in this vital agenda‐setting stage, yet our understanding of winnowing is nascent. Why do some bills move forward while most fail? I examine that question here by developing and testing a theoretical framework of winnowing grounded in bounded rationality, which includes institutional and sponsor cues and also incorporates the unique issue milieu. A heteroskedastic probit model is utilized to analyze the winnowing fate of all bills introduced across five issue areas in the House and Senate from 1991 to 1998. The findings counter much received wisdom and suggest that the process is indeed cue based. The majority party helps structure this critical process in both chambers, though party effects appear stronger in the House. Contrary to recent work on the rise of Senate individualism, the seniority of the sponsor has significant effects in both the Senate and House, but again exhibits a stronger effect in the House. Surprisingly, presidential proposals are no more likely to survive than typical bills. The findings further suggest that the entrepreneurial efforts of bill sponsors breathe life into this process.     

Electoral and structural losers and support for a national referendum in the U.S.

The U.S. is one of only a few democracies in the world never to hold a national referendum. Recent national surveys reveal that a majority of respondents approve of a national referendum both cross-nationally and in America is relatively stable. Building on previous work (Bowler and Donovan, 2007), we find public opinion on a reform proposal is fluid and responsive to electoral politics, rather than stable as reported in earlier work. In this paper, we argue that contemporary support for a national referendum in the U.S. is contingent on whether a citizen is a short- or long-term “winner” or a “loser” when it comes to electoral politics. We expect that public support for a national referendum in the U.S., where legislation referred by Congress would be subject to a popular vote, may vary at the individual level because of short-term electoral fortunes as well as long-term structural conditions. Strategic voting as well as losing in candidate races and policy issues may be important, but so might be partisanship, with non-partisans the most likely to benefit from citizen law-making at the national level. Support for a national referendum might also be contingent upon state context, that is, upon use of direct democracy in the state where a person lives, as well as the population of a state. The results based on a natural experiment and 2008 panel survey data provide an important window into understanding public opinion on institutional change more broadly.     

Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments

Does partisan conflict damage citizens’ perceptions of Congress? If so, why has polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the “electoral connection” by exploring the mass public's attitudes toward partisan conflict via two survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of members and Congress. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party identification with respect to evaluations of members. Independents and weak partisans are more supportive of members who espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution.     

A Natural Experiment in Proposal Power and Electoral Success

Does lawmaker behavior influence electoral outcomes? Observational studies cannot elucidate the effect of legislative proposals on electoral outcomes, since effects are confounded by unobserved differences in legislative and political skill. We take advantage of a unique natural experiment in the Canadian House of Commons that allows us to estimate how proposing legislation affects election outcomes. The right of noncabinet members to propose legislation is assigned by lottery. Comparing outcomes between those who were granted the right to propose and those who were not, we show that incumbents of the governing party enjoy a 2.7 percentage point bonus in vote total in the election following their winning the right to introduce a single piece of legislation, which translates to a 7% increase in the probability of winning. The causal effect results from higher likeability among constituents. These results demonstrate experimentally that what politicians do as lawmakers has a causal effect on electoral outcomes.     

Electoral Voting Preferences and Political Orientations of Athenians in Greece: A Three-Perspective Model*

Using a three-perspective model of stratification, group and issue-oriented variables, an effort was made to examine the relevance of three perspectives in predicting voting behaviour among Athenians in Greece. The model was based on an analysis of 478 cases from data collected in Athens in the spring and summer of 1977. Pro-Western attitudes and politics of friends were found to be the most important variables in predicting vote among the Athenians. Unlike other European countries, education and occupation were not important while income and age were. The primary group variable of father's politics had important indirect effects while the secondary group variable of workers’ membership in political or occupational organisations had a significant direct effect. The interdependence of the variables in the three-perspective model were also delineated in the analysis.     

The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes

Extended party network (EPN) theory characterizes political parties in the United States as dynamic networks of interest groups that collaboratively support favored candidates for office. Electoral predictions derived from EPN theory have yet to be tested on a large sample of races. We operationalize EPNs in the context of organized interest contributions to U.S. House campaigns. We deduce that support by a partisan community of interests signals the ideological credibility and appeal of a candidate. EPN integration overcomes voter ambiguity surrounding challengers’ ideological preferences, and resources provided by these coordinating interest groups promote a consistent message about the candidate. Using data from the 1994–2010 cycles, we apply network analysis to detect EPN support of challengers and find that EPN integration substantially improves the electoral prospects of challengers. The effect of EPN integration is distinct from that of campaign resources. The findings provide support for EPN theory, as applied to congressional elections.     

The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures

In this study we revisit the question of black representation on city councils and school boards using a novel substantive and methodological approach and longitudinal data for a sample of over 300 boards and councils. Conceptualizing black representation as a two-stage process, we fit Mullahy's hurdle Poisson models to explain whether and to what extent blacks achieve representation in local legislatures. We find that while the size of the black population and electoral arrangements matter more than ever, especially for overcoming the representational hurdle, the extent to which the black population is concentrated is also strongly associated with black council representation. Further, whereas black resources and opportunities to build "rainbow" coalitions with Latinos or liberal whites are marginally if at all related to black legislative representation, we find that legislative size is an underappreciated mechanism by which to increase representation, particularly in at-large systems, and is perhaps the best predictor of moving towards additional representation.     

Needed: A smaller and very different U.S. military

Conclusion How should the Pentagon decide those missions that it will retain in house? Those missions for which it should seek strategic alliances? Those new missions that it will actively seek to develop a competency in? Or those missions that require service competition because they are viewed as critical? Or those missions that have acquired redundancy due to service poaching, and thus can prudently be the target of reductions?The answers to these questions very much depend on the leadership's developing a view of the long-term future that is very different from the past. For example, will the United States be in the business of maintaining stability in troubled Third World regions? If so, what kind of capabilities, what kind of missions, does it see as necessary to conduct effective operations in these conflicts? What can the U.S. military count on from its strategic partnerships with other nations? What competing roles will the U.S. military be asked to play? What resources are available?These are fundamental, first-order questions. But they must all be answered - a credible vision of the business must be established - before restructuring can proceed in a productive manner. This does not imply a definitive prediction of the future; rather, it involves recognizing that the United States is in a period of relatively low danger, high uncertainty and dynamic change. For that reason the defense establishment should restructure to be more flexible, innovative and adaptive. A primary goal should be to exploit rapidly advancing technologies, while meeting (or preferably forestalling) the greatest and most likely challenges to national security. In summary, developing a credible vision of the future security environment, and acting upon it, is essential if the U.S. defense establishment is to avoid the pitfalls of the interwar French military and the IBM of the 1980s, dominant organizations that restructured to be more efficient in a competitive environment that was rapidly passing into history.     

Economic performance and U.S. Senate elections: A comment

This paper investigates the issue of economic performance and U.S. Senate elections analyzed by Bennett and Wiseman (1991) in a work published in this journal. Our study analyzes the electoral margins and election outcomes of U.S. Senate elections using state-level data involving only incumbents up for reelection in the 1976–1990 period (212 elections). The ordinary least squares and logit estimation results suggest that the effects of economic performance variables on incumbent senatorial elections are in general overshadowed by other factors known to be important in determining electoral margins and outcomes. In addition, the empirical results of the entire model are in general consistent with prior findings noted in the public choice and political science literature concerning the analysis of U.S. Senate elections. Therefore, we suggest that the findings raised in our study provide enough theoretical and empirical evidence to raise sufficient doubt regarding the robustness of the results suggested by Bennett and Wiseman (1991), and thus call upon other researchers to study further the relationship between economic performance and voting behavior in U.S. Senate elections.     

Class,Party and Ideology: A Danish Case Study of Electoral Behaviour in Referendums*

In this paper elements of a theory of electoral behaviour in referendums are presented and tested on a theoretically important case. Among the main determining factors — social class, political party and ideological attitude — it is shown that on a relatively simple issue with low importance for the everyday life of the voters, ideological attitude is far more important than politicál party and social class in explaining referendum voting. On this basis a scheme of analysis and a number of hypotheses are suggested for further study.