A Common Future and a Common Identity： The Transformation Process of Political and Social Identities in the South Caucasus Countries

In reflecting on the case of the South Caucasus （Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia）, one of the most popular perspectives is its lack of a common identity. The main argument is that it is a culturally diverse region with old-fashioned, ethnically exclusive nationalism. From this point of view, the process of the formation of a European identity in the region acquires particular importance. A European identity could act as a catalyst for bringing the region together. This identity could be considered as based on much more than just political orientation but fundamentally grounded in common values. This comprehensive integration in the South Caucasus can be achieved through the formulation and acceptance of a common political identity based on the political orientations of the South Caucasian States and their citizens. The main question that this study tries to answer is how people in the South Caucasian countries identify themselves in terms of a European identity. A suitable analysis is increasingly important at both the micro and the macro levels. The author examines the people＇s attitudes in the three South Caucasian states toward Western culture, states, and organizations, drawing on opinion polls conducted by the Caucasus Research Resources Center （CRRC）. The author seeks to analyze attitudes toward the West in the South Caucasus on a macro as well as on a micro level. The author seeks also to provide a much-needed analysis for decision making, based on empirical data that help understand public opinion toward the European Union （EU） in the countries of the South Caucasus, and that can contribute to the refinement of integration strategies.     

Protest participation and economic crisis: The conditioning role of political opportunities

The economic crisis that started in 2008 has negatively affected European nations to different degrees. The sudden rise in demonstrations particularly in those countries most hard hit by the crisis suggests that grievance theories, dismissed in favour of resource‐based models since the 1970s, might have a role to play in explaining protest behaviour. While most previous studies have tested these theories at the individual or contextual levels, it is likely that mechanisms at both levels are interrelated. To fill this lacuna, this article examines the ways in which individual‐level grievances interact with macro‐level factors to impact on protest behaviour. In particular, it examines whether the impact of individual subjective feelings of deprivation is conditional on contextual macroeconomic and policy factors. It is found that while individual‐level relative deprivation has a direct effect on the propensity to have protested in the last year, this effect is greater under certain macroeconomic and political conditions. Both significant results for the cross‐level interactions are interpreted in terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for protest among those who feel they have been most deprived in the current crisis. These findings suggest that the interaction of the contextual and individual levels should continue to be explored in future studies in order to further clarify the mechanisms underlying protest behaviour.     

东南亚华人的身份、地位和权利问题

到20世纪80年代末,东南亚华人基本完成了从华侨社会向华人社会转变的过程,绝大多数都加入了当地国籍成为各国的公民.东南亚华人身份的转变过程由于受到冷战时期的一些时局因素的制约变得复杂而曲折,转变过程的完成意味着长期以来使用的"华侨"称呼已经不能反映实际情况,同时学术研究和实际工作中也应该做出一些相应的调整.华人成为东南亚国家的公民之后,在有些国家可以享有充分的社会政治权利,而在有些国家则受到不同程度的歧视,处于一种二等公民的地位.华人的政治社会地位如何往往并非掌握在华人自身手中,因为除新加坡之外,在各国华人都是少数民族.     

Housing and populism

Abstract

The recent success of populist candidates in the UK and Continental Europe has sparked a major debate between those who view populism as a reaction of the economically ‘left behind’ and those who view it as a cultural ‘backlash’ by groups with declining social status, pointing to stark divisions between urban and rural areas, core and periphery. This paper bridges the economic and values-based approaches to populism by arguing that the geography of wealth inequality offers a convincing explanation for the pattern of populist vote share. Drawing on fine-grained house price data in the UK and France, it is shown that the pattern of house prices ? even within small districts ? plays a major part in shaping support for Brexit and Marine Le Pen. The findings illustrate how longstanding variation in local wealth shapes the geography of discontent and drives populist appeal. Populism, the article concludes, is primarily a politics of place, and place is a product, in part, of the housing market.     

Protest,memory, and the production of ‘civilized’ citizens: two cases from Turkey and Lebanon

This article studies the proliferation of discourses of rationality and responsibility among a particular elite social group in Lebanon and Turkey, as they remember student mobilization of their past. I offer these episodes of student mobilization as acts of citizenship that create and make use of rapturous moments in the histories of their countries and institutions. I extend these acts of citizenship to the contemporary context and study the ways in which they become part of discourses of citizenship in unexpected ways. I propose that these narratives draw upon a set of local practices that reflect meanings of citizenship, originating from Western discourses of liberalism, albeit following a different route. In the narratives, violence and irrationality become the defining features of politicized behavior, whereas being civilized epitomizes good manners and rationality. Such boundary-drawing exercises contribute to making conceivable exclusionary social orders based on the idea of a hierarchical distribution of reason and social utility.     

The politics of other citizens

In all kinds of political action, citizens are confronted with the performances of other citizens. An important guide to political behaviour is therefore likely to be the assumptions people make concerning how others can be expected to behave. This article explores common sense ideas about other citizens as potential political participants, drawing on a series of group interviews conducted with taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic. I argue the expectations voiced of other citizens tend to be pessimistic in nature, casting them as ill-informed, apathetic, passive and unduly self-interested, notwithstanding the appearance of a more optimistic view which holds they can be expected to follow the lead of those who ‘take a stand’. These empirical observations lead to a discussion of the theoretical issues they raise, notably where to locate the origins of such views, and how to appraise their implications for democracy.     

日本人的国家同一性和对人种、民族的刻板印象探索性的讨论

通过对日本大学生的数据分析,探讨了日本人的国家同一性和对人种、民族的刻板印象的关系。结果表明,对民族的刻板印象和内群体偏爱效应显著。此外,国家同一性和对国民印象的交互作用明显。表明国家同一性强的人,对自己国民的肯定性评价显著高于国家同一性弱的人。需进一步探讨国家同一性概念的定义和测量刻板印象的妥当性。     

Does counter-mobilization contain right-wing populist movements? Evidence from Germany

Right-wing populist (RWP) movements have been on the rise in Western democracies. Outside of party politics, such movements regularly organize demonstrations against political elites and minority groups. At the same time, civil society coalitions have mobilized against these movements. Yet we know little about the effect of counter-demonstrations on RWP protest activities. We derive competing theoretical expectations from previous work. On the one hand, counter-mobilization reduces mobilization because the original movement is less likely to achieve its goals (expected utility/costs). On the other hand, clashes and standoffs between opposing movements facilitate mobilization through polarization and anger (identity/emotions). We empirically analyze movement–countermovement dynamics using a new city-level event dataset on street protests by the German Pegida movement and its opponents. In our quantitative analysis, we investigate how counter-mobilization is associated with the onset of Pegida protests, their intensity in terms of participant numbers, and their demobilization. Counter-mobilization does not prevent protest onset, but large counter-demonstrations are associated with larger subsequent Pegida protests, and violence against Pegida supporters reduces the likelihood that they will stop protesting.     

Judging politicians: The role of political attentiveness in shaping how people evaluate the ethical behaviour of their leaders

Political theorists have developed well‐defined normative understandings of what constitutes ethical political conduct. Based on democratic theory as well as the demands of practical politics, these understandings prescribe certain types of behaviour and proscribe other types. However, it is unclear to what extent this normative framework has resonance for ordinary citizens. This article demonstrates that attention to politics tends to increase the resonance of this normative framework. The analysis identifies three norms about the holding of public office that are expected to structure citizens' ethical judgments: the avoidance of conflicts of interest; conformity with the law or institutional rules; and the maximisation of the public good. The article assesses the importance of these norms in structuring judgments by means of an experiment embedded in a population survey conducted in Great Britain. The analysis finds that informational cues pertaining to conflict‐of‐interest avoidance only condition responses among the attentive, while information pertaining to law conformity has far wider resonance. This finding has implications for approaches to political ethics focusing on normative considerations that appear to have low salience for much of the general public.     

When trade unions succeed: Cases of blocked liberalisation in the common market

Despite the generally accepted weakness of trade unions at the European Union level, an analysis of two high profile cases – the Services Directive and the Port Directive – shows that trade unions are able to mobilise effectively at the European level and, within constellations of actors, crucially impact EU decision making. In contrast to common claims that a lack of access to EU institutions makes such groups powerless, it is argued here that the exclusion of large opposing societal groups from consultations is neither a quick nor a sure fire recipe for dismantling opposition. On the contrary, it politicises the process and may lead to opposing groups mobilising in more contentious ways.