The Left's New Urbanism

The idea of suburbia, or the suburban, or the suburbs, can imply a number of different things. Suburbia suggests a physical place, in general the outskirts of a city or large town; suburban can infer a certain lifestyle; and the idea of the suburbs is often used to identify a community or class of people who inhabit a specific territory. In politics, these terms can also retain various meanings in terms of geography, culture or community. Alongside the ideas of the urban or the rural, they are often used to debate questions of political strategy and shifting electoral coalitions. In this article, ideas of urban and suburban places, cultures and communities are used to consider wider debate regarding future coalitions and strategy within the modern left, specifically a renewed urban politics that can be identified. This new ‘urbanism’ suggests a geographical realignment—partly on cultural or lifestyle grounds—which is significant within an overall attempt to redefine the ‘base’ of the left in terms of class and community. This article considers these issues with reference to what historically has been described as the ‘Progressive Dilemma’.     

O,The Roast Beef of Old England! Brexit and Gastronationalism

‘Gastronationalism’ is the idea that there are distinctive and authentic national food cultures that are threatened by the forces of globalisation. It is a myth: there are no unique or authentically distinctive national culinary cultures. But the idea of gastronationalism is a powerful one that can have important political effects, as Brexit shows. In this article, I chart the rise of British food with regard to Britain’s historical relationship with Europe and the EU. I consider how different understandings of British food culture—one more nativist, one more cosmopolitan—have played a symbolic role in the debate on Brexit, before considering the broader relationship between contemporary populist nationalism and gastronationalism.     

‘Who were those People?’: The Labour Party and the Invisibility of the Working Class

Labour’s historic cross-class alliance of ‘workers by hand and by brain’ has endured a hundred years, but it has never looked so vulnerable as today. Brexit, in particular, has spectacularly exposed—and widened—a crack in the alliance. On opposite sides of the argument sits a high proportion of the Labour party’s working-class supporters (the so-called ‘left behinds’) and the liberal and relatively affluent middle classes (the so-called ‘metropolitan elites’). Much of the traction in the Brexit debate was, and still is, achieved through ‘identity politics’. But where the question of class is concerned, this is not as new as it can sometimes seem. No one used the term ‘identity politics’ in the early twentieth century, but Labour representation, from the very start, had an important psychological dimension to it. It exploited a formidable and tenacious working class desire ‘to be counted’ and not be pushed into the shadows of public life. The notions of respect and humiliation (or outraged respect) continued to provide vital sources of fuel in the growth of the Labour Party for the next fifty years, and beyond. If the party is to have a future, it will need to get to grips with the feeling of many of its traditional supporters that they do not count anymore. And to better understand that feeling, it could look with profit to its own past for guidance.     

Housing and populism

Abstract

The recent success of populist candidates in the UK and Continental Europe has sparked a major debate between those who view populism as a reaction of the economically ‘left behind’ and those who view it as a cultural ‘backlash’ by groups with declining social status, pointing to stark divisions between urban and rural areas, core and periphery. This paper bridges the economic and values-based approaches to populism by arguing that the geography of wealth inequality offers a convincing explanation for the pattern of populist vote share. Drawing on fine-grained house price data in the UK and France, it is shown that the pattern of house prices ? even within small districts ? plays a major part in shaping support for Brexit and Marine Le Pen. The findings illustrate how longstanding variation in local wealth shapes the geography of discontent and drives populist appeal. Populism, the article concludes, is primarily a politics of place, and place is a product, in part, of the housing market.     

What does Brexit Mean for the UK's Climate Change Act?

This article examines the potential implications of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (so‐called ‘Brexit’) for the success and survival of the country's flagship climate policy, the Climate Change Act 2008. The impact of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ Brexit for the main features of the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence and elite interviews with key policy‐makers and policy‐shapers. The article argues that the long‐term viability of the Climate Change Act was being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.     

‘Get Brexit Done’: The New Political Divides of England and Wales at the 2019 Election

This article analyses the successful Conservative election campaign of 2019 and how it took advantage of a fractured political and economic landscape. It reviews the unique circumstances around the 2019 election and the ‘surprising death’ of a no-deal Brexit. We then analyse the divergent political communication strategies in the 2017 and 2019 Conservative campaigns showing how the latter was much more coherent and politically unorthodox. Drawing on socioeconomic, demographic and British Election Study data, we argue that Boris Johnson’s messaging was carefully tailored towards the demands of voters in the ‘red wall’ seats. Conservative success was built around an appeal to voters in these economically depressed ‘geographies of discontent’. But while tremendously successful, the coalition this created is potentially fragile. An unconventional, ‘leftish’ Conservative campaign built a new, diverse bloc of voters. It includes a number of left-wingers expecting change alongside traditional Conservative supporters, and will be hard to keep together given the economic turbulence ahead.     

Interrogating the Political Economy of Age

This article considers the argument by Tim Vlandas, in this issue, that an ageing electorate may undermine democracies’ ability to make the right economic choices. Vlandas suggests that the emergence of gerontocratic politics may give rise to ‘gerontonomia’: an economy run for the old, at the expense of younger generations and of future prosperity. However, evidence from the UK suggests a more mixed picture. Age-based voting patterns have been consequential around single issues, not least the 2016 Brexit referendum. However, voters’ interests in broad economic policy models are not easily reducible to age dynamics, and intergenerational politics are filtered through a set of normative and affective considerations beyond straightforward self-interest. Moreover, since the rational interests of different age groups do not speak for themselves, cueing by political elites is potentially significant and may be contributing to older voters’ relative tolerance of a poor economic record.     

Food Brexit and Chlorinated Chicken: A Microcosm of Wider Food Problems

This paper situates food safety concerns raised in the Brexit debate since the referendum and suggests that, although the issue of chlorinated chicken entered public discourse, it represents wider concerns about food safety standards. Food safety has had high resonance in the UK since the 1980s, but Brexit shows how it connects to wider concerns also raised about Brexit, such as impacts on healthcare, the effects of austerity on food poverty, the limitations of low waged employment, concerns about migration and labour markets, and regional economic disparities. Brexit’s impact on the UK food system is immense because food has been highly integrated into EU governance. While food standards can be portrayed as a single narrow issue, the paper suggests it provides a useful lens with which to examine, interrogate and comprehend these wider Brexit politics. The complex realities of food politics and wider food system dynamics undermine any simplistic political narrative of ‘taking back control’.     

Breaking the Mould? Roy Jenkins’ ‘Radical Centre’ and British Social Democracy in the ‘New Hard Times’

Social democratic politics in Britain requires compelling answers to three animating questions that Roy Jenkins posed in his landmark 1979 Dimbleby lecture. Firstly, how can the British system of democracy be reformed to develop a culture of political participation and pluralism that leads to more equitable economic and social policies? Secondly, how can the centre‐left and left unite to forestall long periods of Tory dominance in electoral politics, thereby avoiding calamities such as the 2016 referendum on EU membership? And, thirdly, how can a flourishing intellectual ecosystem be cultivated on the progressive left that generates radical ideas for economic and social reform, recognising the importance of concerted dialogue between political traditions? This article revisits Jenkins’ 1979 lecture by considering the prospects for ‘breaking the mould’ of British politics in the ‘new hard times’ of Brexit and ‘permanent austerity’.     

Cultural variations in management practice: an exploration of the management trainer's dilemma

This article is a contribution to the debate on cross-cultural transfer of management practice. It describes the difficulties experienced in introducing ‘western’ management theory in a Pakistan government training centre; considers the social and cultural context and the local management style; analyses the differences in six key areas of management and discusses their implications for management trainers; and proposes a ‘middle way’ to ensure that management material is culturally acceptable and practically appropriate. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resurgent Remain and a Rebooted Revolt on the Right: Exploring the 2019 European Parliament Elections in the United Kingdom

The 2019 European Parliament (EP) election took place against the backdrop of the vote for Brexit and the failure of Parliament to agree on a withdrawal agreement. Nigel Farage’s new Brexit Party topped the poll and the pro‐Remain Liberal Democrats, which called for a second referendum on EU membership, returned from electoral obscurity to take second place, while other pro‐Remain parties similarly performed well. In sharp contrast, the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, recorded their lowest combined vote share since they became the main representatives of the two‐party system. In this article, we draw on aggregate‐level data to explore what happened at the 2019 EP election in Great Britain. Our evidence suggests Labour suffered from a ‘pincer movement’, losing support in its mainly white, working class ‘left behind’ heartlands but also in younger cosmopolitan areas where Labour had polled strongly at the 2017 general election. Support for the new Brexit Party increased more significantly in ‘left behind’ communities, which had given strong support to Leave at the 2016 referendum, suggesting that national populists capitalised on Labour’s woes. The Conservatives haemorrhaged support in affluent, older retirement areas but largely at the expense of the resurgent Liberal Democrats, with the latter surging in Remain areas and where the Conservatives are traditionally strong, though not in areas with younger electorates where the party made so much ground prior to the 2010–2015 coalition government. Lastly, turnout increased overall compared with 2014, but individuals living in Leave areas were less motivated to vote. Overall, our findings suggest that those living in Remain areas were more driven to express their discontent with the Brexit process and more inclined to support parties that offer a second referendum on Britain’s EU membership.     

Tracing the Gordian Knot: Indeterminate‐Sentenced Prisoners and the Pathologies of English Penal Politics

This article explores some of the key pathologies of English penal politics by applying an interpretive political analysis perspective to the specific issue of the plight of the ‘prisoners left behind’, the thousands of indeterminate‐sentenced IPP (imprisonment for public protection) prisoners who remain incarcerated, notwithstanding the abolition in 2012 of this sentencing option targeted at ‘dangerous offenders’. The article draws on research findings from an ESRC funded study of penal policymaking to examine why the Gordian knot of the prisoners left behind has proved to be so hard to untangle. The broader lessons of this specific story are then set out. In particular, it is argued that the public and political debate around criminal justice has become damagingly narrow over recent years.     

The West Midlands and Powell's Birmingham Speech

This article examines how the changing political debate in West Midlands’ constituencies influenced Powell's thinking, and how the area reacted to his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech. It looks at local perceptions of Commonwealth immigration in the West Midlands. It contrasts largely tolerant Wolverhampton with attitudes in nearby Smethwick; here a small number of race propagandists shaped local feeling through the columns of the Smethwick Telephone. The article considers their campaign, and the notorious victory of the hardliner Peter Griffiths in the 1964 general election. Powell and allies learnt there was electoral mileage in the ‘race card’, then campaigning on the issue. The article details the strength of subsequent local support after his Midlands Hotel speech, a loyalty only fortified in response to the execration of a horrified metropolitan elite and lasting until his defection from the Conservative party in 1974.     

Questions of Sovereignty: Redefining Politics in Scotland?

The issue of sovereignty has never been resolved in Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act, creating the Scottish Parliament affirmed that the Westminster Parliament is sovereign, but this is disputed. In practice, the issue was left largely in abeyance as sovereignty was seen as an outdated concept. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the UK Brexit referendum of 2016 both brought back the question of sovereignty in stark terms. Analysis of data from the British Election Study of 2019 with regard to (a) the right of Scottish self‐determination, and (b) the right of a UK‐wide majority to take Scotland out of the EU, allows us to identify ‘sovereigntists’ and ‘unionists’. Sovereigntists, on both dimensions, now constitute a majority. A smaller group of unionists reject both positions. There remains a group of ‘semi‐sovereigntists’ who accept Scottish self‐determination, but also that the UK as a whole should decide on Brexit. Controlling for the social and political factors, Scots are increasingly polarised around issues of sovereignty, which have become central to contemporary Scottish politics.     

The European Commission and fiscal governance reform: a strategic actor?

The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has added a new impetus to the debate over the possibilities for securing supranational fiscal integration within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Since the literature on the European Union’s response to the crisis is dominated by the study of intergovernmental politics, this article considers the previously neglected role of the Commission. A framing analysis of the Commission’s crisis discourse is operationalised here, which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located in the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) during key phases of the crisis. It is found that a supranational reform agenda was never internalised by the Commission. Instead, the Commission acted strategically by framing the crisis around intergovernmental fiscal discipline. These findings suggest that, in line with the ‘new intergovernmentalist’ thesis, supranational institutions themselves may not be as ‘hard-wired’ towards supranationalism as is often assumed.     

A Strategic Left? Starmerism,Pluralism and the Soft Left

This article places the Labour Party’s present post‐Corbyn renewal in the context of previous periods of renewal in the party’s recent history, associating with the new leadership of Keir Starmer a potential to rediscover the strategic project of the pluralist soft left as an alternative to the programmatic character of the hard left. After assessing the Corbynist hegemony established in the Labour Party between 2015 and 2019, it considers the current absence of any clearly defined set of principles or values underpinning ‘Starmerism’. It then looks back to the Kinnockite ascendency in the 1980s, and the Blairite ascendency in the 1990s, as possible templates for how the party reassesses its positioning with reference to changing electoral, social and economic circumstances. A critique of Corbynism’s left populism culminates in a consideration of the possible grounds for a new pluralist agenda attuned to the policy and electoral challenges Labour faces today.     

Who's European? Scotland and England Compared

In the Brexit referendum in 2016, Scotland voted 62 per cent Remain, and England 53 per cent Leave. This article explores whether this came about because more people in Scotland considered themselves ‘strongly European’ compared with people in England. Analysis of Scottish and British Social Attitudes survey data for 2017 shows that people in Scotland are significantly more inclined to say they are ‘strongly European’ (45 per cent) than in England (34 per cent), a finding that holds true across the spectrum of socio‐demographic and political variables. Nevertheless, the key predictors of being strongly European are similar in both countries: having liberal values, high levels of education, political party support, as well as being British, while in Scotland supporting the Scottish National Party and being in favour of independence are important. ‘Being European’ has taken on different meanings in Scotland and England as the aftermath of the Brexit referendum works its way through the political process.     

Government Communications,Political Trust and Compliant Social Behaviour: The Politics of Covid-19 in Britain

It is commonly said that the lockdowns and social distancing necessary to control coronavirus pandemics will only work if the general population trusts its government, believes the information it provides, and has confidence in its policies. This article traces the British government’s record in providing information about its policies and performance, and compares this with the public’s use of the mainstream news media. It then considers how these two sources of information affected trust in government and public compliance with social distancing and lockdown rules. Lastly, it compares Covid-19 with Brexit and draws conclusions about how beliefs and behaviour are formed when individuals are personally faced with a serious threat.     

From Multiculturalism to Cultural Voluntarism: A Family‐based Approach

In the context of the current debate on multiculturalism, this article draws on three models of state policies towards families to propose a reframing of multiculturalist policies. They are the ‘authorisation’ model, wherein the state authorises families to define and enforce family obligations as law; the ‘delegation’ model, wherein the state prescribes the norms families are to follow and delegates to families the role of enforcing them; and the ‘purposive abstention’ model, wherein the state uses the voluntary performance family norms as a tool of policy, giving them limited legal recognition within the continued application of the general law. The article considers how these models might guide policy towards communities, which can be seen, substantially, as collections of families. It favours the ‘purposive abstention’ model, which, in the context of cultural groups, could be termed ‘cultural voluntarism’.     

Brexit and Strand Three of the 1998 Agreement: The Three Faces of East-West

Under Strand Three of the 1998 Belfast ‘Good Friday’ Agreement, institutions were set up to promote the ‘harmonious and mutually beneficial development’ of the ‘totality of relationships’ between the peoples and governments of Ireland and the UK, including its devolved administrations and Crown Dependencies. According to the text of the 1998 Agreement this ‘east-west’ dimension was to have two elements with corresponding institutions: an intergovernmental one reflected in the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) and an interjurisdictional one reflected in the British-Irish Council (BIC). These Strand Three institutions were designed to provide fora for, respectively, intergovernmental cooperation on ‘non-devolved Northern Ireland matters’ in the case of the BIIC and information exchange and cooperation ‘on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations’ in the case of the BIC. Nowhere in the 1998 Agreement text is the concept of ‘east-west’ used to refer to relations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Yet, in the wake of Brexit, and in the midst of controversy over the implications of the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (GB–NI) have been newly framed as ‘east-west’. The creation of this new discursive face of ‘east-west’ relations marks an important, but little discussed, impact of Brexit on the political and constitutional landscape of the UK and Ireland. Against this backdrop, this article considers the impacts of Brexit, and the Protocol, on three faces of ‘east-west’ relations—the BIIC, the BIC and, newly, GB–NI—and discusses their implications for the future of Strand 3 institutions and the ‘totality of relationships’ they represent.