“9·11”事件后俄罗斯对外战略的重大调整

去年"9·11"事件以来,俄罗斯外交战略的调整引起了全世界的高度关注,其外交动向呈现出鲜明的"大西洋主义"色彩。俄罗斯外交战略的调整既是俄罗斯传统战略文化的现实折射和外交经验的深刻总结,也是俄着眼于国际环境和自身实力而做出的务实选择。"立足欧洲、融入西方"已成为俄罗斯既定的外交战略,俄美关系、俄北关系、俄欧关系也将随之经历重大变化,它们彼此之间的利益互动和冲突决定了俄罗斯的"西进"之路将是曲折而漫长的。     

The Potential and Pitfalls of a Zero-Sum Grand Strategy

Grand strategy provides the strategic vision for a state in pursuit of its national interests. The current U.S. grand strategy straddles the line between isolationism and off-shore balancing. Based on the international relations theory of realism, these strategies view international actions as a zero-sum game. In other words, a country can only benefit at the expense of another. The zero-sum logic is clearly articulated in the “America First” strategic documents. It is also apparent in many of the president's speeches and policy actions. While the Trump administration's zero-sum approach has potential to rebalance burdens and level the playing field in such areas of trade, it is fraught with risks and jeopardizes the standing of the United States in the world.     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

Descending Eagle: The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review & the Decline of U.S. Power

This article reviews power transition theory and emerging threats to U.S. national security. It then analyzes how the 2014 QDR will ensure U.S. relative power decline and how the strategy fails to effectively counter the rise of China and Russia as challenger states in the international system. Finally, several policy options are proposed to address the deficiencies of the QDR and to counter an increasingly aggressive China and revisionist Russia.     

2011年美国外交面临的挑战

2011年国际局势中的许多事态对美国的中东外交政策形成新的挑战。西亚北非的动荡和变局可能导致中东地缘政治版图重新绘制,对美国未来的中东外交必将带来许多变数;美国一巴基斯坦之间发生的事态可能对奥巴马政府的反恐战略及南亚战略提出新的挑战;巴勒斯坦不顾美国阻挠申请加入联合国,使美国与穆斯林世界的关系面临新的考验。这些挑战今后有可能进一步发酵,对美国全球战略产生影响,其中包括对奥巴马政府＂-3前高调进行的“重返亚洲”形成牵制。     

Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint

This article hopes to contribute to the strategic content of U.S. foreign policy by offering a definition of grand strategy and case for reorienting U.S. policy around it. Rather than advocate a specific grand strategy—a matter still open for debate—the analysis concludes with a set of attributes to assess whether a proposed grand strategy constitutes a “good” grand strategy. It concludes by introducing the concept of an applied grand strategy approach, which may help to identify and assess the strategic implications of foreign policy choices.     

印度的海洋战略及印美在印度洋的合作与矛盾

作为主要的印度洋国家,印度长期以来寻求一项确保自身安全和经济利益的大国海洋战略,它体现了印度立足南亚、面向印度洋、争做世界大国的战略图谋。冷战结束以来,特别是随着印度综合国力的发展以及追寻其“大国梦”的步骤加快,印度对印度洋的安全需求持续增大,将确保海洋战略利益、特别是保证印度洋海上石油通道的安全视为保护其基本国家战略利益的头等大事。鉴于印度洋对印度和美国的重要战略意义,印度在实施其海洋战略过程中既会与美国保持合作,同时也可能引发相互间的利益冲突。     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

Keeping Friends Close and Enemies Closer: Classical Realist Statecraft and Economic Exchange in U.S. Interwar Strategy

This article addresses the relationship between economic exchange and grand strategy and explains why rival states exchange with each other. The theoretical debate among realists is defined, while a novel, yet classical, realist exchange theory is proffered and evaluated against the record of U.S.-Japanese exchange, 1918–41. In this particular case, the origins of Japan's oil dependency on the United States are detailed for the first time as is the U.S. policy toward Britain and the Netherlands that created this dependency. The article finds U.S. strategic coordination of Japan's economic vulnerabilities and their use advanced U.S. grand strategy leading into WWII. The article concludes that the July 1941 U.S. oil embargo against Japan was purposeful and the product of a larger policy arc from the early post-WWI period.     

Failed States After 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?

This paper addresses the relationship between accumulated knowledge and U.S. policy dealing with failed states and terrorism. The central thesis is threefold: (1) that more was known about the possible linkages between failing states and terrorism than appears in pre-9/11 U.S. policies; (2) that since 9/11 some important realignment of knowledge and practice has occurred, but it remains partial and incomplete; and (3) that new knowledge, especially about the policies to sustain and promote legitimate governance, needs to be generated in order to support an effective grand strategy for addressing the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. The paper recommends such a grand strategy and, in addition to the required new knowledge, a significant reorganization of the U.S. national security policy-making apparatus. International studies curricula appear well suited for contributing to that new knowledge and the practitioners we require.     

What Strategic Outlook Holds for America in Iraq?

Agreat controversy is stirring up the world opinion over the future direction of developments in Iraq, a matter affecting overall U.S. foreign policy and even the international power configuration as well. An accurate assessment, however, requires analyzing the relevance of the issue to U.S. vital interests, the results of its current policy over there and its ability to cope with further potential challenges. The author rules out U. S. giving up its cause in Iraq or the likelihood of any drastic modifications in its present policy. He also concedes its ability to achieve partial successful reconstruction in the war-torn country, albeit in a scaled-down version, far short of its original much-vaunted expectations. In sum, Washington will naturally make constant policy adjustments to meet challenges for realization of its dynamic phased goals and maintain its continued military presence there in a certain form so as to ensure its strategic interests in Iraq,the Greater Middle East and even the entire "arc of instability."     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

Dangerous Revisionism: On the Founders, ‘Neocons’ and the Importance of History

Debates regarding the Bush Administration's grand strategy began long before the forty-third president left office. A group of distinguished historians and political scientists have argued over the course of the last few years that the Administration's grand strategy did not represent a major break with historical precedent, as is sometimes argued, but continued the evangelical support for liberty that has always made the United States a “dangerous nation” to tyrants. Along the way, this revisionism creates straw men, and co-opts or redefines terms that are central to the traditional understanding of U.S. foreign policy. It also seems to misunderstand grand strategy itself, focusing almost entirely on continuity of ends while ignoring the rather glaring discontinuities in the ways that generations of U.S. presidents have chosen to pursue them. Overall, the revisionist project fails in both of its tasks, which are: To make the case that the Bush administration took actions of which the Founding Fathers would have understood and approved; and by implication, to justify the unnecessary, tragic war in Iraq.     

试析未来美国对外政策的走向

奥巴马国家安全团队组成人员基本上都是经验丰富的温和务实派,体现了美国外交和国际安全问题上的现实主义倾向。美国外交将改变布什政府的单边主义,注重多边合作。中美关系不会过于偏离正常轨道,但在诸如知识产权、汇率、人权、应对全球气候变化等问题上,中国可能面临更多的压力。     

Evolution of the U.S. Strategy toward China and China’s Peaceful Development

China-U.S. relationship is the most important one between two big powers in the world today. It is both bilateral and global by nature. How to handle this relationship is closely linked with the fundamental interests of the U.S. and China, as well as peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region and even in the world. So, a profound examination of the nature of U.S. strategy toward China and its evolution over the years will help to fully understand the opportunities and challenges China will meet in the course of peaceful development.     

The Belt and Road Initiative and its Implications for China-Europe Relations

The EU brought out a Global Strategy for foreign and security policy in June 2016, which indicates European efforts to reflect on and reshape its grand strategy. Meanwhile, China is also conducting an in-depth assessment of the international order under transition, and strives to rebalance its own national development and foreign policies. Beijing is pursuing a connectivity-oriented grand strategy. The peaceful rise of China depends on whether China and other economies can fully leverage each other’s development opportunities, and become stronger by taking advantage of increasing interconnectedness in the world. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is a key element of such a grand strategy and will have far-reaching implications for China-Europe relations.     

Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited

In The Gathering Storm, Winston S. Churchill claimed that during the 1930s British leaders were willfully blind to the German threat and failed to meet it by rearming. Accepting the Churchillian narrative, leading IR scholars regard British grand strategy during the 1930s as glaring example of strategic adjustment failure. This article reappraises British grand strategy during the 1930s and rejects both the Churchillian narrative, and the scholarly claims that Britain did not adjust its strategy to the German threat. In the 1930s, Britain did balance against Germany and focused on countering what policy makers perceived as the key threat facing Britain: its vulnerability to German air attack. Britain's grand strategic options were limited by external conditions and by domestic economic constraints. Neville Chamberlain, therefore, was playing a weak hand, and did the best that he could with the cards he was dealt. Britain's 1930s grand strategy is one of the historical cases most frequently used by IR scholars for theory testing. For that reason alone, it is important to get the history right. This is not the only reason, however. The 1930s have provided many of the concepts, images, and metaphors that have dominated the discourse about American foreign policy since World War II. Because scholarship about the events of the 1930s shapes the discourse about real-world policy, getting the history right matters.     

Foreign Policy Orientation, Strategic Interaction, and the Initiation of International Crises

In recent years, scholars studying U.S. foreign policy and the diversionary use of force have begun to focus more attention on when foreign regimes time crises with the U.S. Many argue that U.S. domestic conditions play a role in this. I argue that these models should take into consideration the foreign policy relationship between foreign governments and the U.S. I develop a theory of crisis initiation that considers the foreign policy orientation of states that may initiate a crisis with the U.S., and second, when the crisis may occur. I argue that by virtue of their foreign policy orientation, some regime leaders will be more likely than others to initiate a crisis with the U.S. Those regimes that are either closely aligned with the U.S. or closely identified with anti-U.S. interests will be much more likely to initiate crises with the U.S. than those whose foreign policy interests do not lead to such intimate ties of friendship or enmity. I develop and test hypotheses predicting what regime characteristics will be predictive of crisis initiation and when such crises are likely to occur. The results demonstrate that regime type matters more than U.S. domestic conditions in predicting where and when crises involving the U.S. will take place.     

塑造与被塑造——中美在国际多边机制下的互动

在全球化的大背景下,中美相互依赖加深,利益交汇点增多。而中美两国的战略抉择为双方在国际多边机制下的互动提供了必要的空间。双方利益交融和结构性矛盾并存,必然导致中美多边互动是既合作又竞争,甚至是斗争。中美在国际多边机制下的互动,既塑造了对方,也塑造了未来,推动国际多边机制的变革。不过,这将是一个从量变到质变的漫长过程。