我的“五个一”读刊法

一、摘录一个新观点。《中国监察》的《要文》栏中,经常刊发中央领导讲话、中央纪委会议报告、重要言论,这些都是纪检监察工作的方向和指针。我在通读的基础上,常常把其中的一些新观点、重要论述摘抄下来,反复阅读,细细体会,每每成为我工作开拓创新的源泉。二、分析一篇理论文章。理论是行动的指南。我十分注意选取一些好的理论文章进行精读和认真分析,同时力求读写结合,学以致用。三、借鉴一个好经验。《中国监察》刊登的工作经验,是从全国精选出来的,很有典型意义和指导性,我经常从中汲取营养。今年,我市全面开展效能监察,我从《中国监察…     

经济法行为理论探析

目次引言一、经济法行为理论纷争与评析二、经济法行为的概念层级与类型结构三、经济法行为的个案分析——经济法律行为四、结语引言对于法律来说,除了我的行为以外,我是根本不存在的,我根本不是法律的对象。我的行为就是我同法律打交道的唯一领域……     

让生命为阳光下最壮丽的事业燃烧

我是一名普通的军队院校政治理论教员,研究和传播党的创新理论是我的本职工作。今天,党和人民给了我这么高的荣誉,我深感不安。这个荣誉不是我一个人的,光荣属     

“洞穴”外的善良

“洞穴理论” 一天晚上点完名后,服刑人员王林申找到我,说他给家人写了一封信,希望我帮他发一下.在对信件进行例行检查时,我发现他的信中有很大篇幅是描述他对柏拉图“洞穴理论”的理解.这引起了我的兴趣,不仅是关于“洞穴理论”,而且更让我关注的是王林申对此理论的理解对他以后的改造是否有帮助.于是,我利用工作之余,通过网络和书籍详细查阅了这个理论.     

用马克思主义构建我国律师制度的理论基础

任何一项法律制度的建立,都有其相应的理论基础,而指导律师制度构建的理论基础,我认为,就是马克思主义。在这里,我尝试着运用马克思主义的基本理论和马克思、恩格斯关于律师的主要论述,对我国律师制度建设中的主要问题做一些分析.我相信,只有运用马克思主义才能科学地夯实我国律师制度的理论基础。一、学习马克思主义关于人的本质的理论,认清律师的本质是为当事人提供法律服务的专业人员所谓性质是指某一事物本身具有与他事物不同的特征。而本质是事物的内部联系,本质是事物内存的、相对稳定的方面,本质是事物的根本性质。在诠释律师性质的时候,最重要的是要研究和厘定律师的本质。历史上,关于律师的本质并没有人专门讨论过,但是,关于人的本质一直是哲学界讨论的重要问题之一。在马克思的著作中,关于人的本质的论述占有很大篇幅。马     

论我国民事诉讼证明标准的完善

我国在长期以来刑事立法优于民事立法,直到近年来,民诉证明标准才被单独树立进行研究。本文在介绍了当前我国民诉证明标准理论和两大法系民诉证明标准学说的基础上,对我国民诉证明标准的问题从理论、司法实践等多个方面进行了分析,也通过对国外各种学说的比较分析下,提出了完善我国民诉证明标准的建议和想法,最终得出了在大陆法系理论的基础上发展我国民诉证明标准的结论。     

“权利本位”对于宪法学研究的意义

对于宪法学,我所知甚少。不过,既然“理论无禁区”,“在真理面前人人平等”,我愿略陈浅见。我刚刚参加了两个会,一个是珠海的全国法学理论讨论会,一个是前天刚结束的长春的法学基本范畴研讨会。我想谈谈从这两个会上得到的宝贵认识,以及它对于宪法学研究的直接意义。     

读者对《法学》的关怀与支持

《法学》杂志复刊以后,我就是她的热心读者。阅读《法学》,提高了我的法学理论水平,也开阔了视野。贵刊最大的特点,就是能理论联系实际。一份法学刊物的学术价值,我所理解的,就应该是积极反映司法实践中     

行政权“嫁接”的理论边界？——一种法理维度内的思考

本文通过对苏州“养狗问邻”文件的解读,提出了行政权“嫁接”理论。在随后的体系建构中,我从政治哲学、经济学等社科角度重述了政府作为公权力行使者产生的渊源以及合理性,并以此分析概括出行政权的特征及其在此基础上,我对行政权“嫁接”的现象、特点,以及它所演化的权利分配的状态从法理学角度进行了全面阐述。通过本文写作,企求能给政府为主导型的中国法治建设提供一种理论的范式。     

春风化雨润我心田

我是一名在校的大学生,也是一名中国共产党党员。《中国监察》这本刊物已经伴随我走过了3年的时间。在尚未踏入工作岗位之前,这本刊物扩大了我的视野,丰富了我的人生观和价值观,为我以后走上工作岗位打下良好的理论基础。与同类期刊相比较,《中国监察》有着自己的特色。一是在注重理论的同时关注现实。用事实说话,更加具有说服力。二是不回避社会现实,勇于揭露腐败,振聋发聩,发人深省。三是关注基层,关注民生。譬如《群众呼声》这一栏目,就是最吸引人的一个看点。春风化雨,润我心田。能够成为《中国监察》的读者,使我获益匪浅。□春风化雨润…     

Practical reason and the ontology of statutes

Conclusion A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the required specification, criteria of evidence and warrant justifying an interpretation are not well-defined.An adequate theory of statutory interpreation must contain both epistemic and ontological components. It must provide criteria for treating information as evidence relevant to, and standards for, interpreting a statute. Providing such criteria in turn requires also giving an account of the object of interpretation — what a statute consists in. Practical reason theories fail to provide acceptable criteria and standards for interpreting a statute. These accounts therefore fail to supply an adequate epistemic components for a theory of statutory interpretation. As to the ontological component, things are less clear. I have argued in sections II and III that this component is partly a matter of substantive political theory. Although practical reason theorists fail to offer a substantive political theory for defining the proper object of interpretation, their accounts are in principle ontologically unobjectionable. At most, practical reason accounts are incomplete. Of course, practical reason accounts might still be defective for other reasons. They may invoke a defective substantive political theory. Or the constraints imposed on properties of a statute or relations between them may not in fact affectuate the goals set by the theory. Such failings would be normative, not metaphysical. Since practical reason accounts are epistemically inadequate and ontologically incomplete, legal theorists should find the accounts less attractive than they do, even putting aside the normative soundness of the accounts.I thank Barry Adler, John Harrison, George Rutherglen, William Stuntz and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Larry Alexander for discussions and comments on previous drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Autopoietic Law and the 'Epistemic Trap': A Case Study of Adoption and Contact

This paper examines autopoietic theory with reference to functionally differentiated social sub-systems, particularly law, science, and politics. It sets out to 'test' the practical relevance of autopoietic theory in relation to ongoing debates about post-adoption contact and personal identity issues. Law has resisted social scientific pressure to regulate post-adoption contact in the context of a social policy approach, which emphasizes the relationship between identity development and genealogical continuity. I argue that law's response to this pressure relates to the particular nature of adoption as this is expressed through legislation and case law. Law's refusal to intervene in post-adoption contact reflects its self-referential operations and its attempts to avoid epistemic entrapment by a social scientific discourse. Applying autopoietic theory to law's practical operations in adoption clarifies its explanatory value, provides a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between law, politics, and social science and indicates areas that require theoretical refinement.     

Permissive Laws and the Dynamism of Kantian Justice

If Kant’s theory of justice is known for one thing, it is for offering a vision of a perfectly just society that is utterly disconnected from the imperfect societies that we occupy. The purity of Kant’s account has attracted criticism from those who claim that if a theory of justice is to be practical, it must offer more than a vision of a perfectly just society. It must also explain how existing societies mired in injustice are to be brought into ever-closer conformity with the ideal that justice prescribes. In this essay, I will argue that this is exactly what Kant’s mature legal and political theory offers. To discern this feature of Kant’s theory, a neglected component must be integrated into his broader framework. This component is what Kant refers to in Toward Perpetual Peace as a permissive law of public right.     

The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse*

Abstract. One of the most powerful accounts of the necessary connection between law and morality grounded on the openness of communication is provided by Robert Alexy, who builds a discourse theory of law on the basis of Habermas’ theory of general practical discourse. In this article I argue that the thesis based on the openness of legal discourse is problematic in that it does not provide a convincing account of the differentiation of legal discourse from other practical discourses. I offer an understanding of the institutionalisation of legal discourse as the tacit commitment of the participants to their shared normative experience and in particular in: 1) the possibility of containing normative force in space, 2) the possibility of transforming word into deed, 3) the possibility of grasping and controlling time and 4) the possibility of transforming deed into word. That commitment of participants in legal discourse is revealed as a set of fundamental assumptions embedded in all legal utterances, which provide the necessary bedrock that makes communication possible. It also provides a basis for the institution of legal discourse, to the effect that their problematisation signifies a departure from the latter.     

微观权力分析——读米歇尔·福柯的《规训与惩罚》

通过对微观权力分析,指出福柯与传统自由主义"司法-论述性的分析"模式不同之处,他并没有采用合法与非法的二元对立的模式,而是将自由主义分析框架之中对权力分析所需要的价值基础从它的分析中剥离出去,因而将其自由主义社会本身中隐藏的微观权力用系谱学的方法揭示出来,指出的微观权力的隐匿性与生产性的特征.微观权力就隐藏在社会运作体制之中,隐藏在我们的日常生活之中,并且生产出了我们所认可的真理与知识,并且形成了规训社会.面对这样的规训社会,我们主体的本真性如何表达出来.因此随后分析了微观权力与反抗的关系,指出了福柯与司法-论述性的权力模式的代表哈贝马斯的不同,以及福柯给出的与韦伯对于现代性中个体的出路不同的分析.在对福柯的审美个体的反抗的进一步分析中指出,他的反抗模式在理论上可能存在暗含有基础性的可能性以及审美个体之间冲突的可能性,从而在理论上存在危险.同时在实践中,也对福柯提倡的大众生活的日常反抗的实践效果的可行性与个人的审美体验进行了质疑.     

The Aesthetic Account of Everyday Life in Organizations: A Report on Recent Developments in Organizational Research

This article examines recent advances in organizational studies that disputed the dominance of conventional-positivist paradigms by addressing everyday life in organizations through the lens of aesthetic principles. First, I discuss developments in theory and methods, focusing on the “strong” version of Organizational Aesthetics that defends new conceptions about the nature of organizations and experiences of organizational life. Then, I illustrate this new account using two relevant studies. My research finds that the aesthetic account of organizations provides concepts and modes of analysis able to better respond to current conceptual and practical challenges both in organizational research and arts management.     

The Hurried Justification of Sanctions

In this paper I try to see how the Derridean aporias of the law of the urgency of legal decisions (the law interrupts the input of knowledge in the decision-making process) and the épokhè of the rule (justice can never be done in the present) are revealed in the context of the justification of sanctions. I argue that sanctions can only be justified in a purposive manner in the last instance. They can only be means to an end of punishment which has been opted for, and which can be justified on grounds of principles, or an authoritative calculation of incommensurable entities. I argue against theories, which advocate the internal connection of law and morality, because if such a connection could be established, the aporia of the hurried and unjustified action would obviously disappear. In particular my target is discourse theory as formulated mainly by Robert Alexy with his Sonderfallthese(Special Case Thesis). My objection is that, because of their instrumental nature, sanctions cannot be justified on moral grounds. I also consider some objections that could be raised from Klaus Günther's theory of appropriateness and Habermas' distinction between the moral, ethical and pragmatic employments of practical reason. I am argue that the former, which would become relevant at the stage of application, that is sentencing, does not resolve the justificatory problem of sanctions, and the latter confirms rather than falsifies my claim that punishment can never be said to be just.     

Talk it out: toward a narrative theory of community conferencing

I advance a narrative theory of restorative justice-practice – more specifically a narrative theory of community conferencing practice. I contend that positioning theory, a particular type of narrative theory, enhances the understanding of how community conferencing works. I argue that positioning theory offers a significant advancement of the current theories of community conferencing practice – affect theory and the theory of reintegrative shaming. In order to make this argument, I provide a brief history of the development of the practice of community conferencing, followed by a discussion of the current predominant theories of community conferencing practice. Then, I discuss the value of narrative theory, with a specific focus on the utility of positioning theory. Finally, I apply positioning theory to an understanding of community conferencing practice and suggest areas for future investigation of the utility of the theory.     

Levinas and the possibility of justice

I consider the question of whether critical legal theory can amount to more than an obstructive exercise and point to an alternative approach to the problem of institutional justice. I am not trying to redeem critical legal theory neither do I attempt to exonerate it from the charge of obstruction or as Drucilla Cornell terms it, negative dialectics. However, I share to some lesser degree the concern that it ought to be possible to offer more than the exposure of camouflaged injustice. By camouflaged I mean that branch of jurisprudence, positivist in outlook and tonality that maintains and defends the violation of the other as an integral and necessary aspect of law and further argues that as such it is entirely ethical. I examine a number of different perspectives to this seemingly impossible challenge. Borrowing from and adapting their theses I then go on to suggest my own solution for applying alterity to juridical encounters with the Other.Dr. Amanda Loumansky is a Sessional Lecturer at the Faculty of Continuing Education, Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK     

Development of the Soviets and the Tasks of Science

The conditions of development of socialist society require intensification of the ties between science [nauka] and the practice of the building of communism. As L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, "theoretical interpretation of the phenomena of social life and its leading trends enables the Party to foresee the course of social processes and to develop the right political course, avoiding errors and subjectivist solutions." The Congress advanced the task of giving even greater attention to the development of theory and achieving an intimate connection of the social sciences with practical work and the solution of current problems in the building of communism.