Projections of economic well-being for Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and 2062

Policymakers considering potential changes to the Social Security program need to be able to assess how such changes would affect the economic well-being of future retirees. The first step to understanding these effects is to determine the well-being of future retirees under the current Social Security system. To this end, this article projects the retiree populations aged 62 or older in 2022 and 2062 using the Social Security Administration's MINT (Modeling Income in the Near Term) model and assesses their well-being. Because no one measure can fully capture whether future retirees will have adequate resources to meet their needs, we employ several indicators to assess retirement prospects. In addition, because current-law Social Security promises cannot be financed from current-law taxes, we project an alternative 2062 baseline that adjusts Social Security benefits downward to reflect the amounts that current-law taxes can support. Our results illustrate the importance of using several measures when assessing the well-being of future Social Security beneficiaries. When using absolute measures, retirement well-being will improve for Social Security beneficiaries in 2062 compared with those in 2022. Median per capita income of Social Security beneficiaries is projected to increase by a third (in real terms) between 2022 and 2062, with a corresponding decline in projected poverty rates. In addition, median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062. Relative measures of well-being, however, suggest a decline in well-being between Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and those in 2062. The share of beneficiaries who have low income relative to their peers, measured as the share whose income-to-needs ratio is less than half of the median ratio, will increase over time. In addition, income replacement rates are projected to fall between 2022 and 2062, indicating a decline in how well-being during retirement compares with that during the working years. And although median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062, it will actually fall relative to economy-wide average wages. Projected improvements over time would lessen, and declines would be exacerbated, if instead of assuming the payment of currently scheduled Social Security benefits we assumed that benefits would be reduced according to what is payable under current-law taxes. Regardless of which measure of well-being is used, certain groups fare worse than others, including beneficiaries who never married, nonwhites, beneficiaries without a high school degree, and those with fewer years of labor force experience and low lifetime earnings. These vulnerable groups are likely to be more dependent on Social Security benefits for their retirement income. As a result, they fare particularly poorly under the assumption that Social Security benefits are reduced to reflect what is payable under current-law taxes.     

The economic status of the aged.

This article discusses what is known about the economic status of the aged. Numerous complexities involved in the assessment of their status are discussed. Compared with most other recent assessments, this study finds a less favorable status for the aged relative to other age groups. The focus is on an examination of detailed age groups, rather than summary aged and nonaged groups--thus providing a more complete picture of age differences. More than most other assessments, this study stresses uncertainty about the relative status of the aged and emphasizes what we do not know. It stresses that better adjustments for differences in needs among age groups and other subgroups of the population are necessary. It emphasizes that consistency between the definition of resources and the specification of needs is essential. Also discussed is the vulnerability of the aged to economic risks. Major findings include: Median cash income is highest for middle-aged family units and lowest for the oldest and youngest units. The poverty rate for aged persons is above the rates for other adult age groups, but below the rate for children. When noncash income is considered in addition to cash income, the income of the aged tends to improve relative to that of the nonaged, but serious measurement problems exist. When wealth is considered in addition to cash income, the economic status of the aged improves relative to that of the nonaged.     

Racial and ethnic differences in wealth and asset choices

White households in the United States are far wealthier than black or Hispanic households, a disparity that remains unexplained even after taking into account income and demographic factors. This article uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine various components of aggregate wealth, including housing equity, nonhousing equity, financial assets in general, and risky assets in particular. It inspects asset choices by race and ethnicity and assesses whether differences in saving behavior--and, consequently, in rates of return on assets--are possible sources of the wealth gap. It also demonstrates the equalizing effect of pension wealth and Social Security wealth on total wealth. Racial and ethnic differences in housing equity narrow among households in the higher income quartiles, whereas differences in nonhousing equity generally widen as income increases. The widening gap in nonhousing equity stems from differences in financial asset holdings, particularly risky assets. At every income quartile and educational level, the percentage of black and Hispanic households that own risky, higher-yielding assets in considerably smaller than the percentage of white households. Thus, some of the wealth gap appears to be attributable to differences in saving behavior. Understanding how people save--in particular, knowing whether certain people will be more vulnerable financially because of their saving choices--helps policymakers assess older Americans' financial preparedness for retirement and anticipate their economic well-being thereafter. Lower rates of investment in the financial market will probably result in slower wealth creation in minority households. Recognizing this, some organizations are trying to open opportunities for minority households to invest in the financial market. This is a positive step toward narrowing the wealth divide. Such efforts will become even more critical if Social Security reform places increased responsibility on individuals to manage personal accounts.     

Happiness and Voting: Evidence from Four Decades of Elections in Europe

There is a growing interest among policy makers in the use of subjective well-being (or “happiness”) data to measure societal progress, as well as to inform and evaluate public policy. Yet despite a sharp rise in the supply of well-being-based policymaking, it remains unclear whether there is any electoral demand for it. In this article, I study a long-run panel of general elections in Europe and find that well-being is a strong predictor of election results. National measures of subjective well-being are able to explain more of the variance in governing party vote share than standard macroeconomic indicators typically used in the economic voting literature. Consistent results are found at the individual level when considering subjective well-being and voting intentions, both in cross-sectional and panel analyses.     

Application of experimental poverty measures to the aged

The U.S. Census Bureau recently released new, experimental measures of poverty based on a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel's recommendations. This article examines the effects of the experimental measures on poverty rates among persons aged 65 or older in order to help inform policy debate. Policymakers and analysts use poverty rates to measure the successes and failures of existing programs and to create and defend new policy initiatives. The Census Bureau computes the official rates of poverty using poverty thresholds and definitions of countable income that have changed little since the official poverty measure was adopted in 1965. Amid growing concerns about the adequacy of the official poverty measure, a NAS panel undertook a study of the concepts, methodology, and data needed to measure poverty. The panel concluded in its 1995 report that the current measure no longer provides an accurate picture of relative rates of poverty for different groups in the population or of changes in poverty over time. The panel recommended changes in establishing the poverty thresholds, defining family resources, and obtaining the required data. The Census Bureau report shows how estimated levels of poverty would differ from the official level as specific recommendations of the NAS panel are implemented individually and how estimated trends would differ when many recommendations are implemented simultaneously. It computes nonstandardized and standardized poverty rates. (The latter constrains the overall poverty rate under the experimental measures to match the official rate.) This article reports poverty rates that have not been standardized and provides considerably more detail than the Census report about the effects of the experimental measures on poverty among the aged. It examines the effects of changing the poverty thresholds and the items included or excluded from the definition of available resources. It also explores the effects of the experimental measures on persons aged 65 or older by age group, gender, race and ethnicity, and marital status. Results indicate that: Poverty rates in 1997 for persons aged 65 or older under the experimental NAS poverty measure are 17.3 percent, compared with 10.5 percent under the official poverty measure. This 65-percent increase is largely driven by the NAS-based measure's subtraction of medical out-of-pocket (MOOP) expenses from resources. Under the NAS-based measures, poverty rates increase for all major groups of older persons, and increase the most for groups for whom the incidence of official poverty is the lowest. The experimental NAS poverty measure shows narrower differences between genders, racial and ethnic groups, and among persons of different marital statuses than the official poverty measure. For example, white Hispanic women aged 65 or older have poverty rates that are 450 percent higher than those for white non-Hispanic men under the official poverty measure and 181 percent higher under the NAS measure. The NAS-based measure's subtraction of MOOP expenses from resources has a disproportionate effect on poverty rates among non-Hispanic whites and men as compared with other groups. However, changes in relative poverty between groups appear to be most influenced by the NAS midpoint equivalence scale. Because this scale decreases poverty rates for persons who live alone or with unrelated individuals and increases them for persons who live with others, poverty rates differ meaningfully under the NAS and official measures among demographic groups. This article highlights issues concerning the elements of the experimental NAS poverty measure that are particularly important to the measurement of poverty among the aged population. Results suggest that the research community's future efforts to refine, enhance, and build upon the NAS panel's recommendations will yield important insights about poverty among the older population.     

Money incomes of aged and nonaged family units, 1967-84

This article provides a detailed examination of changes in the income of the aged and of other age groups from 1967 to 1984. Levels of income, income inequality, the relative importance of selected types of income, and the poverty rates of various age groups are also analyzed. The data are from the Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey and annual money income before taxes is the measure of income. The relative income gains of the aged, compared with the nonaged, in 1967-84 reversed an earlier pattern in the post-World-War-II period: From 1947 to 1967, the incomes of the nonaged rose at a faster pace than those of the aged. Differences in their income growth were greater in 1979-84 than in 1967-79. Despite the substantial difference in the rates of income growth for the aged and nonaged units in 1967-84, the relationship between age and median income was altered only slightly. In 1984, aged family units continued to have relatively low median income, especially compared with the incomes of those in middle age.     

Lifetime distributional effects of Social Security retirement benefits

This article presents three measures of the distribution of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) for people born between 1931 and 1960. The results are based on simulations with the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), which projects retirement income through 2020. The base sample for MINT is the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation panels for 1990 to 1993, matched with Social Security administrative records. The study population is grouped into 5-year birth cohorts and then ranked by economic status in three ways. First, the population is divided into five groups on the basis of individual lifetime covered earnings, and their lifetime present values of OASI benefits received and payroll taxes paid are calculated. By this measure, OASI provides much higher benefits to the lowest quintile of earners than to other groups, but it becomes less redistributive toward lower earners in more recent birth cohorts. Second, people are ranked by shared lifetime covered earnings, and the values of shared benefits received and payroll taxes paid are computed. Individuals are assumed to split covered earnings, benefits, and payroll taxes with their spouses in the years they are married. By the shared covered earnings measure, OASI is still much more favorable to persons in the lower income quintiles, although to a lesser degree than when people are ranked by individual covered earnings. OASI becomes more progressive among recent cohorts, even as net lifetime benefits decline for the entire population. Finally, individuals are ranked on the basis of their shared permanent income from age 62, when they become eligible for early retirement benefits, until death. Their annual Social Security benefits are compared with the benefits they would have received if they had saved their payroll taxes in individual accounts and used the proceeds to buy either of two annuities that provide level payments from age 62 until death: a unisex annuity that is based on the average life expectancy of the birth cohort or an age-adjusted annuity that is based on the worker's own life expectancy. On the permanent income measure, OASI is generally more favorable to people in higher income quintiles. Moreover, it is particularly unfavorable to those in the lowest quintile. Because people in the lowest quintile have a shorter life expectancy, they receive OASI benefits for a shorter period. This group would receive greater benefits in retirement if they invested their payroll taxes in the age-adjusted annuity. OASI is more favorable to them than the unisex annuity, however, OASI is becoming more progressive in that the net benefits it provides drop more rapidly among higher income quintiles than lower ones. This article also examines how OASI affects individuals by educational attainment, race, and sex. On both the lifetime covered earnings and the permanent income measures, OASI is more favorable to workers with less education and more favorable to women. The results by race and ethnicity are mixed. When people are ranked by the present value of their shared lifetime covered earnings, OASI appears more favorable to non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than to non-Hispanic whites. When people are ranked by shared permanent income in retirement, however, OASI produces negative returns for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the most recent birth cohorts, with non-Hispanic blacks faring relatively worse. The changes across cohorts occur partly because of changes in tax rates and benefits, but more importantly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce. Of particular importance is the increasing share of beneficiaries who receive worker benefits instead of auxiliary benefits as wives or widows. OASI benefits are based on the lifetime covered earnings of current or former married couples, as well as on earned retirement benefits of individuals. The reduced importance of auxiliary benefits (due to the higher lifetime covered earnings of women) and the increased proportion of divorced retirees make OASI more progressive--even as net benefits decline--for current and future cohorts than for cohorts who retired in the 1990s. Analysis of these findings suggests that simulations of policy changes in Social Security must take into account the decreasing importance of auxiliary benefits across birth cohorts and the complex changes in individuals' marital histories.     

Spreading the Wealth

The new American president promoted the value of “spreading the wealth around” as an election theme, providing low-income families with tax breaks, rebates, and credits. The practice of using federal income taxes to re-distribute wealth, which sometimes reflects the noblest of goals, frequently generates significant unintended harm. Prominent among those unplanned casualties is a reduction in charitable giving: American voluntary wealth transfers (e.g., charitable contributions) are in danger of being crowded out by mandatory transfers (e.g., federal taxes) used to redistribute wealth. This paper considers the social and economic costs of raising taxes that crowd out charity.     

Incomes of the aged and nonaged, 1950-82

This article discusses the results of previous studies, both supportive and nonsupportive of the conclusion that the aged are as well-off as the nonaged, and then presents a range of figures from Bureau of the Census reports over the period 1950-82 that measure both the incomes of the aged and nonaged and those of subgroups within these populations. Census figures indicate that the aged and nonaged have about equal levels of average per capita family income and that about the same proportions of these groups have incomes below the poverty line. However, aged unrelated individuals, who account for about a third of all aged persons, have less than three-fifths the income of nonaged unrelated individuals. When the per capita family income of the aged is compared separately with that of families headed by persons aged 25-44 and 45-64, aged persons receive more than those under age 45 but less than those aged 45-64. Trends in the economic status of the aged and nonaged over the period 1950-82 indicate numerous fluctuations rather than a consistent improvement in the income of either group in relation to the other.     

Economic growth and income equality since the 1982 recession

This paper tests the “rising tide” and “trickle down” hypotheses of income growth by examining several measures of income inequality between 1983 and 1987. A close look at household incomes between those years shows that post-tax income growth has been concentrated among the 20 percent of American households with the highest incomes. The middle income classes have experienced only modest income growth over this period, and the 20 percent of American households with the lowest incomes have experienced a decline in income. These results hold whether the analysis is based on a summary measure of income equality such as the Gini coefficient, or on a less technical measure such as average income. Furthermore, income growth seems to be decreasing most rapidly for groups of households that historically have had the lowest incomes: female-headed households, blacks, and Hispanics. Finally, two standard explanations of the inequality trend—that the distributional changes are the result of either cohort effects or the movement of jobs to the lower wage areas of South—are tested by disaggregating the data. Neither hypothesis is confirmed by our research.     

RURAL AND URBAN POVERTY: AN INCOME/NET WORTH APPROACH

This paper examines rural and urban changes in the distribution of poverty that would result from modifying the conventional poverty measure to include the annuity value of household net worth.
Use of this new income/wealth measure caused numerous shifts in the location and demography of the poverty population. Among those more often found to be in poverty under the new measure were young, renter, and large central city resident households. Age, homeownership, farm employment, education, retirement status, public assistance participation, and residence in the West were important factors in explaining the divergence of the WH and INC measures. The age and retirement impacts were significantly different in rural and urban areas. Rural residence itself was not an important factor in explaining WH and INC differences.     

The relationship between income and material hardship

This paper examines the relationship between income and the extent of material hardship and explores other factors that might affect hardship. Using panel data from the Women's Employment Study, we examine the incidence of material hardship from 1997 to 2003 among current and former welfare recipients. We then consider the extent to which income is associated with hardship. We show that hardship decreases monotonically across quintiles of the income distribution for several income measures. When we measure income as the average across the 6‐year study period, a 10 percent increase in average income is associated with a 1.1 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of experiencing a hardship, a drop of about 3.4 percent. We also find that the relationship between transitory changes in income and hardship is weak. These results are consistent with findings based on a nationally representative sample of disadvantaged households from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Our results indicate that observable factors, such as measures of mental health, are more strongly related to hardship than current income. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Nationally poor,locally rich: Income and local context in the 2016 presidential election

When social scientists examine relationships between income and voting decisions, their measures implicitly compare people to others in the national economic distribution. Yet an absolute income level (e.g., $57,617 per year, the 2016 national median) does not have the same meaning in Clay County, Georgia, where the 2016 median income was $22,100, as it does in Old Greenwich, Connecticut, where the median income was $224,000. We address this limitation by incorporating a measure of one's place in her ZIP code's income distribution. We apply this approach to the question of the relationship between income and whites' voting decisions in the 2016 presidential election, and test for generalizability in elections since 2000. The results show that Trump's support was concentrated among nationally poor whites but also among locally affluent whites, complicating claims about the role of income in that election. This pattern suggests that social scientists would do well to conceive of income in relative terms: relative to one's neighbors.     

New perspectives on the public policy implications of defense and welfare expenditures in four modern democracies: 1950–1970

This article compares expenditure decisions in four “Western” democracies (Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in the policy areas of defense, health, education, and all government expenditures from 1950 to 1970. In addition, national income is used as a measure of economic growth in the four countries. The research focuses on the yearly fluctuations of expenditures and the statistical relationships existing among the variables under changing conditions. The research indicates significant departure from prior research findings and suggests that the assumption of an explicit trade-off between defense and welfare expenditures be reconsidered. In addition, when varying economic growth was examined, the research again indicates the need for reconsideration of prior relationships. Throughout, the article encourages the development of comparative policy research and theory and recommends the development of careful theoretical and methodological constructs.     

Housing prices and wealth inequality in Western Europe

Abstract

Comparative political economy (CPE) has robustly examined the political and institutional determinants of income inequality. However, the study of wealth, which is more unequally distributed than income, has been largely understudied within CPE. Using new data from the World Income Database (WID), this article examines how economic, political and institutional dynamics shape wealth-to-income ratios within Western European and OECD countries. It is found that the political and institutional determinants that affect income inequality have no short- or long-run effects on the wealth-to-income ratio. Rather, the rise in wealth-to-income ratios is driven by rising housing prices, as well as price changes in other financial assets, not home ownership or national saving rates. The article concludes by examining how the changing dynamics of housing prices and wealth inequality will increasingly shape intergenerational – and associated class-based – political conflict in Western Europe.     

Impact of trade and investment on income surge in Bangladesh: Evidence from trade liberalization regime

Trade and investment are crucial drivers of economic growth. Successful execution of trade and investment policy can elevate a developing country to a sustained growth path and make it self-reliant. Bangladesh implemented a trade liberalization policy in the 1980s, deviating much from its conservative trade policy. This article assesses the impacts of trade, investment in physical as well as human capital, and a few trade policy variables on income surge for the liberalized regime. The econometric analysis finds that export, import, and domestic investment stimulate income. The impact of foreign investment is not conducive. Public spending on education also contributes to the income surge. Among the policy variables, trade openness and currency depreciation produce a beneficial impact. Population growth retards economic growth. The baseline results hold in the estimations involving several specifications of variables and testified as robust. The article views that a comprehensive approach to trade and investment policy would ensure the comparative advantage of trade and the well-being of Bangladesh.     

Race,income, and home PC ownership: a regional analysis of the digital divide

While digital divide research has focused on differences in computer access at the national level, few studies have examined interrelationships among race, income, and personal computer (PC) ownership at the regional level. This article examines the racial and economic divide in home PC ownership across four census regions of the U.S. Our analyses are based on supplementary data from the Census Bureau’s August 2000 Current Population Survey. The results indicate that White households are significantly more likely to own a PC than African American households in all regions. The extent of this racial divide is greatest in the Midwest and smallest in the West, and particularly high in the $50,000–$75,000 income category. The racial divide in PC ownership is negated only in households earning more than $75,000 annually. A significantly large income divide also exists among African American PC owners in all regions.     

Alternative measures for the financial condition of the multifamily housing stock

Abstract

Indicators of the financial condition of the multifamily housing stock can potentially inform several policy issues, such as the loss of affordable rental units, multifamily developers’ access to capital, and the emerging secondary mortgage market for multifamily properties. Several rules of thumb exist for assessing financial condition. This article uses the Residential Finance Survey to investigate whether it matters, from a practical standpoint, which one is employed. Specifically, we ascertain how five measures—loan‐to‐value, debt coverage, rent‐to‐value, net operating income—to‐value, and vacancy loss ratios—relate to each other and rank properties.

We found that Pearsonian correlations among the measures varied dramatically. Factor analysis produced two factors, one corresponding to a rent‐flow measure and the other to a debt‐burden measure. Spearman rank‐order correlations revealed that with one exception, measures yielded noticeably dissimilar financial condition rankings. We conclude that single‐dimensional measures of financial condition should not be used in isolation.     

This is not your parents' retirement: comparing retirement income across generations

This article examines how retirement income at age 67 is likely to change for baby boomers and persons born in generation X (GenX) compared with current retirees. We use the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model to project retirement income and assets, poverty rates, and replacement rates for current and future retirees at age 67. We find that, in absolute terms, retirement incomes offuture cohorts will increase over time, and poverty rates will fall. However, projected income gains are larger for higher than for lower socioeconomic groups, leading to increased income inequality among future retirees. Finally, because postretirement incomes are not expected to rise as much as preretirement incomes, baby boomers and GenXers are less likely to have enough postretirement income to maintain their preretirement standard of living compared with current retirees.     

Labour market regulation and subjective well-being in low-income countries

A growing literature suggests social democratic policies, as exemplified by the welfare state and active labour market policies, promote higher levels of life satisfaction compared to the neoliberal agenda of austerity, smaller government and more ‘flexible’ labour markets. In this article, this inquiry is extended to low-income countries. A theoretical argument is developed for why labour market regulation (LMR) (rather than social welfare spending or the general size of government) is a more appropriate locus of attention outside of the industrial democracies. The relationship between LMR and several measures of well-being is then empirically evaluated, finding robust evidence that people live more satisfying lives in countries that more stringently regulate their labour market. Moreover, it is found that positive benefits of LMR on well-being are the largest among individuals with lower incomes. The implications for public policy and the study of human well-being are discussed.