The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

Argumentation and Interpretation in Law

Abstract
The author proceeds from a brief elucidation of the concept "argumentation" through a more extended account of substantive reasons in pure practical argumentation and of institutional argumentation applying "authority reasons" as grounds for legal decisions to an initial account of the nature and place of legal interpretative reasoning. Then he explores the three main categories of interpretative arguments, linguistic arguments, systemic arguments and teleological/deontological arguments; and he examines the problem of conflicts of interpretation and their resolution. His conclusion is that legal argumentation is only partly autonomous since it has to be embedded within widerelements of practical argumentation.     

The Special Case Thesis

The author outlines his thesis that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse ( Sonderfallthese ) and develops it as an attempt to cover both the authoritative, institutional, or real and free, discursive, or ideal dimension of legal reasoning. On this basis, he examines the objections raised by Habermas (1996) to the special case thesis. First, he discusses the reduction of general practical discourse to moral discourses ( genus proximum problem) holding that the former is a combination of moral, ethical, and pragmatic arguments within the priority of just; second, he examines the objection that general practical arguments change their character or nature when employed in legal contexts (subset and specification problem) and the related problems concerning legal validity and unjust law. He concludes proposing a procedural (opposite to a coherential) integration of general practical arguments in the legal context.     

What is the Theory Legal Argumentation For?

The paper aims to present the legal theories of legal argumentation constructed in the last century, organised into two groups: the precursors (Viehweg, Perelman and Toulmin) and the authors of the standard theory (MacCormick and Alexy). Then, some criticisms about all these conceptions are presented. And finally, an outline of a theory of legal argumentation is made, capable of overcoming some of the previous criticisms. The fundamental idea for this is to build a very abstract concept of argumentation that could then allow various interpretations or conceptions of legal argumentation. From here, one would be in a position to find an answer to the three main argumentative questions raised by legal practice: how to analyse an argument, how to evaluate it, how to argue.

     

Presumptions in Legal Argumentation

In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may be useful in cases in which there is insufficient evidence to prove the claim to an appropriate standard of proof.     

The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse*

Abstract. One of the most powerful accounts of the necessary connection between law and morality grounded on the openness of communication is provided by Robert Alexy, who builds a discourse theory of law on the basis of Habermas’ theory of general practical discourse. In this article I argue that the thesis based on the openness of legal discourse is problematic in that it does not provide a convincing account of the differentiation of legal discourse from other practical discourses. I offer an understanding of the institutionalisation of legal discourse as the tacit commitment of the participants to their shared normative experience and in particular in: 1) the possibility of containing normative force in space, 2) the possibility of transforming word into deed, 3) the possibility of grasping and controlling time and 4) the possibility of transforming deed into word. That commitment of participants in legal discourse is revealed as a set of fundamental assumptions embedded in all legal utterances, which provide the necessary bedrock that makes communication possible. It also provides a basis for the institution of legal discourse, to the effect that their problematisation signifies a departure from the latter.     

On the Connection between Law and Morality: Some Doubts about Robert Alexy’s View

The paper aims at a critical discussion of Alexy’s conception of the relationship between law and morality, which is known to insist on their necessary connection. After a brief recapitulation of this conception, the author scrutinizes three of its essential elements: the thesis of the dual nature of law, the argument from law’s claim to moral correctness, and the idea of an objective morality. Finally, he sketches his own position which, in some respects, resembles Alexy’s view, but also differs from it in certain relevant points.     

三段论推理在法律论证中的作用探讨

司法三段论这一近代以来占主导地位的法律推理模式,当今的法学家对其提出了诸多批判,法律方法论亦由此从总体上实现了向法律论证理论的转换。但是,三段论推理本身的合理价值依然应当予以承认。在法律论证中,形式方法仍然具有无可替代的作用。法律论证的逻辑有效性对于实际的论证活动依然是个比较重要的评价标准。足见三段论推理在法律论证理论中具有重要意义。可以说,演绎模式的说理规则表达了对于法律论证最低限度的理性要求。在事实与规范相互对应的法律适用观念下,三段论推理继续在法律论证,尤其是在内部证立当中发挥作用。     

Charles Sanders Peirce, A Mastermind of (Legal) Arguments

In this article, we try to trace the relationship between semiotics and theory of legal reasoning using Peirce’s idea that all reasoning must be necessarily in signs: every act of reasoning/argumentation is a sign process, leading to “the growth of knowledge. The broad scope and universal character of Peirce’s sign theory of reasoning allows us to look for new conciliatory paradigms, which must be presented in terms of possible synthesis between the traditional approaches to argumentation. These traditional approaches are strongly affected by either the dialectical (logical) perspective or the rhetorical perspective on argumentation, while Peirce’s approach tends to reconcile the rhetorical and methodological aspects of reasoning. This reconcilation is best illustrated by Peircean analysis of argument’s logical and rhetorical structure; while the diagrammatic (iconic) analysis of arguments is performed in the system of Existential Graphs (which is Peirce’s major methodological system, designed for the expressions of propositions in point of their relational structure). Obviously, Peirce’s original division of argument parts offered only the characterisation of the sign activity (involved in the process of reasoning), and thus left much to be desired in terms of practical explication.     

A Critique of Alexy’s Claim to Correctness

This article offers an overview of the difficulties in Robert Alexy’s idea of law’s “claim to correctness.” The inquiry takes us deep into the nature of simple communication, back out to what it means to have a theory about the nature of law, and also in the direction of wondering about the interaction of legal theory and practical reasoning—reasoning about how we should best act. The article offers reasons to question whether law in fact makes claims, at least in any straightforward sense. Even if one brackets that matter, there are reasons to raise doubts about what is in fact implicit in the act of lawmaking. At one level, an act of lawmaking does implicitly assert the authority to act in that way. Whether it also implies that the content of the action is morally good, or at least not clearly morally bad, is, at a minimum, a harder question.     

Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. A Defence of the Original View

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance of the one‐right‐answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.     

Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo-Arguments in Practical Philosophy*

Abstract
The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence.     

论法制的权威

本文以现阶段中国达成的关于树立法制权威的基本政治共识为出发点,主要从传统、理由论证以及调整问题的解决这三个层面分析了权威得以形成和维持的条件,概括出以权威制约权力的不同类型和制度设计模式。作者强调,在目前的社会现实中,应该首先理所当然地充分发挥法律规范的调整功能,然后再推动制度化的论证性对话。从这个角度来看,兼有技术调整和意见论证的程序权威就是政治体制改革"软着陆"的关键,是健全的、稳定的、依法的民主运作机制的核心因素。     

A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation

Abstract . The paper gives a formal reconstruction of some fundamental patterns of legal reasoning, intended to reconcile symbolic logic and argumentation theory. Legal norms are represented as unidirectional inference rules which can be combined into arguments. The value of each argument (its qualification as justified, defensible, or defeated) is determined by the importance of the rules it contains. Applicability arguments, intended to contest or support the applicability of norms, preference arguments, purporting to establish preference relations among norms, and interpretative arguments are also formalised. All those argument types are connected in a unitary model, which relates legal reasoning to the indeterminacy of legal systems, intended as the possibility to develop incompatible defensible arguments. The model is applied to permissive norms and normative hierarchies, and is implemented in a Prolog program.     

溯因推理新论——法律论证的视角

溯因推理具有显著的特征：或然性（假设性）、逆向性、非单调性、语用性和创新性.溯因推理研究的新进路在于,其发生了语用学的转向以及语用论证（论辩）的转向.在法律方法（法律适用）和法律逻辑的视域,溯因推理的研究及其运用,长期困固于刑事侦查领域中,对于其在司法判决（审判阶段中）作为一种法律论证方法以解决疑难案件的论证则少有使用.以法律论证为视角,用一例只有被害人陈述为直接证据的强奸案件为例,通过对传统证据链模式的分析,提出印证式证据链模式和排除式证据链模式,建立溯因推理的正向溯因推理模式和反向溯因推理模式,并在案件证据所呈现的情境下建构法律语境,展现溯因推理在具体案件中的法律论证,以期能为我国司法判决实现合理性和正当性,提供一种新的论证模式或方法.     

法律论证中的逻辑理性

法律论证中的逻辑理性,是指追问以及追求法律的逻辑性或法律在逻辑上的合理性。逻辑理性在法律论证中有重要的作用,它既可以为法律思维提供基本的思维框架和模式,具有建构性功能;也可以为法律论证提供公正的平台。但是,逻辑理性在法律论证中也有一些局限性,这说明在法律论证中,只有逻辑理性是不够的：还需要实践理性和价值理性的补充。它们三者既有联系又有区别,它们的关系体现了合理与合法的关系,其有机统一对构建以法治为基础的和谐社会有积极的意义。     

On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality*

Abstract. The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality.     

迈向“言说”理性的法律会话推理

法律推理是理性的过程,具体而言是一种实践理性.法律实践是一种“言说”的实践,特别是在司法过程中,任何一个环节都离不开“言说”这种会话模式.法律推理的过程就是在法律会话实践中选择最适合结论的过程,它包括一定法律行为正当化的论证和相对于一定目的的最佳手段的确定.法律会话推理①正是从多主体“言说”角度寻找正当性的法律推理方法,是一种“言说着”的理性,其以话语为媒介,以法律当事人之间的会话沟通为方式,通过各方对话语意图理解找到解决问题的最佳行为方法,从而对推理结论进行正当性论证,这里的正当性建立在主体间性的基础上,因而具有主体间的可接受性和社会层面的合理性.     

Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality

This paper criticizes Alexy's argument on the necessary connection between law and morality. First of all, the author discusses some aspects of the notion of the claim to correctness. Basically, it is highly doubtful that all legal authorities share the same idea of moral correctness. Secondly, the author argues that the claim to correctness is not a defining characteristic of the concepts of “legal norm” and “legal system”. Hence, the thesis of a necessary connection between law and morality based on such claim cannot be accepted. 1 Abstract by Antonino Rotolo.
     

Correctness and Cognitivism. Remarks on Robert Alexy's Argument from the Claim to Correctness*

The argument from the claim to correctness has been put forward by Robert Alexy to defend the view that normative utterances admit of objective answers. My purpose in this paper is to preserve this initial aspiration even at the cost of diverting from some of the original ideas in support of the argument. I begin by spelling out a full‐blooded version of normative cognitivism, against which I propose to reconstruct the argument from the claim to correctness. I argue that the context of uttering normative propositions points to the possibility of normative cognition, but does not constitute it. What constitutes the possibility of cognition is, as of necessity, the propositional structure of norms. I conclude that the argument from the claim to correctness ought to safeguard a distinction between the context of uttering a normative sentence and the proposition that individuates the content of the utterance.