Rediscovering corruption’s other side: bribing for peace in post-conflict Kosovo and Chechnya

Conventional approaches towards the impact of corruption on post-conflict stabilization suggest that corrupt practices impede a successful war to peace transition. When transparency and accountability are absent, the risk of corruption threatens to turn the state apparatus into a tool of enrichment for those in power and affect the “exit” from violence/insurgency towards demobilization and reintegration. However, corruption may have redeeming values by serving the function of a power-sharing arrangement between antagonistic parties, thereby, reinforcing peace. Radical anti-corruption programs in post-conflicts situations may bring adverse results such as a renewal of violence. Aimed to fill the void in research on corruption in post-conflict situations, the article inquires about the links between corruption, peacebuilding and violent non-state actors. By combining various disciplinary approaches, the article theorizes the outcomes of corruption in post-conflict situations and discusses them in the context of Kosovo and Chechnya.     

贪污罪的数额解析

贪污罪的数额对贪污罪的定罪与量刑具有重要意义。对贪污罪数额理解存在诸多争议,对贪污罪的司法实践具有较大影响。本文围绕贪污罪数额的界定、贪污罪数额的内涵、实践中贪污罪数额的认定标准展开探讨,作者提出了自己的观点。     

Corruption and NIC development: A case study of South Korea

The debate on corruption and economic performance has swung from one position to the other over the decades. During the 1960s the school of thought associated with modernisation theory argued corruption was often positively correlated with economic growth. (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964) Subsequently corruption came to be viewed as inimical to growth by undermining the basis of stable, rational public policies and allocation through markets (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Theobald, 1990), the situation in which it is still largely viewed today, particularly following the “corruption eruption” of the 1990s (Alam, 1989; Leiken, 1997; Naim, 1995). East Asian countries stand as important case studies of the role of corruption in industrialisation: this article focuses on South Korea. Firstly corruption coexisted with development. Secondly corruption in South Korea was at different times functional, detrimental, irrelevant and relevant, but always present during rapid industrialisation. This is not of course to argue corruption fuelled growth nor to recommend it as a plausible policy option for developing or transitional economies, since it is evident that in many cases corruption is harmful to growth. This article seeks to understand the role corruption played in Korean economic development to better understand the phenomenon of corruption itself. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

How Chinese e-public feel and think about corruption: A case study of Audit Storm (Shenji fengbao – 审计风暴 – Part II)

Corruption is pervasive, rampant, enduring, and above all else a tolerated and taken for granted social problem in China. Still, corruption is a major concern for the political leaders, general public and foreign observers. Foreigners complained about the corruption cost of doing business in China. Students took to the street and peasants staged violent protest against government corruption. The consensus is that corruption challenges CPC's legitimacy and threatens China's stability.A systematic review of the literature uncovers no investigation on the Chinese people's reception and reaction to the corruption, on the internet. This is a first attempt to do so.This is a research into the “feelings” and “thinking” of Chinese internet users (e-public) on (anti)corruption in China. Specially, it tries to document and analyze the comments–reaction of the e-public to news articles on various aspects of “Audit Storm” in June–July 2004.     

How Chinese e-public feel and think about corruption: A case study of Audit Storm (Shenji fengbao – – Part I)

Corruption is pervasive, rampant, enduring, and above all else a tolerated and taken for granted social problem in China. Still, corruption is a major concern for the political leaders, general public and foreign observers. Foreigners complained about the corruption cost of doing business in China. Students took to the street and peasants staged violent protest against government corruption. The consensus is that corruption challenges CPC's legitimacy and threatens China's stability.A systematic review of literature uncovers no investigation on the Chinese people's reception and reaction to the corruption, in the net. This is a first attempt to do so.This is a research into the “feelings” and “thinking” of Chinese internet users (e-public) on (anti)corruption in China. Specially, it tries to document and analyze the comments – reaction of the e-public to news articles on various aspects of “Audit Storm” in June–July of 2004.     

Corruption in Public Procurement: Finding the Right Indicators

Red flags are widely used to minimize the risk of various forms of economic misconduct, among which corruption in public procurement. Drawing on criminal investigations, the literature has developed several indicators of corruption in public procurements and has put them forward as viable risk indicators. But are they genuinely viable, if only corrupt procurements are analysed? Using a dataset of 192 public procurements — with 96 cases where corruption was detected and 96 cases where corruption was not detected — this paper addresses the identification of significant risk indicators of corruption. We find that only some indicators significantly relate to corruption and that eight of them (e.g. large tenders, lack of transparency and collusion of bidders) can best predict the occurrence of corruption in public procurements. With this paper we successfully tap into one of the most vulnerable areas of criminological research — selecting the right sample — and consequently, our results can help increase the detection of corruption, increase investigation effectiveness and minimize corruption opportunities.     

Win,lose, or draw? China’s quarter century war on corruption

In 1982, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party ordered a crackdown on corruption. As China’s war on corruption enters its 25 year an obvious question is whether the party winning? Because there is no direct way to measure the actual rate of corruption (ARC) and the data we have on the revealed rate of corruption (RRC) may not perfectly reflect changes in the ARC while changes in the perceived level of corruption (PLC) may be subject to subjective distortion, trends in the RRC and the PLC may not provide reliable answers. The mathematical relationship between the ARC and the RRC, however, can be defined as a function of risk. Increases in risk can be interpreted as signaling a narrowing of the ARC–RRC gap. Decreases in risk can be interpreted as signaling a widening of the ARC–RRC gap. By combining data on changes in risk with data on movement in the RRC it is possible, therefore, to assess (in broad terms) the movement of the ARC even though it remains technically unknowable. Using data on the lag between when officials first engage in corruption and when they are prosecuted to measure changes in risk, this article raises doubts about whether Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is winning its war on corruption.     

Laws without teeth: An overview of the problems associated with corruption in Ukraine

This paper presents an overview of the current problems of corruption in Ukraine. It provides an example of specific corruption practices in the country and describes the general provisions related to the fight against corruption in Ukraine. The paper presents preliminary results of a pilot study of corruption in Ukraine to examine the impact of corruption on thefinancial markets. We support the proposition of Claessens, Djankov, andKlingebiel (2000) that the development of financial institutions and the improvement of financial market services in a nation can be viewed as indicators of the effectiveness of the economic, political, and legal reforms and the dedication of the government to these reforms. The paper ends with a discussion of the role of the international community in the fight against corruption in Ukraine.     

Democratic transitions and forms of corruption

Any transition to democracy has implications for corruption. This papertakes a contextual and procesual approach to the analysis ofdemocratisation and corruption. It disaggregates some variables wherebydemocratisation can provide the context for the development of corruptionand crime. This paper does not argue democratisation causescorruption and crime. Nor does it argue democratisation does not providethe social space for the reduction of corruption and crime. This paperconcentrates on the areas in which democratisation provides an oftencomplex environment for the development of corruption and crime.     

Public corruption and fraud in the Netherlands: Research and results

Empirical research by social scientists on public corruption and fraud in the Netherlands has been scarce. Exceptions are research on criminal cases of corruption and, recently, a survey among local government functionaries to establish the extent of public corruption and fraud in the country. The article presents the conceptual framework and the results of this survey research on local corruption and fraud. A discussion of the findings concludes the article: How serious is the problem of Dutch public corruption and fraud? To stimulate comparative research, the questionnaire is added in an Appendix.     

Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981–2011

Corrupt politicians have to a surprisingly great extent been found to go unpunished by the electorate. These findings are, however, drawn from case studies on a limited number of countries. This study, on the contrary, is based on a unique dataset from 215 parliamentary election campaigns in 32 European countries between 1981 and 2011, from which the electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals are analyzed. Information about the extent to which corruption allegations and scandals have occurred is gathered from election reports in several political science journals, and the electoral effects are measured in terms of the electoral performances—the difference in the share of votes between two elections—of all parties in government, as well as the main incumbent party, and the extent to which the governments survive the election. The control variables are GDP growth and unemployment rate the year preceding the election, the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties, and the level of corruption. The results show that both corruption allegation and corruption scandals are significantly correlated with governmental performances on a bivariate basis; however, not with governmental change. When controlling for other factors, only corruption allegation has an independent effect on government performances. The study thus concludes—in line with previous research—that voters actually punish corrupt politicians, but to a quite limited extent.     

腐败预防立法体系的理性建构

腐败的本质是权力的滥用,腐败预防立法体系能够有效控制权力.理性的腐败预防立法体系建构应当考虑腐败的衍生规律与治理效能,厘清腐败预防立法体系中存在的一些现实障碍,明确公共权力在管理国家与社会事务中的角色定位,一体推进"不敢腐""不能腐""不想腐",以确保公权力行使的廉洁性,有效预防腐败.     

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.     

去利益化：行政腐败的控制机理

控制行政腐败的路径有多种,但切断利益对行政权力的操控,使行政权力与行政主体的利益彻底脱钩,避免利益因素渗透到行政过程,即去利益化,是行政腐败控制最有效的途径。行政腐败存在于行政过程的各个环节,要有效控制行政腐败,必须着重解决行政立法、行政执法和行政司法中的去利益化问题,可以说,去利益化是行政腐败控制机理的内核。     

Measuring Political Corruption from Audit Results: A New Panel of Brazilian Municipalities

Comparative research on corruption has always faced challenges on how to reliably measure this phenomenon. Indicators based on perceptions of or experience with corruption are the most common approaches, but these methods have also faced criticism regarding limitations to their conceptual and measurement validity. A number of scholars have thus sought to develop alternative, more objective, measures of corruption. Following this line of research, this paper relies on audit reports from Brazilian municipalities to construct a concrete indicator of political corruption. Data collection exploits the setup of randomized multiple audit rounds to construct a unique panel of 140 municipalities covering five administrative terms between 1997 and 2013. A first empirical application of data is presented, testing the potential deterrent effect of electoral accountability on future corruption levels.     

Factors which deter public officials from reporting corruption

A survey of over 800 public sector employees was conducted to explore the factors which would be most likely to deter public sector employees from reporting workplace corruption. Respondents were asked to consider whether they would make a report in the absence of certain factors which have been found in past research to impact on the decision to make reports. The aim was to determine which workplace strategies managers should make a priority when encouraging employees to report workplace corruption. Concern about not having enough proof was the most commonly reported deterrent, followed by the absence of legal protection from negative consequences. The factors which were reported as deterring the least number of respondents were the absence of role responsibility for reporting corruption and not being directly affected by the corruption. Respondents from lower income groups were more likely to be deterred from reporting corruption in the absence of encouraging factors. In addition, a relationship was found between a lack of information about mechanisms for reporting corruption and a negative attitude toward reporting corruption. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The multi-shade paradox of public corruption: the Moldovan case of dirty hands and collective action

Corruption is an undoubtedly a difficult conceptual area to operate in. This is particularly accurate for the post-Soviet space, where seemingly mutually exclusive forces appear to coexist on regular basis, defying and rejecting rational interpretations. Standard assumptions, definitions and theoretical perspectives often fail to generate useful understandings of corruption in Eastern Europe, habitually obscuring fundamental patterns, hence leaving corruption largely misunderstood. In order to construct anticorruption policies that would be effective in the environment where corruption is systemic, it is critical to resist the temptation of eschewing the complexity of societal factors by over-focusing on the corrupt individual. In an effort to reemphasize the imperative role played by societal variables in explaining corruption in the post-Soviet space, this article uses insights gathered from studying corruption in Republic of Moldova to discuss the role of three fundamental dynamics: “dirty hands,” the problem of “collective action” and the achromatic schema of white-gray-black corruption.     

The Supply-Side of International Corruption: a New Measure and a Critique

I consider the supply-side of corruption in the context of international bribery, which I define as firms bribing public officials abroad. I present the Bribe Payers Corruption Index (BPCI), a non-perception-based measure of cross-border corruption coherent with a simple analytical framework based on an important distinction: that between the propensities to corrupt and observed levels of corruption. The BPCI is compared with a widely known indicator of the supply-side of corruption, Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index (TI-BPI), which I demonstrate to be flawed. Whereas according to the TI-BPI firms from corrupt countries are more likely to bribe abroad, the opposite emerges when the BPCI is considered. I explain and discuss such results, the implications of which are framed within the global discourse on the supply-side of international corruption.     

Corruption,bribery and patriarchy in Tanzania

This is an ethnography of the political culture of Tanzania as compared to the political culture of the United States. Endemic and harmful corruption among the political leadership of Tanzania and the United States alike stems from widespread popular equation of order with patriarchy, made worse by extending the logic of patriarchy to belief that social order and welfare rest on the strength of the nation state. The Tanzanian war on corruption and ensuing shutdown of the University of Dar es Salaam during the first half of 1990 affirm the radical feminist premise that the models of legitimacy we apply in the privacy of our families are identical to and inseparable from the models of legitimacy employeed domestically and internationally by our political leaders. Corruption and other violence are more directly expressed in Tanzania and more indirectly expressed by Americans who as a consequence are more enslaved to corruption and violence than Tanzanians. The contrast in Tanzanian and U.S. political cultures and the nature of patriarchy itself leads to a set of paradoxes about achieving freedom from corruption through exercise of patriarchal state power—as that children who are the ultimate victims of corruption are at once most blamed by adults, more responsive to change than adults, and unable to change as long as they remain the subjects of patriarchal discipline. Bribery is not necessarily a part of the problem of corruption but is a part of the solution. Freedom from corruption basically requires democratic accountability. Tanzanians and Americans are linked symbiotically: neither people can free themselves from corruption without before the other. There is no logical starting point for a patriarchal approach to freeing people from corruption. On the other hand radically effective emancipation from corruption is occurring across Tanzania and the United States.     

清除腐败赖品德———兼论法律作用的有限性

腐败有掌权者腐败和机构腐败之分。掌权者腐败具有“行为的个别性”和“明显的不合理性”的特点。机构腐败也有两个显著特点：（1）它是机关行为或一定权力系统的行为,没有具体的责任人;（2）它的不合理性不十分明显,人们对它常常不能形成稳定一致的是非评价。由于腐败与执法的同源性、权力的不受惩罚性、反腐败的法令只能由不腐败的权力创制等原因,对腐败无法像对其他犯罪那样通过严格执法来实现治理目标。在民主政治下,根治腐败的根本出路是贯彻品德原则,建立对官员的品德评价系统。品德评价系统是依据品德标准对公职人员实施辞退、罢免、撤换的政治评价系统。这个系统由执法权自洁系统、监督系统和以公众为力量源泉的基础系统等构成。