An Appraisal of the National Health Insurance Scheme of Nigeria

Clarity is very important in legislative drafting to allow the drafter to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness in the law, which may affect the rights of citizens. Ambiguity occurs when in the law words can be interpreted in more than one way and vagueness occurs when there is doubt to where the words’ boundaries are or when the word has an open textured meaning. It is difficult to attain clarity due to the fact that in legislation ambiguity and vagueness may be caused by insufficient drafting instructions, and it is incumbent on the drafter to seek further clarifications. In pursuing clarity, some tools are needed such as the use of plain language which makes legislation clear and understandable for a lay person, gender-neutral language and the proper structuring or layout of the legislative intent to enhance clarity.     

Can the Law Speak Directly to its Subjects? The Limitation of Plain Language

Can we dispense with lawyers as intermediaries between the law and its subjects? Can laypeople have direct access to the law? The Plain English Movement (PEM) has long promoted the use of plain language in legal writing as the way to demystify the law, and many governments and private corporations have expended significant resources on drafting legislation and legal documents in plain language. This article argues that the PEM has exaggerated the capacity of plain language to render the law intelligible to the non‐lawyer, obscuring the deeper question of legal complexity by focusing solely on language and style. Using the law effectively requires expertise that goes far beyond understanding the meaning of the words used to communicate it: certain complex aspects of the law cannot be eliminated by mere simplification of language and this article demonstrates that other specialized skills are required over and above the ability to penetrate technical language. The paradigmatic illustration of the need for such skills is litigation.     

Plain English in the law — a new model for the 21st century

Abstract

Traditional language of the law is called “legalese” because it is difficult for those not trained in its mystery to understand. A myth about legalese is that it is necessary for certainty in law. This is untrue. The proponents of plain English have shown through their writing that the use of plain language in legal writing produces certainty in language that is easy to read and understand. This article looks at the history of the plain English movement and discusses its benefits, shows how legal writing can be improved by its use and, in the final section, briefly gives an illustration of how a culture of plain English writing can be embedded into a law school curriculum.     

Prerogative legislation as the paradigm of bad law-making: the Chagos Islands

Legislation made by way of the Royal Prerogative is a paradigm of bad law-making. This is examined via the case study of the British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order 2004. The Order was made without reference to a legislature and without proper scrutiny or legislative drafting. It is unclear, ambiguous and imprecise. It does not use plain language or gender-neutral language. It is deliberately inaccessible, making it extremely hard for the citizen to know its contents. In form and substance, it offends against the rule of law.     

Mainstreaming the Duty of Clarity and Transparency as part of Good Administrative Practice in the EU

Abstract: Language rights in the EU tend to be viewed in terms of the respect of national identity on the one hand and the clear and harmonised application of the internal market on the other. It is argued that an efficient language policy in the EU is one that reconciles respect for diversity with the need for effective communication. The use of specialist jargon in effect consolidates networks and power, of which there are two separate but related dimensions. The first is the external dimension of language, namely the lingua francaof deliberation, be it English, French, German, and so on. The second dimension refers to the use of élite codes, that is, language for ‘insiders’, which operates in spheres of politics, the law, economics, culture, medicine, and so on. It is the latter which the EU language rights régime has neglected. The absence of enabling provisions governing a duty of clear language renders democratic legitimacy intended by the former relatively meaningless. It is argued that the law can protect, facilitate, safeguard, and encourage clarity and transparency as part of good administrative practice. The duty to use language in a clear and comprehensible manner that has arisen in relation to producers in the EC law context of consumer rights is a useful case in point.     

Law and Its Rhetoric of Violence

This article explores the manner in which politico-legal language makes use of metaphors of violence and destruction in order to describe state/legal functions and actions. It argues that although such use of a militaristic hyperbole is generally regarded as normal and appropriate, it is in fact harmful in the way that it presents complex and specific problems as being simple and abstract. From a semiotic point of view, and using the work of Roland Barthes, law is regarded as a system of signs and ‘combative’ legal language can be seen as ideological manipulation through the technique of so-called second-level signification (myth). Although it is conceded that law, similar to all other interpretive systems, cannot avoid the use of metaphoric language, it is argued that we should resist regarding legal language as neutral and ‘natural’ and that we should rather retain the memory of legal concepts and categories as historical, man-made, and therefore always open to revision.     

Langage Juridique et Langage Usuel: Vrais ou Faux Amis?

This article tries to bring to light the mistaken idea that the words the law borrows from plain language, without explicit definition, should keep their original meaning; Although legal language and plain language are obviously close “friends”, they seem to be also “false friends”, because these words belonging to two different languages have, beyond their formal similarities, partially different meanings. For this purpose, this article provides a critical analysis of the reference of the belgian case law to the ordinary meaning of words. This reference is analysed in relation to three different matters: interpretation, legality, and autonomy of criminal law.     

法律语言技术化与法的现代性问题

追求精确的目标使法律发展出了一套专门语言,这种语言在许多方面与日常语言不同。法律的科学化带来了法律语言的技术化,法律语言作为专家语言日益与日常语言分离,伴随这种分离的是生活世界与系统的分离。语言是存在的家,生活世界存在于日常语言中,技术语言泛化带来生活世界的殖民化。法的现代性问题源于语言的分裂。交往行动与日常语言密不可分,只有实现技术语言与日常语言的有机融合,才能实现沟通理性对工具理性的治理。     

To Live Outside the Law: Frank O'Hara

This essay reflects on the New York School poet Frank O'Hara in terms of the idea of law. I suggest that art depends on a notion of an immanent law: that for language to become artistic is to become a meaningful part of an order which announces its autonomy from the surrounding world. O'Hara exploits this fact by making the most unlikely pieces of language into poetry, and thus giving the law to the life from which his words are taken. But he is also constantly improvising his own rules of art, drawing the law of poetry from the whim of the moment in radically individualist fashion. The gamble of O'Hara's writing is that the reader will submit to this profoundly personal law for the duration of a poem. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Linguistic Justice in International Law: An Evaluation of the Discursive Framework

Claims by minority groups to use their own languages in different social contexts are often presented as claims for “linguistic justice”, that is, justice as between speakers of different languages. This article considers how the language of international law can be used to advance such claims, by exploring how international law, as a discourse, approaches questions of language policy. This analysis reveals that international legal texts structure their engagement with “linguistic justice” around two key concepts: equality and culture. Through a close examination of the way in which these concepts function within international legal discourse, the article suggests that this conceptual framework may sometimes constrain, as well as enlarge, the possibilities for justice for minority language speakers. Thus while international law may provide a language for challenging injustices in the linguistic sphere, limitations inherent in this discourse may also restrict its emancipatory potential.     

The Jury between the Civil and the Criminal Law

This article comprises two case studies of a ``problem' within the Anglo-Welsh legal process of jury trial. In that tradition, the judge not only instructs on the law to be applied by the jury, s/he also ``summarises' the evidence after counsel have already done so. This summarising is largely unconstrained by appellate control. The ``problem' that the two cases present is that they were trials of ``civil' issues in which the subject matter is also categorised as ``criminal'. Where such overlaps occur the relevant law is not easy nor clear. This can present difficulties for the judge, which may and in these cases were transmitted and amplified to the jury. In the first case study, the rhetorical direction of the judge's language are analysed. In the second, the language is analysed as a generator of confusion rather than direction. In both cases the outcome in the jury's verdict reflect the judicial language. Under current British law, investigation of the conversion process from judicial ``Summing-up' through collective jury deliberation to verdict is illegal.     

刑法立法语言的明确化

作为罪刑法定主义的实质侧面，明确性是刑法规范对立法语言的基本要求，这就使得刑法的立法语言具有准确清晰、简洁通俗、庄重严谨等鲜明风格，然而，我国《刑法》的立法语言则存在着语义不清、累赘重复、罪状表述含糊、法定刑幅度过大等突出问题。为此，从宏观上来讲，需要制定一部规范立法语言文字的专门法律，并构建立法语言审查制度，以期实现我国《刑法》立法语言的明确化。     

Out of the Fly-Bottle: Conceptual Confusions in Multilingual Legislation

Conceptual confusions permeate all forms of intellectual pursuit. Many have contended that multilingual legislation, i.e., one law enacted in different languages, is unviable when carried out by means of translation. But not many have realized that the same would also be true of drafting if their contention could be justified. My involvement in the translation of Hong Kong laws into Chinese in the run-up to 1997 exposed me to a whole world of myths and misconceptions about legal translation arising from our failure to command a clear view of the workings of language. Over the years I have endeavoured to come to grips with the problems inherent in legal translation, showing that the arguments against the possibility of exact translation, against the possibility of achieving equivalence between different language texts of the law, and against the possibility of bridging the conceptual gap between legal terminologies in different languages, are all ill-grounded and misguided. There are indeed enormous difficulties in drafting and translating multilingual law, but they are essentially of a technical nature, by no means theoretically irresolvable. The viability of multilingual legislation is simply grounded in our innate communicative intention to use signs and symbols to convey meaning. As language users, we are capable of making language work for us for any particular purpose. Just as we can translate the rules of chess from one language to another whereby players speaking different languages can play the same game called “chess”, we don’t see why we can’t do the same with multilingual legislation. The door has always been open!     

法律中的语言游戏与权力分配

既然法律是对社会资源进行合理配置的一种手段,那么表达法律的语言就足实现这一目标的工具。立法者通过语言,确立了社会资源的分配原则,而语言所表征的分配方式本身,证明着规范的正当性。但是,立法者通过语言对社会权力所做的分配不可能终局性地完成,这一任务必须向后延伸到司法过程中。司法者通过对个案中具体权利的决断与平衡,将立法者对社会权力所做的初次分配现实化、具体化、个别化。所以说,法之正义是由立法者和司法者共同缔造的,在立法者和司法者那里,语言本身都是一种权力。     

论侦查行为的分类

分类是探寻事物本质的一种方法和路径,这对于侦查行为而言也是如此。通过对侦查行为分类,可以厘清刑事侦查行为的本质,明晰侦查机关权力的具体承担者——侦查行为的价值指向。在比较法的视野下,对不同法系、国家的侦查行为的异同进行研究,从而以科学的态度实现扬弃,可以为权利保护提供不同视角,为精确和严密的立法提供理论依据。     

Open wide--I meant your pocketbook: repercussions of the dental exclusion to the Medicare act

For many Americans, dental coverage is merely a matter of cosmetics, a pretty smile. But for the elderly, a dental condition can affect nutrition, health, and financial well-being. In her note, Amanda Schwob explores the dental exclusion to Medicare, a provision of great concern to the elderly. Ms. Schwob seeks to define the scope of the dental exclusion by means of the plain language of the Medicare statute, case law, and legislative history. This analysis reveals startling uncertainty in this area of law. Next, Ms. Schwob considers several proposals before Congress as well as state reimbursement policies. The note concludes with concrete suggestions to remedy the ambiguity surrounding Medicare's dental exclusion.     

Cornerstones of a Civilized Society: Law,Morality, Faith and Spirituality

The linkages among law, morality, faith and spirituality are historically accepted. Yet, the separation between law and morality/faith/ spirituality have also been accepted and expected in order to preserve the traditional separation of church and state. Nevertheless, application, infusion and adoption of legal, moral, faith and spiritual principles have been the cornerstones of the building of this country for almost three centuries. Recently, and increasingly, those cornerstones are being chipped away. Stated more succinctly by Selleck and Josephson (1995). “There is a hole in the moral ozone and we've got to fix it” (p. 53). This paper explores and revisits the unique contributions of each and the connectedness among law, morality, faith and spirituality as partners in refurbishing the cornerstones that can support this nation securely into the next millennium. While examined separately, it is clear that these four components of lifespan development are not mutually exclusive and overlap considerably, both historically and in modern society. Included are models of morality, faith development and spirituality which may provide the reader with concrete touchstones for reflective thought.     

Clear, Simple, and Precise Legislative Drafting: How Does a European Community Directive Fare?

In 2001, Martin Cutts redrafted Toy-Safety Directive 88/378/EEC¹in plain language. He criticized the language of that Directiveas being archaic legalese.² He added that Directives, as a whole,were poorly drafted.³ The European Commissions Legal Servicerejected his criticisms. It stated that it had published theEuropean Commission’s plain language guidelines⁴ afterDirective 88/378/EEC had been drafted. In a previous articlein the Statute Law Review,⁵ Butt and Castle’s⁶ plain languageguidelines were explicated using examples from Directive 2002/2/EC.⁷In this article, their guidelines are applied to the whole ofthat Directive to see if its language is ‘clear, simple,and precise’.⁸ The criticisms made in the previous article,⁹combined with those made in this article, suggest that the draftersof Directive 2002/2/EC¹⁰ have not yet mastered the skill ofwriting in ‘clear, simple, and precise’ language.     

反对解释的场景及主体

反对解释是法治社会的一个原则。这一原则强调,对明确的法律规范,尤其是强制性法律规范,法官等法律人应该直接认定其意义并加以贯彻,而不能解释,尤其不能过度解释。反对解释的场景是个审判等活动“语境”的问题,但由于场景都是片断,因而难以从理论上系统叙述,所以,我们只是把场景作为思考的起点和归宿,在法治理念下叙说反对解释的一般要求。我们相信,法制要求人们对法律规范的固有意义保持克制,要求尊重法律的权威。能动主义是一种克服司法机械的思路。司法能动主义者几乎把严格等同于机械。但法制恰恰是因为有了适度严格才显示其魅力,如果到处能见到灵活那就不可能有法制。近百年来,几乎所有的法学都围绕着维护或破除法律的严格(或机械)而展开。但从法制基本教义看,司法克制主义是主流,而能动主义只能在克服法律过于死板,或协调法律与社会正义的严重冲突时才显现其功用。反对解释的主体是所有的适法人员,对不同的主体有不同的要求。     

The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the way in which it works can be seen as a microcosm of how a multilingual, multicultural supranationalisation process and legal order can be constructed—the Court is a microcosm of the EU as a whole and in particular of EU law. The multilingual jurisprudence produced by the CJEU is necessarily shaped by the dynamics within that institution and by the ‘cultural compromises’ at play in the production process. The resultant texts, which make up that jurisprudence, are hybrid in nature and inherently approximate. On the one hand, that approximation can lead to discrepancies between language versions of the Court’s case law and thus jeopardise the uniform application of EU law. On the other hand, that approximation and hybridity define EU law as a distinct, supranational legal order. This paper analyses the operation of the CJEU and considers whether a linguistic cultural compromise exists within that institution which exercises a formative influence on the character of its ‘output’—i.e. its jurisprudence—and what that may mean for our understanding of the development of EU law.