The Information Confrontation with Radical Islam

Information has emerged as a critical—potentially the decisive—front in both the global war with violent radical Islam and the overlapping but so far largely unadmitted Cold War with nonviolent radical Islam. In fact, the information front is undoubtedly the closest thing that al Qaeda has to a strategic center of gravity. Unfortunately, America faces an extremely hostile information environment in the Middle East and al Qaeda has proven far more effective at getting its message across than has the United States. A more effective U.S. information strategy would be one that stresses three themes: a democratic critique of radical Islam; an Islamic critique of radical Islam; and a critique of the crisis in Middle Eastern civilization. While these will not necessarily make the U.S. or its policies more popular, they may drive a wedge between radical Islam and potential supporters.     

Identity,Solidarity, and Islam in Europe

Populists argue that Islamic immigrants are fundamentally different from Europeans. As evidence, they point to notions of religious and cultural identity. Such arguments have popular resonance. As more mainstream politicians pick up on these themes, they begin to take on an air of common sense. Nevertheless, they are mistaken. Europe has a long track record of reconciling competing identities. This has happened by focusing on patterns of interaction (solidarity) rather than obvious indicators of distinctiveness. Using the examples of the Netherlands and Turkey, this article illustrates the wide spectrum of European approaches to the challenge of getting different groups to share the same geographic space.     

Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations

This article addresses three questions. The rise of radical Islamic movements in Southeast Asia, the links between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda, and the challenge to Southeast Asian states from JI. Desker gives an overview of radical Islamic organisations in Southeast Asia resorting to violence, and their reciprocal connections and ties to the global al-Qaeda network. These organisations and their actions draw attention to the interplay between transnational non-state actors, postcolonial states and regional integration processes in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Desker points out the fragility of postcolonial states challenged by religious, ethnic and linguistic groups promoting separatist or transnational agendas. As new states protective of their sovereignty and the primacy of their national identities, the ASEAN members generally have pursued individual national interests in confronting such transnational actors. As such the ASEAN member-states have not relied on their multilateral relationships, highlighting the erosion of the ASEAN security community after the Cold War. The original version of this paper was prepared for the Regional Outlook Forum organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore on 7 January 2003.     

Radical Islam and the struggle for influence in Central Asia

The threat of an Iranian‐style Islamic takeover of the newly independent states of Central Asia is currently more of a potential than actual threat to the secular rulers of these countries. Nonetheless, economic, environmental and nationality problems render these rulers vulnerable to a future Islamic potential challenge. The threat of Islam has been used by local leaders to justify dictatorships and intervene in neighboring countries, while foreign governments, such as Turkey and Israel, have sought to exploit the threat of Islam in Central Asia to strengthen their support from the United States. By contrast, Iran has downplayed the Islamic factor in its foreign policy toward these new republics and as a result has enhanced its relationship with Russia, which seeks to establish its hegemony over the region.     

Islam and politics in Europe and in Asia: Comparative reflections

This article compares the role of religion, and of Islam in particular, in politics in Europe and in South and South East Asia. It starts out with the policy dilemmas facing France, Europe's most secular country that also has Europe's largest immigrant Muslim community. After long debates nation-wide Muslim organisation is now sponsored by the state in order to strengthen moderate Islam in France. In contrast, explicit Christian parties are in decline in most of Europe. Those who are still electorally successful are Christian mostly in name only and have turned into centre-right conservative people's parties instead. Religious discourse in politics has hence vanished almost entirely in Europe. In difference in Asia Islamic opposition parties have managed to set increasingly the political agenda in the majority Islamic states. In those countries with an Islamic minority their public religious agitation serves to strengthen their ethnic minority identity. Meaningful bi-continental dialogue needs to be aware of this discrepancy in religious politics.     

Islam embedded: Religion and plurality in Southeast Asia as a mirror for Europe

This essay is a brief introductory survey of some fundamental aspects of Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly, within the maritime Malay-Muslim world. Ethnic, linguistic and cultural variation is the norm in the region. In addition, the region is heir to Hindu and Buddhist traditions and also to three European colonial systems of government and administration (Portuguese, Dutch and British). Islam is but one amongst all these. In some aspects of life it has been considerably reformulated by them. Thus to understand Islam in Southeast Asia one must begin with data from the area than with some Middle-Eastern and theological formulation of Islam. But we have to recognize that Islam is a universalistic theology originating from the Arabic Middle East. Therefore, a more informed analysis and understanding of Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia and their contemporary articulations must be ‘embedded’ in the historical reality of both the plurality and plural society templates that become the ‘moulds’ of social life in the region. Similarly, to understand contemporary Islam and Muslims in Europe, its ‘embedization processes’, both breadth and depth, have to be understood historically and sociologically.     

阿富汗的伊斯兰教

伊斯兰教进入阿富汗已有一千多年的历史,是大多数阿富汗居民的信仰。然而,由于极为复杂的原因,伊斯兰教又不得不与一些前伊斯兰和非伊斯兰的信仰体系分享阿富汗人的精神世界。阿富汗的宗教阶层主要包括毛拉、圣族或圣门的后裔及苏菲派皮尔,由于阿富汗的部落社会特征,宗教阶层或高踞社会之上,或处于社会之外,从而形成阿富汗极为特殊的社会群体。与阿富汗分散、落后的部落社会结构相适应,阿富汗的宗教设施也有自己的特征。苏菲教团是阿富汗伊斯兰教的重要组成部分,不仅影响阿富汗人的精神世界,而且是阿富汗政治与社会生活中的重要角色。     

对东南亚伊斯兰的理性评估--《亚洲伊斯兰教》介评

东南亚地区共有2亿多穆斯林,他们总体属于主张宽容的温和派。但1997年亚洲金融危机后,印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾等国政局动荡,伊斯兰极端势力发展迅速,呈现出国际性和跨国区域合作二大特征,对国际、地区安全和有关国家社会稳定构成威胁。2002年10月在印度尼西亚巴厘岛发生的重大恐怖爆炸事件更令世界震惊,东南亚的伊斯兰教也因之引起了世界的广泛关注。美国和解出版公司2002年出版的由“美国犹太人委员会”亚洲、太平洋地区研究所所长贾森·艾萨克森与“澳大利亚以色     

政治伊斯兰意识形态与伊斯兰教的政治化

伊斯兰并非天生具有政治属性.政治伊斯兰意识形态是政治人将伊斯兰进行政治化加工的产物,即通过重新解释部分教义、发明传统等方法,把特定政治主张包装成宗教责任,进而把民众的宗教热情引入政治轨道.政治伊斯兰意识形态话语兼具宗教和政治色彩,内容包括"真正信仰"、沙里亚或伊斯兰国家、乌玛3个层面,其核心目标指向政治权力.作为载体,政治伊斯兰运动是具体的、多样的.学界对政治伊斯兰成因机制的分析框架大体分为文化本质主义模式、结构-制度模式、认同-安全模式、代理人模式等几大类.政治化是理解政治伊斯兰现象的关键.政治化对伊斯兰自身发展的深远影响值得广泛关注.     

印尼的激进伊斯兰教派

同一些国家一样,印尼也存在激进伊斯兰教派.不过,近几十年来,由于当局的严厉镇压,激进伊斯兰教派活动范围已趋于缩小,有的组织已不复存在.因此,有关他们的情况不怎么为世人所知.     

The Taliban and Islam

This paper examines the aims, motives and methods of the Taliban, the present rulers of most of Afghanistan. In accordance with their fundamentalist views the Taliban have established an Islamic system which focuses on the implementation of Shariah. This paper argues that the Taliban apply directly the divine injunctions which they have drastically sharpened - that means without being sanctioned by act of law of men. The government which the Taliban have set up has so far reached only a low level of institutionalization; the real power emanates from their leader, Mullah Omar.     

The Taliban and Islam

This paper examines the aims, motives and methods of the Taliban, the present rulers of most of Afghanistan. In accordance with their fundamentalist views the Taliban have established an Islamic system which focuses on the implementation of Shariah. This paper argues that the Taliban apply directly the divine injunctions which they have drastically sharpened ‐ that means without being sanctioned by act of law of men. The government which the Taliban have set up has so far reached only a low level of institutionalization; the real power emanates from their leader, Mullah Omar.     

巴基斯坦的政治伊斯兰透析

巴基斯坦的政治伊斯兰有温和的民族主义与极端的原教旨主义两个层次。但这两者之间的界限常有不确定性和可变性，有时共生共荣，有时却各自为战。巴基斯坦伊斯兰原教旨主义组织在精神和物质上依赖于国外的伊斯兰原教旨主义中心，它在沟通阿拉伯地区与中亚内陆方面起着桥梁与纽带的作用。     

伊斯兰解放党探析

自20世纪90年代开始,随着苏联的解体和网络通讯技术的飞速发展,本已被多数阿拉伯人淡忘的极端组织--伊斯兰解放党出现死灰复燃的迹象.伊斯兰解放党成立于1953年,其理论宗旨一直停留于创始人纳卜哈尼倡导的伊斯兰原教旨主义思想水平上,建立一个没有疆界、不分种族、一统天下的哈里发帝国,是伊斯兰解放党的终极梦想.伊解恢复哈里发制度的战略分"三步走":即"宣传阶段"、"与乌玛互动阶段"、"接管政权阶段".伊斯兰解放党反对世俗化,认为西方国家是伊斯兰的死敌,对民主政治十分反感.