结盟对抗均不可取--忆八十年代中苏关系实现正常化的过程

20世纪70年代末,促使中苏关系解冻的气候已逐步形成.从1979年开始走出对抗到1989年实现关系正常化,经历了10年过渡阶段.中苏关系第一轮谈判于1979年10月在莫斯科举行,标志着对抗了20多年的两国关系发生转折.此后,沿着几条渠道向着改善的方向一步步取得进展:1982年重开国家关系谈判;1982～1985年的三次"葬礼外交";纽约外长会见;1987年恢复边界谈判;1985年戈尔巴乔夫上台后改善关系的步伐加快.中苏两国于1989年按邓小平设计的方案实现关系正常化.中苏(俄)建立的不结盟不对抗不针对别国的新型友好合作国家关系,已成为冷战后大国关系的典范.     

From ‘Rustless Screws’ to ‘Nail Houses’: The Evolution of Property Rights in China

This article addresses property rights in China under four headings. I begin by placing the Chinese case within the larger context of property rights literature. The second section reviews the existing scholarship on property rights in China and identifies existing lacunae. The third section provides the broad contours of the contemporary Chinese intellectual and political discourse over property rights in China. And finally, I offer several cases of property rights that illustrate the variation in the scope of the concept of property rights in China and suggest possible avenues for future research.

The right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive the people of this is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.- Arthur Lee, Virginia, 1775

You reproach us with planning to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels¹

The fact that a legal or economic model does not exist for an activity or a behavior is no reason to oppose it, because the laws can develop out of experience and practice.- Wu Guoping, Yangtze Water Resources Commission²

     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

NGOs: A ‘New Class’ in International Relations

Nongovernmental organizations have attempted to take control of civil society, displacing traditional governing institutions. This serves the interests of the terrorists, warlords, and mafia dons, who benefit from weak central government, and hinders the West's ability to mobilize allies to participate in the war on terror. NGO leaders who are hostile to the nation-state itself seek to transform a voluntary system of participation in international organizations by sovereign member-states via a “power shift” to an unholy alliance of multinational corporations and NGOs. Since they do not possess the traditional sources of legitimacy enjoyed by nation-states, they seek to impose their will by financial or forceful means—for example, “sanctions” or “humanitarian intervention.” A new class of NGOs has thus emerged that is essentially opposed to the diplomatic, legal, and military measures required for dealing with civilizational conflict.     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

China's Energy-Driven ‘Soft Power’

Energy security has prompted China to turn its strategic gaze to the seas for the first time in six centuries. For now, Taiwan remains Beijing's uppermost priority, but there are signs that Chinese leaders are already contemplating the “day after” matters in the Taiwan Strait to resolve them to their satisfaction. In the meantime, China is attempting to shape the diplomatic environment in vital regions such as Southeast and South Asia using “soft power.” By invoking the voyages of Zheng He, the Ming Dynasty's “eunuch admiral,” Beijing sends the message that it is a trustworthy guarantor of Asian maritime security. But the success of this soft-power strategy remains in doubt.     

China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics,Cold Politics’

According to integration theory, growing economic interdependence between China and Japan should have spilled over into more cordial political relations. The opposite occurred, as summarized in the phrase “hot economics, cold politics.” Even as both sides acknowledge the value of cooperation for shared benefit, commercial and strategic rivalries have intensified, calling into question the validity of integration theory.     

China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ Enters Turbulence

This article seeks to place recent developments in China in a larger context through three arguments. First, Chinese military policy has indeed made a major turning over the past decade; second, this turning is based on a fragile and unrealistic strategy that is already eliciting counterreactions that will make achievement of its apparent goals increasingly difficult. Finally, this strategy's failure will present China with unwelcome choices about how far to take her use of force. The “rise” of China is now encountering turbulence that may undo it.     

The End of History: ‘Neojuche Revivalism’ and Korean Unification

This article argues that prospects for change in North Korea and, thus, reduction in threats to regional security, lay more in rising prospects for Korean unification than in scant hopes for reform inside North Korea. It identifies several factors that have made unification a more salient idea than at any time in the last decade. First, Kim Jong Il's failing health and his youngest son's and designated heir's uncertain grip on succession mean greater risk of political instability in North Korea that could bring discontinuous change, including reunification. Second, it has become clear that the Six Party Talks and other diplomatic efforts will not produce denuclearization and reduction of the regional security threat posed by Pyongyang's weapons program. Third, the current and likely future leadership in Pyongyang is incapable of reform, making regime collapse a more likely scenario and unification a more likely route to meaningful change. Fourth, the North Korean regime has become heavily dependent on Chinese support, material and political-diplomatic. Finally, thinking about how unification might occur has shifted to scenarios that are more feasible to key parties, including South Korea, the United States and Japan.     

‘Ali Baba's Cave’: The Sea of Okhotsk's Contentious Triangle

Amidst international furor over its annexation of Crimea, Russia quietly acquired a far more lucrative territory through different means: in March, the United Nations recognized Russia's claim to the resource-rich “Peanut Hole” in the center of the Sea of Okhotsk. This strategically and economically important body of water—a “real Ali Baba's cave” of untapped oil and gas reserves—lies within a contentious triangle formed by eastern Russia and northern Japan. Securing the Okhotsk's legal status as an internal sea goes far to advancing Russian claims in the Arctic, and bolsters Russia's bargaining position over four disputed Kuril islands which Japan callsits “Northern Territories.”     

China on the Horizon: India's ‘Look East’ Policy Gathers Momentum

While the world has been focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Beijing and Delhi are also engaged in a quiet struggle in the contested waters. By putting up for international bidding the same oil block that India had obtained from Vietnam for exploration, China has thrown down a gauntlet.¹ By deciding to stay put in the assigned block, India has indicated it's ready to take up the Chinese challenge. At stake is Chinese opposition to India's claim to be a regional power in the larger Asian strategic setting. India is trying to emerge as a credible regional balancer but it has a long way to go.     

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Emerging ‘Shia Crescent’

To form a more prudent foreign policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, we must understand it not only as a domestic actor, but also as a major regional player. In fact, the Brotherhood has a complex relationship with Iran and the Shias, which blurs the lines of the so-called Shia Crescent. This article addresses the Muslim Brotherhood's foreign/regional policy by analyzing its attitude toward the Shias and Iran, thus placing it within the context of the emerging regional order. Addressing the complex relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shias/Iran will help to clarify the regional fallout were the Brotherhood to gain control of a major Sunni Arab state. This is a vital issue for policy makers who are considering the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Brotherhood.     

‘Phase IV’ Operations in the War on Terror: Comparing Iraq and Afghanistan

This article identifies the obstacles and prospects of implementing President Obama's surge strategy in Afghanistan by examining four issues: (1) the origins and implementation of the Iraq surge policy; (2) U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan; (3) a comparative examination of Afghan and Iraqi tribal insurgent structures; and (4) suggestions for a counter insurgency policy more in sync with regional social and tribal structures.     

Dangerous Revisionism: On the Founders, ‘Neocons’ and the Importance of History

Debates regarding the Bush Administration's grand strategy began long before the forty-third president left office. A group of distinguished historians and political scientists have argued over the course of the last few years that the Administration's grand strategy did not represent a major break with historical precedent, as is sometimes argued, but continued the evangelical support for liberty that has always made the United States a “dangerous nation” to tyrants. Along the way, this revisionism creates straw men, and co-opts or redefines terms that are central to the traditional understanding of U.S. foreign policy. It also seems to misunderstand grand strategy itself, focusing almost entirely on continuity of ends while ignoring the rather glaring discontinuities in the ways that generations of U.S. presidents have chosen to pursue them. Overall, the revisionist project fails in both of its tasks, which are: To make the case that the Bush administration took actions of which the Founding Fathers would have understood and approved; and by implication, to justify the unnecessary, tragic war in Iraq.     

U.S. Strategy in a Transitioning Middle East: Reviving ‘State Responsibility’

In light of the uncertainty surrounding the Middle East stemming from the Arab Awakening, and the inability of Washington to shape the process of transition, U.S. decision- makers must rethink their strategy for the region in general and for counterterrorism in particular. Reducing U.S. involvement in the region and letting the dust settle will serve American interests better and allow for building healthier relations with Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, since the risk of negative effects on neighboring states that accompany transition must be kept in check, the United States, together with other powers, should lead the international community in reviving the principle of “state responsibility” as a productive way to reduce spillover of conflicts and even provide incentives for actors in the region to limit violence.     

Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.