German–American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.     

With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo–American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945–1958

This article looks at the Anglo–American atomic intelligence relationship in the early post-war period. In 1946 the wartime sharing of technical atomic information was terminated; despite this barrier, atomic intelligence relations continued and given the common objective of discerning Soviet capabilities, flourished. The close relationship offered many mutual benefits to both sides. As such, the atomic intelligence relationship was to become a crucial instrument in achieving a resumption of relations in 1958, what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to as the “great prize.” This article details the composition of the Anglo–American special-relationship's special-relationship, describing joint operations and placing these within the normal nuclear partnership at this time.     

Wolfish Wilsonians: Existential Dilemmas of the Liberal Internationalists

There are limits on America's ability to bring democracy to deeply divided societies with little or no history of democracy, and many American liberal internationalists have succumbed to intellectual and moral paralysis about America's right and ability to spread its system in the rest of the world. The principles of law-governed freedom are in fact important and nearly eternal principles, but they are best spread by America's setting the example as a peaceful democracy. The messianic approach to democracy-promotion adopted by the Bush administration and its liberal allies, rooted in faith in the “American creed” and an emerging “global civil society,” can only damage both American power and the cause of democratizing the world. The American approach to democratization needs instead to be governed by rigor of the intellect and generosity of spirit.     

Hybrid Strategies: The American Experience

The United States has never followed only one grand strategy at a time. In this article, I develop the concept of “hybrid” grand strategies—strategies that vary by time and place, and combine the advantages (or disadvantages) of pure strategic archetypes such as containment, integration, regime change, bargaining, or non-intervention. I argue that hybrid strategies have been ubiquitous in American history, varying more by emphasis and degree than by absolute contrast. Moreover, U.S. hybrid strategies have often succeeded in accomplishing their major goals.     

“Now that the Milk is Spilt”: Appeasement and the Archive on Intelligence

This article assesses British intelligence and its effect on policy during the interwar years. It discusses the publically available documentation, which now includes almost all the material on the matter, though the data base has been permanently destroyed in significant ways. The paper traces the development of British intelligence between 1869–1939, involving the transition from a tradition to a system of intelligence, with the greatest change occurring during the Fist World War. The article assesses how, between 1914–39, intelligence was interrelated to bureaucratic politics, modes of decision making, and the formulation of strategic politics, modes of decision making, and the formulation of strategic policy. It discusses the structure and power of British intelligence agencies between 1919–39, their quality compared to rivals in other countries, and the impact on policy of their successes and failures. It concludes that intelligence, as an influence and a source of evidence, is essential to the study of diplomatic and strategic history, upon which its impact is complex and variable.     

Security and Solvency

The American defense establishment has come to think of itself as the victim of complex and demanding threats, political irresponsibility and public apathy. While true, such conditions are often the case in American history. “Don’t fight the problem” is a standard instruction in war games. The Department of Defense should adopt that approach with its budget and strategy: stop submitting budgets in excess of legislated limits and devise a strategy consistent with them. It should explore alternative ways to achieve policy objectives, develop a concrete means of assessing risk, and on that basis build greater support for its preferred strategy.     

A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945–1950

This article focuses on British intelligence in China, Japan, and Korea from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It seeks to ascertain whether the collection of secret intelligence and its subsequent interpretation provided an accurate picture of Soviet and local communist intentions in East Asia. Since the war against Japan began, the region was largely an American responsibility and remained so after 1945 when they occupied Japan, Korea below the 38^th parallel, and sent forces to China. Much of the intelligence effort for East Asia also devolved upon the Americans. Yet, the British retained an intelligence interest there not least because of their extensive commercial assets in China and the region's proximity to Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia. That interest gathered pace after growing Communist threats inside China and Korea. However, the available intelligence resources for the Far East as a whole were scarce, making it difficult to piece together a clear picture of fast moving events in East Asia.     

The lessons of Eastern Europe for modern intelligence reform

The proliferation of threats to security, which emerge in states going through major reform processes, demands a functional intelligence architecture. Accurate intelligence is essential in identifying risks to the wider reform process. Western intelligence agencies have viewed intelligence services in reforming states as tactical opportunities and sources of intelligence rather than as targets for reform in the context of a wider reform agenda. Sensitivities inherent in intelligence gathering in states with a recent history of repressive government make the relationship between the intelligence services and civil society crucial if the intelligence services are to be effective and to play a positive role in the transition process. The practice of countering terrorism has altered the nature of intelligence gathering in ways that make accountability and public legitimacy more central to the effectiveness of intelligence services than the ‘traditional’ threats did. Western models of intelligence oversight and accountability are inadequate in states without developed traditions of democratic governance and weaknesses in wider political culture means that these models are not effective in lending intelligence services popular legitimacy. Alternative models for structuring the relationship between the intelligence services, parliament, the executive and the public must therefore be identified.     

D. Rossini,Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy: Culture,Diplomacy, and War Propaganda

The period 1967–1968 was a difficult one for the Anglo–American relationship, as a result of developments such as British defense cuts “East of Suez.” In the run-up to a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1968, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau provided a lively and detailed evaluation of American bonds with Britain. The analysis maintained that the relationship was based on deeply established cooperation in defense, diplomacy and intelligence, and that despite recent problems Britain would remain of unparalleled importance as an American ally. The immediate impact of the memorandum in the White House of Lyndon B. Johnson was quite limited, but among other things the document helps to explain the ready blossoming of close high-level Anglo–American bonds during, for example, the Falklands War of 1982. The most important sections of the memorandum are reproduced, and a brief analysis is provided to put the issues in context.     

美国国家安全认知的新视阈：人工智能与国家安全

人工智能作为一种革命性技术,正在从根本上变革国际社会的发展进程及方式。面对这一发展趋势,美国已将人工智能提升到国家安全的高度。人工智能对美国国家安全的影响主要存在于三个方面:首先,人工智能是影响和塑造未来美国国家安全的核心变量。人工智能能够优化美国在国际政治格局中的力量配比,弥合并纠正美国社会内部的分裂和失序状况,并助推美国军事实力实现“跨越式”发展。其次,有效克服人工智能的负面效应是确保未来美国国家安全的关键。人工智能可能引发诸多社会和道德问题,其固有的缺陷也将增加战争决策的风险成本,还可能增加武装冲突的频率和强度。最后,美国强调中国人工智能的快速发展对未来美国国家安全构成严重“威胁”。中美在人工智能领域的竞争已无法避免,美国认为中国正在试图“挑战”美国在高新技术领域的领导地位;为应对美国在人工智能领域对华遏制政策,中国应制定和形成人工智能研发以及应用规则和规范;通过制度化协调与合作来规制中美关系,努力避免“科技冷战”的发生。     

Defeating the Sixth Column: Intelligence and Strategy in the War on Islamist Terrorism

For the first time since the late 1940s, Washington is attempting a comprehensive analysis of the role and performance of the American intelligence system. In rethinking intelligence, it needs to address that the sixth column—Islamist terrorists residing in states that knowingly or unknowingly give them sanctuary—is the weak underbelly in the war on terror. To defeat this sixth column, important personnel, doctrinal, and cultural issues need to be addressed. The experience of other countries that have had success in fighting terrorism suggests that the United States must focus on offensive counterintelligence, penetrating terrorist groups, and creating mistrust among them.     

The Invincible Wilsonian Matrix: Universal Human Rights Once Again

A conservative or realist approach has little appeal in the present debate over American foreign policy. In the twentieth century, according to George F. Kennan, the United States succumbed to “the evils of utopian enthusiasms.” In recent years, this worldview has been associated most closely with the neoconservatives, but even the Clinton administration leaned in the same direction. Crusading moralism has been the recurrent theme of America's self-image as a global power. Whether or not neoconservatives and liberals today are really dedicated to the same democratic political culture as the one that Wilson idealized, a recognizable Wilsonian manner of conceptualizing international relations has come to dominate American politics, reflected in a shared rejection of any foreign policy that is not based on the temporal salvation of humanity. Yet many Wilsonians seem unable to imagine that one can be “moral” without trying to make everyone resemble one's self.     

20世纪70年代美国在鄂霍次克海的谍报活动探析

美国海军和美国国家安全局(NSA)等部门于20世纪70年代联合发起了在鄂霍次克海海域窃听苏联海底通讯电缆的谍报活动,它曾被认为是美国现代史上最成功的情报搜集活动之一,此即"常春藤之铃"行动。其起根发由、运策决机及东窗事发都有着比较深刻的历史背景。冷战后美国针对有关国家的类似谍报活动远未停止。     

Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the Central Intelligence Agency

Intelligence accountability ("oversight") encompasses the supervision of a vast range of secret activities and 15 major agencies. Oversight since 1975 has been robust compared to earlier years; yet it continues to fall short of goals espoused by the Church Committee that year, as well as by subsequent panels advocating intelligence reform. Lawmakers have responded responsibly to intelligence surprises ("fire alarms"), carrying out probes into domestic spying, assassination plots, and other questionable covert actions, counterintelligence vulnerabilities, and major intelligence failures. They have paid less attention, though, to the day-to-day "police-patrolling" that might uncover weaknesses and eliminate the need for emergency firefighting. Individual members in both branches of Congress have displayed a significant commitment to oversight activities, and now and then the full oversight committees have worked energetically as a unit. Mostly, however, intelligence accountability since 1975 has been a story of discontinuous motivation, ad hoc responses to scandals, and reliance on the initiative of just a few members of Congress—mainly the occasional dedicated committee chair—to carry the burden. Despite the recommendations of several scholarly studies and government reports, absent still is a comprehensive approach to intelligence review that mobilizes most, if not all, of the members of the House and Senate standing committees on intelligence toward a systematic plan of police-patrolling, without waiting for fire alarms.     

南亚地区形势的特点及其走向

在过去一年中,南亚地区各国政府虽然维持了政治上的基本稳定,但经历的挑战巨大;地区整体经济形势增长受挫;总体安全形势十分严峻。未来南亚局势将更趋复杂,主要表现为:印度的战略地位将继续走强;巴基斯坦的长期稳定问题值得担忧;美国撤军将使阿富汗面临安全真空。由于南亚具有特殊的地缘政治地位,大国在地区的角逐和争夺始终不会停止,地区局势的演变对中国的影响尤为重要,中国在对印关系、对巴关系和对阿富汗问题应有切实可行的应对思考。     

Diplomacy and intelligence

'Intelligence' as a discrete institution is part of twentieth-century government. It combines the skills of covert collection with expertise on certain subjects. Its differentiation from legitimate diplomacy is on the whole clear: intelligence provides information by special methods, diplomacy uses it. Nevertheless, there are numerous operational overlaps. Intelligence's overseas liaisons interact with diplomacy and foreign policy. Embassies act as intelligence bases and are targets for local intelligence attacks. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office plays a leading part in intelligence assessment. Some distancing between diplomacy and covert intelligence is desirable, but Western intelligence is less of a rival to diplomacy than has sometimes been portrayed. In Britain, in particular, intelligence's knowledge has not meant power.     

United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense

Liberal theory asserts that the need for cost-effective, technologically advanced weapons requires the United States to acquiesce to increasing defense globalization even as this restrains U.S. power. Realist logic dictates that the United States should resist defense liberalization to retain its self-sufficiency. This is a false choice; the United States encourages defense globalization in order to extend its international political influence. This paper proposes an alternate theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance. Modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies, and the value chain for the production of these monopolistic goods is dominated by the systems integration techniques of prime contracting firms. In turn these prime contractors remain largely enthralled by U.S. market power. The United States gains international influence by controlling the distribution of these weapons. Put simply, technology with international political effects is likely to have international political origins.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

CIA plot,socialist conspiracy,or new world order? the origins of the Bilderberg group, 1952–55

Ever since its first meeting in 1954, the Bilderberg Group, a secretive annual conclave of Atlantic elites, has attracted conspiracy theories. Some observers have perceived it as a CIA plot to take the teeth out of the European left, others as a socialist conspiracy to undermine American capitalism. Recently it has been accused of being the seat of a hidden global government, the ‘New World Order’. The article draws on newly available archival sources to reconstruct the early history of the Group and test these conspiracy theories, concluding that Bilderberg was neither an entirely American nor European invention, but rather the product of a complex process of Atlanticist interaction.