Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory

Abstract

Focusing on the Euro-Atlantic conflict over the Iraq war operation in early 2003 (the ‘European Iraq conflict’), the purpose of the present article is to explain the pattern of Atlantic (vs. Continental) predispositions among European countries. It argues that this is the best suited conflict in the post-Cold War era to illuminate this stable and fundamental pattern. Whereas systemic power distribution, size, public opinion, or government ideology all fail to account for the positioning of states in the conflict (and balance of threat applies only modestly), a theory of ‘past and present geopolitics’ is outlined that seems able to explain states’ predispositions and, hence, their positionings in this specific situation. It is remarkable that ‘old-fashioned’ geopolitical dynamics can be identified even within the Euro-Atlantic zone of ‘peace and prosperity’—not only at its fringes, but also in its very heart.     

What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?

This article assesses the validity of the concept of ‘religious terrorism’ and its consequences for research and policy practices. It explores the origins, assumptions and primary arguments of the term and subjects them to an analytical assessment. It argues that the distinctions typically drawn between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as ‘religious terrorist’. In particular, it shows that the behaviour of those thus labelled is so diverse, and often so indistinguishable from their ‘secular’ counterparts, that the term has little meaning without further qualification, while simultaneously obscuring important aspects of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ violence. It then goes on to illustrate how the term, rooted in a particular historically situated understanding of religion and a particular set of power structures, serves as a disciplinary device to domesticate ‘political religion’, delegitimising certain actors while legitimising a number of highly contentious counterterrorist practices designed to deal with those described as ‘religious terrorists’. The article ends with some suggestions for alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence.     

The problems of ‘nation‐building’: imposing bureaucratic ‘rule from above’

With the problems of stabilising Iraq continuing under the ‘fully sovereign’ Iraqi interim government, which formally replaced the United‐States‐led transitional administrative authority on 28 June 2004, many critics have argued that the United Nations (UN) should play a much larger role in the transition process. This article suggests that while imposing an alternative set of external administrative ‘advisers’ might be popular with European powers, it is unlikely that greater UN involvement would make much difference to the people of Iraq. Using the example of the international protectorate of Bosnia, which is also a ‘fully sovereign’ state, where the UN plays a fully engaged role, it is clear that external enforcement can provide little legitimacy for Iraqi institutions. This article challenges the idea that the ‘rule of law’ can be imposed from outside by focusing on two areas of legal activism in Bosnia: constitutional change and property return. It suggests that the ‘rule of law’ approach sees legal or administrative solutions as a short cut to addressing political problems, fetishising the legal framework at the same time as marginalising the political sphere. Rather than more coercive external involvement in the form of pressures for more legislation and better law enforcement, the experience of Bosnia highlights the need for greater levels of political legitimacy, a need that runs counter to the logic of the ‘rule of law’ approach.     

‘Non-lethal’ weapons and the occupation of Iraq: technology,ethics and law

The occupation of Iraq is a challenging task for the United States (US) military, which is considering resort to options other than lethal force as a possible just response. From the outset, the notion that a weapon can be deemed ‘non-lethal’ is problematic. Some weapons intended to leave their target alive often have lethal consequences and other weapons intended to have lethal effects often do not kill their target. This article explores ethical and legal challenges that arise from the potential use by US forces in Iraq of two classes of so-called ‘non-lethal’ weapons: incapacitating chemical agents and dazzling laser devices. Such challenges are highly relevant to questions about the role of Just War theory in the context of modern warfare. In particular, they beg the question whether the use of non-lethal weapons supports or subverts the jus in bello requirement that war be waged in a discriminate and proportionate fashion.     

Contrary Siblings: Syria,Jordan and the Iraq War

Jordan and Syria, severed parts of the same country, were in many ways ‘siblings’: their systemic situation, as economically weak small states surrounded by more powerful enemies, was similarly vulnerable; their leaders at the time of the Iraq War were of a similar ‘modernising’ generation; the identities of their populations were similarly Arab-Islamic. Yet, they followed diametrically opposite policies toward the invasion of Iraq: Jordan bandwagoning with the United States and Syria defying it. This contrary behaviour is explained by their differential experiences of state formation and the differing social forces incorporated and identities institutionalised in Ba'thist Syria and Hashemite Jordan.     

In the eye of the storm: Ambassador James Richards' mission to Iraq in April 1957

This article discusses the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special emissary to the Middle East, to Iraq in April 1957 following the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. An analysis of the Richards Mission encompasses a range of specific issues, including the relationship in Iraq between the US and UK and American assessments of the stability of the Iraqi government. Moreover, this article examines the American strategy for navigating the rising tide of Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq after the Suez War. This article explores the ways in which US policy-makers privileged the notions of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in Iraqi political affairs and reflects on the critical dilemmas and contradictions underlying American policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the 1956 Suez War.     

Beating the water: The terrorist search for power,control and authority

Starting from Mao's well‐known metaphor of ‘water and fish’, this article examines the nature of power as it applies to terrorist groups. Terrorists are under constant pressure actively to increase their influence and control over their constituent communities. Our understandings of how terrorist groups can do this has generally suffered from being too limited and overly simplistic. Focusing on Northern Ireland, this article explores how terrorist groups can first identify and then access various sources of power which can be used to strengthen the group's position and authority. The article argues that there are identifiable strategies which can be exploited by current and future terrorists in virtually any setting. It is in the interest of those combating terrorism to study these principles closely if they wish to limit the power and durability of terrorist opponents.     

A tale of two wars: great expectations,hard times

This article compares two very different wars—the civil war in Sierra Leone and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq—and finds some significant similarities. It notes that both wars can be seen as systems which promise (and deliver) benefits for relatively privileged actors and promise (but do not deliver) benefits for ordinary combatants. The article also examines the extent to which the recruitment of Sierra Leoneans and the recruitment of Americans were made possible by the existence of ‘failing states’.     

Comparing Theories of Democratic Support: Lessons from Post-Communist Europe

This article sets out to evaluate the dominant approaches that are used to explain democratic support with a particular interest in what can be learned from the case of post-communist Europe. The main argument is that the case of post-communist Europe illustrates the weakness of the dominant sociological and instrumental approaches. In post-communist Europe democratic support does not depend on a familiarity with democratic institutions and norms, a belief in the democratic form of government, the avoidance of economic deprivation or satisfaction with government performance. Instead it is suggested that an alternative, more nuanced understanding of the dominant instrumental approaches is suited to the case of post-communist Europe.     

The Role of Intra-Religious Conflicts in Intrastate Wars

Many civil wars are fought between members of different religious communities. It seems plausible to focus on these communities’ interrelations to identify the causal factors responsible for the escalating effects that religion can have in such conflicts. A closer look, however, reveals that processes within religious communities can be crucial in influencing the role religions play in intrastate wars. Within single communities, factions of religious elites compete for material and dogmatic supremacy. Such intra-religious conflicts can motivate religious elites to search for support from political allies to prevail over their religious rivals. In return, they legitimize their political patrons’ claims for political power and their violent campaigns against members of other religious communities. Thus, intra-religious conflicts can effectively contribute to the religious escalation of intrastate wars between different religious communities. This argument is exemplified with reference to conflicts in Thailand, The Philippines, and Iraq.     

German policy in a strategic triangle: Berlin,Paris, Washington … and what about London?

The article presents the German view on the current stand and future perspectives of the transatlantic relationship. It points to the caesuras that have defined the US–German relationship since the end of the Cold War. It also details the German role in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and highlights the German discussion on its involvement in those wars. The historical strategic triangle of the US, Germany and France might develop into a Euro‐American ellipse to confront current global challenges, but, as of today, many hurdles remain, particularly the lack of a common vision and policy regarding the future political order of Europe. The article finally calls on the German government to continue its policy as a ‘civilian power’ and to repair its relations with the US after the Iraq war. International cooperation in multilateral institutions remains the main pillar of German foreign policy.     

Civilizing interventions? Race,war and international law

Over the past decade there has been an explosion in literature on imperialism and international law. This scholarship has focused on the use of force, especially humanitarian intervention and the war on terror. These accounts foreground the issue of race, arguing that these legal arguments reproduce the dynamic of the civilising mission. This article argues that such analyses miss some key elements. Contemporary interventions must be counterposed to the First Iraq War, which was enabled through the uncontroversial authorization of the Security Council. Humanitarian intervention and the war on terror emerged in reaction to the fear that other states would veto Security Council resolutions. Consequently, the ‘racial’ discourse around intervention cannot simply be read as ‘othering’ the peripheries, but was also a response to inter-imperialist rivalry. The article then advances a conception of the arguments as an attempt to articulate hegemonic coalitions against emerging rivalries, and reads racialization in this light.     

Morality and the national interest: towards a ‘moral realist’ research agenda

This article engages with recent scholarship on role of morality in classical realist conceptions of the national interest. It argues that for analytical purposes morality can be linked to notions of power, rather than being explicitly or solely normative. This stems from a re-examination of conversations between classical realists about absoluteness, where morality is treated as a categorical imperative; and about consequences, or the understanding that policy can have both moral and material outcomes. I then conduct a focused analysis of three common strands in the work of Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan that facilitate the development of what might be termed a ‘moral realist’ framework. In doing so, I address the expectations, modes and results of foreign policy choices. This incorporates expectations of reciprocity in state relations, the importance of rational choice and the outcomes of ‘moral’ foreign policy choices. I conclude that moral realism shows some promise as an evaluative tool, and is worthy of further development.     

Something old,something new: security governance in Iraq

The lack of a coherent security paradigm capable of explaining the concerns of both traditional and ‘new’ security is evident from the US-led occupation of Iraq. Security is the critical element in Iraq's reconstruction, and understanding the multiple meanings and relationships through which it is exercised is essential for empirical and analytical reasons, yet policy is flawed and the debate remains polarized. Thus Washington assumes that conventional security can be provided—and US power employed—independently of the relationship in which it is to be exercised, whereas Iraqi concerns focus on security at the level of the individual. The result can be seen in the paradigmatic examples of coalition operations in Basra in 2003 and Falluja in 2004. This article suggests that the interaction between coalition authorities and Iraqis, and, by extension, conventional and new forms of security, is best understood in terms of power relations; a comprehensive understanding of security must incorporate a relational dimension.     

Concepts of dialogue as counterterrorism: narrating the self-reform of the Muslim Other

Since 9/11, the terrorist is often awarded the position of the radical Other: the personified existential threat to the West. The counterterrorism strategy presented by the Danish government describes itself as covering a ‘broad spectrum’ of efforts. It includes an ‘active foreign policy’ in relation to the Muslim world and an ‘active integration policy’ in relation to Muslim migrants. Both inside and outside the nation-state, efforts range from ‘hard power’ security strategies of elimination and control involving military, police and intelligence operations, to ‘soft power’ strategies of information, partnerships and dialogue. This article analyses Danish counterterrorism policy narratives to identify the concepts of dialogue implied and the positions awarded to less-than-radical Muslim Others. This article finds that Muslims might – especially after the Danish Muhammad cartoon affair – in counterterrorism dialogue find a position for talking back, even if it is still a position circumscribed by control and securitisation.     

Punitive Justifications or Just Punishment? An Ethical Reading of Coercive Diplomacy

Can the use of military force in response to violations of human rights norms be meaningfully described as ‘punishment’? If so, does this form of punishment help to constitute a just and peaceful international order? This paper investigates these two questions by examining the use of strategic bombing in campaigns of coercive diplomacy as a means to punish states. The paper explores the concept of punishment and its relevance for international affairs as a theoretical basis. It then turns to two cases of punitive uses of force—US and UK strikes against Iraq in 1998 and NATO strikes against Serbia in 1999. These two military campaigns are assessed as punitive but not necessarily just in that they fail to fit within a clear, legal institutional order and confuse the agent that deserves punishment. The paper concludes by suggesting that while punishment may be necessary for a legitimate international order, current punitive actions do not support such an order.     

The three worlds of post-communism: revisiting deep and proximate explanations

Since the upheavals of 1989–1991, the post-communist countries have embarked upon three distinct political trajectories: a path leading to democracy in the Western part of the setting, a path leading to autocracy in the Eastern part of the setting, and an intermediate path – both in geographical and political terms – leading to ‘defective’ democracy. This article seeks to explain the emergence of these three worlds of post-communism. Using typological theory as the principal methodological tool, we revisit Herbert Kitschelt's distinction between deep (structural) and proximate (actor-centred) explanations. The empirical results show that the post-communist setting is characterized by striking regularities in the form of clustering in the explanandum as well as the explanans. The orderings of referents on both the deep and the proximate attributes show a remarkable co-variation with the political pathways of post-communism – and with each other. The presence of such systematic empirical regularities lends support to two conclusions. First, both kinds of explanations elucidate the present variation in post-communist political regime types. Second, the variation on the deep factors largely explains the variation on the proximate factors. Kitschelt's general plea to dig deeper is thus supported, and the explanatory quest turns into a challenge of theoretical integration.     

Evaluating Democratic Progress Inside Russia: The Komi Republic and the Republic of Bashkortostan

This article compares and contrasts the political transitions in the two Russian Republics of Komi and Bashkortostan. It is argued that these republics are among many in Russia's weak federation whose behaviour is akin to nation-states. Two critical junctures occurring in the early 1990s profoundly affected the transition paths. Democratic transitions of the political regime had been completed in both republics by early 1995. Since then both have completed regime consolidation but not resulting in democracy. Political elites have cloaked their true intentions by seeming to want to participate in the 'spirit of the times', namely democratization in post-communist Europe, while in fact promoting undemocratic practices and only superficial accountability. The arrival of President Putin at the centre may prove to be a third critical juncture that jolts the regimes in the two republics into a period of uncertainty and a new transition.     

Civil society,democratization and development (I): Clearing the analytical ground

This is the first section of a two‐part article investigating the relationship between civil society and the recent wave of democratization in developing countries. It highlights the ambiguity of the term ‘civil society’ and proposes a definition which may prove serviceable in discovering the political role played by civil society in facilitating or impeding democratization. In addition to the conventional distinction between civil society and the state, the article makes further distinctions between ‘civil society’, ‘political society’ and ‘society’. It specifies several commonly held expectations about the potential political influence exerted by civil society on the character of political regimes and the behaviour of the state, and generates certain historically rooted hypotheses about these relationships. These concepts and hypotheses are intended as an analytical framework to be applied to specific country case‐studies in the second part of the article to follow in a later issue of this Journal.     

The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States

The Iraq War exposes the new shape of world politics. It discredits the idea of a benign hegemon defending world order, content to be an ‘offshore balancer’, exercising its power through multinational institutions and constrained by mutually agreed rules. Rather, the hegemon, facing few external constraints in a unipolar world, is driven by the particularistic interests of its ruling group, in the pursuit of informal empire wherein military force is used to impose client regimes and economic subordination. The impotence of both a realist power balance and of liberal institutions to restrain it calls into question the main bases of global order, leaving imperial overreach as the main limitation on hegemonic power. Small states may be able to adapt to, even temporarily profit from, bandwagoning with the hegemon, but it is they that are potentially most threatened when a hegemonic power undermines the international constraints on the use of power.