Foreign Policy Making Under Koizumi: Norms and Japan's Role in the 2003 Iraq War

Japan's policy toward the 2003 Iraq War is a test of the constructivist argument about the weight of norms as opposed to material systemic factors in foreign policy making. Constructions of external threats and interests were contested between a largely realist-minded elite around prime minister Koizumi bent on Japan's remilitarization and those still holding to antimilitarist norms. This contest is traced in an analysis of the policy-making process, including the role of bureaucratic and political institutions, the opposition parties and the public. Indicative of the power of norms, Koizumi was forced to compromise his ambition to use the Iraq crisis to help make Japan a "normal" great power.     

Capitalism,Democracy and the War in Iraq

Although Saddam Hussein was a bloody tyrant, and although deposing him served a noble purpose, one still may doubt the wisdom of the American war against Iraq. It is quite dubious whether the democratisation of Iraq can serve as a justification of the American war effort. Properly understood, the democratic peace proposition does not promise that poor, emerging, and illiberal democracies surrounded by autocracies are more peaceful than autocracies. By itself, the transition towards democracy is quite likely to imply some semi-democratic phase when the country is at risk of civil war. Moreover, the democratic peace proposition says nothing at all about the likelihood of success of democratisation in a poor, oil-rich, Arab and Muslim country where there is little common ground to unite the democracy-imposing occupier and the defeated country. Finally, defeating the insurgency in the Sunni triangle of Iraq might require means which a democracy cannot even wish to apply. Whereas the promotion of democracy by war looks like a dead end and is doomed to failure, the prospects of promoting peace by exporting capitalism, growth, and prosperity look much better. Such a strategy even serves the purpose of later democratisation of those countries that now accept only creeping capitalism.     

Contrary Siblings: Syria,Jordan and the Iraq War

Jordan and Syria, severed parts of the same country, were in many ways ‘siblings’: their systemic situation, as economically weak small states surrounded by more powerful enemies, was similarly vulnerable; their leaders at the time of the Iraq War were of a similar ‘modernising’ generation; the identities of their populations were similarly Arab-Islamic. Yet, they followed diametrically opposite policies toward the invasion of Iraq: Jordan bandwagoning with the United States and Syria defying it. This contrary behaviour is explained by their differential experiences of state formation and the differing social forces incorporated and identities institutionalised in Ba'thist Syria and Hashemite Jordan.     

Power and Rhetorical Bargaining: The UN Security Council Debate on the Iraq War

The UN Security Council (UNSC) was an important arena of confrontation between the major powers during the recent pre-war crisis on Iraq, yet the realist-materialist focus of IR theory does not provide a useful perspective for analysing the debate and the ensuing defeat of American interests. This paper seeks to establish the meaning of “power” within a rhetorical context, applying insights from Searle's theory of institutional facts, constructivism, and self-presentation theory. Rhetorical strategies are then examined empirically by means of thematic and structural analyses of key texts from the UNSC debate on Iraq.     

The Rotten Carrot: US-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003 and the Pitfalls of Social Embeddedness

Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.     

Re-negotiating the Just War: The Invasion of Iraq and Punitive War

This article examines the arguments pertaining to punitive war presented by President George W Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair and various just war theorists, in order to examine how they relate, first, to the case made for war against Iraq in 2003 and, second, to the classical just war tradition. In highlighting the confluence between contemporary justificatory rhetoric and the classical just war tradition, this article sketches an account of the mode by which the tradition has developed over time. By drawing attention to the homologies linking just war arguments, classical and contemporary, it constructs a basis for a critical perspective: understanding the idea of punishment as it has figured historically in just war tradition past may enable us to gain a degree of critical purchase on how it figures in just war tradition present.     

中国石油安全面临的挑战与对策--兼谈伊拉克战争的影响

中国的石油安全问题是一项系统工程 ,它涉及一系列政治、外交、经济、军事和战略问题。伊拉克战争不仅是对中国石油安全的一次初步考验 ,它的长期影响也将会日益显现。随着对其他国家和地区石油依赖的不断加深 ,中国的石油安全风险系数日益增大。保障可靠和安全的国外石油供应 ,日益成为中国对外战略必须密切关注的问题。做好应对国际石油供应中断和油价上涨的物质与心理准备、制定和建立应急石油储备、走国际能源安全合作之路等 ,应该被视为中国主要的石油安全战略手段和保障措施     

Anatomy of Failure: Bush's Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War

The Bush administration's decision-making process leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been singled out for its many shortcomings: failure of intelligence; lack of debate concerning options; an insufficient invading force; and poor postwar planning. Contrary to the administration's claim that no one foresaw the difficulties of waging a war in Iraq, many concerns about the challenges the United States would face were raised inside and outside of government. Yet, none of this information had a significant effect on the decision-making process. This paper develops a decision-making model that integrates elements from the individual to the organizational level and explains how important information was marginalized, leading to a poor policy outcome. The model illustrates how the combined effects of the president's formal management style, anticipatory compliance on the part of key players, bureaucratic politics, and the intervening variable of the 9/11 terrorist attacks contributed to a defective decision-making process.     

Flipping the Switch: Combat,State Building,and Junior Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Contemporary us counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan requires junior leaders to engage in both combat and state-building activities. This study aims to explain the fundamental challenge in merging these. I argue that difficulty lies in separating insurgents from civilians, and translating doctrine from senior to junior officers. Junior officers consistently develop a similar ad hoc decision-making tool— role-switching—to simplify complex situations to a binary of “hostile or not.” They understand themselves to fill only two roles, the violent “on” role and the non-violent “off” role and develop several tools to minimize the difficulty of role-switching, help their subordinates switch, and signal switching to local populations. Ultimately, however, problems with role-switching—role stickiness, inappropriate switching, and role bias—can in some cases encourage indiscriminate and excessive violence, pointing to the fundamental failures of using military forces as a one-size-fits-all solution to state-building projects abroad.     

Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony,Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq

As the costs of the invasion and occupation of Iraq mount, scholars have sought to explain how the United States came to launch this war in the first place. Many have focused on the “inflation” of the Iraq threat, and indeed the Bush administration did frame the national dialogue on Iraq. We maintain, however, that the failure of most leading Democrats to challenge the administration's case for war in 2002–2003 cannot be explained fully by the bully pulpit, Democrats' reputation for dovishness, or administration misrepresentations. Rather, we argue that leading Democrats were relatively silent in the run-up to war because they had been “rhetorically coerced”, unable to advance a politically sustainable set of arguments with which to oppose the war. The effective fixing of the meaning of the September 11 attacks in terms of the “War on Terror” substantially circumscribed political debate, and we explain why this discourse became dominant. The Bush administration then capitalized on the existing portrait of Saddam Hussein to bind Iraq tightly into the War on Terror and thereby silence leading Democrats and legitimate the war. The story of the road to war in Iraq is not only one of neoconservative hubris and manipulated intelligence. It is also the story of how political actors strove effectively after 9/11 to shape the nation's discourse of foreign affairs and of how the resulting dominant narratives structured foreign policy debate. Behind the seemingly natural War on Terror lurk political processes of meaning-making that narrowed the space for contestation over Iraq.     

Strategy,Security, and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the 21st Century

Over the course of events taking place in and around the Persian Gulf over the last three years, the United States has used force to replace a despotic dictator who once served Western interests, placed considerable distance between itself and its erstwhile regional partner Saudi Arabia, and reduced its role as arbiter in the Arab–Israeli dispute. Operation Iraqi Freedom would seem to reveal that the United States has chosen a broader vision for the role that force could play as part of a more aggressive security strategy. The Gulf littoral's forward-deployed footprint, set into place during the first Gulf War, enabled effects-based capabilities to be tested in Iraq that have come online since the 1990s, enabling the US military to begin to operationalise what was initially dubbed the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and now is called ‘Transformation’. As such, the Gulf infrastructure provides the US with a model to emulate around the world as it seeks to realign its forces to better address new threats in the global theatre. The Gulf facilities will become central hubs in the network of bases stretching throughout Central and South Asia and the Horn of Africa which will perform missions associated with the global war on terror. Operation Iraqi Freedom represents only the beginning of this phenomenon in an emerging new global defense strategy that may see forward-deployed forces around the world used with increased frequency to manage an uncertain security environment.     

权力、软权力与国家形象

本文综合考察了国际政治中的权力问题。文章指出,现实主义权力观因过度强调权力的“强制性”和“物质性”一面、忽视非物质性及非强制性一面而具有内在的缺陷。军事、经济力量并非权力的全部,文化、价值观上的吸引力、设定国际议程的能力等“软权力”也是权力的重要维度。如果一国的对外政策过度倚重“硬权力”而忽视了“软权力”的运用,那么在很多时候,它有可能在国际舆论中陷入被动地位,危害本国的国家形象,最终危及本国的对外政策目标。     

The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War

Why did the Bush administration take the United States to war with Iraq in the aftermath of September 11, 2001? The constructivist approach used in this article to answer this question argues that the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals affected political outcomes in remarkably consequential ways. These ideas shaped administration assessments of every major aspect of the Iraq war, beginning with its necessity and justification. Although the administration's ideational commitments were complex and evolving, four sets of ideas were central to its risk-filled gambit in the Middle East: a belief in the necessity and benevolence of American hegemony, a Manichaean conception of politics, a conviction that regime type is the principal determinant of foreign policy, and great confidence in the efficacy of military force. Taken together, these ideas defined the social purpose of American power, framed threats to the United States, and determined appropriate solutions to core problems. Ideas are not the sole factors setting the course of u.s. foreign policy, but they are essential to explaining an otherwise puzzling administration decision.     

二战后中日结盟观比较研究——以中苏同盟、日美同盟为例

战后中日结盟观存在差异。从结盟功能来看,中国谋求的是生存与安全;日本谋求的是从生存、安全到对外权力的增加、对国际秩序的影响。从结盟对象来看,中国的结盟对象包括强国和相对弱势的国家;日本的结盟对象集中在强国。从同盟地位与同盟管理来看,中国强调地位及管理的平等,而日本对这方面的不平等往往持容忍的态度。从结盟基础来看,中国从以面临共同威胁而产生的共同安全利益以及意识形态划界,到淡化、放弃意识形态划界。日本则从以面临共同威胁而产生的共同安全利益以及意识形态划界,到淡化意识形态,再到一度逐渐强化意识形态划界。从结盟影响来看,中国经历了结盟利于和平到不利于和平的观念转变,日本则以结盟利于和平的观念为主。     

Analysis: The effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey

This article examines the potential repercussions of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. An introduction to the Kurdish problem and its securitisation in Turkey precedes an analysis of the Gulf War's impact on Turkey's policies towards the Kurds—in both Turkey and Iraq. The article briefly documents the struggle between the EU's pressures on Turkey after 1999 to improve Kurdish rights and the state's reluctance to implement reforms. Impacting reforms is the heightened sense of insecurity in Turkey after the Iraq War and the perceived threat of greater autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In response, Turkey has identified the Turkmen minority as a key strategic concern. None the less, increasingly the ruling Justice and Development Party's attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish groups indicates the evolution of a more pragmatic approach. In conclusion, two possible options emerge: the continued desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey or its re-securitisation.     

Influence Without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control Diplomacy During the Cold War

This article examines the evolution of middle power diplomacy on arms control during the Cold War. It argues that despite several attempts to influence major arms control negotiations, the structural constraints imposed by strict bipolarity—particularly during the early stages of the Cold War—limited the room for diplomatic manoeuvre by the small and medium-sized states. Factors such as the geographical voting groups within the United Nations system and the self-imposed discipline within traditional alliance structures typically restricted middle power initiatives on the important questions of international security such as arms control. Nonetheless, a number of efforts were made by leading middle powers such as Australia and Canada to progress the cause of arms control and significant policy ideas were at least canvassed during this time. The historical evidence shows that the middle powers were not innocent bystanders in the Cold War arms control debates, but whatever influence they had was ultimately subordinate to the overwhelming structural power of Washington and Moscow.     

Space-Time Granger Analysis of the War in Iraq: A Study of Coalition and Insurgent Action-Reaction

We investigate insurgent-coalition interaction using the WikiLeaks dataset of Iraq war logs 2004–2009. After a review of existing theoretical interventions on the dynamics of insurgency and presenting a baseline model of violent events, we test a conceptual model of reciprocity using an innovative space-time Granger causality technique. Our estimation procedure retains predicted probabilities of reaction in response to a previous opponent's action across different temporal and spatial configurations in Iraq and in Baghdad. Our conclusions about conflict in Iraq are based on these profiles of risk—what we call space-time signatures. We find strong evidence of “tit-for-tat” associations between coalition/Iraq forces on one side and insurgents/militants on the other. Specifically, we find that the action-reaction association varies strongly by majority ethnic region across Iraq and in Baghdad, by urban and nonurban location, and within Sunni-dominated areas, by district income. While violence is strongly temporally dependent in the same location, the effect of distance varies significantly across the different subsets of the Iraq data.     

When Democracies Go to War: Public Debate and the French Decision on War in 1999 and 2003

On what grounds do democratic states wage war? Public opinion is often considered as being of crucial importance in the decision to go to war. This article analyses two debates over war in France. It finds that democracies debate war within a limited range of arguments from which classical reasons for war such as the geostrategic one are absent. However, within the limited range of arguments, public support for decisions to go to war seems to depend significantly on the convergence of all public opinion actors over the interpretation of the crisis situation. The high politics nature of crisis situations gives the political leadership strong leverage in the shaping of thick discourses. The control function of public opinion is then diminished and a de facto prerogative of the government established even though justifications remain restricted to a limited number of arguments. Thick discourses of justification seem to be framed predominantly by arguments of just war.     

‘Phase IV’ Operations in the War on Terror: Comparing Iraq and Afghanistan

This article identifies the obstacles and prospects of implementing President Obama's surge strategy in Afghanistan by examining four issues: (1) the origins and implementation of the Iraq surge policy; (2) U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan; (3) a comparative examination of Afghan and Iraqi tribal insurgent structures; and (4) suggestions for a counter insurgency policy more in sync with regional social and tribal structures.     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.